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AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 


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BY Wises 
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JAMES H. RYAN 


OF THE FACULTY OF PHILOSOPHY IN THE CATHOLIC 
UNIVERSITY OF AMBRICA 


Nem York 
THE MACMILLAN COMPANY 
1924 


AU rights reserved 


Copyricnt, 1924, 
By THE MACMILLAN COMPANY. 


Set up and electrotyped. Published, December, 1924. 


Printed in the United States of America. 


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*kPATRICK CARDINAL HAYES, 
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AUGUST 8, 1924. 






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PREFACE 


The present work was written for college students as a 
means of introducing them to the study of philosophy. 
Being an introductory study, it makes no pretensions to an 
exhaustive treatment of any of the subjects discussed. The 
majority of college students, because of time limitations, 
are able to pursue the study of philosophy for only a 
semester or two. It is, therefore, most important in an 
Introduction not to stress philosophical questions which, 
because of their abstractness or secondary importance, will 
not appeal to the average student. Such problems may 
well be left to those who intend to take up graduate studies 
in a particular phase of philosophical thought. But that a 
general acquaintance with the central problems of philos- 
ophy is of great value to all students is evidenced by the 
increasing amount of emphasis which is being placed on this 
subject by those responsible for the construction of college 
curricula. 

The writer has kept in mind constantly the young men 
and women attending our colleges. For this group he 
thought it best to develop the principles of philosophy in 
the form of projects. Fundamental problems are first 
presented, the different positions taken by successive think- 
ers outlined and discussed, and the student is encouraged 
and assisted to make up his mind on the theory which 
he shall accept. While the text is put forward as basal, it is 
not the intention of the author that it should be used solely 
as a textbook. It is rather a handbook to guide the student 
in the selection and presentation of the material which is 
discussed in the classroom. Moreover, since it is view- 

ix 


“4 PREFACE 


points and not history which the student should take away 
with him from these discussions, insistence has been put on 
the topical presentation of the material, although the 
historical connections of the different theories have also been 
pointed out. The practical teacher will advise the con- 
stant use of a standard history of philosophy to accompany 
the study of the text. 

Few things disturb the beginner in philosophy more than 
the difficulty of understanding the extremely technical 
language in use among philosophers. A conscious effort has 
been made to simplify as far as possible the work of the 
student by presenting philosophical theories in non-technical 
language. This has been done, even at the risk of not ex- 
pressing exactly a particular thinker’s position. The 
professional philosopher undoubtedly will find many things 
to criticize in this work. Let him remember that it was 
written, not for men trained in and long accustomed to the 
intricacies of philosophical thought, but for groups of 
immature students to whom the very word “philosophy” 
is strange, and whose acquaintance with its subject-matter 
and methods is nil. 

Furthermore, the references cited are neither complete 
nor mandatory. Every teacher has his favorities among 
reference works, and is guided in the selection of them by 
the capacities of his auditors and the resources of the 
college library. The list given at the end of each chapter is 
merely suggestive, and contains only those books which 
will be found in any well-stocked college library. 

It may not be out of place to state here that the problems 
of philosophy as presented in this book have been ap- 
proached from the position of dualistic realism. The 
author is a realist, in the sense that he believes firmly in the 
reality of an extra-mental world and in the validity of our 
perceptions of it. He is a dualistic realist in this, that he 


PREFACE xi 


looks upon the distinction between subject and object, 
spirit and matter, man and God as primary and fundamen- 
tal to all metaphysics. 

The author has tried faithfully to indicate his indebted- 
ness to previous writers, but is quite conscious that the full 
extent of it will scarcely appear from the brief citations 
offered in the foot-notes. In few fields is an author under 
such heavy obligations to his predecessors as in that of 
philosophy. In a special manner he wishes to acknowledge 
his obligations to his many teachers who initiated him into 
and encouraged the “‘love of wisdom.” Particularly is he 
indebted in the preparation of this work to the encourage- 
ment of the Rector of The Catholic University of America, 
the Right Reverend Thomas J. Shahan, S.T. D. Monsignor 
Edward A. Pace, Ph.D., head of the Department of Philos- 
ophy in the same University, has assisted in countless ways. 
He is also grateful to his friend and colleague, the Reverend 
Charles A. Hart, who read this book in manuscript and 
made many helpful suggestions and criticisms. 


James H. RYAN. 


The Catholic University of America, 
Washington, D. C. 


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CONTENTS 


PAGE 

CHAPTER I, Puttosopuy, ITs MEANING, SCOPE, AND METHODS. 
DCUMC Ole MLOSOD UY UM NTU ia eee ner tor I 
Explanation of the Definition of Philosophy.............. 5 
PMCEOTVISIONS OLME OLOSODU ys Vie Maem crate tat net, II 
Subdivisions of Theoretical Philosophy.................. 12 
SU VistoOuSsS OLE Tacuical CUNOSODUV Emit ia mimics Li). 13 
le Vy etnods OL EOUOSODIY sa cman re eens che cs 15 
he iurperimental or Anal yuciviethod sa yi wee wt 16 
The Deductive or Synthetic a Priori Method.....:....... 18 
ThetAnatytito+synthetie Methods 6 SMe eae 19 
het Valuelof Philosophy in rycen eae AR Se OB) 21 
CHAPTER IT. THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE Many...... 25 
(Phe: Problem} s sw2ors apres Mie ny a et aU Ry AL 25 
MGHISt gy Sek RE Ae Ba oh EE RE A PEEL RP BAS yd 27 
MeétaphysicallMonisni nye ea atone tiny ieecte cee ee tae eee FE 28 
ThedVonism" Of spimoza yen iis BA) POOR Si ey OR 28 
he Monism: of -egels. reas 4 CES BI SEER SE Os LEER TE 5s 30 
WVIATEIALISTICINLODISII ay Sone Cumin ra aay ia maT ta Ty 32 
Arguments in Payor o1avlonisin gd Wy Mann We ee 34 
CP RICICTSTINOM VIOTISHD Jenne ice Widale ds OILY oes sls vee ane a5 
Jina LISTV ich ween PatmmnmeN Caray sald) he IU Mosu0 vais ALAMO ai 39 
IN AAVCRIOLISMSIIMO EM er eNO MONE Ne ORI th kd Sota AiR PY 4O 
hes bDudglismiotsAristotlem we tiiaey gianna ed Nor wean ail yayal 40 
The Extreme Dualism of Descartes. ........00.0.0000005, A2 
Arguments in Kavor of, Dualism oe en sak eae, ait ean 43 
Griticisin Of Wualisniceam a rven ici tater mikey Ouae be hionil) ¥is 45 
Pe TUTALISIY cyan. Oe biden es cere Se UR YE May “diene 47 
ATOUMehisiieavor Ol. F uralismi wane hoa ene wol ciel 50 
Criticism oF Pluralisnaa tine Loves Meare ene eee. FO, Yale 50 
OnCIUSION Wat wai. AAPA AERA GN AO Ne hepa CME eR YE 51 
CHAPTER III. THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY..... 54 
MOeRECODIEN) ena. ESR ee HES Senn ONO: BONER PEO 54 
WE Tera isthe aus aie LE ete COUR OW A ate ccs LO aia ey BE 


x1V CONTENTS 

PAGE 
Arguments in Favor of Materialism. «2... Sceayeee ee ee a7 
Criticism ‘of Materialism: c..0c..}< «5's - 1 ee ee 58 
ASMOSTICISM Plea Miles nits CoN As ys a alist ae hee 60 
SOIPIEUALISING wo ey gies esate feed OL see Se ee 62 
The Spiritualism :of Leibniz.) ..As. 20h. 22 ee 63 
The Spiritualism of Berkeley .2).... i.44)...0 00 65 
The Spiritualism of the Objective Idealists............... 66 
Arguments in Favor of Spiritualism. ...s. 5..-o2 eee 69 
Criticism of Spiritualism .'3..:.\05-. 4..¢pse ee 70 

Moderate Spiritualism or a Dualistic Synthesis of Material- 
ism.and Spiritualism, . 20... Sct). ghe ae Gee 71 
CHAPTER IV. THE PsycHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM............... 74 
Epiphenomenalism or Psychological Materialism.......... 78 
Psycho-Physical Parallelism. . >3s..,:.si0a S48) eee eee 80 
The Double Aspect Theory—Phenomenalistic Parallelism... 81 
The Double Aspect Theory—Psychical Monism.......... 82 
Arguments in Favor of Parallelism. .......... .AWoea eee 83 
Criticism of Psychical Monism .... 00.0. 2.0250 0 ee 86 
Interactionism or the Mind-Substance Theory............ 94 
Arguments in Favor of the Interaction Theory........... 99 
Criticism of the Interaction Theory: }. 2.42 45-eeee IOI 
Guaprer V. Toe PRosirem OF LIFE. 20). .0i 2.00 04a) 109 
Mechanism ..< sci.) e ia ey lad ke yp ele III 
Neo-Mechanism .\. 0.055) de oo a 114 
FEMETPISIN Fy. coy ead eee bile wiea Uaihlesogge- 2 Oar 116 
Arguments in Favor of Mechanism...) .). 9) 
Criticism of the Mechanistic Theory. 1). .))) ee 126 
IM SERLISIN ie se ales vns lass ip blade Mate tls dak AM i 133 
Arguments in Favor of \Vitalism. ....:)..00) 00 Re ee 
Criticism of Vitalism,. 3.05 04 icy s. cukobe vos es ga A 138 
CHAPTER VI. THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE................. 144 
Epistemology: 0 35)0.) s a occ swe colo ou eee 146 
Toles fe aise ao hia ek aed 6 ale cee ey Oe 148 
The Psychological Basis of a Knowledge Theory.......... 151 
Criticism of Kant's Idealism <.:) <0... eee 157 


CONTENTS XV 


PAGE 
Criticism of the Theory of Knowledge of Absolutism...... 163 
eragmmatism Gino i! ts UR ee oy aa euaiae Likes (eo 6 166 
Criticism of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge....... 573 
The Theory of Knowledge of Realism................... 177 
Naive Realism or the Copy Theory of Knowledge......... 179 
Realism or the Correspondence Theory of Knowledge..... 180 
ATgumentsiin Favor Ol; mealisme cep nuh. Bane ae teva die /IO7 
riticisn Ob Realism We (ae maior ni eee i ia) Hc are IgI 
SUDCUNGW? IS CAUSIG and are 0 opel ce Me eRe SMA ware AL 007 
CHAPTER VII. THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF 
dN ta: oa ah RN rit Teo stile OEE RO MMM RULE a AW 203 
Scepticism 242 MMe reeithg Se RRO ae Nos Male duh UL Cunt a ent 2 205 
Evolution and the Validity of Knowledge................ 209 
DIO QTHALISIN fii eyaiiiets ce och eka: CRP ree pa at aaa ealsia 208 
COTOICESMe I himnactore mete Hite en Monit pain ke OAR ARAN ye ATEN 215 
ihe Meaninpiota Drith aie ukrainian unis Ui ky 217 
ne; Coherence: Pheory, of Uruth we te a ae eat ite 222 
Criticism: ofthe Theory of Coherence: oo) ures. & 224 
The Pragmatic or Utility Theory of Truth. .0.), . 05.025... 226 
Criticism onthe Utiitya Pheorvin uaa ey Oka teeny 230 
ne, Correspondence HeOry i iia insds be ehcety co dkead Malultd 232 
(HAPTERUV LL FHE- PROBLEM OF KREEDOM) (li Nin Us aly 243 
TVG EOTAVITI SIT ee he eda 0 ae ay ees Risk GAA WN LCRA BME Gada OO aR ER SE SNS 244 
Criticism Ot: Determinisnys neck | bane beh bana ain gt 248 
The Meaning of Breau Will vie) late AAR abet uk ma bal 252 
Argumentsin Pavor of Brees W ill, spine ante ei cet dei Ui ele 250 
Criticism, of the Doctrine of Free: Willis oe Ne 266 


CHAPTER LX THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY Wii val sien: 27.3 


EXC ON IST ere he ae See OT Tee Ud ULL IRN e HOLMAN GU I 277 
LCLLILATIATIISI Ree ens Concrete ease ren TD NOMA Sn RT Ga.’ Rive eee Sed 278 
HICISTIMIOL ELEGONISIN Nia amma Wanmntaae fats steel 270 
GrifersnnoleUtiitarianismin si aiaeriee ania a0. eran al ene 282 
Evolutionary tthics—Herbert Spencers.) ). 3) vine it 284 
LUPE ee aU Gly ae naan UUs MSMR be day A RGA 288 
PNT iNT calc Uo Rear Pac et URNA Bank te ATU 7 a ne OU RR at 289 


Xvl CONTENTS 


PAGE 

TH tOItION ISO ea Pe a 294 
Reason, the Sanction of Morality.........686..0 7200). 295 
Criticism of the: Ethies ‘of Reason.) 34/2 "UR Ee epee en 299 
CHAPTER X. THE PROBLEM'OF THE SELF.) 0) ae 304 
Phe miGaning OF MING 2s ci oe sai snes gue a ee 309 
Materialism and the'Ego 0 eal eae ee 314 
Criticism of Sensationalistic Phenomenism............... 314 
ine sstream of nought Theorys 0020) eeu ee 316 
Pipa usr Oe HOS ye. fo. tie eo els eee ee 318 
Ries A eOryy OL Lhe Selt orc. < as cine tee ae 319 
Wualistic Realism and the Self i... oe 322 
Arguments in Favor of Dualistic Realism................ 324 
hesspirituality of Mind oe Sy ei ae 320 
Criticism, of the Soul ‘Theory «20 0.00..4.4. 40.3 ee 333 
CHAPTER XI. PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION........... 341 
iPheevacure Ol oClerice {ho tes ae Ue 346 
eoenceann Deterhiinism (00% (0a, ee ene 350 
The Instrumentalism of Professor Dewey................ 354 
The Logico-Analytic View of Philosophy................. 356 
aie wimitations of Sciences. sy. ha ee cs ee 359 
abe Meaning of Philosophy... ........4.509 4 363 
The Punction of Philosophy )!. 00 i ee 367 
The schools of Philosophy... ..0.:.......4.04 00 ee 374 
Is'There'a “ Philosophia Perennts??' 20 75. a 378 
Philosophy and Morality........0054 22 )7. 92 A 382 
Philosophy and Religion; -)/2 000. 0. 0.4 2 ee 336 


AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


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ANY INPRODUGTION TO 
PHILOSOPHY 


CHAPTER: I 


PHILOSOPHY, ITS MEANING, SCOPE, AND 
» METHODS 


Definition of Philosophy.—The word “‘philosophy”’ is 
a Greek derivative and means ‘‘love of wisdom.” The 
ancient thinkers used the word to cover a wide range of 
subjects, including science and knowledge in general. 
To-day, philosophy has a very precise connotation. It 
does not include knowledge in general, but confines itself 
to the study of a series of problems which arise from man’s 
consideration of the universe, and to which it proposes to 
give a reply. 

In the popular mind, and even amongst many of the 
learned, philosophy is often held to be synonymous with 
vague speculations, divorced from life and incapable of 
solid proof. So widespread has become this false conception 
of the nature of philosophy that the term ‘‘metaphysics,”’ 
which is a branch of philosophy, is quite generally used to 
express contempt for the groundless conclusions which 
philosophers attempt to foist upon mankind. 

Another source of misunderstanding arises from the sup- 
posed opposition between science and philosophy. Modern 
science, with its positive methods and unquestionable 


results, we are told, stands in marked contrast to the un- 
: 


2 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


proved, and probably unprovable, findings of philosophy. 
The scientific mind cannot afford to dally with the more or 
less probable theories which attempt to explain the so-called 
realities which lie hidden behind phenomena when, in the 
laboratory, full and unquestionable evidence concerning 
the phenomena themselves is open to every investigator. 
In some circles, an attitude of contempt for philosophical 
speculation has been inherited from the positivistic ideas of 
the nineteenth century, as well as from the pride born of the 
great achievements of the special sciences, with the result 
that many to-day view philosophy as a land of fiction, and 
any effort therein as mere mental gymnastics. 

Lastly, the supposedly impractical character of philos- 
ophy has turned many away from its study. Mankind is 
interested, above all things, in the satisfaction of daily 
needs. He must make a living and is, therefore, concerned 
about those things which will assist him in the attainment 
of that purpose, in the shortest possible time and with the 
exercise of the least amount of mental energy. To speculate 
about the origin, or the possible outcome of things, makes 
little or no appeal to the man in the street. What he desires 
primarily are principles which can, without difficulty, be 
translated into the terms of everyday life. For these 
reasons, the ordinary man is apt to grow impatient with a 
study which has no readily perceptible bearings on his daily 
life, habits, or happiness. 

These opinions, so widespread to-day, arise from a false 
or narrow view of the true réle of philosophy. Correctly 
understood, philosophy has a very definite function to 
perform in the field of both human knowledge and human 
endeavor. While its language is technical and oftentimes 
not easy for the uninitiated to grasp, the principles and the 
results of philosophical speculation are clear-cut and not 
dificult to comprehend. Philosophy does not busy itself 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS 3 


with shadowy speculations, except for the man who comes 
unprepared to take it up and grapple with its problems. 
The same objection might be leveled against any of the 
more abstract sciences which require quite as much and as 
serious preparation, on the part of the student, as philos- 
ophy. While it is true that the history of philosophy ap- 
pears at first glance but the record of disagreements amongst 
philosophers themselves, underlying these apparent con- 
tradictions and rival systems, there is a unity of truth which 
mankind accepts and holds to, despite the fluctuations of 
philosophical thought. “The truth Pythagoras, Plato and 
Aristotle sought after, is the same that Augustine and 
Aquinas pursued. So far as it is developed in history, truth 
is the daughter of time; so far as it bears within itself a 
content independent of time, and therefore of history, it is 
the daughter of eternity.” ! 

The false attitude towards philosophy which characterizes 
so many positivistic scientists is far more difficult to explain, 
and next to impossible to overcome. When we consider 
that science, no less than philosophy, must deal with general 
ideas; that any science which would be more than a mere 
accumulation of unrelated facts, must hark back to the 
despised first principles of philosophy as a foundation and 
justification for its researches, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to understand the aloofness of the average scientist 
to philosophy. This attitude of distrust is no doubt ex- 
plainable on the ground that the ‘laboratory method”’ 
has begotten a mental impatience with the slow analysis 
characteristic of philosophic inquiry. 

Moreover, in comparing philosophy with science, it is 
too often forgotten that philosophy is not a particularized 
science, nor should the methods of any special science be 
compared with the methods of philosophy. Philosophy is a 

1 Willman, Geschichte des I dealismus, II, p. 550. 


4 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


“general” science. It is outside of, and above, not alongside 
of, and on an equal footing with a particular science; for 
example, biology, chemistry, or physics. It does not come 
“before,” but “after” every particular science. The field 
of philosophy embraces the final facts which have resulted 
from scientific investigation in all branches of human 
knowledge. These facts are of such a character that they 
defy further analysis by the methods available to empirical 
science. They thus become the subject-matter of philosophy 
which attempts, by means of its synthesis of these facts, 
to answer the inevitable questions: What are they? 
Where do they come from? What do they mean? 

To the objection that philosophy is impractical, we may 
reply that if by “practical” is meant the narrow view by 
which the unthinking man rules his daily life, then philos- 
ophy merits the note of impracticality. If man, on the 
other hand, is to govern his life by the highest rule of reason, 
if he is to live by truth and not by impulse, if his intellectual 
life is to control the urgings of the lower self, if he is to be 
guided not by custom, convention, nor imitation, but only 
by the highest and loftiest motives, then philosophy is not 
impractical. Lo make philosophy the guiding star of daily 
life has been the vision of every philosopher since Plato. 
And until mankind has learned to walk by reason, and not 
by instinct as the brute, little progress will be made towards 
the general acceptance of those vital principles of conduct 
which every “‘lover of wisdom”’ knows will alone insure the 
attainment of the highest possible ideals. 

Many definitions of philosophy, all expressing the fun- 
damental idea that it is a study of the ‘‘ wholeness of things,” 
have been formulated. No serious purpose would be at- 
tained by a mere recitation of them all. The leading think- 
ers, however, have been practically a unit on the elements of 
the definition which they have considered worthy of em- 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS - 5 


phasis. Thus, Aristotle views philosophy as ‘concerned 
with first causes and principles.”’! Thomas Aquinas 
defines it as the “‘science which considers first and universal 
causes.” * Practically all modern thinkers have accepted 
this formulation of the nature of philosophy. They have 
emphasized also its essentially synthetic character. The 
aim of philosophy is to inquire into the ‘‘wholeness of 
things,” that is, things are studied apart from the narrow 
relations which make them either particular or temporary. 
No particular thing, but things; no individual phenomenon, 
but the universe as a whole; no temporary relation, but the 
eternal unchanging relations of things to one another and 
to the universe—this is the content of philosophy. And 
the mental attitude of the philosopher towards this “‘ whole- 
ness,” or towards the universe, may be characterized as an 
attempt to comprehend it all and in its totality. Of course, 
this does not mean that the philosopher hopes to know the 
world as a whole, quantitatively. Such a venture is man- 
ifestly impossible. He can, however, gather together the 
scattered fragments of knowledge, the assumptions and 
principles which are common to all the sciences, bind them 
into an intelligible whole, and from this intellectual or- 
ganization of the world of thought and of action, arrive 
at what the Germans so aptly call a ‘Welt und Lebens- 
anschauung”’—a world view and life view. 


Explanation of the Definition of Philosophy.—Philosophy 
is defined by Thomas Aquinas as a science. Some objection 
would be made to the classification of philosophy as a 
science by those who have narrowed the conception of 
science to knowledge acquired solely by means of laboratory 
methods. While it is true that philosophy possesses a 


1 Metaphysics, I, 1. 
2In Metaphysic, I, Sec. 2. 


6 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


method which is peculiarly its own, and does not confine 
itself to the consideration of objects perceivable by the 
senses, nevertheless it deals with the knowledge of a very 
special class of objects for which it attempts to give a ra- 
tional explanation. This knowledge of things and of their 
causes which results from philosophic analysis is clearly 
differentiated from the so-called knowledge which arises 
from hearsay, conjecture, and even from the acceptances of 
religious belief or historical testimony. ‘The prime char- 
acteristic of philosophical knowledge, as of science, is its 
certainty. In giving the reasons for things, philosophy 
exhibits the essentially synthetic character of science. 
Therefore, it merits the name of science, or, at least, may 
be called “‘scientific.”” To separate philosophy from the 
sciences, and to deny it the right to be classed as a science, 
would be to negative the whole history of philosophic 
' thought. This false attitude has come about as a direct 
consequence of the ever-increasing amount of specialization 
and narrowing of the field of investigation, which has been 
so prominent a feature of the progress of modern physical 
science. It is, however, wholly arbitrary, and can be 
accepted only by those who wish to place in jeopardy the 
proved results both of science and philosophy. ‘‘ Philosophy 
cannot be separated from the sciences; it is simply the 
sum-total of all scientific knowledge.” } 

The claim of philosophy to deal with reality, under the 
aspect of wholeness, justifies its right to acceptance by us 
as a science. The great difference between it and any 
special science lies in the fact that philosophy pushes its 
investigations further back than does a. particular science. 
Each science deals with only a very circumscribed part of 
the discernible universe. It stops short of explaining the 
very assumptions upon which its own conclusions are 

1 Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, Tr. Thilly, p. 10. 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS 7 


founded, to say nothing of the nature and validity of these 
conclusions. Philosophy, on the other hand, examines 
these assumptions and conclusions, analyzes them, and 
arrives at the truth or falsehood of the data submitted by 
the special sciences. From the cross sections of truth as 
conveyed to it by physics, biology, and chemistry, it en- 
deavors to reconstruct a complete system of knowledge. 
Not only is it a science, therefore, but it 1s the “science of 
sciences”; it is the sum-total of our knowledge of the 
universe as a whole. 

This description of the réle which philosophy has to play 
in the scheme of human knowledge would be unfair were 
it not admitted that philosophy depends upon science for 
the material from which it constructs its generalizations. 
The accepted conclusions of every science form the ground- 
work of all philosophic speculation. Upon these it builds 
its superstructure of generalized conceptions. From the 
manifold manifestations of being, as revealed to us by the 
theories and laws of natural science, philosophy extracts 
the inner core of reality. It is not concerned with the law 
of gravitation, or the functioning of the brain, or the facts 
which demonstrate the law of chemical affinity, viewed in 
their particular relations to any given set of natural phenom- 
ena. The truth or falsehood of these laws, however, is of 
grave concern to the philosopher in as far as either will 
affect his synthesis of reality, viewed in its entirety. For 
these reasons, philosophy should be keenly alive to every 
advance in scientific knowledge as bearing on the validity 
of the thought constructions which it has formulated. 

It would be false, however, to conclude from what has 
been said that philosophy is but an auxiliary to science, or 
that it depends so exclusively upon the tested findings of 
science as to be unable to make progress independent of the 
development of the special sciences. Philosophy has a 


8 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


position of its own in the hierarchy of knowledge. History 
proves that previous to the rise of empirical science it had 
furnished an adequate explanation of the universe which the 
findings of scientific investigation in later times have con- 
firmed. To make of philosophy, therefore, but a branch, 
and that an insignificant one, of science would be to mis- 
conceive the nature of philosophy. Philosophy possesses 
besides individuality, its own special field of investigation, 
its own special methods, its own structure of laws and 
principles which stand to the facts studied in the strict 
relation of causality. ‘Philosophy therefore,” writes Ladd, 
“Should not be defined solely by stating its relation of 
dependence upon the particular sciences. ‘This would in- 
volve too wide a departure from the historical point of view. 
Philosophy was cultivated, and the most essential factors 
of its right conception recognized, for centuries before 
its relation to the particular sciences was clearly dis- 
cerned.” } 

The second part of the definition states that philosophy 
is the science which considers first and most general causes. 
Philosophy embraces all things, but it is evident that this 
cannot be accepted in a quantitative sense. It investigates 
all things, but only in their first causes. The proper object 
of philosophy, therefore, is the consideration of all things 
in their simplest, most complete, and most final elements. 
The very essence of knowledge consists in perceiving the 
causes of phenomena. We know a thing when we know why 
it is, what it is, and how it acts. In other words, to know the 
cause of something is to know why the thing exists. Now, 
causes are of different kinds. Some are proximate or re- 
mote; others, final or last. To know the final or last causes, 
to know why things are what they are, is the endeavor of 
philosophy. The burden of philosophy is to reply to the 

1 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 26, 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS 9 


ultimate why of all reality, to give the last answer to the 
problems of what the universe is and why it exists.! 

The proper function of philosophy may be better under- 
stood if we point out the different attitude which it takes 
towards the study of the universe from that of science. 
Science, no less than philosophy, deals with causes. But 
science confines its investigations to the immediate causes 
of a particular series of phenomena, while philosophy dis- 
regards the proximate and concentrates on the ultimate 
reasons for all phenomena. Science is knowledge of a part 
of nature; philosophy is knowledge of the whole. For 
example, biology studies living organisms, their habits, 
functions, history, and organization. It collects all the 
data possible to serve as an explanation of why living things 
act in one way and not in another. It is satisfied if it can 
discover the causes which will explain why any organism 
functions in the peculiar way it has been observed to func- 
tion. But biology, as an experimental science, does not 
investigate the nature of life itself; neither does it offer an 
explanation of the differences between living and non- 
living things; much less does it discuss what is the real 
nature of the living things it has under observation. This 
is the task of philosophy which sees in living animals not 
the individual but the universal type, and endeavors to 
explain this type, not in terms of any particular functioning 
it may possess, but in its relations to reality as a whole. 

Not only is the field of each special science more narrow 
than that of philosophy, but its approach to the problems 
which come before it for investigation is of a temporal as 
distinguished from the final and definitive point of view of 
philosophy. The results of scientific study, because of their 
dominantly practical nature, fail to satisfy completely 
the inquiring mind of the philosopher whose interest in them 

1Mercier, Metaphysique Générale, 5th ed. pp. 527 et seq. 


IO AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


transcends the particularities of here and now. Unless he 
can perceive things in their ‘“‘whole”’ relations, he feels that 
his knowledge is inadequate. This inadequacy creates a 
void which can never be filled by the findings of science, no 
matter how searching or how final they may appear to be. 

To discover the ultimate causes of things necessitates 
beforehand the asking of questions which are themselves 
final. It is the replies given to such ultimate questions 
which constitute philosophy. Human thought, from the 
earliest times, has been deeply interested in these problems, 
and universal recognition has been accorded to the im- 
portance of the answers given to what might be called the 
problems of philosophy. Merely to name some of the more 
fundamental problems will demonstrate the supreme value 
which mankind has always placed on the efforts of philos- 
ophers to advance solutions which could be generally ac- 
cepted. Man, of course, has been, and is, most interested 
in himself. It is not surprising, therefore, to learn that a 
vast amount of philosophizing has revolved about the 
question of his origin, his destiny, his relations to other 
men, to nature, and to God. Human conduct and its 
sanctions have occupied also a prominent place in his 
thoughts. What is the world? Is it real, or mere appear- 
ance? Is reality one or plural? What is truth, and how is 
it distinguished from falsehood? Can we really know 
anything at all? Does God exist? If so, is He a person or 
must He be confused with the universe itself? 

These, and many others, are some of the problems to 
which philosophy offers a reasoned answer. The mere 
recital of them should convince us that their solution lies 
far outside the realm of any special science. Without any 
intention of disparaging the value of the knowledge which 
has come to us through science, it may be asserted safely 
that, in the absence of all philosophy, our knowledge would 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS 11 


present a fragmentary, heterogeneous character, full of 
wide gaps and unexplained lacunz, miles removed from 
the massive solid appearance which it manifests to-day. It 
would be a knowledge of facts, not of causes; it would lack 
the synthetic fulness which philosophy alone can give 
to reality, conceived ‘‘sub specie @ternitatis.”’ Professor 
Dewey well described the note of finality in philosophy 
when he stated that ‘‘philosophy cannot be defined simply 
from the side of subject-matter. For this reason, the defini- 
tion of such conceptions as generality, totality, and ul- 
timateness is most readily reached from the side of the 
disposition toward the world which they connote. In any 
literal and quantitative sense, these terms do not apply to 
the subject-matter of knowledge, for completeness and final- 
ity are out of the question. The very nature of experience 
as an ongoing, changing process forbids. In a less rigid sense, 
they apply to science rather than to philosophy. For 
obviously it is to mathematics, physics, chemistry, biology, 
anthropology, history, etc., that one must go, not to philos- 
ophy, to find out the facts of the world. It is for the sciences 
to say what generalizations are tenable about the world 
and what they specifically are. But when we ask what 
sort of permanent disposition of action toward the world 
the scientific disclosures exact of us we are raising a philo- 
sophic question.” ! 


The Divisions of Philosophy.—A general division of the 
philosophical sciences which will be universally acceptable 
is no less difficult to frame than a definition which all will 
receive. Historically, the division formulated by Aristotle 
has had the most influence on human thought. It was 
undoubtedly an outgrowth of his definition of philosophy, 
and reflects the realistic attitude of this great thinker. 


1 Democracy and Education, p. 379. 


12 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Thomas Aquinas justified the Aristotelian division by 
analyzing the different kinds of cosmic order which are 
presented to the philosopher’s consideration. This order 
is fundamentally of two kinds—one which exists inde- 
pendent of our minds; the other which is created by the 
mind. The first is the order of nature, which was not made 
by man, but which he can study, or speculate about. ‘The 
second is of man’s creation, the work of his intellect and 
of his will, or of his actions. This is the practical order. 
From which he concludes that the study of philosophy 
involves two distinct fields, the speculative and the practi- 
cal, and therefore should be divided into two main divi- 
sions—namely, theoretical philosophy and practical philos- 


ophy. 


Subdivisions of Theoretical Philosophy.—Since the func- 
tion of philosophy is to study things in their totality, it is 
evident that no science which confines its researches to 
particularized conclusions merits a place under the heading 
“theoretical philosophy.” Philosophy deals only with 
general truths which come to us after reflection upon the 
conclusions of the special sciences. Now, the most funda- 
mental and general facts in the universe which the human 
mind perceives have to do with such essential things as 
change, quantity, and being. These form the basis of the 
sciences of physics, mathematics, and metaphysics, and 
when viewed philosophically, that is, out of relation to 
any particular series of facts, constitute the subject-matter 
of philosophy or metaphysics as distinguished from the posi- 
tive or inductive sciences. And Aristotle so viewed them. 

By Physics he did not mean what to-day we call physics. 
His conception of Physics was essentially synthetic, and its 
field of operations he extended to the investigation of the 
most prominent and most universal characteristic of all 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS 13 


natural phenomena; that is, change. ‘Translated into 
modern language, Physics would mean the Philosophy of 
Nature and Psychology. Mathematics to Aristotle did not 
connote the special mathematical sciences, like arithmetic, 
algebra, or geometry, but the larger aspects of quantity or 
extension, such as the axioms and postulates of mathe- 
matics, the problems of unity, multitude, plurality, etc. 
By Metaphysics, or “first philosophy,” Aristotle under- 
stood the study of being in all its ramifications, and di- 
vorced from the limitations of both change and extension. 
In other words, metaphysics treats of the timeless thing, 
or subject, or principle, or cause abstracting from the 
restraining, limiting conditions of time and place, and 
therefore in its unchangeable and incorporeal manifesta- 
tions. The modern philosopher would call this subject 
either by the name of Ontology or Epistemology, depending 
on whether the matter examined is one of pure being or 
one of knowledge; nor would he be inclined to accept with- 
out reservations the combining of being and knowledge 
under a single heading, or call it Metaphysics. 


Subdivisions of Practical Philosophy.—All human actions 
result from either the operations of the intellect or of the 
will, and issue in certain activities which we organize, 
execute, and control. The study of the rules which guide 
the human mind in its own operations is called Logic. The 
content of Logic, therefore, has to do with the product of 
thought and the correctness of the processes by which we 
arrive at truth. Conception, judgment, reasoning, to- 
gether with the method which guides us in using these 
processes systematically and in an orderly fashion make 
up the subject-matter of the science of Logic. 

The functioning of the will produces human conduct, the 
guidance of which, according to the norms of right reason 


14 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


and in conformity with man’s ultimate end, forms the 
subject-matter for the consideration of Ethics. In formulat- 
ing rules for the guidance of human acts, Ethics must 
determine not only what is right and wrong; it must also 
examine the motives which impel men to act, as well as the 
sanctions which are offered to justify their choice of one 
course of action above another. 

Men not only reason correctly and act morally, but they 
likewise produce different kinds of works, as poetry, sculp- 
ture, music, etc. The study of the principles which should 
guide man in thus expressing himself is called Esthetics, or 
the Philosophy of the Beautiful.? 

Modern philosophers have not accepted i toto the 
Aristotelian Division. They sought a new basis for making 
their divisions, some deriving the philosophical sciences 
with mathematical exactness from their own systems of 
philosophy, others founding their classifications on deduc- 
tions from the ‘‘Absolute,’’ which they held to be the 
ground of all reality. The general tendency, however, has 
been to divide philosophy into as many different branches 
as there are distinct problems to solve. While each one 
of these problems concerns but one or other aspect of the 
main problem of philosophy—that of reality—yet each 
possesses distinctive elements of differentiation from the 
central problem of metaphysics so as to insure it the honor 
of being accepted as a separate department of philosophy. 

The classification most widely accepted was that of 
Christian von Wolff, which, made under the influence of 
the rationalism of the eighteenth century, separated philos- 
ophy altogether from science, conceiving it as a purely 


rational study. The Wolffian division of philosophy is as 
follows: 


1 For a more extended discussion of the Aristotelian Division of Philosophy, 
see Coffey, Ontology or the Theory of Being, pp. 7-23. 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS | 15 


I. Logic | 
. { Theodicy—the _ study 
II. Speculative haa Metaphysics of God 


Bo Special Metaphysics ie esemin vay 


Psychology—the study 
of Man 


Ethics 
III. Practical Philosophy ; Politics 
Economics 


The tendency of contemporary philosophy, due prin- 
cipally to the ever-widening field of knowledge, and to the 
remarkable discoveries of science, especially of biology, has 
been to detach the philosophical disciplines from the main 
branches and to award to each one a certain amount of 
autonomy. Especially remarkable has been the number of 
subdivisions made in psychology, which has been broken 
up into a dozen or more subsidiary sciences, as epistemology, 
physiological psychology, psychiatry, social psychology, 
child psychology, genetic psychology, etc. A similar 
regrouping has taken place in logic and in ethics. 

Many of the present-day sciences merit the name of 
philosophy only by sufferance, as, for example, the philos- 
ophy of history, of art, or of religion. It is true that 
these subjects obtain a great deal of their material from 
philosophy, and often are pursued in the philosophical 
spirit; they are not, for all that, distinct divisions of philoso- 
phy, but merely complex discussions based upon philoso- 
phy. 


The Methods of Philosophy.—By method in philosophy 
we understand the systematic means which the philosopher 


1De Wulf in Catholic Encyclopedia, Article ‘‘ Philosophy’’, Vol. XII, pp. 26, 273 
Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 162-177. 


16 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


should use to attain truth. Each branch of knowledge 
possesses a method of arriving at the conclusions which it 
accepts. Mathematics has a method; biology and chemistry 
each have a method. While the problem of method is one 
of the most difficult of solution in any science, both from 
the theoretical and the practical point of view, the answer 
to it has generally come about from the growth of the study 
itself rather than from prolonged discussions as to what 
method should be adopted. There are thinkers, like William 
James, who scout the whole idea of philosophical method. 
“Philosophy, taken as something distinct from science or 
from practical affairs, follows no method peculiar to itself. 
All our thinking to-day has evolved gradually out of prim- 
itive human thought, and the only really important changes 
that have come over its manner (as distinguished from the 
matters in which it believes) are a great hesitancy in assert- 
ing its convictions, and the habit of seeking verifications for 
them wherever it can.’’! The history of philosophy, too, 
records the different, and often conflicting, paths which 
mankind has followed in the search for philosophical truth. 
At one period, the method most in vogue was the deductive; 
at another, the inductive method held sway. Modern 
philosophers have attempted a combination of both, but 
not always with happy results. 

The three methods which have been most generally used 
in the search for philosophical truth have been the Exper- 
imental or Analytic, the Deductive or Synthetic a Priori, 
and the Analytico-Synthetic. 2 


The Experimental or Analytic Method.—The exper- 
imental or analytic method is an adaptation to the problems 
of philosophy of the methods used in the natural sciences. 


1 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 15. 
? De Wulf in Catholic Encyclopedia, Article ‘‘Philosophy’’, Vol. XII, PP. 29, 30. 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS 17 


It consists in the observation, accumulation, and verifica- 
tion of facts. All speculation or theorizing outside of or 
above observable fact is regarded as unscientific, and there- 
fore incapable of producing truthful results. 

The experimental method has characterized all the 
materialistic philosophers, ancient and modern. It had a 
great vogue in the last century due to the popularity of the 
Positivism of Comte, and to other thinkers deeply influenced 
by positivist ideas, like Mill, Huxley, and Spencer. Nor 
has its influence receded altogether. Many contemporary 
philosophers are anxious to apply the “laboratory meth- 
ods,” used so successfully in the special sciences, to the 
peculiar problems of philosophy. This attitude is based on a 
misconception of the real nature of the philosophical 
sciences, and has actually resulted in more harm than good. 
No one can deny that philosophy must know and accept 
the principles and proved conclusions of natural science; 
it must, also, conduct its investigations in conformity with 
the general methods in use in science, and according to 
what is known as the “scientific spirit”’; but there is no 
need, in fact there is every reason to the contrary, to tie 
itself down to the technique, no matter how successful it 
has been, of any special science.? 

The objections, which are leveled against the exclusive 
use of the inductive method in philosophy, are no less 
convincing than they are valid. By confining his study to 
observable phenomena, and disregarding all causality as it 


1 For a detailed and trenchant criticism of the “Idol of scientific method” cf. 
Hoernlé, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, pp. 24-49. ‘‘Of experiment in the in- 
strumentalist sense there is little in philosophy: of experiment in the adjusting of con- 
flicting beliefs there is a great deal. There is a weighing of considerations, a trying out 
of alternatives, a mobilising of all the resources of one’s experience and reflection, a 
feeling one’s way from a distracted and unstable to a coherent and stable outlook. 
Experiment in this sense is one with ‘dialectic,’ with learning by experience, with the 
recasting and transforming of beliefs which mark the growing insight, as the thinker 
advances from haphazard and partial to orderly and inclusive reflection.” Op. cit., 
Dp. 47. 


18 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


affects these facts, the empiricist but half understands the 
very phenomena under consideration. Whether he wishes 
it or no, the philosopher must take cognizance of the totality 
of things. A method which ignores causality, as well as the 
other laws governing phenomena, is one-sided, open to 
error, and seriously unphilosophical. 

We may add to this criticism of pure empiricism in 
philosophy another based on the essential relativity of the 
analytic method. For the experimentalist, facts alone are of 
value, but facts in themselves have no cognitive value nor 
are they of necessity bound together by any principles or 
laws possessing objective validity. Facts are but the instru- 
ments of thought, of practical value, but in no sense, as far 
as our knowledge can go, related to any underlying realities. 
Reality may exist, the Absolute may be conceivable, the 
laws of thought and being may possess validity, but sci- 
entific investigation in the positivist sense of the term, 
is powerless in the face of such problems. The empirical 
method is the negation, therefore, or, at best, a stumbling- 
block in the onward progress of human thought towards 
what is final, complete, and unchangeable truth. 


The Deductive or Synthetic a Priori Method.—The 
Deductive method is the opposite of the Analytic. It 
proposes to deduce, or to descend, from a central simple 
truth, intuitively known, to a whole series of secondary 
truths, more complex than the original datum. Included 
in the first all-embracing principle is contained every truth 
which the philosopher must know. It is the task of the 
deductionist to discover this primitive idea, and from it, 
by a logical process of reasoning, to formulate the whole 
fabric of knowable truth. Some thinkers have conceived 
this Absolute to be God, others have called it Being. 

Plato was a deductionist. Amongst modern thinkers, 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS 19 


Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz attempted in geometrical 
fashion to bind up all knowledge into a few simple axioms. 
The successors of Kant, and especially Hegel, are likewise 
to be classed as Synthetic a Priori thinkers. Starting from 
an intuition of Absolute Being, which they conceived, in 
pantheistic fashion, to be identical with God, they arrived 
at a metaphysics of reality which was contained in the 
Absolute, existed by virtue of the Absolute, and must 
eventually return to be absorbed again in the Absolute. 

The principal criticism to which the Deductive method 
leaves itself open is that it makes no use of, in fact dis- 
parages, the vast treasures of information which have come 
to us as a direct result of our observation of the world and of 
man. This is a fatal objection. If philosophy is to arrive 
at the whole truth, its bounden duty is to leave no stone 
unturned in its pursuit of fact. Facts should precede, not 
follow upon, theories. And to assign causes anterior to an 
examination of the facts is to put the cart before the horse. 

Facts, too, act as a wholesome check on our a priori and 
preconceived notions of reality. No small amount of the 
opprobrium which has been cast upon philosophy in the 
past, because of its alleged impractical and speculative 
character, has resulted from the manifest exaggerations of 
the followers of the Deductive method. 


The Analytico-Synthetic Method.—This method is a 
combination of the Analytic and Synthetic, and is the 
only method not open to the serious objections brought 
against either of them taken separately. It is the natural 
method of thought itself, for it is by combined analysis and 
synthesis, induction and deduction, that we eventually 
reach indisputable truth. The great majority of philos- 
ophers, to say nothing of the great scientists, have been 
advocates of this method, and have used it constantly in 


20 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


producing the wonderful syntheses of orderly and organized 
knowledge which they have given to the world. Even the 
professed experimentalists have not disdained to synthesize 
into metaphysical constructions the conclusions they re- 
vealed by patient analytical work. 

The true method of philosophy must be, first of all, 
analytical. By reflecting critically on the assumptions of 
the particular sciences we arrive at a body of presuppositions 
which are common to all the sciences. The principles which 
lie at the basis of psychology are the selfsame principles 
upon which biology, chemistry, or physics have been 
reared. Psychology presupposes the existence of a psy- 
chologist, of a mind to study, of the law of causality. 
Biology presupposes the existence of a biologist, of living 
things, and of the law of cause and effect. Philosophy 
sifts, criticises, accepts, or rejects these common assump- 
tions. It is then ready to proceed to a synthesis, to the 
construction of a system of thought which will both justify 
and explain, in terms of the widest possible generalization, 
the implications imbedded in human experience. It must 
not be forgotten, however, that philosophy builds upon 
something more than the mere presuppositions of science, 
even when justified by analysis. Centuries of thought, the 
wisdom which has resulted from the experience of the race, 
bring to the thinker valuable material from which, by a 
process of selection, he will sort out the pure gold from the 
alloy, to fashion a thing of marvelous beauty, truth pure 
and undefiled. 

To the beginner in philosophy method is not so important 
as the spirit with which he approaches the study of its 
problems. ‘There is no royal road to wisdom. Patience, 
coupled with humility, are the two most needed intellectual 
virtues for him who would follow in the footsteps of the 
world’s sages. Disregard of the teachings of the past is 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS ar 


certain to hamper the novice in philosophy in his search 
for truth. The world indeed has not learned from the great 
thinkers of bygone ages everything that there is to be 
learned. Plato and Aristotle have a message for the pre- 
sent which only the proud and self-sufficient will disdain 
to hear. Moreover, to possess in goodly measure the trait 
of teachableness is the best possible preparation for one 
who expects to learn and to profit by his excursions into 
the field of what has been aptly called “the science of 
sciences.” The man who comes with preconceived notions 
and set opinions closes the door of truth in his own face. 

Discussion is the life breath of philosophy. To philos- 
ophize is to discuss, that is, to search out the reasons for 
things, to explain them, to accept or reject them after 
serious examination. For philosophical discussion to be 
profitable, however, certain rules must be observed. It 
is in the spirit of the following canons that every student 
should venture to discuss the problems of philosophy: 

1. He must respect facts. 

2. He must respect self-evident principles. 

3. He must love truth. 

4. He must acknowledge the claims and excellence of 

morality.1 


The Value of Philosophy.—Many question the value of 
the study of philosophy principally because of its supposed 
impractical character.2, So much emphasis has been placed 
by modern education on professional subjects, or on sub- 
jects which prepare one directly for a business career or a 
profession, that the value of philosophical studies has been 
greatly obscured in the minds of many college students. 


1 Ollé-Laprune, La Philosophie et Le Temps Present, 5th ed., p. 323. 
2 Fullerton, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 263 et seq.; Russell, The Problems of 


Philosophy, pp. 237-250, 


22 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


The tendency to devote as little time as possible to subjects 
like metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics has grown to 
such an alarming extent that the very future of the philo- 
sophical disciplines is menaced. No educational policy 
could have more disastrous results for our national culture 
than a weakening, with an eventual elimination from the 
curriculum of colleges and universities, of the courses given 
in pure philosophy. 

Philosophy should have a place, no less important than 
the languages, mathematics, or physical science in the 
formation of every man. ‘The breadth of view which 
results from an intimate contact with the great problems of 
philosophy would in itself justify the amount of time 
necessary to become acquainted with them. No man is so 
narrow as he who knows but one subject, no matter how 
intensively. Knowledge cannot be packed away into 
water-tight compartments of the mind and labeled science, 
economics, history. Knowledge is a whole, and the man 
who sees it as a whole, that is, ‘‘philosophically,” sees every 
item truly and in its proper perspective. Not only does 
philosophy unify knowledge, but it criticises and evaluates 
the information derived from all other sources. To be 
freed from the prejudices of some one particular science, to 
rise above the conventions of a particular country, or even 
of a century, is a mental possession worth any price one may 
be called upon to pay for it. 

Moreover, no man should be considered truly educated 
who is not acquainted with the best products of the human 
mind down the centuries. And the history of the best in 
human thought is the history of philosophical thinking. 
The end purpose of philosophy is to produce knowledge, and 
what knowledge is of more worth than that which deals 
with the most fundamental and far-reaching questions which 
have troubled mankind since the beginnings of history? 


PHILOSOPHY: MEANING, SCOPE, METHODS 23 


If it is of value to know the habits of the amceba, to be 
able to dissect a crayfish, or to trace the rise of industrialism 
in modern society, is it not of equal value to know what 
mankind has thought, and thinks, of the problems of matter 
and mind, of the origin and validity of knowledge, or of the 
meaning and purpose of human life? To know Newton, 
Pasteur, Helmholtz and to be ignorant of Plato, Aristotle, 
Thomas Aquinas, and Kant, is to be acquainted with but a 
part, and that a very insignificant one, of the great spiritual 
influences which have moulded our civilization and made 
it what it is to-day. 

Philosophy, too, exerts a very beneficial effect on the 
individual who seriously contemplates its problems. What 
man has not sought for the answers to the great questions 
which have troubled the human mind since its very origin? 
Who has not asked himself, Who am I?) Why am I here? 
Whither am I going? Our minds seek certainty, freedom 
from doubts, a stable guide to action. It is true that every 
man has a “‘philosophy of life,” although he may be quite 
unconscious of the possession. There is a difference, how- 
ever, between the philosophy of the uneducated and that 
of him who has, under the guidance of the great thinkers of 
the past, thought out for himself a reasoned rule of action. 
The philosopher walks by the light of the best thoughts of 
the race. His mind has been clarified, his will strengthened, 
his motives purified, for he has sounded the reasons of 
things. To know the causes of things, is to go to the very 
source of all light. 


REFERENCES 


Aquinas, Tuomas: Summa contra Gentiles, New Translation by Eng- 
lish Dominicans. 

Catholic Encyclopedia: Article “ Philosophy,” Vol. XII. 

CorFey: Ontology or the Theory of Being. 


24 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


DusrAy: Introductory Philosophy. 

FULLERTON: An Introduction to Philosophy. 
HALDANE: Essays in Philosophical Criticism. 
HoERNLE: Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics. 
JAMES, WILLIAM: Some Problems of Philosophy. 
Jevons: Philosophy, What Is It? 

KULPE: Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Pillsbury and Titchener. 
Lapp: Introduction to Philosophy. 

LEIGHTON: The Field of Philosophy. 

Marvin: [niroduction to Systematic Philosophy. 
Mercier: A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy. 
OLLE-LAPRUNE: La Philosophie et Le Temps Present. 
PAULSEN: Introduction to Philosophy, trans. Thilly. 
Perry: The Approach to Philosophy. 

RUSSELL, BERTRAND: The Problems of Philosophy. 


CHAPTER II 
THE PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 


The Problem.—At the very outset, it is only fair to 
impress upon the student that the problems of philosophy 
are of so intricate a character that they cannot be stated 
always in such clear-cut fashion so that each one forms a 
distinct question in itself, to which an equally distinct and 
separate reply can be given. While there are indeed many 
problems of a most fundamental kind, yet each one of these 
has relations more or less intimate with other problems, so 
that a complete answer often entails a reply to questions 
raised in a totally different field of philosophy. For example, 
we cannot discuss the central problem of metaphysics, 
namely, that of the one and the many, without glancing at 
the same time at the problems of psychology and of epis- 
temology. If the universe is one, it follows that it must be 
either a materialistic or a spiritualistic universe and if so, 
all reality, including man, must be either matter or spirit. 
Likewise, the theory of knowledge which we accept will 
color our views of the nature of reality, for if consciousness 
can only know its own states, then, at least as far as knowl- 
edge goes, the only universe which exists must be a product 
of the mind. In philosophy one central problem always 
leads to another, with the result that it is often of the utmost 
importance not only to solve correctly a specific question, 
but to keep constantly before our minds the possible bear- 
ings of every solution upon other closely related domains of 
thought. 

25 


26 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Supposing, therefore, for the time being, that we can know 
that a world external to our minds really exists, the ques- 
tion spontaneously arises as to the nature of this reality. 
From everyday observation, no less than from the knowl- 
edge we have gathered from science, it is apparent that the. 
world in which we exist is made up of many things. But 
are these so-called things essentially different from one 
another, and is it not possible to resolve them all, with their 
manifold differences, into two or three fundamental forms 
of reality, or even possibly, into one, in which they all agree 
despite apparent differences? ‘There can be no doubt 
of the fact that the human mind naturally tries to combine 
the scattered fragments of its knowledge of real existences 
into some sort of unity. This process of simplification 
and unification is going on constantly. The very term 
“universe” designates an attempt to understand the 
manifold and fragmentary experiences of everyday life in 
terms of unity. 

Now, on the surface, reality is not only manifold, it is 
incapable of being expressed in any sort of unity. For the 
untutored mind, there are as many different kinds of reality 
as there are seemingly different kinds of things. To the 
philosopher, however, the task of bringing order out of the 
apparent chaos of our ordinary experience is not hopeless. 
Behind all the differences, startling and arresting as un- 
doubtedly they are, he beholds likenesses. Although 
things are separated from one another, he can perceive 
them together; and the resemblances of things, while not 
as apparent, are, after some study, as striking as the differ- 
ences which divide them. The thinker, therefore, asks 
himself: Is reality, the totality of human experience, the 
universe, the cosmos, all things, at bottom but one thing 
or must we believe that many things exist, so different from 
one another that the resolution of them all into some sort 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 27 


of unity is impossible? In other words, is the world one 
or is it many? 

The school of Philosophy which answers that there is but 
one reality, and that an all-inclusive one, is called Monism 
or Singularism. Those who believe that reality is made 
up of many distinct beings, irreducible to any further 
unity, form the school of philosophical Dualism or Plural- 
ism. 


Monism.—Monism is the doctrine which believes that 
all reality can be expressed in unitary terms. It is one of 
the fundamental points of view in philosophy, and has 
had defenders since the very beginning of the history of 
thought up to our own times. Many philosophers to- 
day are monists. They differ from their predecessors 
in this, that the tendency of contemporary Monism 
is frankly materialistic and evolutionary. Free Thought 
of a very radical type seems tobe the controlling spirit 
of this school. 

The older systems of Monism were frequently spiritual- 
istic, believing that all reality is but an aspect of mind, and 
ultimately resolvable into the Supreme Being, God. This 
form of Monism is both idealistic and pantheistic, and 
numbers amongst its more prominent defenders the ancient 
Hindu thinkers, Plotinus and the Neo-Platonists, and in 
modern philosophy, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, Bradley, and 
Royce. 

Because Monism ranks as a system of philosophy, and 
is therefore something more than a mere theory, it is 
apparent that for every problem it has a solution to offer 
in line with its primary belief as to the oneness of all things. 
It will be necessary, therefore, to return to the monistic 
philosophy again and again in subsequent chapters, espe- 
cially when treating of the nature of mind, of the value of 


28 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


knowledge, and of the relations of religion to philosophy. 
Here we shall attempt to trace only the main outlines of 
Monism, as it has appeared in metaphysics. 


Metaphysical Monism.—To the question, how many 
things there are in the universe, Monism replies that there 
is but one, and this one is God. Sense experience would 
lead us to believe that reality is manifold, but the senses 
are not to be trusted. The many is an illusion. There is 
no distinctness or separateness in the universe, but only 
an illusory plurality. To judge things by what they 
appear to be is to be deceived. Neither do things 
change. The supposed action of one thing on another 
is likewise an illusion. The only existence is God, who is 
immutable, eternal, all-inclusive. The so-called ‘“‘real 
things”’ of this so-called real world are at best outer aspects 
of the one reality. God is all, and all is God. This view is 
also called Pantheism. 


The Monism of Spinoza.—Spinoza is probably the best 
representative of the idealistic and spiritualistic type of 
Monism in modern philosophy. His philosophy is Panthe- 
ism in its purest form. According to Spinoza, the temporary 
and finite is but an expression of the eternal and infinite. 
God is the one-all, for the reason that He is the only sub- 
stance. Now the very essence of a substance is infinity. 
Spinoza proves the proposition that “‘every substance is 
necessarily infinite” by the following argument: “There 
does not exist more than one substance with a given at- 
tribute, and it belongs to the nature of that one to exist. 
It must, therefore, belong to its nature to exist either as 
finite or as infinite. Butnot as finite. For it would have 
to be limited by another of the same nature, and this, also, 
would necessarily have to exist. There would, then, be 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY = 29 


two substances with the same attribute, which is absurd. 
It therefore exists as infinite.” 1 The argument of Spinoza 
stands or falls with his idea of substance, which he defines 
as follows: ‘‘ By substance I mean that which is in itself, and 
is conceived by means of itself: that is, that the conception 
of which does not need to be formed from the conception 
of any other thing.”’? This definition of substance is, of 
course, a patent ambiguity, for the only substance which 
exists of itself, and in itself, is the necessary being, God. 
To use the word ‘‘substance” in the Spinozean conception 
of the term is to change its whole meaning, and to cause, 
as Spinoza actually did cause, confusion and disorder in 
philosophic thought.® 2 

God, in this view, is not only the life of the world, or a 
world soul, He actually is the world. Everything comes 
from Him, and depends upon His divine nature. Nature, 
in the sense of this world and all that it contains, is thus 
caught up in God who expresses Himself by means of His 
two attributes of thought and extension, which do not, 
however, constitute two separate beings. In a universe in 
which there exists but a single being, and that infinite, it is 
useless to look for marks which would distinguish sub- 
stances from one another. 

It need scarcely be pointed out that the pantheism of 
Spinoza, only the one-God exists, is not to be confounded 
with monotheism which holds that one God alone exists. 
While monotheism believes that the divine nature itself 
demands of necessity that God be eternal, unchangeable, 
and omnipresent, it does not, on the other hand, deny 
reality to things outside of God. These things both exist, 
separate from the existence of God, and act as primary 


1 The Philosophy of Spinoza, Trans. Fullerton, p. 29. 

2 Spinoza, op. cit., p. 25. 

3 For a discussion of the true meaning of substance, and a critique of false ideas 
concerning the same,see Coffey, Ontology, pp. 207 et seq. 


30 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


agents, to a certain extent independent of the acts of God. 
Thought is an attribute of the Deity, but extension is an 
attribute of matter alone. Matter and mind, or the world 
and God, are therefore not to be confused as they are in the 
system of Spinoza. ! 


The Monism of Hegel.—Another form of Monism in 
which the pantheistic trend is not so prominently displayed, 
but which is of a no less spiritualistic type than the theory 
of Spinoza, is the Idealistic Monism of Hegel. It has been 
called Jogical pantheism to distinguish it from metaphysical 
pantheism, for the reason that the world is not viewed so 
much as one with God (as a matter of fact, God, the infinite 
and absolute, does not exist except as the terminus of our 
realization of the wholeness of things) but as a world un- 
folding, according to the laws of logical necessity, the ideal 
content of reality. The universe is a whole or a unit which, 
through the ages, has evolved into a multitude of forms, 
each one of which is the partial expression in self-con- 
sciousness of the Absolute. 

This philosophy of Hegel is known variously as Logical 
or Objective Idealism, Idealistic Monism, or the Philosophy 
of the Absolute. According to Hegel, there is no reality 
outside our thoughts. Experience, or consciousness, alone 
justifies us in asserting that a thing exists. Therefore, for 
a thing to exist it must first be thought. All knowledge is 
built up by a uniting of individual experience with the 
universal truth, or Idea, which Idea is not an abstraction, 
but a real whole, organically existing. This whole alone 
is true. Things possess truth only in as far as they reflect 
the nature of this whole in the process of its unfolding. 
“The True is the Whole,’ writes Hegel. ‘‘The whole, 


‘For a complete discussion of Pantheism vs. Theism see Ward, The Philosophy of 
Theism. 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY ) 3r 


however, is only the essence perfecting itself through its 
development. It must be said of the Absolute that it is 
essentially result, that only at the end is it what it is in 
truth. And herein consists its real nature—in being the 
Actual, Subject, or Self-developing Principle.”! 

The individual exists, but only as an aspect of the whole. 
The only real universal is the divine Idea which embodies 
in itself the totality of things and determines their relations 
both to itself and to one another. The divine Idea is the 
world of the Absolute Self. Nor is this universe a mere 
abstraction of the mind. It is an organic thing, which in- 
cludes all particular things, each one of which is but a faint 
expression of the whole, but all of which, taken together, 
notwithstanding the fact that they are but finites, con- 
stitute the Absolute Idea. Likewise, it is numerically one 
with all the finites which its thinking covers. It is thus 
that Hegel attempts to explain the relations between the 
finite and infinite, as well as between the mind and reality, 


which he holds to be one. 2 


1 Phenomenology of Mind, p. 14. 

2 Royce, in The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, p. 225, has stated the doctrine of 
Hegel in the following terms: ‘‘One could not mention a formula more characteristic 
of the Hegelian doctrine than this account of what Hegel calls the ‘concrete univer- 
sal,’ which constructs, brings forth, in the endless play and toil of rationality, its 
own ‘differences,’ the individuals of the world of experience. It is this which for 
him explains how in the church or in the state we, the individuals, find ourselves 
‘members one of another.’ It is this that shows us the whole world as an organism. 
Wherever this sort of universality is mot found, as is the case in the world of uncom- 
prehended sense-facts, where, for instance, only men as individuals seem to exist, 
and man appears to us as a dead abstraction, we are not dealing with the world of 
truth. The first sign that we are dealing with the truth itself is our success in dis- 
covering an organic connection amongst things. For organism is selfhood or person- 
ality viewed in its outward manifestation. There is, then, for Hegel a lower form 
of thinking that reaches only a Verstandes-Allgemeinheit. Such thinking finds itself 
in the presence of individual facts, and regards the universal either as a bare abstrac- 
tion, or else as present only in each individual as its inner and separate nature. For 
such thinking the only concrete truth is the world of individual things as such. But 
the deeper insight into the world is revealed to us through a reflection upon the 
nature of self-consciousness, wherein the universal, or self, is the organic total of the 
facts of consciousness, which exist not save as related to one another, and to this 
universal.” 


ee AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


The great difference between the Monism of Spinoza 
and that of Hegel lies in their different conceptions of the 
Absolute. For Spinoza, substance or God is essentially 
static, and only by an evident contradiction did he assign 
to it individuality and purposeful activity. On the other 
hand, the Hegelian Absolute, besides being the ground of 
all reality, is essentially dynamic, manifesting itself in all 
the countless ways in which this universe, man, social 
institutions, and the state, realize the truth which compre- 
hends them all and alone makes them all intelligible. 

Contemporary thinkers, like Bradley and Royce, have 
attempted to refine the thought of Hegel and to make more 
explicit his philosophy of the Absolute, particularly on the 
side of its contacts with man and his moral nature. Royce 
is very insistent in his interpretation of the Absolute as the 
self of selves, or even the person of persons, which is in the 
process of fulfilling completely all possible outcomes and 
meanings. 

It should be noted that Monism of the idealistic type is 
on the wane at the present time. Not only in its pure form 
as Hegelianism, but also in the shape of Neo-Hegelianism, 
the doctrine of idealistic Monism has suffered a decided 
eclipse. The reaction away from Monism, led by such 
men as William James, has traveled very far along the road 
in the direction of an acceptance of both a realistic and 
pluralistic universe. Spiritualistic Monism has had its day, 
and in the face of the terrific onslaughts which it is ex- 
periencing from the side of modern realism, it can be as- 
serted safely that there is little chance of a successful 
revival of monistic thinking, at least in our day. 


Materialistic Monism.—Materialistic Monism is the 
direct opposite of Idealistic Monism, and asserts that all 
reality is but matter. What we call mind is matter in 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 33 


motion. The essential attributes of matter are extension 
and impenetrability, and its primary activity is motion. 
These principles explain all reality, and there is no necessity 
of calling into existence such things as souls, states of 
consciousness, or even God, to make clear the nature of 
what real things are. 

This form of Monism is to be identified with what is 
ordinarily known as Materialism. As a metaphysical 
doctrine, Materialism, at least of the crude type, has never 
occupied a strong place in the hierarchy of philosophical 
systems. Amongst the Greeks the Ionian school was 
materialistic, and amongst modern philosophers, Hobbes, 
Priestley, La Mettrie, and Biichner accepted the point of 
view of materialism. 

Modern Materialism has spent most of its efforts in the 
fields of Cosmology and of Psychology, and especially in 
the latter, where many of its successes have been attained. 
For example, the physiological explanation of the nature of 
our psychical processes is purely a materialistic explana- 
tion. The theory of evolution gave for a time new life to 
materialism. In recent years, however, it has been almost 
completely submerged by the advance of spiritualistic 
thought, and is quite generally regarded now as a totally 
inadequate explanation of the universe. Metaphysical 
materialism has few, if any, followers at the present time. 
Those who do accept it, like the disciples of Haeckel, are 
almost a unit in repudiating the central doctrine of ancient 
materialism; namely, that reality as such is body. They 
confine themselves to a denial of the differences between 
body and mind, uniting both in a higher something distinct 
from either matter or spirit. Materialism to-day is more a 
tendency, a temper of the philosophic mind, than a system 
of philosophy, and numbers its adherents principally 
amongst the positivist scientists and the advocates of 


34 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


radical thought, especially in matters of religion and of 
ethics. 


Arguments in favor of Monism.—The arguments or- 
dinarily advanced to justify metaphysical monism are 
the following:! That which is most general must be one. 
Particular or special ideas are all referable to a more 
general idea, and as there is, moreover, a perfect parallel 
between thought and existence, the most universal thought 
must be the most universal being. Therefore, the high- 
est thought is but the expression of the highest being, 
which is one. 

All causality is finally explainable only on the assumption 
that there exists an ultimate cause, which causes all things, 
but is itself causeless. 

To exist is to be one. The being, therefore, which in- 
cludes all existence must be one. 

The best and most beautiful, since it is the superlative 
of its kind, must be one. 

The above arguments, although stated in four different 
ways, are really but one argument, whose validity depends 
on our acceptance of the deductionist principle that the 
special is necessarily contained in the more general. But 
this is precisely the point at issue, and is a principle which 
all realists will deny or seriously call into question.? Be- 
cause truth is simple ordinarily, it does not follow that 
universally the simple is more true than the complex. 
Very often the simple and the true are synonymous, and 
quite as often they are not. As a matter of fact, even 


1 Kiilpe, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 115. 

2 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 65, calls this the “ error of psuedo- 
simplicity.” ‘It consists in the failure to recognize the difference between the sim- 
plicity that precedes analysis, and the simplicity that is revealed by analysis; between 
the apparent simplicity of an analyzed complex, and the real simplicity of the ulti- 
mate terms of analysis; or between the simplicity that is owing to the little that 
one knows, and that which is owing to the much that one knows.” 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY - 35 


granting for the sake of argument the monistic contention, 
it still would remain true that the complex can never be 
fully explained in terms solely of the simple. Many dis- 
tinct and separate things actually exist, and everyday 
observation convinces us of their existence. But it is 
assuredly no explanation of this manifold to deny the 
multiplicity of actual existences by affirming the meta- 
physical unity of all things. 


Criticism of Monism.—The real difficulty in every form 
of monism or of singularism is its refusal to look at facts, 
and its support of an a priori theory which contradicts ex- 
perience, at least as far as we are capable of knowing and 
appraising it. Change is one, if not the most prominent, 
characteristic of reality as experienced by us. Now, one 
does not explain this fundamental and all-embracing fact 
of human experience by explaining it away. If the Abso- 
lute be immutable and timeless, as it must be in any system 
of Monism, how does this Absolute unity combine in itself 
the multitude of real changes taking place at every minute 
of the day, not only in ourselves, in our feelings, thoughts, 
and desires, but in the things, living and non-living, which 
surround us? The failure to explain change is the fatal 
error of every form of monistic thought. 

Another fact of experience which evidently escapes the 
attention of the monist is that of the real relations actually 
existing amongst things. So simple, evident, and universal 
is this fact of interaction that no assumption other than that 
of a universe which is, at least partially, both temporal 
and quantitative sufficiently broad enough to comprehend 
the same. Real relations between the parts of an all-in- 
clusive Absolute are unthinkable, for the very simple reason 
that the Absolute has no parts. In the dualistic conception, 
on the other hand, both mind and matter exist as distinct 


36 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


entities, preserving thereby the possibility of acting one 
upon the other. 

Singularism implies a determinist philosophy which 
renders impossible any acceptance of freedom, especially 
for the human individual. If the Absolute alone exists, 
and man is but a necessary element of this perfect whole, 
all his activities are predetermined by a necessary, com- 
plete, and eternal submission to the functioning of the whole. 
God alone really acts; the actions of men are determined 
by the plans of the Absolute, according to which we move, 
and live, and have our being without the slightest chance 
of selection or control on our part. This is a conception 
of human nature which is not only erroneous, but of no 
practical utility in ordinary life. Human society, and all 
human intercourse, are founded on the assumption of man’s 
freedom. Not to recognize the freedom of man, as Monism 
fails to do, is to construct a universe full of logical contra- 
dictions and practical impossibilities.? 

This conception is likewise in open conflict with the 
deeply rooted belief of every man that he is an individual 
self, who thinks, feels, and acts. I am not a mere part of 
an Absolute whole, a fragment of an all-inclusive one (at 
least I never think of myself as such), neither do I think 
of any other man other than as an individual self, possess- 
ing self-consciousness no less than myself. My whole 
experience is against the view which would submerge my 
own individuality, or that of another man, in the supreme 
Oneness of a higher, more universal individuality. 

Finally, Monism, in its search for logical unity, very 
illogically passes from the world of mere thought to that 
of reality, falsely assuming that because our thoughts can 
be reduced to a unity, in the form of Absolute Idea, reality 


In this connection read the chapter “‘Absolute Idealism and Religion ” in Perry, 
Present Philosophical Tendencies, especially pp. 188-192. 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 37 


must be an identical outer expression of this inner Idea. 
This process is a reversal of the correct mode of reasoning. 
Thought should explain reality, not vice versa. No phi- 
losophy of the universe can hope to stand which fails to face 
facts as they exist, but prefers to torture and distort them 
on the Procrustean bed of its own a priori principles. 

Many philosophers have accepted Monism for the reason 
that, urged on by the laudable desire to achieve unity, they 
saw in every form of Dualism the erection of an impasse 
against which the human mind revolts in its search for the 
truth. Itis not open to doubt that the tendency to Monism 
has been marked throughout the whole history of philos- 
ophy, and the assumption of the unity of all reality has been, 
more or less an avowed postulate, especially of modern 
thought. But as Kiilpe remarks: ‘‘Reverence for unity, 
whether ethical, esthetical or mystical, has nothing at all 
to do with a scientific metaphysic.”’ ! 

There is a limit to the unifying process in human knowl- 
edge. The process of unification in ordinary experience, as 
well as in scientific knowledge, should and must continue, 
but there comes a point where to strive for a further and 
more elementary unity is to distort facts, and can only 
result in confusion of thought and in error. If the rational 
were coterminous with the real, then the possibility of 
some day arriving at a series of categories, or of one cate- 
gory, which would encompass all reality might be admitted. 
But Hegel has failed to prove the basis of his whole theory; 
namely, that only the rational is real. Until Monism can 
convince the philosophical world that this proposition is 
provable, the better part of prudence and of wisdom would 
seem to dictate an acceptance of Dualism, with all its lack 
of completeness, as the more logical working theory. 

Dualism must protest, also, the insinuation against its 

1 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 116. 


38 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


scientific character, which is given expression by many | 
idealists, to the effect that dualism is not founded on sound 
arguments, but has arisen mainly as a protest against some 
exaggerated form or other of Monism. Ladd repeats this 
observation when he writes: ‘‘It is to be noted that Dualism 
arises—at least in modern times—almost altogether as a 
protest against some form of Monism, which is deemed 
extreme or dangerous.” ! 

We venture to assert that it is not as a protest against 
Monism that Dualism exists to-day, and has attracted to its 
banner a great number of thinking men. Dualism is 
securely founded on facts, which rebel against the a priori 
explanations of the Idealists. The distinction between self 
and non-self, body and mind, matter and force, subject and 
object, good and evil, is of such universality, and of such 
cogency, that we must demand more than the tendency of 
the mind to achieve unity in thought before we can consent 
to destroy a series of differences so deeply rooted in nature, 
thought, and human life. Every thinker has an abiding 
sympathy with the efforts of those who search so diligently 
for the key which will unlock the treasures of the universe. 
But where shall that key be found? Assuredly, not in 
Monism. Ladd himself swears away the main strength of 
the monistic position when he cautions its followers against 
wiping out the dualistic distinctions which are so prominent 
a part of the nature of man and of the universe. ‘“‘ Forms 
of Monism, which virtually contradict the distinction be- 
tween the reality, me, and the reality that is nof-me, cannot 
succeed in preventing the persistent recurrence of rival 
dualistic schemes. Monism must so construct its tenets 
as to preserve, or, at least, as not to contradict and destroy 
the truths implicated in this distinction; otherwise, it cannot 
remain in possession of the rightful domain of philosophy. 


1 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 402. 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 39 


But even more imperative, and far more difficult, is the 
task imposed upon Monism by those dualistic considera- 
tions which emerge on ethical grounds. To blur, or reduce, 
or deny, valid ethical distinctions is to furnish an elixir 
of life to an expiring Dualism; it is even to equip it with an 
all-conquering sword. No form of Monism can persistently 
maintain itself which erects its system upon the ruins of 
fundamental ethical principles and ideas.” 1 

A detailed criticism of Materialistic Monism in its 
psychological implications will be given in the chapter on 
the psycho-physical problem. As far as the ontological 
aspects of materialism go, it is sufficient to note here that 
materialism stops short of the very problem under dis- 
cussion by making all reality synonymous with matter. 
To call mind body, and to attempt an explanation of the 
processes of consciousness in the terms of physiology, is 
not to give an answer to the problem of reality, but rather 
to deny its existence. The task of metaphysics is not to 
define whether subject and object, ideal and real exist, but 
whether they are two distinct things, or are ultimately 
resolvable into a higher reality, which is not two but one.? 


Dualism.—The term Dualism, like so many other terms 
in philosophy, does not bear a constant meaning throughout 
the history of thought. It is employed in different mean- 
ings by different schools. In general, however, it designates 
a system of philosophy which, in contrast to Monism, 
believes that reality is dual; that is to say, that in the ulti- 
mate analysis of being we will arrive at two principles, one 
material and the other, spiritual. These two principles are 
so essentially different from each other that any further 


1 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 404; James, A Pluralistic Universe, passim, for a 
criticism of the different forms of Monism; also James, Some Problems of Philosophy, 
pp. 135 et seq. 

2 Turner in Catholic Encyclopedia, Article ‘‘Monism,” Vol. X, pp. 483-487. 


40 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


reduction of them into a more fundamental kind of unity 
is impossible. 


Naive Dualism.—Dualism is used to designate widely 
different schools of thought. In the first place, there is 
Naive Dualism, which holds that bodies alone really exist, 
although alongside of and often dominating them there are 
spirits, possessing a secondary kind of reality, which in- 
fluence the bodies as efficient forces, and continue to exist, 
when separated from them, in the guise of ghosts or de- 
parted spirits. This was the view of primitive thought, as 
well as of primitive religion, especially in the East. To-day, 
although the plain man has rejected the manifest absurdi- 
ties contained in this religious-popular conception of reality, 
he remains a dualist in the sense that he rejects the oneness 
of all things, and believes that body and mind are two 
distinct realities, operating on each other in a way that is 
beyond understanding. 


The Dualism of Aristotle-——Philosophical Dualism is a 
product of the Aristotelian thought, and is often called 
Common-sense Dualism, for the reason that it acknowledges 
the distinction between mind and body, or, better, between 
physical and psychical phenomena, a distinction which our 
everyday experience commits us to. Dualism, however, 
is compounded of something more than the facts which are 
apparent to every thinking man, and are given to us in 
daily contact with one another and with the world; nor 
does it accept these facts until, after a full and complete 
criticism of their validity, it has been proved beyond a 
doubt that they are real. It is this critical attitude which 
Dualism assumes towards the acceptances of common 
sense that justifies its claim to be considered a philosophy 
in the most rigid sense of the term, 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY a1 


Dualism believes in the reality of an extra~-mental world 
despite the fact that sense perception can be shown to err 
in many of its deliverances or, that the influence of the 
mental is oftentimes very great in our constructions of the 
external world, elaborated from the data of sense experience. 
Dualism, therefore, is something more than a “protest” 
against Monism. It is a reasoned philosophy of nature, 
thoroughly consonant with accepted facts as we know 
them. 

The fundamental doctrine of ontological Dualism is that 
the distinction between mind and body, subject and object, 
cannot be broken down. This distinction is final and 
absolute. Body possesses extension, and exists in time. 
The mind is unextended, and also exists in time. Mental 
states, no less than bodily states, are subject to change. 
Both temporal and quantitative elements are inherent in 
the very nature of reality as we know it and as it exists, 
with the exception of the mind, which is unextended or 
spiritual. The difference between body and mind is, there- 
fore, a difference not only of degree, but of kind. The 
universe contains both types of being. While it is true that 
one kind of being can and does act upon the other (the 
manner of this interaction is a special problem in itself) 
mind and matter are not to be confused as inner or outer 
aspects of one underlying ground of reality, but must be 
kept separate and distinct as two fundamental principles 
of nature. 

Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas were philosophical 
dualists, and their dualism influenced deeply the other 
parts of their philosophy, especially their psychology, 
epistemology, and ethics. Contemporary thinkers are re- 
turning in great numbers to the above-stated view. There 
are undoubtedly great differences to be noted between the 
ancient or medizval dualists and modern dualism; the 


42 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


fundamental distinction, however, between the material 
and spiritual is accepted by both schools. This form of 
Dualism is quite different from the extreme Dualism of 
Descartes, a system of philosophy which has had the most 
widespread and serious consequences in modern philoso- 


phy. 


The Extreme Dualism of Descartes.—In the philosophy 
of Descartes, the difference between mind and body was 
regarded as so wide that by no possibility could either one 
act in any effective way upon the other. In the case of man, 
a feeble kind of interaction, of a purely mechanical nature, 
is acknowledged, evidently a concession on the part of Des- 
cartes to popular opinion. The mind was a thinking sub- 
ject, a “res cogitans.” Thought was of its very essence. 
The mind was therefore an immaterial, unextended, self- 
acting principle.1 

Having determined thus the nature of mind, he contrasts 
it with the body, or matter, which is extended a ‘“‘res 
extensa,’’ composed of parts, and possessing motion by 
reason of its weight or the impact of its constituent atoms 
upon one another. There are, therefore, in this world two 
distinct substances, one spiritual and the other material. 
The body is a machine, and the soul stands to it much in 
the relation of a pilot to the boat which he guides. Animals 
likewise are mere machines. It is the possession of a soul 
which raises the human individual above the level of the 
automaton. 

The founder of modern Dualism influenced philosophic 
thought very extensively. From the extreme doctrine 
of Descartes regarding the body and mind came in one 


' Descartes, Meditations, Il, Trans. Veith: ‘But, what, then, am I? A thinking 
thing (res cogitans) it has been said. But what is a thinking thing? It is a thing 
that doubts, understands, conceives, affirms, denies, wills, refuses, that imagines 
also and perceives.” 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 43 


stream the Occasionalism of Malebranche, and, in another, 
the Idealism of Locke, Berkeley, Hume, and Kant. The 
Cartesian doctrine of the human body as a machine gave 
rise to the various theories of Mechanism which have 
proved so marked a characteristic of recent psychology. It 
must be remembered always that Descartes was first of all 
a psychologist, and that both the basis and outlook of his 
philosophy were psychological. By a natural process of 
reasoning his dualistic psychology formed the groundwork 
for a metaphysical dualism. It is thus that Descartes 
left to us what has been so justly called his ‘“‘luckless leg- 
acy” of two substances, matter and spirit, which are by 
their very nature antithetical, the gap between which can 
never be bridged.! 


Arguments in Favor of Dualism.—lIt is often asserted 
that thought can find no justification for Dualism on gen- 
eral grounds, and that any strength which the dualistic 
position possesses arises as a direct result of its opposition 
to Monism. No statement could be further from the truth. 
Dualism can be proved by legitimate reasons which stand 
the severest tests of everyday observation and need no a 
priori generalizations to bolster up their worth. 

In the first place, our belief in the existence of other peo- 
ple’s minds is a rational inference from our belief in the ex- 
istence of their bodies, for it is only by the operations of 
the body that the presence of a mind is revealed. If we 
cannot be sure of the existence of other people’s minds, 
neither can we be sure of the existence of their bodies. But 
to deny the existence of the external world is to end in 


1See Mercier, The Origins of Contemporary Psychology, trans. by W. H. Mitchell, 
for a very complete analysis of the influence of the Cartesian system upon the 
development of modern psychology. 

See Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 122-124, for the arguments ad- 
vanced by Berkeley against the Dualism of Descartes, from the point of view of 
Idealism. 


44 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Solipsism, a theory which renders impossible the existence 
of any kind of reality outside the thinker’s mind. Nothing 
in human experience justifies the acceptance of such a rad- 
ical position. In fact, everything points to the reality of 
both our own bodies and minds, as well as of those of other 
people. 

Physical science assumes the reality of the existence of 
matter. And this assumption has been proved to be true 
again and again by the results obtained through a multi- 
tude of scientific observations carried on at different times 
and places, and by a multitude of different scientists who 
could have no valid purpose in asserting that they dealt 
with realities, if such were not the case. If sound, light, 
heat, and electricity are not real things, what then is physics 
or chemistry? Modern science, at least on its experimental 
side, stands fixed irrevocably against a belief in any form 
of Monism. 

And what is true of the physical sciences is doubly so of 
the physiological and psychological. If the world is but 
a collection of mental states, it seems to be an extravagantly 
absurd thing to write of the influence of the brain centers 
upon our processes of memory, or to trace the physiological 
influences which so radically affect the growth and develop- 
ment of sensation. If any more cogent general reason is 
needed for a belief in dualism than that, without it, the 
foundations of science being false, the whole superstructure 
which it has so laboriously erected, would crumble to the 
ground, then it must be sought for outside the ordinary 
realms of human experience. Every instinct, every tend- 
ency in man’s intellectual makeup insistently calls out for 
an acknowledgment of the reality of body and mind. As 
Bertrand Russell has so well said, ‘Every principle of 
simplicity urges us to adopt the natural view, that there 
really are objects other than ourselves and our sense-data 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 45 


which have an existence not dependent upon our perceiving 
iverane 


Criticism of Dualism.—The objections generally brought 
against Dualism do not distinguish clearly between the 
various forms in which this theory has appeared. ‘That 
naive, and even extreme Dualism, are open to very serious, 
some would say unanswerable, arguments against their 
validity, can scarcely be questioned. The Cartesian theory, 
in particular, built as it is upon a false notion of substance, 
cannot stand up under a severe critical examination. Phil- 
osophical or scientific Dualism, on the other hand, is better 
grounded, and is more than able to take care of itself in the 
presence of objections from the side of Monism, either spir- 
itualistic or materialistic. 

The first, and most usual, difficulty brought against 
Dualism is that it fails to explain how two principles, the 
one extended and the other unextended, can act upon each 
other. Such interaction seems not only impossible, but 
even inconceivable. To which we might reply, that a fact 
is one thing and the explanation of it quite another. That 
the problem of interaction between body and mind does 
not present insuperable difficulties, and can be explained 
to a satisfactory degree, will be brought out in detail in 
the chapter on the psycho-physical problem. Suffice it to 
say here, even granting that no satisfactory explanation 
of interaction is at hand, we may not logically conclude 
that the fact of the existence of two distinct entities, body 

1 The Problems of Philosophy, p. 37, cf. also op. cit. p. 39: ‘‘Philosophy should show 
us the hierarchy of our instinctive beliefs, beginning with those we hold most strongly, 
and presenting each as much isolated and as free from irrelevant additions as possible. 
It should take care to show that, in the form in which they are finally set forth, our 
instinctive beliefs do not clash, but form a harmonious system. There can never 
be any reason for rejecting one instinctive belief except that it clashes with others; 


thus, if they are found to harmonize, the whole system becomes worthy of accept- 
ance.” 


46 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


and mind, is thereby rendered doubtful, even impossible. 
Conceivability or inconceivability should not be the final 
motive to guide a philosopher in his acceptance of facts. 

Another objection is raised on the ground that any inter- 
action of body on mind, or conversely, would upset the 
law of the conservation of energy. A complete answer to 
this objection will be given when we treat the question of 
psychological Monism. It may not be amiss to recall here 
that many eminent physicists do not look upon the law of 
the conservation of energy as applicable to living organisms. 
Certainly, it has never been proved to hold good for the 
universe as a whole. Until this is done, it can be asserted 
safely that the interaction of mind on body does not in- 
crease the quantity of energy in the world, and, therefore, 
such interaction is not a violation of a fundamental law of 
nature. | 

A more serious difficulty for some minds would seem to 
be the utter impossibility of two processes, so radically 
different as the mental and physical, ever coming under 
the single law of cause and effect. To this, however, we 
would reply that if qualitative likeness is a necessary con- 
dition for the operation of the law of causality, then a rap- 
prochement of any kind between the spiritual and material 
is evidently ruled out of question. But the causal law says 
nothing at all about the likeness or unlikeness of the proc- 
esses which stand to each other in the relation of cause 
and effect. In the physical world, the law operates ex- 
clusively between material extended objects. But what 
logic forces us to deny the validity of the law when it is 
transferred to the interaction of disparate entities like the 
mind and the body? There is no justification, either in 
logic or in fact, for a narrowing of causality to purely phys- 


McDougall, Body and Mind, pp. 206 et seq. for a detailed reply to this objection 
as well as to the argument from ‘‘inconceivability’’; also Maher, Psychology, pp. 
517-524. 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 47 


ical processes. It cannot be done without begging the whole 
question at issue. In this connection Kiilpe remarks, ‘‘ As 
for mental phenomena themselves, no more objection is 
raised to their causal interaction than to that of physical 
processes. It is truly a strange rule that is based upon one 
single instance, and then held to be valid simply in order 
that this single instance may be brought under it.” ? 

Metaphysical Dualism, therefore, while holding securely 
to the doctrine that reality is double, does so out of respect 
for facts which cannot be explained in any other way, with- 
out being explained away. The problems as to what mat- 
ter 1s or what mind is, or how they can interact, bring up 
questions the replies to which should not, because of their 
supposed or real inadequacy, prejudice the student against 
the central truth of a dualistic ontology; namely, the exist- 
ence of two distinct realities in this universe. At this 
time we are not contending for any further admission than 
acceptance of the reality of the dual principle in nature. 
Sympathetic with the aspirations of the monist for unity, 
the dualist feels that the process of unification goes forward 
altogether too quickly when it fails to take notice of facts, 
differences, and distinctions, which are fundamental both 
in thought and in being. To obtain intellectual unity at 
the expense of logic and experience is to pay too great a 
price for victory.? 


Pluralism.—It is not easy to state, in a few sentences, 
the precise position of that school which is known as Plu- 
ralism, in regard to the problem of the one and the many. 
Most pluralists are what are known as pragmatists, and 


1 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 136. 

2 For the consequences of Dualism in the field of morality and religion, consult 
Professor Pratt, Matter and Spirit, pp. 197-230. 

De Wulf in his Philosophy and Civilization in the Middle Ages, pp. 194 et seq. has 
a very fine exposition of the dualistic conception of the world current amongst the 
scholastic philosophers. 


48 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Pragmatism is a system of thought which is somewhat con- 
temptuous of metaphysics, being primarily a theory of 
knowledge. In spite of the fact that Pragmatism looks 
upon metaphysics, in the words of Schiller as “a luxury,” 
it nevertheless accepts a universe, or, better still, a ‘‘multi- 
verse’? which is in striking contrast to the universe of Mon- 
ism. Pluralism is diametrically opposed to all forms of 
Monism by its denial that the world is a complete unity, 
or an organized systematic whole. Reality is not one but 
multiple, and is incapable of ever being reduced to any- 
thing approaching ontological unity. Pluralism has no 
sympathy with the efforts of monistic philosophers to re- 
solve all things into a whole or into a one. Reality is a 
series of eaches, everys, anys, eithers. Each thing is so 
distinct from every other thing that it stands alone, forms 
a small universe in itself. Universals, generalizations, the 
world, the cosmos are mere words. ! 

The contrast between Monism and Pluralism is well put 
by James when he writes: “Pluralism stands for the dis- 
tributive, Monism for the collective form of being.” 2 But 
how are these distinct realities ever brought together? one 
naturally inquires. By an almost infinite number of 
connections founded on similarity, dissimilarity, oneness, 
difference, etc., things come together in our minds, without 
however in themselves forming parts of any kind of a real 
whole. Things are related to one another, there can be no 
doubt of that fact, but not in the sense of forming a unit 
with other things, not in any “all-relationship.” James 
explains this type of union as the “‘strung-along type.” 
“Tf the each-form be the eternal form of reality no less 
than it is the form of temporal appearance, we still have a 
coherent world, and not an incarnate incoherence, as is 


1 Marvin, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 222 et seq. for an excellent statement of 
the different kinds of Pluralism. 
2 Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 114. 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY 49 


charged by so many absolutists. Our ‘multiverse’ still 
makes a ‘universe’; for every part, though it may not be in 
actual or immediate connexion, is nevertheless in some 
possible or mediated connexion, with every other part 
however remote, through the fact that each part hangs 
together with its very next neighbors in inextricable inter- 
fusion. The type of union, it is true, is different here from 
the monistic type of all-einheit. It is not a universal co- 
implication, or integration of all things durcheinander. It 
is what I call the strung-along type, the type of continuity, 
contiguity, or concatenation.” 1 

Pluralism, therefore, denies all possibility of ever ap- 
proaching an all-inclusive unity. It supports the existence 
of a Deity who is an essence distinct from the Absolute, as 
well as from all other entities. However, God is not the 
Personal Deity of traditional Christian thought. He is, 
though, the ground and goal of finite persons, and a finite 
part of the finite universe itself. This is, indeed, a new 
form of Pantheism, if such doctrine is worthy to be dignified 
by the name of Pantheism.? Despite the fact that Pluralism 
vigorously opposes all forms of Monism, it is difficult to 
perceive how it escapes the main objection to Monism; 
namely, that at bottom all things are, somehow or other, 
one and thesame. The possibility of ultimate oneness is not 
denied by James, though it is certainly now beyond any- 
thing which we have experienced. He, therefore, takes 
refuge from the dilemma in some form or other of Panpsy- 
chism. 

Recent pluralists, Ward, Sorley, Howison, and especially 
A. Seth Pringle-Pattison, while acknowledging the ex- 
istence of a material order, look on it rather as a founda- 
tion for the development of personality which will receive 


14 Pluralistic Universe, p. 325. 
? Wells, in God, the Invisible King, supports the idea of a finite God. 


50 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


its final accomplishment in God, the supreme ideal of 
personality.! 


Arguments in Favor of Pluralism.—The arguments in 
favor of Pluralism can scarcely be stated any better than 
they were by Professor James who, outlining the advantages 
of the pluralistic theory, contends that “1. It is more 
‘scientific,’ in that it insists that when oneness is predi- 
cated, it shall mean definitely ascertainable conjunctive 
forms. With these the disjunctions ascertainable among 
things are exactly ona par. The two are codrdinate aspects 
of reality. To make the conjunctions more vital and 
primordial than the separations, monism has to abandon 
verifiable experience and proclaim a unity that is inde- 
scribable. 2. It agrees more with the moral and dramatic 
expressiveness of life. 3. It is not obliged to stand for any 
particular amount of plurality, for it triumphs over monism 
if the smallest morsel of disconnectedness is once found 
undeniably to exist. ‘Ever not quite’ is all it says to 
monism; while monism is obliged to prove that what 
pluralism asserts can in no amount whatever possibly be 
true—an infinitely harder task.’ ? 


Criticism of Pluralism.—Many strong objections may 
be brought against Pluralism as a satisfactory explanation 
of the problem of reality in the universe. Nor has any 
sufficient answer ever been made to them. In the first 
place, it is objected that Pluralism, no less than Monism, 
fails fully to explain change, the problem which is at the 
bottom of all cosmology. If things are plural, and are in a 
constant state of evolution, the explanation of the same 
must be sought somewhere outside the things themselves. 


1 Consult Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 242 et seq. 
2 Some Problems of Philosophy, pp. 142, 143. 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY J s1 


Where there is change, there is causality. But nothing 
causes itself. We must search for the source of causality 
outside of things, and we can find it nowhere outside of 
God, Who is at once the Causeless Cause, and the final unit 
source of all causality in this universe. By doing away 
with God, Pluralism eliminates the other term in change, 
and thereby fails to explain it. On the other hand, by 
assuming that things interact, it assumes the very principle 
which it attempts to explain. 

Pluralism accounts, as no form of Monism does, for the 
infinite variety and manifoldness of things. It offers no 
explanation, however, for the multitude of remarkable 
resemblances between things, which are undoubtedly as 
prominent and as fundamental a characteristic of reality 
as is variety. 

Pluralism, while objecting strenuously to Monism on the 
grounds that it does away with freedom, falls itself into a 
no less grave difficulty by not distinguishing clearly be- 
tween freedom and mere causality. In the pluralistic, or 
melioristic, universe of James, man does not possess any 
larger share of freedom than do the plants or animals. 
Chance rules the universe, and as Perry remarks, ‘‘it is as 
likely to be the mishap of which man is the victim, as the 
opportunity of which he is the master.” 4 

A very serious objection to Pluralism is its theory of a 
finite God, which not only involves insuperable difficulties 
from the point of view of religion, but renders the problem 
of good and evil insoluble. 


Conclusion—From the above exposition, admittedly 
inadequate, of the theories which have been advanced to 
explain the problem of the one and the many, it follows that 
the doctrine of philosophical Dualism presents the solution 

1 Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 254. 


52 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


best able to deal with facts as we know them. The most 
searching analysis of reality more than justifies the belief 
of the plain man that the world is made up of two radically 
different classes of entities, the material and the spiritual. 

Dualism, it should be recognized, does not entail the 
reduction of all experiences to only two kinds. It frankly 
acknowledges that physical phenomena are of an almost 
infinite variety, while mental phenomena are scarcely less 
varied. In spite of this variety, there runs through both 
classes of experience a unifying characteristic which marks 
them off from each other. Pluralism accentuates the 
diversity of things, but fails to give due prominence to their 
similarities. Monism, on the other hand, submerges all 
dissimilarities in an all-embracing likeness. Our position, 
that of Dualism, refuses either to do away with the distinc- 
tion between mind and matter, subject and object, self and 
non-self, or to deny its real validity because of the multitude 
of supposedly conflicting forms under which things appear. 
And the chief advantage of Dualism is that it does no 
violence to ordinary experiences, nor to the religious and 
moral convictions which have played so prominent a réle 
in the development and preservation of our Christian 
civilization. It must never be forgotten that, above all 
things, human personality must have a valid and adequate 
recognition in every construction of the world which 
philosophy attempts. The worth, freedom, responsibility, 
and meaning of life are not to be swallowed up by a timeless 
Absolute, nor frittered away in the play of cosmic forces 
over which we can have no possible control. Nothing short 
of an over-powering argument will alter the general belief 
that our individual existence, with its strivings, defeats, 
and successes is the ground of a self independent of the 
cosmos or of other selves. Until this argument is forth- 
coming, both plain man and philosopher should hold fast 


PROBLEM OF THE ONE AND THE MANY - 53 


to the universal conviction that we are distinct and separate 
individuals 

While it would be unfair not to recognize the limitations 
of philosophical Dualism, it must be pointed out that these 
are but the limitations of human thought itself. There is 
a veil behind which reason cannot carry us. Faith alone 
holds the key to the mysteries hidden in the region beyond 
that veil. 


REFERENCES 


BRADLEY: Appearance and Reality. 

Catholic Encyclopedia: Articles ‘‘Monism,” ‘“‘Dualism,” ‘“Prag- 
matism.”’ 

Dusray: Introductory Philosophy. 

HoERNLE: Matter, Life, Mind, and God. 

Howison: The Limits of Evolution. 

James: Some Problems of Philosophy; A Pluralistic Universe. 

Kure: Introduction to Philosophy. 

Le1cHTon: The Field of Philosophy. 

McDoucatt, W.: Body and Mind. 

Marvin: An Introduction to Philosophy. 

MErctErR: Les Origines de la Psychologie Coniemporaine. 

Perry: Present Philosophical Tendencies. 

RickaBy: First Principles of Knowledge. 

WALKER: Theories of Knowledge. 

Warp: The Philosophy of Theism. 


CHAPTER III 


THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 


The Problem.—The problem which we propose to treat 
now is very closely allied to the problem in ontology dis- 
cussed in the preceding chapter. In fact, it is but an exten- 
sion of that problem, the central one in all metaphysics. 
There the question was very broad, and had to do with the 
universe as a whole. The inquiry was: Is the Universe one 
or many, and what are the relations of the parts to the 
whole? This fundamental question carries with it another 
and a no less interesting one; namely, What is the nature of 
that which we call real? If this world in which we live is 
made up of but one entity, thing, or substance, what is 
that substance? If, however, it is composed of two or 
more substances, are these substances material, spiritual, or 
possibly a combination of both? The answers given are 
known in philosophy as Materialism and Spiritualism. A 
modern form of Materialism which asserts that the universe 
is material, but that, if anything higher in the scale of being 
than the material exists, we are incapable of knowing it, is 
called Agnosticism. Both Materialism and Spiritualism, 
regarded as systematic solutions of certain problems of 
metaphysics, have had great influence on the conceptions 
of the nature of man current in psychology. They have 
also flowed over into Epistemology, coloring philosophical 
theory both as to the origin and validity of human thought. 
At this point we shall disregard the psychological and 

54 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY = 55 


epistemological implications contained in either Materialism 
or Spiritualism, and confine our attention to the cosmolog- 
ical aspects of the problem. 


Materialism.—The materialist agrees with the dualist, 
realist, and the pluralist that the external world is a real 
world, and that what we perceive when we see, touch, or 
feel things is a real world. Whatever the mind may be, 
this much is certain, it is not the same thing that it per- 
ceives. But while the materialist admits the distinction 
between the perceiver and the perceived, he does not 
acknowledge that they are two different substances. At 
bottom they are but one, which we call matter. Hence 
the name Materialism. It is in this metaphysical sense 
that the term is here used. 

With the exception of some ancient thinkers like Leucip- 
pus, Democritus, and Epicurus who were dualists, mate- 
rialists have all been monists, either in theory or in tend- 
ency. This is, in an especial manner, true of modern 
Materialism. 

The fundamental conception of every kind of Materialism 
may be summed up in the statement that all reality is body. 
No substances other than those composed of matter exist. 
The primary qualities of matter are extension, impenetra- 
bility, figure, and motion, and, it is out of this stuff, so to 
speak, that bodies are composed. Sensations are simply 
the secondary qualities of things, and do not exist sep- 
arated from the person who experiences them. They are, 
like thoughts, a function of the movement of the sense 
organs and the brain, which are material. Thought, no 
less than matter, consists of molecules in motion. ‘This 
more or less crude form of Materialism, which conceded to 
matter the power of thought, was modified greatly when, 
under the influence of Leibniz, matter endowed with force 


56 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


was substituted by philosophers for matter merely endowed 
with extension, as in the theory of Descartes. 

Materialism reached the highest point of its influence in 
France during the eighteenth century. Amongst French 
philosophers, thinking became a function of the brain, for 
the reason that physiological processes always accompany 
psychological processes. Science proved, they told us, that 
only animals which possess a nervous system think. There- 
fore, the possession of a mind is the necessary consequence 
and concomitant of the possession of a nervous system. 
As the operations of the nervous system are purely mechan- 
ical, so the operations of the mind can be explained in 
mechanical terms without any recourse to spiritual entities 
or forces. 

Moreover, Materialism, it was contended, is scientific 
(in fact, it is the only scientific theory) because it endeavors 
to explain phenomena, both physical and psychological, in 
terms of antecedent phenomena already known, and not 
by the introduction of spiritual principles, or psychic forces, 
or a soul into the domain of physical action. Science sees 
in the processes and acts of consciousness only a very special 
kind of physiological process. It may be difficult to under- 
stand how matter can perform so many and such highly 
complex activities as, for example, judgment, volition, etc. 
Everything in biology, anatomy, and physiology, however, 
points to a necessary dependence of mind on brain. There 
is, therefore, no reason to suppose that any substance other 
than matter exists in the universe. 

Such is the doctrine of Materialism which has had many 
advocates amongst modern thinkers, the most prominent of 
whom were Hobbes, La Mettrie, Holbach, as well as Hume, 
Hartley, Priestley, etc. The spirit of Materialism has been 
violently anti-religious at all times (it was especially so 
amongst the French Encyclopedists, of whom Voltaire was 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 57 


the acknowledged leader) the crowning argument for its 
acceptance seeming to have been the desire to do away with 
every form of supernaturalism by denying the very possibil- 
ity of the existence of the spiritual. Likewise, it has always 
manifested a decided mechanistic tendency, due probably 
to the success attained by this attitude in the study and 
marvelous development of experimental science since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. 

The advance of science bestowed new life on the dying 
Materialism of La Mettrie and Holbach. Both biology 
and physiology appeared to confirm the view that mind 
was a useless luxury in trying to explain the universe. The 
doctrine of evolution gave added support to this position, 
implying, according to general opinion, a gradual develop- 
ment of all things from an original lifeless atom, which, 
solely by the action of the forces with which it was endowed 
from the beginning, has originated everything, living and 
non-living, physical and psychical. Existence, therefore, 
becomes a problem primarily of chemistry, which is itself 
but a form of physics.1 


Arguments in Favor of Materialism.—The arguments 
advanced to support Materialism may be summarized 
briefly under the following headings: ” 

Only extended objects exist in space. A spiritual sub- 
stance is by hypothesis unextended. The soul, for example, 
cannot occupy space no matter how small. Matter, there- 
fore, alone exists. 

We have no right to assume the existence of the spiritual, 
if everything in the universe can be explained on the same 

1 For an historical statement of the progress of Materialistic thought, see Weber, 
History of Philosophy, pp. 404-433, and especially Section 61 on David Hume. 
Also, Lange, History of Materialism, trans. by Thomas. 


* For the materialistic arguments of Priestley, see Weber, History of Philosophy, 
PP. 409-410. 


58 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


principles as material phenomena. But thought can be 
explained in the terms of chemistry and physiology. 

All our knowledge can be proved to have arisen from a 
combination and refinement of sense data. Sensation is a 
brain function; likewise thinking. 

Evolution proves that the development of the mind is 
completely and at all points dependent on the development 
of the body. Why then insist that bodily function is 
different from mental function? 

The history of modern science, whose standpoint is 
wholly materialistic, by its very successes proves the truth 
of the materialistic hypothesis. ? 


Criticism of Materialism.—Crude Materialism has few, 
if any, advocates to-day. As a metaphysical theory, its 
weaknesses are so many and so evident, that it has actually 
ceased to exist as a plausible explanation of the nature of 
reality. It will only be found, and defended, in medical and 
allied circles, and not even there except as the proper mental 
attitude which should characterize the scientific worker. 

The principal argument against Materialism is that it 
assumes the body and mind to be identical because there 
can be proved to exist a wonderful uniformity between 
physical and psychical processes. But this is precisely 
the question under debate. When, we ask, did a relation of 
uniformity become synonymous with a relation of identity? 
To assume that thought is but a function of the brain is to 
prove nothing. As Paulsen remarks, “‘Thought is not 
motion, it is thought.” 2 No one has as yet succeeded in 
seeing the brain molecules in motion, and until this opera- 
tion has been observed, and the molecules have been shown 
to be the source of our thought processes, it is sheer nonsense 


1 Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 60-66, and especially the note on Biich- 
ner. 
* Introduction to Philosophy, p. 83. 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY - 59 


to speak of thought as a function of the brain. No mate- 
rialist has ever shed the faintest ray of light on the darkness 
which enshrouds every materialistic explanation of how an 
intellectual operation is but the necessary consequence of 
some physical movement. 

The fact of the dependence of body on mind is quite as 
well established as that of mind on the body. Psychology 
gives innumerable examples of this dependence. Shall we 
then conclude that matter is but an aspect of mind? 

The distinction between the primary and secondary 
qualities of matter is purely academic. As far as the per- 
ceiver goes, it is impossible to perceive the primary qualities, 
except by and through the secondary. If the secondary do 
not exist, neither do the primary. It is a pure assumption, 
unsupported by any evidence and contrary to all experience, 
to state that secondary qualities do not represent anything 
actually existing in matter, but that primary qualities are 
the very essence of things. 

Many other arguments might be adduced against Mate- 
rialism. For an extended exposition of them we refer the 
student to Kiilpe who concludes that not only is Mate- 
rialism, ‘“‘as an explanation of the world-whole, a very 
weak hypothesis, but that it is exceedingly improbable.” ? 


1 Professor Tyndall in the famous address to British Association at Norwich— 
Rudolf Eucken: His Philosophy and Influence, quoted by Meyrick Booth, p. 66: ‘‘The 
passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness 
is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the 
brain occur simultaneously, we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently 
any rudiments of the organ, which would enable us to pass by a process of reasoning 
from one to the other. They appear together, but we do not know why. Were our 
minds and sense so expanded as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the 
brain, were we capable of following all their motions, all their groupings and electric 
discharges, if such there be, and were we intimately acquainted with the correspond- 
ing states of thought and feeling, we should be as far as ever from the solution of 
the problem— ‘How are these physical processes connected with the facts of con- 
sciousness?’ The chasm between the two classes remains still intellectually im- 
passable.” 

2 See Kiilpe, Introduction io Philosophy, pp. 122-126. 

For the religious and moral aspects of Materialism, read Paulsen, Introduction to 


60 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Agnosticism.—The term Agnosticism is applied to an 
attitude or tendency which claims that the spiritual, if it 
does exist, is unknowable. As generally used, Agnosticism 
has particular reference to religious doctrines, to the belief 
in’ the existence of the supernatural, which it does not deny 
but holds to be “unknowable.” In the present connection, 
however, it refers to a form of Materialism which, while 
insisting on the fundamental doctrine of Materialism that 
only bodies exist and are knowable, professes ignorance 
both as to the nature and existence of spiritual entities. 
The present-day materialist, as a result of the findings of 
modern psychology, is not quite so sure of his ground as 
were the followers of La Mettrie and Hobbes. ‘The sweep- 
ing character of the statements of the older Materialism 
has been toned down to meet the objections arising from 
our increased knowledge of psychological processes. We 
are now told that spiritual entities may possibly exist. 
However, we cannot prove that they exist nor know any- 
thing about their nature. 

This new form of Materialism is grounded on the assump- 
tion of Positivism, that the knowable is coextensive with 
the sensible, and that all universal ideas are but collective 
ideas which, when analyzed or decomposed, are shown to 
be nothing but the data of sense experience. To the idea 
of matter is added that of force. Materialism calls this 
new substance, “‘force-matter.’’ But force-matter is noth- 


Philosophy, pp. 67-74. Paulsen shows conclusively that moral laws are natural 
laws no less than are physical laws, a point which the modern materialist is very 
apt to forget. 

We may be pardoned for quoting in this connection Marvin, Introduction to 
Philosophy, p. 194, who writes: ‘‘Materialism actually tends to undermine our 
belief in God and in the universal validity of our moral judgments. We tend to 
think that in a world of atoms governed wholly by purely mechanical laws, there is 
no room and no rational need for God, nor any basis for morality other than the 
chance working of physical forces that have given rise to certain moral instincts 
and sentiments in our brains.” 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 61 


ing new. It is the old idea of matter decked out in a new 
verbal dress. 

Agnosticism, like Materialism, is both monistic and ma- 
terialistic, and in sharp contrast to a dualistic and theistic 
philosophy. The radical political and religious tendencies 
of Agnosticism are evidenced in the writings of all the fol- 
lowers of the new Materialism, and in no one more prom- 
inently than in those of Ernst Haeckel and his school. ! 

Of all the forces which served to develop the new Mate- 
rialism, the Darwinian theory undoubtedly exercised the 
most profound influence. The materialists insist that Dar- 
winism, by its theory of natural selection, did away with 
such principles of nature as involved purposiveness, final- 
ity, or what is known as teleology, and erected mechanism 
into a satisfactory explanation of the origin and develop- 
ment of the universe. Add to this, the successes attained 
by the application of mechanistic principles to anatomy, 
physiology, physics, and chemistry, and one has a body of 
apparently irrefragable arguments against any interven- 
tion by a spiritual or supernatural power in the ordered 
movements of the cosmos. 

The arguments advanced to prove the new Materialism 
do not differ in kind from those which the old Greek, or 
modern German and French materialists, have always in- 
voked. ‘There has been a change of emphasis from the 
metaphysical to the scientific, but not with any added suc- 
cess for the cause of Materialism. These arguments, drawn 
from scientific sources, will be examined at length 1 in the 
chapter on Vitalism sae Mechanism. 

The new Materialism, while it has dropped the dogmatic 
attitude, which asserted that mind cannot exist, is neverthe- 


1 Consult Kiilpe, The Philosophy of the Present in Germany, trans. Maud & G. T. 
W. Patrick, pp. 83-106, for a statement of the Materialism of Haeckel. For a 
critique, Engert, Der Naturalistesche Monismus Haeckels auf Seine Wissenschaftliche 
Haltbarkeit gepriift. 


62 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


less essentially one with all the older forms of Materialism. 
Although it refuses to parade under the banner of Ma- 
terialism, and calls itself Positivism, or Neo-Criticism, it 
remains, as far as fundamental doctrines go, Materialism.1 

Spiritualism is now in the saddle. Materialism, whether 
in the form of Materialistic Monism, Sensationalism, or 
Positivism, is utterly discredited before contemporary 
thought. Only a philosophy which recognizes the duality 
of nature, and assures to mind as large a place in the uni- 
verse as it does to body, can hope to make a lasting appeal 
to present-day thought. Science has not banished either 
mind or finality from the world. It has but served to em- 
phasize the value of human personality, and the necessity 
for the existence of spiritual forces, if we are ever to solve 
the problems which arise from man’s contemplation of the 
universe. It is not in any form of Materialism, nor, as we 
shall see, in any exclusively spiritualistic conception of 
things, that we shall discover the truth about the nature of 
reality. 


Spiritualism.—Spiriiualism, as a systematic solution of 
the problem of the nature of reality, should not be confused 
with what is often called by the same name, but more cor- 
rectly should be styled Spiritism. Spiritism denotes a be- 
lief in the possibility of communication with disembodied 
spirits through the agency of persons called mediums, or by 
means of mediumistic devices. Spiritualism, on the other 
hand, is a philosophical doctrine which accepts the reality 
of the existence of the spiritual or of the mental, in contrast 
to Materialism which believes that the universe is made up 
of but one reality, matter and its properties. Like Mate- 
rialism, Spiritualism has had along history. Many of the 


‘Read Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 63-84, for a critique of both 
naive and critical Naturalism. 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 63 


Greek thinkers were spiritualistic in their metaphysics. 
Following upon Anaxagoras, Plato and Aristotle vindicated 
for all times the claims of mind to a necessary place in our 
interpretation of the world. Plato, not only is rightly 
called the father of spiritualistic philosophy, but has done 
as much, if not more than any subsequent thinker, to win 
for Spiritualism the ascendency in philosophy which it has 
always held. 

Since the days of Plato, Spiritualism has appeared in 
many different shapes, and has been known by as many 
different names. The leading idea of all spiritualistic 
thought, however, has been the thesis that real beings exist, 
and that these beings, at least some, if not all, are radically 
distinct from matter. In philosophical constructions of a 
monistic tone and character, this spiritual being has been 
held to be the only real being, existing in the form of a uni- 
versal mind, of which all other minds are but aspects. Mat- 
ter has no real existence in this conception. Spiritualism 
has assumed, on the other hand, a pluralistic attitude which, 
while conceiving the universal mind as an all-embracing 
reality, does not deny the existence of other minds which 
depend both for their existence and activities on the Divine 
Mind. A more clear-cut distinction between mind and 
matter, God and nature, is recognized in what we may call 
Moderate Spiritualism. Aristotle is the author of Moderate 
Spiritualism, but, unfortunately, his ideas as to the exact 
relations of the soul to the body in the human individual 
are somewhat obscure. Christian philosophy, especially 
in the Middle Ages, elaborated a well thought out and log- 
ical theory of these relations. It is this aspect of Spiritual- 
ism which we accept and defend. 


The Spiritualism of Leibniz.—Leibniz is looked upon by 
many as the father of modern Spiritualism, in the sense of 


64 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


those who believe that only the spiritual exists. He started 
with the idea of substance which he defined as Descartes 
did; namely, that it is a being which exists per se, but with 
this distinction that his substance is essentially dynamic, 
while that of Descartes was static. ‘‘No body without 
movement, no substance without effort,’ was an axiom of 
Leibniz. From this definition he deduced that only one 
substance existed which was both conscious and unex- 
tended, but which, because of its inner power of action, 
should be looked upon as manifold. Since force alone exists 
and force is the very essence of matter, matter is in reality 
not matter at all, but mind. Now, matter as force is unex- 
tended, incorruptible, simple, and indivisible. Force, since 
it is manifold, entails a multiplicity of substances, which 
he called monads. These monads are like atoms, or, better, 
like mathematical points, since each is a substance distinct 
from every other substance, each is a microcosm in itself. 
But each monad does not represent reality with the same 
degree of clearness. There are diverse grades of representa- 
tion. The body monad represents the world in a confused 
way; the human soul monad, with clarity and distinctness. 
One may ask, How do these monads, since each is a self- 
active universe, act upon one another? By virtue of a ‘‘pre- 
established harmony” of which God is the author, replies 
Leibniz. 

The philosophy of Leibniz is undoubtedly a very in- 
genious one, his doctrine of monads and of the different 
grades of consciousness being one of the most original con- 
ceptions in the whole history of philosophy. The accept- 
ance of it, though, would entail so many difficulties that 
it has found few, if any, defenders, and no disciples. 

In the first place, it is a purely a priori construction of the 
universe. It may be true and it may not be true—Leibniz 
offers no arguments which would convince us of its reality. 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 65 


The conviction, however, is borne in upon every one who 
examines the doctrine of monads that they are unreal. It 
is difficult for us to believe that matter is psychical. If it 
were, indications of this psychical nature, somewhere, 
somehow, would filter in upon our consciousness. That 
matter is active is an accepted belief of modern science, but 
that this activity is nothing less than a result of a play of 
spiritual forces imbedded in an entity which is essentially 
spiritual, cannot be harmonized with what we know of 
nature. One thing is certain, Leibniz has not convinced 
the world that all processes, physical and psychical, can 
be reduced to a common spiritual basis.? 


The Spiritualism of Berkeley.—The philosophy of 
Berkeley is an extreme Spiritualism, an out and out Jm- 
matertalism. Starting with the principle of Locke that 
knowledge is but the perception of the agreement or dis- 
agreement of our ideas, he goes much further and lays down 
the proposition that not only are colors, sounds, tastes, 
etc., products of the mind, but that even extension, shape, 
motion exist only in the mind which perceives them, and 
not in things themselves existing outside the mind. Accord- 
ing to Berkeley, to exist is to be perceived: “esse est 
percipt.”’ Matter is, therefore, a phenomenon of the mind, 
and does not exist outside of a subject which is conscious 
of it. The so-called external world is a mental construction. 
Things and thoughts are identical. God and the human 
mind really exist. All else is fiction. 

The arguments, however, advanced by Berkeley to prove 
his doctrine of Spiritualism are not convincing. He argues 
from the fact that since materialists admit that the so-called 
secondary qualities of matter, sound, color, taste, etc., are 


1Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 507-512; also, Weber, History of Philosophy, 
PP. 345-369. 


66 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


essentially mental, there is no warrant for our assuming 
that the primary qualities, extension, motion, etc., are not 
likewise mental. The fact that they, unlike the secondary 
qualities, are always present, does not prove that they 
exist apart from our perception of them. The reasoning of 
Berkeley is logical enough; his assumption, however, that 
colors, sounds, tastes, etc., do not exist 7 any way outside 
the perceiver is false. Sounds, etc., as perceptions exist 
only in the mind, but sounds as physical things exist in 
nature. ! 

The theory of Berkeley fails altogether to explain the 
nature of reality. By denying the real existence of the 
world of time and space, and by building up in its place 
a world of ideas, he not only destroys materialism, but with 
it all possibility of ever understanding the manifest mani- 
foldness of reality. If nature is but the continuous mani- 
festation of the Divine Mind to human minds, natural 
science ceases to exist, psychology becomes meaningless. In 
particular, the Berkeleyan Spiritualism offends all our con- 
ceptions of the essential uniqueness of human personality. 


The Spiritualism of the Objective Idealists—The more 
modern forms of Spiritualism, as a metaphysical doctrine, 
have a very close connection with epistemology and are, 


1 Marvin, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 196-202, for the arguments of Berkeley. 
Marvin contends, and rightly, that Berkeley does not reply to the ontological prob- 
lem at all. His answer is a truism. ‘‘Have Berkeley and the Berkeleyans really 
answered our question? The ontological problem was this: What are the ultimate 
characteristics of the world; what is its essence? We did not ask, How is the world 
known? We asked, What is the world as known to us? Surely the world as known 
to us is in part at least a material world. Let us grant, for the sake of argument, 
that the world exists only as perceptions in the mind of each of us. Then our ques- 
tion would run, What is it that you Berkeleyans perceive? You reply, We perceive 
our perceptions. But what an absurd answer. If we ask a man what he sees yonder 
in the street, and he replies, ‘I see what I see,’ how are we any the better off because 
of his most truthful information? The materialist may then continue to maintain, 
the world you perceive is in truth the world you perceive; but when you commence 
to describe it any farther, you will find it a material world; and that is all I mean.” 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 67 


therefore, often spoken of as Idealism. The epistemological 
aspects of Idealism will be examined later. Here we shall 
confine ourselves to a consideration of its metaphysics, which 
is at bottom a monistic solution of the ontological problem. 

Idealism does not deny the existence of things. It asserts, 
however, that they do not exist independent of mind. All 
being is pure thought. Idealists admit, it is true, that the 
activities of nature (the most prominent characteristic of 
which is change) are different from those of mind. The 
world is ever in a state of becoming. But change can never 
be explained adequately in the terms of a mechanistic 
philosophy. The trouble with the materialist is that he 
looks upon nature from a very limited standpoint. There 
is a mental world no less than a physical world. If one 
examines closely the workings of the mental world, he will 
find a perfect analogy, a perfect parallel between it and the 
workings of the physical world. The constant changes 
which take place in ourselves, as one moment we feel, the 
next think, the next will, are an almost perfect reproduction 
of what is going on in the external world. Look at the 
whole world, not at a part of it, and look at it from the stand- 
point of knowledge and it becomes apparent immediately 
that it is one. For, everything is either knower or known. 
The physical is but an aspect of the psychical. Matter does 
not really exist. The Absolute exists, and what we call 
mind and matter, are but the endless, almost infinite 
differentiations of an underlying unity manifesting itself 
in the ceaseless changes which appear about us. The prime 
characteristic of this unity is activity or change, its essence 
is mind, and our understanding of it depends on our inter- 
pretations of its multitudinous processes in terms of the 
mental. 

The most powerful exponents of this view in modern 
philosophy are Fichte and Hegel. As a metaphysic it 


68 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


cannot be fully appreciated, nor can the difficulties which 
it involves be grasped, without an understanding of the 
epistemological doctrines upon which it is based. These 
we shall examine later in the chapter on Idealism, Realism, 
and Pragmatism.! Up to very recent times Idealism was 
the most popular form of Philosophy. In England, Green, 
Bradley, and Bosanquet were Idealists, and in the United 
States, Royce was acknowledged to have been the leading 
defender of the idealistic point of view. 

Spiritualism has grown of late into the doctrine called 
Panpsychism, which maintains that all material things are 
but our perceptions of them. Nothing is external to us. 
Our perceptions image a reality which is within us; outside 
of the mind, the appearances and manifestations of our 
perceptions exist, but that is all. Panpsychism is the 
extremest form possible of Spiritualism. And, as Paulsen, 
its most noted exponent, writes: “It rests essentially on 
the parallelistic theory of the relation between the physical 
and the psychical, and upon the voluntaristic psychology. 
It culminates, however, in the monistic solution of the 
cosmological problem.”’ ? 

Another characteristic of modern Idealism is that it has 
shifted the center of metaphysical unity from the intellect 
to the will. It is, therefore, voluntaristic, in contrast to the 
intellectualistic position of thinkers like Kant and Hegel. 
Contemporary voluntarism makes the will the unitary 
ground of all reality, which in its strivings after reality and 
morality finds completeness and satisfaction in the Ideal 
Will. ‘Nature is in evolution,” says Weber, ‘‘of which 
infinite Perfection is both the motive force and the highest 
goal.” 3 


1 For the present the student may read Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, pp. 
253-269; Turner, History of Philosophy, pp. 567-581. 

2 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 144. 

3 History of Philosophy, p. 603. 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 69 


Arguments in Favor of Spiritualism.—At first glance it 
would appear that the arguments used to destroy Ma- 
terialism should prove just as effective in sustaining the 
position of Spiritualism. Such, however, is not the case. 
They prove indeed that the universe contains other than 
material beings; they do not prove that it is made up solely 
of spiritual existences. Hibben states this as follows: 
“Materialism false does not argue Spiritualism true; for 
the most cogent arguments against Materialism bear upon 
its monistic features, and these arguments also make against 
Spiritualism regarded as a monistic philosophy. The 
transition from mind to matter is as bewilderingly mys- 
terious as the transition from matter to mind. The two 
disparate phenomena cannot be brought under the single 
category either of matter or of mind.” ! 

Experience forces me to conclude that mind exists, says 
the idealist. But nothing compels me to the position that 
matter exists. I only know it in as far as I know my own 
thoughts. The ‘‘data of experience” are as wide, and only 
as wide, as the phenomena of consciousness. What we 
ordinarily call the objective side of consciousness is nothing 
but certain relations which by custom we refer to as matter, 
motion, energy, etc. If we recognize these relations to be 
what they really are, that is, aspects of consciousness, no 
necessity arises for accepting a reality existing outside our 
own minds. 

Another argument for Spiritualism is founded on the 
assumption that our senses deceive us when they point to 
the real existence of an extra-mental world. The plain man 
concludes from his sense experiences that the world is real. 
When examined critically this belief is found to be an illu- 
sion. What we are aware of is not the shape, size, color of 
a table, but our own sensations. If proof is needed of this 

1The Problems of Philosophy, p. 49. 


70 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


assertion, recall the innumerable times that we have been 
deceived by our senses. And what ground of assurance 
have we that our senses do not always deceive us when they 
pretend to acquaint us with real things outside ourselves? 
Of the reality of our perceptions, no one can doubt. The 
existence of a real world, or of matter, is at best problemati- 
cal. It can all be explained on the assumption that matter 
does not exist. 

Many other arguments from psychology and epistemol- 
ogy are adduced to prove the possibility of Spiritualism. 
We shall examine them later in their appropriate places. 


Criticism of Spiritualism.—The spiritualistic hypothesis 
is extremely arbitrary in this that it assumes that matter 
and its functions are an exact parallel of mind and its func- 
tions. Nothing that modern psychology has discovered 
necessitates the view that there exists an exact analogy 
between physical and psychical processes. Both the 
materialist and the spiritualist are wrong when they attempt 
to force all nature into one or the other mould. Science, 
on its side, proves that physical energy is one kind of 
energy; psychology proves that psychical energy is a totally 
different kind of energy. Neither one of them demands an 
exclusively materialistic or spiritualistic interpretation of 
all the processes of nature. 

When spiritualists attempt to explain the nature of the 
spiritual entity existing outside of the mind of the per- 
ceiver, they do not describe it in terms which are justified 
by our daily experience. The monads of Leibniz, the Idea 
of Hegel, the World-as-Will of Schopenhauer find no defense 
in the conclusions of natural science. We are forced, 
therefore, to the conclusion that Spiritualism is a one-sided 
theory of reality, and not in harmony with facts as ascer- 
tainable by any known methods of science. 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 71 


Psychology gives the lie to every form of monistic spir- 
itualism. The mind is not merely the center of thought, 
it is the first principle of life. Moreover, life is not solely 
intellectual; it is sensitive and vegetative as well. Nor is 
the soul situated in the brain; it exists in the whole body 
and in every part of the body. Physiological psychology 
does not warrant us in concluding that the nerve cells, or 
even the cerebral substance, is spiritual. On no other than 
a dualistic hypothesis can the findings of modern psychology 
be adequately explained. 

In the last place, experience need not lead us to the 
conclusion that knowledge lacks an objective side. The 
mind is but one aspect of our sense experiences. To over- 
emphasize the subjective and qualitative side of knowledge, 
as the idealist does, and to disregard totally its objective 
side is a very arbitrary procedure, to say the least.! 


Moderate Spiritualism or a Dualistic Synthesis of 
Materialism and Spiritualism.—Moderate Spiritualism is 
so called because it attempts to avoid the extremes of both 
Spiritualism and Materialism. It is dualistic in contrast 
to the Monism of Materialism and Spiritualism. 

Moderate Spiritualism does not deny the real existence 
of matter; it accepts the real existence of mind. But matter 
and mind are not to be confused. They are separate, 
distinct substances, each one possessing an independent 
existence of its own. This is the view of the plain man, as 
well as of all scientific realists and dualists since the days of 
Aristotle. It is, too, in a peculiar way the Christian view 
of nature which has always insisted on the distinction 
between mind and matter, subject and object, God and 
man. 

All the arguments advanced in the preceding chapter in 


1 Kilpe, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 130-132. 


72 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


favor of metaphysical dualism are valid in proving that 
two real substances, one material and the other spiritual, 
exist. This point of view will recetve added confirmation 
as we proceed in the discussion of the problems of philos- 
ophy. Not only does a Moderate Spiritualism possess the 
merit of being in close harmony with the deliverances of 
“common sense,”’ it also manifests the invaluable and con- 
vincing characteristics of a theory which is founded on a 
posteriori arguments and does therefore no violence to the 
scientific spirit because of arbitrary assumptions. It is, 
moreover, the working and living hypothesis of every man, 
whether he be a scientist or not. 

The principal difficulty in the acceptance of dualism 
comes from our inadequacy before the problem of the 
interaction of mind on body. But, as we remarked before, 
facts are facts. Our explanation of them is quite another 
and a different thing. Not to be able to give a wholly 
satisfactory explanation of the facts of interaction is no 
justification for taking refuge in either a materialistic or 
spiritualistic monism, in both of which theories the reality 
of fact has been sacrificed to the possibility of an assump- 
tion. The philosopher, no less than the scientist, must 
keep his feet on the ground, even though he searches the 
heavens themselves for explanations to satisfy the problems 
which disturb his mind. 


REFERENCES 


Batrour: Foundations of Belief. 

BatmEs: Fundamental Philosophy, trans. Brownson. 

Catholic Encyclopedia: Articles “Spiritualism,” “‘ Materialism.” 
DusraAy: Introductory Philosophy. 

H1sBEN: Problems of Philosophy. 

HoErnN te: Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics. 

Howison: The Limits of Evolution, 


PROBLEM OF THE NATURE OF REALITY 73 


KUtpe: Introduction io Philosophy. 
LANGE, H.: History of Materialism. 
LeicHTon: The Field of Philosophy. 
Marvin: Introduction to Philosophy. 
Royce: The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. 
TurRNER: History of Philosophy. 

Warp: The Philosophy of Theism. 

Warp, J.: Naturalism and Agnosticism. 


CHAPTER IV 
THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 


Having formulated the diverse conceptions of philos- 
ophers as to the ultimate nature of reality, the question 
next in order is to determine the precise relations of mat- 
ter to spirit. That body can influence mind, that the soul 
acts and reacts upon the body, seem to be incontestable 
facts. We behold such mutual relations, especially in 
the field of sense experience, every moment of our wak- 
ing lives. Extraordinary experiences, like an injury to 
the head, with its immediate effect on consciousness, 
or unexampled courage in the face of approaching death, 
brought about solely by the overmastering power of the 
will, intensify the common belief that the body-mind 
relation is not an accidental one, but has its roots deep 
down in the nature of these entities themselves. When 
we come to examine these relations in the light of science 
and of a critical philosophy; it is not so easy to state, and 
to justify by arguments, a reasoned reply to the problem. 
Supposing, therefore, that body and mind exist, the ques- 
tion is: What are the relations of the body to the mind ? 
Does it cause all the changes which take place in the mind 
or is the body itself changed by the actions of the mind? 
Perhaps each one acts upon the other—an interaction, 
as it were—in the definite relation of cause and effect, 
but neither one is supreme? Or, possibly, each one acts 
altogether independent of the other, like parallels never 
meeting? Stated thus, or in a somewhat similar fashion, 
we have what is customarily called the body-mind or 
the psycho-physical problem. 

74 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 75 


Marvin ? insists that it is wrong to state the problem as 
one of causation. The only question is: Is it a fact that the 
physical influences the psychical, and to what extent? 
A given stimulus ‘‘A,” say, a ray of light, produces a definite 
physiological reaction in the brain center of vision. Let 
us call that result ‘“‘b.” Does it produce a corresponding 
reaction ‘‘B,” which isa mental state? The problem, there- 
fore, resolves itself into a question of whether ‘‘b”’ is the 
only result of ‘A,’ or whether both ‘“‘b” and ‘“B” result 
from ‘“‘A.” The physiologist studies ‘‘b’’; the psychologist, 
‘““B.”’ The philosopher wishes to know what is the relation 
Ole ibe tou Byand,of both ton "Ar’? 

Marvin, however, takes a too narrow view of the problem 
in our opinion. If it were only a question of the relations 
between certain physiological and psychological processes, 
his construction would be both fair and adequate. But is 
there not something behind the processes, a substrate, a 
foundation, a substance, if you will? It is altogether too 
much to say that the problem is solved by confining our 
investigations to the relations of the two processes. In this 
theory, it would undoubtedly be true that both the paral- 
lelist and interactionist are right. But Marvin has stopped 
short of the very point where the real problem begins. Are 
these processes the whole of mental life, even assuming that 
any given process includes and integrates the totality of 
our previous mental life, or is there not something behind 
the processes which unifies, binds them together? It is no 
answer to assert that both the physiological and psycholog- 
ical processes exist. No one denies this fact. But what are 
they, and how do they exist, is the problem under discussion. 
Perceptions are not merely phenomenal. Their very 
existence postulates a belief in the validity of the law of 
causation. On no other basis, unless one is determined to 

1 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 278. 


76 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


accept Solipsism, can these phenomena be explained. In 
spite of any theory of ours as to the nature of sense percep- 
tion, therefore, the psycho-physical problem remains and 


GRAPH SHOWING 
THE MAIN THEORIES OF THE RELATIONS 
OF MIND AND BODY 


PSYCHICAL’ MONISM 





NOTE:= In the above graph, the symbol (-O-)represents matter and 
(—) represents mind. The dark arrow represents a real entity, and 
the light arrow an epiphenomenon, aspect or appearance. 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 77 


demands a reply. Hoernlé! calls this an ‘‘awkward prob- 
lem.” And such undoubtedly it is, but when did Philosophy 
turn away from the consideration of a problem because it 
presented an awkward side or “‘created a situation which 
is well-nigh desperate’’? 

The psycho-physical problem is one for which answers 
were formulated very early in the history of Philosophy. 
These replies range all the way from the grossest Mate- 
rialism to the most extreme forms of Spiritualism. More- 
over, each philosopher has given to his answer a turn which 
is often peculiarly personal and individual, with the result 
that it is rather difficult to express all the theories ever 
formulated under a few principal groups. The general 
practice is to reduce the different philosophical formulations 
to four solutions: namely, [nteractionism, Epiphenomenal- 
ism, Psycho-Physical Parallelism, and Idealistic Parallelism 
or Psychical Monism. The diagram on the opposite page 
will visualize for the student these principal solutions. 

That these four types of formulation practically exhaust 
the possible answers which may be given to the problem is | 
evident when we consider that the question cannot be 
stated in any more than the following ways: 

1. That body alone acts (Epiphenomenalism) 
2. That mind alone acts _(Idealistic-Parallelism or Psy- 
chical Monism) 
3. That body and mind 
interact (Interactionism) 
4. That body acts and 
mind acts in parallel 
fashion but without 
affecting each other : 
causally (Psycho-Physical Parallelism) 


1 Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, p. 206; Pratt, Matter and Spirit, pp. 
89-130, especially his criticism of the Kantian attitude towards the mind-body 
problem. 


78 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


It would be well, also, for the student to remember, in his 
examination of these theories, that Interactionism accepts 
the dualistic point of view, while the other solutions are all 
modifications, more or less explicit, of a monistic meta- 
physics. 


Epiphenomenalism or Psychological Materialism.—Start- 
ing with the assumption that the universe is purely mate- 
rial, the materialist asserts that mind is at bottom but a 
special kind of matter, and that the functions of mind are 
intrinsically dependent on the functions of the brain. The 
modern materialist dislikes to identify, openly and in so 
many words, brain with mental function; he states his be- 
lief in a more circuitous way by calling the mental state an 
‘‘epiphenomenon”’ of the brain. Consciousness is likened 
to the flow of a stream, every point of which is definitely 
linked up with a brain process, upon which it depends. 
Psychical functions, as distinct from physiological func- 
tions, are non-existent. They depend completely upon the 
working of the central nervous mechanism, but upon which 
they exert no influence of any character. Mental functions 
are much like the shadows cast by the moving parts of any 
machine. 

Epiphenomenalism is widely accepted, especially by 
physiologists. Huxley did a great deal to popularize it, 
and Hodgson is perhaps its best known contemporary de- 
fender. The arguments advanced to prove this view are 
those already noticed in the chapter on Materialism. 
These arguments revolve about the extension of the mech- 
anistic explanation of inorganic matter, current in natural 
science, to the domain of the organic and _ psychical, 
the incompatibility of the law of the conservation of 
energy with a recognition of the existence of psychical 
energy in the universe, and the doctrine of the evolution 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 79 


of consciousness from a lower and non-conscious form of 
matter. 

The older Materialism, which viewed states of conscious- 
ness as but functions of the brain, is now universally re- 
garded as absurd. To identify mind with brain is to talk 
nonsense. On the other hand, while Epiphenomenalism 
is but a form of Materialism, it is a form which presents 
elements which are capable of being defended. The facts 
brought out by comparative anatomy, physiology, and bi- 
ology, especially in the matter of the localization of cerebral 
functions, seem to point to a causal dependence of mind 
upon brain states. To these facts we may reply that there 
never was any question of a certain amount of dependence 
of consciousness upon the functioning of the brain. Both 
parallelist and interactionist admit as much. They point 
out, however, that dependence does not involve identity, 
the tacit assumption of all materialists. Moreover, if the 
physical causes the psychical, that is, causes states of con- 
sciousness which are by hypothesis an epiphenomenon, 
what becomes of the law of conservation of energy? 

In answer to the arguments adduced from Darwinism, 
we may reply that the theory of evolution does not neces- 
sitate our acceptance of the evolution of mind from a pri- 
mordial lifeless matter, even granting for the moment that 
the theory of Natural Selection is an adequate statement of 
evolution (a position against which many arguments might 
be advanced). This is evident when one considers that the 
passage from the material to the spiritual is unthinkable, 
except on the theory that mind actually influences body, 
and is the reason why certain qualities in the individual 
are selected out and transmitted in preference to other 
qualities,—products of a lower grade of consciousness. But 
if, as the Materialists maintain, mind cannot influence 
body in any way, it being an effect not a cause, the com- 


80 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


manding place assigned to mind in Natural Selection cer- 
tainly is in open violation of the fundamental principles 
of Materialism. 

There has recently arisen what has been termed the Vew 
Materialism, the leading proponents of which are Warren, 
Montague, Sellars, and Santayana. Although these thinkers 
have little sympathy with the materialistic assumptions of 
former days, they are not adverse to explaining conscious- 
ness in terms of energy, with which it is to be identified. 
For them the living organism is ipso facto conscious: “‘con- 
sciousness is the brain become conscious.” + It is but “a 
variant of the brain.” ” 

The arguments of the New Materialism, however, do not 
reconcile us to a belief in the materiality of mind. They 
are an ingenious turning and twisting in the net of difficul- 
ties which encompass every form of Materialism, no matter 
how cleverly disguised from view they may be. The New 
Materialism does not solve these difficulties any more than 
did the theories of Biichner and Haeckel. 


Psycho-Physical Parallelism.—Parallelism is an explana- 
tion of the relations existing between body and mind which 
endeavors to avoid the difficulties of both Materialism 
and Interactionism. While maintaining a strictly scientific 
attitude by a whole-hearted acceptance of the mechanistic 
and evolutionary theories as to the nature of both physical 
and psychical processes, it concedes to consciousness a cer- 
tain independence of purely bodily functions. Both proc- 
esses are real, but no relation of causality exists between 


1 Sellars, Critical Realism, pp. 244-245. 

2 For an exposition of the New Materialism read Pratt, Matter and Spirit, pp. 
22-47. He concludes: ‘‘The New Materialism has failed to bring forth a single 
consideration that makes the materialistic hypothesis really easier of acceptance 
than it was at the time when nearly every thinker gave it up, twenty years ago.” 
Op. cit., p. 47. 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 81 


them. Each one moves in a circle all its own; the only re- 
lation being that of concomitance, like two telegraph wires 
which run parallel to each other, both of which carry an 
identical message. Paulsen sums up the theory of Paral- 
lelism thus: ‘‘ Physical processes are never effects of psy- 
chical processes; psychical processes are never effects of 
physical processes.” ! The law of causality holds good in 
each series, the succeeding process always being the effect 
of the one which preceded it. Causation does not, however, 
pass from one series to the other. But while there is no 
causal connection between them, bodily and mental proces- 
ses do not take place in a haphazard fashion. There is an 
order which may be discerned in the parallel workings of 
mind and body; every bodily function having its corre- 
sponding mental function, and vice versa. 

Parallelism has appeared under many forms. Dualistic 
parallelism, which offers no explanation of how the two sets 
of functions may parallel each other, may be ruled out of 
consideration because of its lack both of a plausible theory 
and arguments. The great majority of parallelists are mon- 
ists, and have developed their theories along two main lines, 
one of which is called the Double Aspect Theory, and the 
other, [dealistic Parallelism. The Double Aspect Theory, 
or as it is also called the Identity Hypothesis, must be sub- 
divided into what McDougall has named, Phenomenalistic 
Parallelism and Psychical Monism. 


The Double Aspect Theory. Phenomenalistic Parallel- 
ism.—The fundamental idea of the Double Aspect Theory is 
that body and mind are but one thing which manifests itself 
by two distinct appearances or aspects, the so-called phys- 
ical and psychical processes. As a matter of fact, body and 
mind do not exist as distinct substances. We perceive only 

1 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 87. 


82 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the appearances of body and mind. But one substance 
exists which is neither body normind. What this one 
reality is depends upon our metaphysical conceptions 
of reality. For Spinoza, and those he has influenced, the 
one is God. Kant, on the other hand, stresses the phenom- 
enal side of reality. The noumenal aspect is an unknown. 
Many illustrations have been given to help us imagine what 
this relation is like, the most common being that of the 
curved line which on one side is concave, and on the other 
convex. 

The Kantian formulation of the Double Aspect Theory 
is difficult to maintain. If bodily and mental processes are 
but aspects or appearances of each other and not of some 
third thing distinct from both, the universe is a mere poem, 
an appearance, which possesses no reality of any kind 
except the ‘‘two appearances which are not the appearances 
of any thing and do not appear to any one. We are pre- 
sented merely with two shadows, each the shadow of the 
other,” as Pratt remarks. ! 


The Double Aspect Theory. Psychical Monism.—Phe- 
nomenalistic Parallelism is so evidently untenable, except on 
the assumption that reality is but a figment of the imagina- 
tion, that it was necessary to elaborate a better and more 
logical formulation of the Double Aspect Theory if it were 
to withstand the assaults of its critics. This has been done 
in Psychical Monism, which, until quite recently, was the 
favorite form in which Parallelism was defended. Accord- 
ing to this theory, there is a “‘third something”’ back of the 
parallel bodily and mental processes. What is this some- 
thing? - It is Consciousness, the only reality, of which our 
individual consciousnesses are but a part or an aspect. 
Physical processes exist objectively; when analyzed, how- 

1 Matter and Sbirii, p. 53. 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 83 


ever, they are but the appearances of the mental manifest- 
ing, for example, my consciousness to your consciousness. 
The two processes, therefore, are parallel but the causality 
is confined to the psychical. The physical is but an “‘epi- 
phenomenon” of the psychical—the converse of the doc- 
trine of Materialism. 

Idealistic Parallelism has been in high repute amongst 
philosophers, especially those of the psychological school. 
Prominent amongst its defenders have been Paulsen, 
Wundt, Strong, Clifford, and others. To-day there is in 
evidence a very decided swing away from Parallelism, 
especially in its monistic forms. Its greatest claim to 
recognition had been its complete turning over to mechanis- 
tic science, for exploration and explanation, the field of 
physical action without any fear of unwelcome, and often 
embarrassing, intrusion from the side of the mind. This 
won for it almost universal recognition amongst the sci- 
entists of the last century. If mind did not, in the slightest 
manner, ever affect body, it becomes increasingly evident 
that the law of conservation of energy, and the whole of 
mechanistic philosophy, need have no objection to a 
parallelistic theory of the relations of mind to body. 


Arguments in Favor of Parallelism.—The arguments, 
favorable to Parallelism, have been expounded perhaps 
best by Paulsen and Wundt. Besides the general con- 
siderations which seem to point to the necessity of con- 
ceiving mind in the terms of a process or of an actuality as 
against the older view which accepted the mind as a sub- 
stance, a number of special arguments, drawn in the main 
from the natural sciences, are advanced to prove the truth 
of Parallelism. The basic arguments for Parallelism are 
built upon a searching criticism of the mind-substance 
theory, which is held to be incompatible with the results of 


84 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


modern science, and, in whose place, therefore, we are 
compelled to substitute a function-theory as the only 
satisfactory scientific explanation of mind. We will present, 
too, the secondary considerations which have moved many 
psychologists to accept some form or other of Parallelism. 
These latter arguments, appeals to sentiment and prejudice 
in the main, have made as great an impression on many 
people, and have served to attract as many followers to 
Parallelism, as have the more metaphysical arguments on 
which the theory really depends. 

Parallelism in no way interferes with the reign of physical 
or chemical law in the universe. Mechanical law is supreme, 
even in the province of the human will. There is no such 
thing as purposeful activity in the universe. Even the 
living body is an automaton, a very complex one, it is true, 
but always an automaton. Psychical processes parallel the 
activities of this automaton, but never interfere with its 
machine-like precision of action. 

Our senses deceive us when they tell us that things really 
exist outside the mind. So-called things are but the ap- 
pearances of a mind which perceives them. Consciousness, 
on the other hand, exists of itself. Why, then, should not 
consciousness be the true reality, since everything else 
exists only in as far as it is perceived? Such an assumption 
possesses the merits of simplicity and economy, both char- 
acteristic qualities of every monistic philosophy. In no 
other way can we escape from a duality of substance. 

Parallelism protects the important, if not supreme, réle 
which consciousness has evidently played in the evolution 
of things. If all is consciousness, no one can question its 
effectiveness as an instrument of human development. 

The theory of evolution seems to support Parallelism, for, 


1 For an elaborate exposition and defense of Idealistic Parallelism, we may refer 
the reader to Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 87-144. 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 85 


if everything has evolved from the lowest form of being up 
to man, mind must have been present at the very beginning 
in even the most primordial kind of matter. The con- 
tinuity of the process of evolution demands that from the 
very beginning mind should have existed. Both mind and 
matter, therefore, must have developed in a perfectly 
parallel fashion, neither one influencing directly the other. 

Parallelism, by its recognition of the supremacy of 
mechanical law in the realm of physical activity, and of 
spiritual law in the realm of psychical action, offers the 
only plausible means of reconciling science and faith in a 
way which is acceptable to both scientists and believers. 
In this theory, to the scientist remains his law; to the 
believer, his spiritual interpretation of these laws and of 
reality. There can be no conflict between the two. Psychi- 
cal Monism ends forever the conflict between religion and 
science. 

Many philosophers are attracted to Psychical Monism 
for the reason that it is a contrasting point of view to that of 
common sense, and to the supposedly worn-out beliefs of 
primitive man and of scholastic philosophers as to the nature 
of the soul. To advocate Parallelism gives them a feeling 
of mental superiority over the pla man who, unaware of 
the progress of science, is still steeped in the beliefs of a 
forgotten age. The doctrines of common sense are more 
than apt to be anathema to that class of thinkers who feel 
that philosophy demands something more of its followers 
than the acceptance of theories which satisfied mankind 
in a primitive state of culture. Parallelism possesses this 
great advantage—it is not the belief of the man in the 
street. 

The principal argument for Parallelism is based on the 
theory that mind-substance does not exist except as it is 
perceived, which means that since no one has ever seen a 


86 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


mind, only mental processes really exist. There is no need 
to assume the existence of a reality, a mind-substance, or a 
soul which supports mental processes. This argument 
receives reinforcement when we reflect that it is impossible 
to picture to ourselves how a mind-substance can possibly 
influence a body-substance. Any connection between a 
mind, which is unextended, and a body, which is extended, 
is inconceivable as well as inexplicable.? 


Criticism of Psychical Monism.—The only form of 
Parallelism which merits detailed analysis is that of Psychi- 
cal Monism. Its arguments possess for many a logical and 
scientific value which has been sufficient to move them to 
accept the monistic formulation of the relations between 
body and mind. The difficulties present in this theory are, 
however, of such gravity and so unanswerable that an un- 
prejudiced thinker, after weighing them, can arrive at but 
one conclusion; namely, that Parallelism is unable to sup- 
port the contention that it is an adequate theory of the 
body-mind relation. 

In the first place, the refusal of the monist to accept the 
reality of mind-substance, or, if you will, of the soul, brings 
along in its train a host of practical difficulties, any one of 
which appears to be a sufficient reason for rejecting Par- 
allelism. If the soul does not exist, how, we make bold to 
ask, does thinking or knowing exist? If the only thing is 
knowing, who knows and what is known? If everything is 
appearance, to whom does the appearance appear? It is 
no answer to describe consciousness in terms of a stream 


1¥For a detailed statement of this argument in its different forms, see Kiilpe, 
Introduction to Philosophy, pp. 174-177. His criticisms appear to be unanswerable 
and led him to this conclusion: ‘‘It must be noted that our criticism of actuality 
does not carry with it a profession of faith in the rival theory of substantiality. 
But it seemed desirable to show that the objections urged against the latter are not 
by any means of the nature of constraining arguments, and that consequently we 
must concede the possibility of substantiality, after as before.” Op. cit., p. 177. 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 87 


of thought, each act of which integrates the rest of mental 
life. Ifa substance cannot serve as the ground for the 
successive acts of consciousness, much less can a number 
of acts become the foundation for a single act. 

The theory that mental states are formed by the in- 
tegration of a number of mental units is both false psy- 
chologically, and a surreptitious introduction into the 
monistic explanation of the idea of substance under a new 
form. Psychology knows no such summation of conscious 
states into a unit, except as the effect of other states which 
are already parts of a unit other than themselves. Mental 
states cannot combine of themselves. Nothing seems more 
clear than that fact. Each state remains what it was 
originally, and only becomes part of the stream of con- 
sciousness on the assumption that the stream is supported 
by something other than itself. As a matter of fact, such 
a stream is nothing but the soul described in new words. 
To use the expression ‘‘stream of consciousness” in any 
other than a metaphorical sense is to talk nonsense. In 
no other way than by conceding that the multitude of our 
conscious processes are brought together in a stream, which 
is distinct from each one of them individually, does the 
phrase acquire meaning. Even Paulsen admits that, on 
the basis of Parallelism, the way conscious units hang 
together in the stream of consciousness is “inexplicable.” 
What advantage then does Psychical Monism possess over 
the soul theory that it should be acclaimed a more rational 
explanation of reality? 4 

1Cf. Maher, Psychology, p. 510; also James, Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, 
pp. 158-160. 

Lotze, Metaphysic, Vol. II, p. 170, puts the argument thus: ‘“‘Any comparison of 
two ideas, which ends by our finding their contents like or unlike, presupposes the 
absolute indivisible unity of that which compares them: it must be one and the 
same thing which first forms the idea of a, then that of 6, and which at the same time 


is conscious of the nature and extent of the difference between them. Then again 
the various acts of comparing ideas and referring them to one another are themselves 


88 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


It is objected that we cannot perceive mind-substance, 
therefore, it does not exist. It is quite true that we cannot 
perceive substance. But neither can we perceive the un- 
conscious processes which both Paulsen and Wundt ac- 
knowledge to exist. The physicist does not banish sub- 
stances from the universe by calling them atoms in motion, 
transformations of energy, ether vortices, electrons, or 
what-not. The scientist replaces substance by energy only 
on the supposition that energy remains unchanged in 
quantity despite the qualitative changes to which it may 
be subjected. Why, then, should not sensations, feelings, 
thought, and willing be explained in the same way? That 
we cannot perceive the atoms which lie beneath energy is 
no reason to doubt that something does lie there. The 
same criticism is valid for mind, or rather is more valid 
for mind, since the manifestations of mind are experiences, 
like sensations and feelings, whose very nature is to be 
perceived. 

Most of the difficulties of the parallelists with reference 
to mind-substance arise from a false idea of what sub- 
stance is. Conceiving it as a mere mass of negative 
predicates, failing to understand how amidst change it still 
remains stable, claiming that it is useless as a means of hold- 
ing together the facts of experience which can be explained 
without postulating its existence, is it any wonder that sub- 
stance has been banished from Metaphysics, and soul from 
Psychology? 

But this conception is a travesty of substance as under- 
‘stood by the dualist and animist. For substance he only 


in turn reciprocally related; and this relation brings a new activity of comparison to 
consciousness. And so our whole inner world of thoughts is built up; of as a mere 
collection of manifold ideas existing with or after one another, but as a world in which 
these individual members are held together and arranged by the relating activity 
of this single pervading principle. This then is what we mean by the unity of con- 
sciousness; and it is this that we regard as the sufficient ground for assuming an 
indivisible soul.” 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 89 


claims that it is a reality which exists by itself, in the sense 
that it does not exist in something else. Self-subsistence 
and stability amidst changes are assuredly very positive 
things. The manifestations or determinations of substance, 
namely, quality, action, space, relation, are all subject to 
constant change. Is it possible to conceive how such 
changes can occur unless something remains unchanged? 
The feeling of anger cannot change to one of love, unless 
some one who was angry before, now loves. It is impossible 
to imagine love without at the same time imagining some 
one who loves, or anger without imagining some one who 
is angry. 

The distinction between substance and its accidents is 
not merely a mental construction; substance really exists 
outside of and independent of our minds. For if we can 
prove (and who will deny that we can) that an accident 
really exists, we thereby and in consequence prove that a 
substance must exist. This does not mean, as is so often 
erroneously supposed, that we thereby know how one sub- 
stance differs from another. No theory of Metaphysics 
can hope to do what is the proper function of empirical 
science, namely, to discover the differences between things. 
Metaphysics simply asserts that substances exist, and to 
this conclusion it is forced as a result of reasoning upon ex- 
perience, which cannot explain in any other acceptable way 
the reality of the mind’s experience, except on the sub- 
stance-hypothesis. For, if there is knowing, feeling, and 
willing in the world, there must be some one who knows, 
who feels, and who wills. Neither is it fair to the idea of 
substance, as defended by realistic thinkers, to understand 
substance as a something which merely underlies accidents. 
On the contrary, substance and accident make up one thing, 
a whole, neither part of which exists without the other.! 


1 Marvin falls into this very error when, criticising the substance-hypothesis, he 


9O AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Again, the stream of consciousness is determined not 
merely by the sense-impressions which are constantly flow- 
ing into it, but also by the individual character of each 
man’s mind. Modern psychology has proved nothing rel- 
ative to the nature of mind with more clearness than the 
fact of individual differences, of an almost infinite number 
and of almost infinite degrees of variation. Minds differ 
in range, in depth, in quickness, that is, in almost every con- 
ceivable way that it is possible for them to differ. Even in 
the same mind there are constant fluctuations of power. 

Memory, too, is a phenomenon of consciousness which 
requires explanation. In spite of the fact that consciousness 
is always in a perpetual flux, we do remember actions, 
which we performed, or, occurrences which happened to 
us, many years ago. 

Consider for a moment the state of consciousness which 
succeeds a period of sleep, or of unconsciousness induced by 
anesthesia, or unconsciousness the product of a blow on 
the head. While unconscious, I cease to exist, in the paral- 
lelist theory. But when I awake, how do I link up my pres- 
ent with my past consciousness? If it is not bound up with 
the old consciousness, I am a new person. If it is bound up, 
the old consciousness never really ceased to exist. What 
we ask of philosophy is an explanation of these unques- 
tioned facts. We ask it to explain, therefore, the unchang- 
ing character of the stream of consciousness, a characteris- 
tic which is equally as prominent a part of it as its liability 
to change. But on these points the psychical monist is 
silent. His only alternative to the soul theory is to declare 


writes (A First Book in Metaphysics, p. 174): ‘‘If we analyze the things we perceive 
about us, for example, a table, abstracting from them their qualities, or predicates, 
do we get a remainder, the thing itself or the substance? Evidently not; a table robbed 
of its properties, its color, its hardness, its weight, its chemical properties as wood, 
becomes nothing at all. The thing is the sum of its qualities and properties in their 
proper relations, it is not some subject over and above or beneath these predicates, 
at least not as far as direct serise perception-shows,” 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM gr 


that the brain is the source of this stability in mental proc- 
esses—a veritable reductio ad absurdum for every thorough- 
going system of Spiritualistic Monism. 

Another serious difficulty may be put in the following 
manner. If the brain is really psychical, and not material 
at all, how does the monist explain that after death the 
brain still exists, and appears to the observing eye as not a 
whit different from the brain of a living conscious person? 
On the monistic assumption the brain should vanish at the 
same time as consciousness does. But it does not disap- 
pear. It remains the same brain. And as Pratt playfully 
concludes: ‘‘Certainly it is an odd fact that almost the 
only time when the cortex is ever actually seen is just the 
time when according to our theory it ought to have dis- 
appeared altogether!” ! 

Psychical Monism, moreover, in its assumption of a 
stream of cosmic consciousness, of which each individ- 
ual consciousness is but a tiny rivulet, is not only 
arbitrary and without a vestige of argument to back up its 
opinion, but is contrary to the overwhelming evidence of 
each man’s individual consciousness which rebels against 
this unwarranted submergence of his personality in an all- 
embracing collective world soul. Nor can the idea of a 
world consciousness be made plausible except on the theory 
that each consciousness is a substantial unit, whether ma- 
terial or spiritual does not concern us now, which, combining 
with other units, forms a substantial whole. It is needless 
to repeat that Monism cannot logically accept any such 
view. 

The last argument brings to the fore what is unquestion- 
ably the greatest weakness of Parallelism, no matter what 
form it may assume. Consciousness, at least as far as we 
can know and recognize it, is always the consciousness of 


1 Matter and Spirit, p. 67. 


92 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


some one, of a person. It is, therefore, a unit, and its most 
characteristic note is its personal quality. Parallelism, how- 
ever, cannot with consistency acknowledge the existence 
of consciousness except in the form of non-individual, non- 
personal streams. Such a limitation is fatal, and marks 
the theory, not only as incompatible with facts, but as a 
fanciful elaboration in the worst manner of metaphysical 
hair-splitting.1 

One more difficulty may be adduced, and that from the 
distinctive side of the theory, namely, its parallelistic ex- 
planation of how mental and bodily processes flow along 
together, without one in any way influencing the other. 
Supposing it has been proven that the brain is mental (an 
altogether illogical assumption as we have already shown) 
the two series of functions, bodily and mental, cannot co- 
exist at the same moment. But which comes first? Evi- 
dently the psychical. Then the psychical causes the physi- 
cal—no other conclusion is possible. But the only kind of 
causation known to the psychical process is teleological, 
while physical processes are governed by the laws of me- 
chanics. The parallelist is therefore compelled to give up 
all mechanical causality, or to admit that, as a matter of 
fact, the two series do not really run independently of each 
other. If he accepts the first alternative, what then be- 
comes of his oft-repeated profession of belief in the validity 


1Eucken, Main Currents, p. 235: ‘Naturalism constructs and rounds off its 
conception of the cosmos without taking man into account—and then, with his 
distinguishing characteristics as far as possible eliminated, he is squeezed in as well 
as may be! We speak of reaction when we see life being screwed back to some old 
stage of being already inwardly obsolete. Yet all such attempts to confine life to 
an outworn historical position are modest indeed compared with this attempt to 
chain life down to its prehistoric beginnings, and so deprive it of all chance of inner 
elevation and true development. When contemplated from this standpoint, the 
whole of human history, with all its characteristic features, is seen to be nothing but 
a colossal error, a complete departure from truth, since it has more and more de- 
et man by holding up to him an inner world which is in reality a mockery and a 

elusion.” 


DHEA SY GHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 93 


and truth of the mechanistic explanation of all physical 
processes? If he accepts the latter, what becomes of paral- 
lelism? As a matter of fact, the parallelist goes a step fur- 
ther and insists that although only the psychical is real, its 
physical correlate always appears in strict accordance with 
the principles of mechanical law. A more fantastic world 
than this, created by Parallelism, it is scarcely possible to 
imagine.! 

In conclusion, we may safely assert that Parallelism 
is a wholly inadequate theory, that it leads to difficulties 
which are insurmountable, and that it puts a strain on 
facts which even Animism, in its crudest form, does not 
surpass. The whole-hearted adherence to mechanism 
and to evolution by monistic philosophers has prompted 
many to accept their conclusions. That the universe 
is governed solely by physical law is a theory which to-day 
does not demand, nor does it receive, universal assent. 
Experiment has not proved it a fact, even in the sphere 
of inorganic matter, to say nothing of the no less wide 
domain of life and of the mind. Neither is a spiritualistic 
doctrine incompatible with the theory of Evolution, when 
correctly interpreted, and limited, as it must be, by facts 
as we know them. 

The defenders of the mind-substance theory are as ex- 
plicit as any one in recognizing and affirming the depend- 
ence of mind on body. Nor has modern physiology changed 
their view as to the fact or the nature of this dependence. 
Shall we then conclude that, as far as the body-mind 
problem goes, philosophy creates, as McDougall calls 
it, “‘the dilemma—Animism or Parallelism?” and that 
it is necessary for us to embrace either one or the other 


1 For a further criticism of Parallelism, read Pratt, Matter and Spirit, pp. 48-88. 
Every student should also read Body and Mind by McDougall. This is undoubtedly 
the best and most complete critique of Parallelism ever published and has done 
more than any other work to make the monistic position in psychology untenable, 


94 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


horn of this dilemma? The answer to this question will 
be given in the conclusion to this chapter. Suffice it to 
say now, granting Materialism to be impossible, that while 
we do not argue from the position that because Parallelism 
is false, Animism must be true, we do contend that, 
considering the arguments which may be advanced in favor 
of the mind-substance theory, as well as the replies which 
may be given to the many difficulties which the theory 
presents, a very good case may be made out for the com- 
mon-sense doctrine that both body and mind really exist, 
and that each one acts upon the other in a way which we 
shall presently explain. ! 


Interactionism or the Mind-Substance Theory.—The 
controlling idea in the mind-substance theory is that 
both body and mind exist, and that they mteract. This 
conception is called the theory of Interaction. Now, while 
it is a very easy thing to say that body and mind interact, 
it is not so easy to define with clearness the precise modes 
of interaction. Before examining the theory somewhat in de- 
tail, it must be impressed on the student that the mind-sub- 
stance theory is, first of all, not the result of any general in- 
tuition, but is a practical conclusion from experience, upon 
which it is based and which it in turn endeavors to make 
intelligible. If the processes of nature and of mind cannot 


1 Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. II, pp. 3-93. Also Bergson, Mind- 
Energy, p. 52, who concludes that ‘‘common sense is right and that there is infinitely 
more in human consciousness than in the corresponding brain.”’ Read the chapter 
“The Soul and the Body,” pp. 37-74. It may not be amiss to quote Jamesas to 
the possibility of arriving at an acceptable soul theory: ‘‘Some day, indeed, souls may 
get their innings again in philosophy—I am quite ready to advocate that possi- 
bility—they form a category of thought too natural to the human mind to expire 
without prolonged resistance. But if the belief in the soul ever does come to life 
after the many funeral-discourses which Humian and Kantian criticism have 
preached over it, I am sure it will be only when some one has found in the term a 
pragmatic significance that has hitherto eluded observation.” (A Pluralistic Uni- 
verse, Pp. 210.) 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 95 


be adequately explained on any other assumption than 
that both of them exist as the products of certain substances, 
then logically we are compelled to accept Interactionism, 
despite the fact that a completely satisfactory explanation 
of the workings of these substances escapes us. The theory 
of Interaction becomes, for practical purposes, true when 
we realize that the difficulties which it involves are not 
important enough to force us to discard it. 

In the Interaction theory, matter is regarded as extended 
substance; mind as unextended or immaterial substance. 
Mind, however, is not to be identified with consciousness. 
It is a much wider term and corresponds more exactly 
to what we call the Ego. Now the Ego not only thinks; 
it wills, feels, moves, eats, and digests. All the manifold 
activities of the living organism are to be traced back 
to one cause—the soul. What is this soul? It is an in- 
complete substance—a substance in that it is a reality 
possessing self-subsistence—incomplete in that it possesses 
aptitude for union with another incomplete substance, 
i. e., the body. While it exists in and ‘‘informs,” so to 
speak, the body, it does not necessarily need the body 
for its existence. As a matter of fact, the soul exists in 
a body, and together with this body, makes up a unique 
personality. A person is not a soul alone nor a body 
alone; a person is a union of both substances, not thrown 
together in a haphazard or accidental fashion, but in a 
union so close that one element is necessary to the continued 
existence of the other as a human person. This union 
of body and soul we call a substantial union to distinguish 
it from the many accidental unions which form so large 
a part of our everyday experience; for example, the color 
of a book, the size of a piece of wood, the weight of a 
block of ice. To conceive of substance, and in particular 
the soul, as an inert mass upon the surface of which ac- 


96 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


cidents successively appear, as warts do upon a body, 
is a travesty of the idea of substance. Substance does 
not exist without accidents, and accidents ordinarily 
cannot exist without a substance. Similarly, the soul 
does not exist without thoughts, perceptions, feelings, 
nor can thoughts exist separated from a thinking subject. 

Man, or a person, is therefore a compound of two sub- 
stances, each incomplete but whose substantial union 
constitutes a complete substance. He is, however, a 
unit, not two substances in the Cartesian sense, one of 
which can never act upon the other. A great deal of the 
misunderstanding regarding the union of body and mind 
would be quickly dissipated if philosophers did not insist 
on viewing this unity as an accidental one, as propounded 
first by Descartes. 

Supposing that body and mind are thus united, what 
is the réle of the mind in this substantial union? The 
mind, or soul, is the form or ‘‘entelechy,”’ to use the word 
of Aristotle, of the body. And what is an entelechy? 
It is the principle which determines the nature of a thing, 
which when united to a subject, which it actuates, makes 
up a complete substance of a specific species. Thus the 
plant has an entelechy, the animal also, and man no less. 
This form is not only the principle which distinguishes 
one thing from another; it confers unity and identity on that 
with which it is united. In a very special sense is the soul 
the entelechy of the human body. In order to make this 
clear, it is necessary to say a word about the matter-form 
theory, a subject which will be treated more fully in the 
following chapter. According to this theory, every material 
substance is compounded of two substantial principles— 
one is called primary matter, the other substantial form. 
Primary matter is pure potentiality, that is to say, it is 
capable of receiving any kind of form. It is not extended, 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 07 


neither is it endowed with any qualities, and therefore 
it is not a complete substance. It becomes complete 
only by being united with a substantial form. A familiar 
example may make this idea more clear. When one eats 
food, the food is transformed into the living tissue of a 
person. We do not say new tissue has been created from 
nothing. Neither do we affirm that the food has ceased 
entirely to exist. It has been changed into living tissue. 
That fundamental thing which persists, amidst the many 
changes involved in digestion, is called primary matter. 
The substantial form was different at each stage of the 
process of digestion; the primary matter, however, re- 
mained constant. 

Thus, in the human organism, the body is conceived 
as primary matter. It could have become anything, for 
the simple reason that it is essentially indeterminate. 
When united with the soul, its substantial form, it receives 
determination, and becomes a person. Nor does this 
idea involve a contradiction, granting that the human 
soul is not material but spiritual. For the soul, as an in- 
forming principle of matter, contains in itself, as a spiritual 
being, powers which are not completely absorbed by its 
function as the form of the body. Besides bestowing the 
functions of nutrition, locomotion, reproduction, and 
sensation upon the body, it still possesses the functions 
of thought and of willing, and is therefore independent 
of the body to a great degree. Asa substance which subsists 
by its own inherent nature, it does not cease to exist when 
the body dies. 

Man, therefore, is not two but one nature. All his 
actions are the actions of the compound, not actions of 
the body alone nor of the soul alone. A person is not a 
soul, nor a consciousness, nor a memory. He is a self 
possessing consciousness; an ego that possesses many 


98 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


different kinds of operations, none of which is the result 
of the actions of either the body or soul alone, but of the 
being as a whole.! 

It is only fair to acknowledge that though this theory 
is consistent logically, and does not seem to involve con- 
tradictions, nevertheless it is obscure and fails to offer, 
or even hold out, the possibility of, a complete explana- 
tion of the substantial unity of the human person. This 
obscurity has been a great obstacle to its acceptance amongst 
philosophers, who, because of the negative nature of primary 
matter, together with the difficulty there is in imagining 
how such a thing as substance exists, are loathe to embrace 
the theory. Substances cannot be seen, felt, or touched; 
neither does the idea of substance include any characteristic 
notes by which we are able to distinguish one substance 
from another. In particular, the relation of body to 
mind seems to defy imagination. Both materialists and 
parallelists say it is ‘‘mconceivable.” Let us frankly 
acknowledge the difficulty, with the observation already 
made, that facts do not cease to be facts because we cannot 
offer a complete explanation of them. An example from 
science may be given which will throw some light on this 


1Mercier, Psychologie, Vol. Il, pp. 247-275. Also The Origins of Contemporary 
Psychology, pp. 204-336. 

Thomas Aquinas, the most consistent defender of the mind-substance theory, thus 
describes the relations of dependence between body and mind: ‘‘Secundum nature 
ordinem, propter colligantiam virium anime in una essentia, et anime et corporis 
in uno esse compositi, vires superiores et inferiores, et etiam corpus, invicem in se 
effuunt quod in aliquo eorum superabundat; et inde est quod ex apprehensione 
anime transmutatur corpus, secundum calorem et frigus et quandoque usque ad 
sanitatem et egritudinem, et usque ad mortem: contingit enim aliquem ex gaudio 
vel tristitia vel amore mortem incurrere. . . Anima conjuncta corpori, ejus com- 
plexiones imitatur secundum amentiam vel docilitatem, et alia hujusmodi. Similiter 
ex viribus superioribus fit redundantia in inferiores; cum ad motum voluntatis 
intensum sequitur passio in sensuali appetitu, et ex intensa contemplatione retra- 
huntur vel impediuntur vires animales a suis actibus; et e converso ex viribus infer- 
ioribus fit redundantia in superiores; ut cum ex vehementia passionum in sensuali 
appetitu existentium obtenebratur ratio, ut judicet quasi simpliciter bonum id circa 
quod homo per passionem afficitur.” (De Veritate, q. XXVI, art. X.) 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 99 


relation. Like every example, the analogy is not perfect. 
It is striking enough, however, and may be of assistance 
to the student who insists on having a concrete example 
with which to round out his thoughts about a thing. 

Suppose two bars of steel, of equal size, weight, etc. 
One is magnetized, the other is not. The magnetized bar 
possesses functions which the unmagnetized bar lacks. It 
is not, however, at least to the eye, different in appearance 
from the second bar of steel. It does not weigh more; nor 
has it grown in length after it has been magnetized. Elec- 
tricity, however, “informs” it at every point, and bestows 
upon it functions which otherwise it would not possess. 
Somewhat analogous is the status of a body without a soul, 
and a body “informed” by a soul. The soul bestows life 
on the body, it vitalizes the body, it is the source and 
principle of all the operations which are peculiar to a living 
body, at the same time adding nothing in weight, size, or 
appearance to the body, conceived as a separate substance 
from the soul. 


Arguments in Favor of the Interaction Theory.—The 
arguments in favor of the mind-substance theory may be 
briefly summarized under the following headings: It is 
argued that consciousness itself makes one aware of the 
existence of the Ego. While it cannot tell the exact nature 
of this Ego, consciousness affirms with absolute certainty 
that an Ego exists, that the I who sleeps, who thinks, who 
eats, who walks, is not a number of different subjects, but 
is one and the same identical subject. Moreover, this Ego 
continues to exist and to perceive amidst the manifold 
changes of daily life. Now, if body and mind did not 
form a substantial and indivisible unit, such testimony on 
the part of consciousness would be unexplainable. Since 
perception and intellection are immanent acts, if they were 


100 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the products of two different subjects and not of one sub- 
ject, would not consciousness be compelled to record this 
fact for us by testifying to the existence of more than one 
Ego? It is true that consciousness does not tell us in what 
the Ego consists, but it does inform us, and in no uncertain 
accents, that the Ego exists. 

Moreover, it is not difficult for us to distinguish one 
thing from another by means of its characteristic activities. 
Nobody would confound water with stones, nor wood with 
diamonds. Material things are easily distinguishable from 
one another on the basis of the different activities which 
they manifest. Now, if material things are distinct, in- 
dividual, different from one another, how much more so are 
minds? If anything has the right to be called a distinct 
thing in nature, certainly it is the Self. Assuredly the 
agreements between material things are much more marked 
than the agreements between any two selves. 

Memory is impossible on any other supposition than the 
permanent existence of an unchanging substance, which is 
itself subject to many changes. The I who thinks and wills 
and perceives is the same I who thought ten years ago. No 
fact of my mental life is more certain than this. 

Each man feels himself responsible for the results which 
attend upon his actions when freely performed. But if 
acts are the whole of reality, and are not to be attributed 
to a permanent individual and responsible agent, this sense 
of responsibility becomes yet another of the great illusions 
with which human nature is unhappily afflicted. 

Purposeful activity is a prime characteristic of the actions 
of man. In spite of the fact that the body has its proper 
functions, no less than the mind, all the activities of man 
conspire to the attainment of certain definite ends, the 
majority, or at least the most important, of which are 
spiritual and rational. If man is a mere machine, he is then 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM IOI 


the most wonderful machine ever conceived. A superficial 
consideration of such a marvelous machine as the body- 
mind machine unquestionably is, leads one to inquire: 
Does it happen by mere chance that the parts of this ma- 
chine, so different from one another, continue to work 
together in a most harmonious way, or is it not necessary 
to assume the presence of some constant abiding cause 
which regulates and controls them? To suppose otherwise 
would be to impose on our acceptance a miracle surpassing 
all belief. Only on the assumption that body and mind are 
united in a substantial union can we find an adequate 
explanation for the persistent, harmonious concurrence of 
so many otherwise conflicting elements. Complex as these 
relations are, there can be no doubt in any man’s mind that 
the Self dominates the actions of the body, and uses them 
for its own, that is, spiritual purposes. 


Criticism of the Interaction Theory.—The difficulties 
which are generally brought against the theory of Interac- 
tion fall under three headings. Variations of the same 
arguments are often met with, but these different forms are 
easily reducible to the three main contentions which we are 
now to examine. 

It is argued that mental action is only a special form of 
motion. Experimental psychology by its researches in 
reaction time proves that psychical processes, since they 
endure for a certain definite amount of time, are but 
movements. In the last analysis it will be found that all 
movements are reducible to one kind of movement, matter 
in motion. 

The same objection is stated in other ways. Physiological 
psychology has shown the dependence of mind on brain. 
“‘No psychosis without a neurosis” is a universally accepted 
principle of modern psychology. 


102 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


We may reply to the above objection that no one ever 
questioned the dependence of mind on brain. It is not the 
fact which needs explanation, but the nature and extent of 
the dependence. Neither does the fact that mental acts take 
place in time necessitate a belief in the intrinsic dependence 
of mind on matter, unless one assumes that everything which 
takes place in timeis but akind of movement. This proposi- 
tion cannot be proved without postulating the very thing we 
wish to prove, namely, that the physiological concomitants 
of the acts of mind are identical with the acts themselves. 

The second difficulty proposed against Interaction is the 
one from “‘inconceivability,’’ an argument which has ap- 
peared in a multitude of forms. We may state it thus: 
it is inconceivable that two substances, so diverse as matter 
and mind, should ever act upon each other. To which we 
may reply, that such interaction is inconceivable only on 
the supposition that our idea of causation, a deduction 
from our experiences regarding the action of one material 
thing upon another, exhausts the possibilities of causation 
and renders any other kind of cause and effect relation 
impossible. Experience alone can inform us whether one 
thing can be the cause of which another is the effect. Now, 
no experience proves that mind cannot act on body. Quite 
the opposite is true. Daily experience brings to us countless 
examples of such interaction. I desire to write, and im- 
mediately I sit down at a desk and begin the physical 
operation of writing. I wish to stop writing and take a 
walk instead, and immediately begin the different move- 
ments necessary to walking. It certainly is difficult to 
explain how the will exerts this influence upon the body, 
but the fact is unquestionable. Nothing, therefore, but a 
preconceived, a priori, and dogmatic formulation of the 
cause-effect relation rules out of court the possibility of 
psycho-physical interaction. 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 103 


The epistemological argument which is based upon the 
assumption that only the sensible is knowable is no less 
arbitrary and dogmatic than the causality difficulty, with 
which it is closely allied. Neither a priori, and certainly 
not a posteriori, is it evident that everything which exists 
must be endowed with material characteristics, otherwise 
we cannot know them. On no other hypothesis than that 
all phenomena must be explained mechanically, in terms 
of extension and motion, can the epistemological objection 
stand. 

The objection from the law of conservation of energy is, 
of all the objections brought against Interaction, the one 
which has had the most weight with the advocates of 
Parallelism. 

The unanimous opinion of scientists is that the amount 
of energy in the universe suffers neither diminution nor 
increase; it is a constant quantity. One kind of energy may 
be transformed into another, but the sum-total of the 
energy, kinetic and potential, of the universe never varies, 
it always remains the same. Now, the mind either trans- 
' forms physical energy into acts which we call acts of 
thought and of will, and it is therefore material; or it pro- 
duces these acts without using any of the energy in the 
universe, and therefore increases the amount of energy 
which, we know, cannot be increased. In either case, 
mind is material. To which might be added as a con- 
firmatory argument that until a positive experimental 
proof is brought forward to justify the exclusion of psychical 
acts from the sway of the law of mechanics, which is uni- 
versally applicable, we are compelled to explain them in 
conformity with this law. 

Before replying directly to the difficulty brought against 
Interactionism because it appears to clash with the law of 
the conservation of energy, it is necessary to inquire as to 


104 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


what precisely the parallelist means by the words, ‘“‘the 
law of the conservation of energy.” If he means the theory 
of Equivalence, namely, that when kinetic energy is changed 
into another form and then changed back again into 
kinetic energy, the amount of energy which latterly exists 
is equivalent to that which existed before any transforma- 
tion took place, we can confidently assert that neither 
sensible nor intellectual operations violate that theory. 
It would be necessary to show experimentally that the 
amount of energy which is used when the body acts on 
mind is not made up for when mind, in its turn, acts upon 
body, to prove Interactionism impossible. ‘This, of course, 
has never been done. Until these experimental proofs are 
forthcoming, the position of the Interactionist is unassail- 
able. 

If, however, by the law of conservation of energy one 
means what is ordinarily meant, namely, that the sum- 
total of the amount of energy in the universe is fixed and 
that, therefore, mental changes would increase this sum- 
total, which is impossible without destroying the law, then 
any one of the following replies is possible. In the first 
place, Interactionism is certainly incompatible with the law 
of the conservation of energy if the law is an a priori axiom, 
in other words, a necessary and universal law of thought. 
But is it an a priori axiom? Itis not. It is a mere general- 
ization from experience and, as such, only holds good to the 
extent of our experience, which in the case of the law under 
question, does not extend beyond the field of phenomena 
in which the experiments upon which it is based have taken 
place. So limited, the law does not affect psycho-physical 
interaction in the slightest degree. 

Moreover, there is no experimental evidence which will 
justify the extension of the law of the conservation of energy 
to include every possible kind of energy. This application 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 10S 


of the law would only be valid on the assumption that the 
universe is a closed system, the amount of energy of which 
cannot be increased or diminished. But this assumption 
has never been proven, and its extension to living organisms 
is unjustified on any experimental basis. No one questions 
the value of the law as a working hypothesis in the domain 
of physical action. But when we apply it to the organic 
world, and bring under it activities of all kinds, even those 
of thought and will, we are making an illegitimate extension 
of the law, unsupported by evidence and made to be so 
simply because we wish it to be so. 

On the other hand, there is no small amount of experi- 
mental proof of the most exact character, to say nothing of 
everyday experience, which proves that mind does in- 
fluence body. Between the facts of psychology and a mere 
prejudice, namely, that unless we accept the universality 
of physical law science becomes impossible, no one need 
waver in a choice. Accept the facts. Science will not be 
destroyed because psychical facts are removed from its 
sway. There still remains to it the physical universe, with 
all its wonders, and all its unsolved problems. And if this 
universe can never be explained except we assume the 
identity of matter and spirit, then perhaps it would be 
better to leave off trying to explain it altogether and be- 
gin again a study of facts as they really exist. 

Nor need the demands of the positivist for an experimental 
proof that the psychical is an exception to mechanical law 
trouble us. He asks the impossible. Consciousness is the 
only source of our knowledge of what consciousness is and 
what consciousness can do. Why, then, look for reasons 
and proofs in the world of matter? 4 

Our examination of the different theories which offer 


1For a detailed discussion of the above objections read McDougall, Body and 
Mind, pp. 206-271, and Pratt, Matter and Spirit, pp. 130-166. 


106 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


solutions of the body-mind problem leads to the conclusion 
that of all the theories studied Interactionism entails the 
fewest difficulties, and, at the same time, presents the most 
consistent answer to this vexing question. Its chief merit, 
it seems to us, is that it harmonizes with facts, both of 
consciousness and of the physical world. The mind- 
substance theory is a common-sense view, but one which no 
philosopher need decry or refuse to accept unless he is 
determined to be swayed in:his views by prejudice rather 
than by facts. The monistic tendency, which has exerted 
so tremendous an influence upon modern thought, has 
served to turn men’s minds away from the study of fact to 
the acceptance of a priori constructions of a more or less 
unstable character. The time has come to return, both in 
science and in philosophy, to facts, even though they happen 
to be the common facts of everyday experience and of every 
man’s consciousness. 

Neither is it fair to the theory of Interaction to describe 
it as an ‘‘outworn superstition” or as incompatible with the 
principles and findings of Natural Science. No student has 
a higher regard for science, nor for the facts of science, 
whether they be bodily or mental, than the Interactionist. 
Without this regard his theory becomes stupidity of a most 
unalloyed kind. He must study physiology, chemistry, 
physics if he would even pretend to understand pyschology. 
But he distinguishes clearly between what psychology 
teaches him, and what physiology pretends to teach him 
about mind. Mechanical explanations are well and good in 
their proper sphere. He cannot see them transferred to the 
domain of mental life without feeling that something is 
wrong, that mechanism is assuming a crown it has no right 
to wear. 

A dualistic metaphysics finds itself in congenial, even 
agreeable, company, when it encounters science, acting and 


THE PSYCHO-PHYSICAL PROBLEM 107 


living as science. But when it meets science, as is often the 
case unfortunately, masquerading as something quite 
different, it immediately becomes suspicious, and sometimes 
ends by being hostile. Dualism has no quarrel with physical 
science. It allows the natural scientist the widest possible 
use of mechanical laws and formule in the field of the phys- 
ical. But philosophy would not be loyal to itself, nor to the 
higher interests of truth, if it failed to protest against the 
unwarranted practice on the part of some scientists in mak- 
ing the mental a mere aspect of matter, and psychology a 
branch of physiology. 

One more word as to the status of Dualism amongst 
present-day thinkers. Far from being an ‘outgrown 
theory’’ metaphysical dualism never had so many and such 
prominent defenders as it boasts at the present time. The 
reaction against both materialism and monism has definitely 
set in, as is evidenced by the increasing number of thinkers 
who are entering the lists in behalf of Dualism. Certainly 
no one would accuse any of the following of being un- 
acquainted with the results of modern science, yet each one 
of them has either openly defended Interactionism or felt 
himself unable to agree with Parallelism in any of its forms. 
I refer to Lotze, C. Stumpf, Busse, Bergson, Kiilpe, Ward, 
William James, Sedgwick, Bradley, Ladd, Schiller, Taylor, 
Driesch, McDougall, Sheldon, Pratt, and Lovejoy. These 
thinkers are neither theologians nor writers of popular 
manuals of devotion. If they can perceive in Interaction- 
ism, or if they cannot perceive in Parallelism, a satisfactory 
explanation of the relations of man to the universe, then it 
scarcely behooves any one to refer to this theory as an out- 
grown scholastic superstition. 

Interactionism is a sound theory, whether viewed from 
the side of physical science or of psychology. It is, more- 
over, the only theory which satisfactorily explains human 


108 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


personality, and the place of man in the cosmos. [If it 
possessed no other claim to recognition, this alone should 
bestow upon it a prominent place in every philosopher’s 
speculations, and entitle it to the place of honor in his 
theories as to the nature of mind and of body, and of the 
relations of one to the other.? 


REFERENCES 


DE WutF: Medieval Philosophy. 
FarGcEs: Le Cerveau, L’Ame, et Les Facultés. 
FULLERTON: A System of Metaphysics. 
GRUENDER: Psychology Without a Soul. 
HoEeRNLE: Matter, Life, Mind, and God. 
James: Psychology. 
Kure: Introduction to Philosophy. 
Lapp: Introduction to Philosophy; Philosophy of Mind. 
Latrp: Problems of the Self. 
LEIGHTON: Man and the Cosmos. 
McDovucatt: Outline of Psychology; Body and Mind. 
Mauer: Psychology. 
Marvin: Introduction to Philosophy. 
Mercier: Psychologie; La Pensée et la Loi de la Conservation de 
L’ Energie. 

PAULSEN: Introduction to Philosophy. 
Pratt: Matter and Spirit. 
Warp: Naturalism and Agnosticism. 

1Tt may appear hypercritical to find fault with so admirable a book as Professor 
Pratt’s. In it he puts the finishing touches to the work of destroying Parallelism 
which McDougall so well began. What we cannot understand, however, is why he 
refuses to go the full distance towards which the facts he cites and logic it- 
self seem to impel him. Pratt stops short with what he names ‘“‘a dualism of 
process,”’ which is ‘‘not necessarily a dualism of substance” (p. 183). But how is 
it possible to conceive one without the other? On page 181, in describing the self 
he defines it as a substance, when he writes: ‘‘The self then is a genuine reality with 
a unity and identity of its own, a center of influence and energy, and not to be con- 
founded with a mere sum of qualities or of states.” 


CHAPTER V 
THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 


The problems which we have dealt with up to this point 
had to do with the universe in its widest aspects. Thus, we 
have traversed the different theories which attempt to ex- 
plain the nature of reality. Our examination seems to prove 
that after a most careful scientific and philosophical analy- 
sis, the belief of the plain man as to the dualistic nature of 
reality is justified. Everyday experience, no less than 
philosophy, confirm us in our acceptance of a dual principle 
in nature. Dualism, it is true, involves difficulties, but the 
difficulties are not so serious that they necessitate a revision 
of the fundamental doctrines, upon which this philosophy 
is based. The theory of Interaction also seems to be, con- 
sidering the present state of our knowledge, a sufficiently 
reasonable explanation of the relations of body to mind. 
No argument yet advanced by Parallelist or Materialist 
is strong enough to force us to discard a doctrine which 
explains so well our experiences, and is in such complete 
harmony with them. 

But these problems, with the solutions we have offered, 
do not by any means exhaust the questions which arise from 
our contemplation of the universe as a whole. Admitting 
that body and mind exist, and even interact, the philosopher 
seeks a more exact explanation than that already proffered 
as to the nature of this interesting relation. No exhaustive 
study is required to reveal to us the existence of different 
kinds of substances, whose characteristics are so marked 

109 


TIO AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


that it is impossible to confuse them, one with the other, 
and whose activities are, at least at first glance, diametric- 
ally opposed. Nobody would mistake a stone for a plant, 
nor a chair for a human body. Neither science nor philoso- 
phy is needed to inform us that these things are very 
different from one another. And this difference, or better, 
series of differences, is evidenced by the diverse ways in 
which things operate. The non-living acts quite differently 
than the living. Amongst living things, there are grades 
of activity, so clear-cut and distinct, that no ordinary 
observer would think of asserting them to be one and the 
same. But, perhaps, after a detailed and critical study 
these differences, which appear so far-reaching, may be 
discovered not to be as vital as first appearances naturally 
lead us to believe. Perhaps everything at bottom is one, 
and what we think of as individual and irreducible activities 
are not so at all. The actions of man seem to be quite 
different from those of a lower animal, a plant, a stone. 
Shall this belief be justified after a searching examination 
of its value and the arguments upon which it relies? 

The history of philosophy proves that all men have not 
accepted as final the generally received belief as to the pro- 
found differences which exist amongst things. Some 
philosophers have seen these differences as merely accidental 
manifestations of a reality, which is in the last analysis, one. 
The so-called qualitative differences, which mark off things 
from one another in such a way that they cannot be ex- 
plained by a single formula, are not imbedded in the nature 
of things. Upon investigation, they will be found to be 
negligible differences, and not primary at all. As a matter 
of fact, qualitative changes are superficial. They are the 
seeming reality, it is true, but a thorough analysis of the 
quality and the activities of bodies reveals to us the truth 
that quality is really nothing. On the other hand, quantity 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 111 


is of the essence of things, which differ from one another in 
the amount of mass which they possess or of motion which 
has been communicated to this mass. Everything, there- 
fore, comes under one law, and can be explained in terms of a 
single principle. This conception of the universe we call 
Mechanism. 

But Mechanism is not the only possible answer which 
can be given to this problem. A group of thinkers rebel 
against the reduction of all reality to one kind, and assert 
that Mechanism is an insufficient explanation of how 
things act upon one another. The world is not a machine, 
in the exclusive sense that a mechanical explanation is 
adequate for every kind of cosmic experience. There exist 
phenomena, we call them vital phenomena, which cannot 
be explained by the laws of mechanics governing lifeless 
matter. To understand adequately vital phenomena, it is 
necessary to construct another series of laws which will 
include aspects and activities of living matter not explain- 
able in physico-chemical terms. The vitalist does not deny 
that matter can be, and should be explained, solely by means 
of mechanical principles. He opposes, however, the exten- 
sion of the mechanical category to the realm of the living, 
which he looks upon as another and different kind of reality 
than the non-living. This view of the world is, therefore, 
vitalistic and its philosophy is called Vitalism.* 


Mechanism.—The mechanical theory has had a long 
history, dating from the days of Democritus. The term, 


1Driesch puts the problem thus: ‘‘Zs organic individual wholeness produced on 
basis of a machine, i. e., by processes which, though arranged in a special given manner, 
are in themselves inorganic processes, as known from physics and chemistry, or are 
there in the organism whole-making processes sui generis, i. e., processes not reducible 
to the forms of inorganic becoming? 

“This, then, is the central problem of biology proper: Mechanism or Vitalism? 
if by ‘Vitalism’ we mean the possibility, merely negative at first, that there may 
be processes in the organism which are mot of the machine-like or ‘mechanistic’ 


112 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


too, has been accepted in many meanings. Principal 
amongst these has been the one which is generally called 
Atomic Mechanism or Chemical Atomism, the underlying 
idea of which is that all substances are composed of atoms 
which never exist alone but in groups, called molecules, the 
activities of which are to be explained according to physical 
and chemical laws. The other leading use of the term is to 
designate a philosophical doctrine which, transcending the 
empirical data of chemistry and physics, strives to build 
Chemical Atomism into a theory of the universe. It is in 
this latter sense that we will treat of Mechanism, namely, 
as a philosophic view which regards the universe as a ma- 
chine. 

Mechanism as philosophy attempts a construction of the 
universe solely in the terms of mechanics. Everything is 
at bottom matter, that is, the atoms of simple bodies are all 
homogeneous, and consist of mass with its attendant func- 
tion of motion. Bodies, therefore,are composed of molecules 
inmotion. These molecules act according to the blind laws 
of necessity. There is no such thing as purpose, end, adap- 
tation, or freedom in nature. Such conceptions are pure 
fiction. When correctly understood, all bodies, living and 
non-living, fall under the universal laws of mechanical 
explanation. While it is quite true that it is very difficult, 
in the present state of our knowledge, to reduce all the phe- 
nomena of both living and non-living bodies to a single for- 
mula, such must undoubtedly be our final objective. This 
task, to which science is committed, is something more than 
a mere pious aspiration. Continuity demands some such 
unified conception of the world. 

In the mechanistic theory there is no real difference be- 
tween forms of matter. All obey the laws of motion. A 


type, and which may be said to be ‘teleological’ or purposeful in more than a merely 
formal sense.” (Problems of Individuality, p. 4.) 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE Eig 


stone cast from a building will reach the ground at the same 
time as a human body of an identical shape and weight, all 
other conditions being equal. The law of chemical affinity, 
the law of gravitation admit no exception of any kind what- 
soever. It must not be supposed, however, that Mechan- 
ism fails to recognize the different degrees of complexity 
which exist amongst bodies. Living bodies, and especially 
the human body, are extremely complex. The atoms, 
though, work in exactly the same fashion and are under- 
standable on the same principles, whether the body be liv- 
ing or not. Everything is mass in motion—no other factor 
is required to explain the activities of nature. 

Of course, our ignorance of complex organisms prevents 
our predicting what they shall do, given certain circum- 
stances, with the accuracy and finality with which we can 
predict the activities of well-known chemical compounds. 
This limitation, however, is not due to the falsity of the 
mechanistic theory, but to the inadequacy of our present- 
day knowledge. If we possessed a comprehensive knowl- 
edge of physiology, the complex functioning of the human 
body would present no mysteries for mechanical science. 
Not only would it understand why this particular response 
follows upon this given stimulus rather than on another, but 
it would be able to predict with unfailing accuracy just what 
response must follow. So far-reaching, in fact, are the prin- 
ciples of mechanics that all the facts of psychology, of sociol- 
ogy, and even of ethics must be brought under its spread. 
Human acts, and human intercourse, complicated as they 
appear to be, are really very simple at bottom and yield to 
a mechanistic interpretation, tentative, of course, at the 
present time, but approaching more nearly to a complete 
explanation as our knowledge of matter and its activities 
is deepened and clarified. If it were possible to know every 
atom of the universe, together with its boundings and re- 


II4 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


boundings, we could safely predict all the phenomena of 
nature, including the fate of every individual man, the rise 
and fall of empires, the future of this world, the transforma- 
tion of the solar system. Nothing escapes the sweep of the 
laws of mechanical necessity, neither on this earth, nor in the 
waters underneath the earth, nor in the heavens above. 

Mechanism, therefore, is an all-embracing science as well 
as an all-embracing philosophy. Since its underlying prin- 
ciple is to interpret all higher phenomena of a complex order 
in terms of lower phenomena of a simpler order, it progres- 
sively reduces the fields of the higher sciences to those of a 
physical and mechanical character. Ethics, psychology, 
and sociology thus become aspects of biology, which, in its 
turn, derives its validity and explanations from chemistry 
or physics. These latter sciences, when analyzed, turn out 
to be but phases of mathematics, which is the ground sci- 
ence. All phenomena are, therefore, referable to mathe- 
matics, and can be stated not only in terms of mathemati- 
cal equations but can only be understood fully in that way. 
The universe, in this conception, becomes a closed system, 
from which everything but mass and motion are banished. 
All such categories as end, purpose, value, and causes, other 
than efficient, are useless, and serve no purpose but to 
hamper a scientific and an ultimately attainable mechan- 
istic explanation of the universe. 


Neo-Mechanism.—The mechanistic interpretation of the 
universe, as outlined, is frankly materialistic and monistic. 
Historically, Mechanism has always stood in very close re- 
lation with both Materialism and Monism. Since Material- 
ism has suffered greatly in prestige in recent years, there 
has followed a loss of ground on the part of Mechanism as 
well. The scientists remain for the large part mechanistic, 
and. many of the thinkers, who inhabit the border-land be- 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE II5 


tween science and philosophy, are no less openly favorable 
to the theory of Mechanism. But the number of mechan- 
ists of an intransigent character, like Loeb, has greatly 
diminished, especially in biology. To-day Mechanism, no 
less than Materialism, has been considerably toned down, 
and its followers seem less sure, or, at least, less outspoken, 
in pressing its claims as a final and authoritative explana- 
tion of all reality. There has thus arisen what has been 
called the New Mechanism. However, there is no great 
difference, certainly no difference of fundamental princi- 
ple, between the neo-mechanists and the mechanists of the 
nineteenth century. Both agree that the atoms of which 
all substances are composed are essentially homogeneous. 
They differ in this, that the neo-mechanists are less dog- 
matic in asserting that every kind of motion can be defined 
in terms of a single substance, the nature of which they 
make no attempt to define. Logically, however, both 
schools are one, for it is manifestly impossible to introduce 
qualitative differences between substances which support 
a reality which is one and undifferentiated, namely, motion. 

Another characteristic of Neo-Mechanism is its lack of 
the dogmatic tone which was so prominently displayed 
in the older Mechanisms. Present-day mechanists frankly 
acknowledge that the mechanical explanation has not an- 
swered all questions, nor do they claim that it ever will be 
able to do so. The explanation of all phenomena in terms 
of motion is a possibility, and should be the goal of science. 
This much we are compelled to recognize. But it is one 
thing, they claim, to acknowledge our ignorance, and another 
to state that this ignorance is final, that a mechanical 
explanation which all can accept lies without the bounds 
of possibility. We must have faith in the mechanical the- 
ory. By the use of it science has gained some of its most 
notable victories. Moreover, it is purely arbitrary to nar- 


116 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


row the extension of this theory to non-living matter. All 
Mechanism asks is a chance to show what it can do in the 
field of biology. To prejudge is both arbitrary and unscien- 
tific. 

Mechanism may possibly be false; it is faced with im- 
mense difficulties; for some it even involves serious con- 
tradictions. In spite of all this, it must pursue its even 
course. To abandon Mechanism because it does not ex- 
plain everything is to destroy the foundations of all science 
and to throw us back into an intellectual atmosphere in 
which demons of good and evil reign, and chance, not law, 
governs their and our actions. Surely, the progress of 
science in the last century is argument enough for any man 
to hold fast to a mechanistic interpretation of this world. 
In the future, as Fullerton remarks, “the steady growth 
of science encourages those who are imbued with the 
scientific spirit to hope that, in our knowledge of nature, 
discontinuity will gradually give place to continuity, and 
that there will become more and more clear before our eyes 
an orderly mechanical system, the successive stages in the 
evolution of which will not have to be accepted as inexpli- 
cable fact, but will be seen to be the appropriate steps in a 
series of changes, the inevitable succession of which we may 
infer with confidence, and which we are unable to compre- 
hend only where we are still hampered by our ignorance.” ! 


Energism.—Amongst recent thinkers, especially in France 
and Germany, Mechanism has been supplanted by Energism. 
The central idea of the theory of Energetics is that energy 
is the only true reality existing in this universe. Matter 
does not exist. It is a mere ‘‘episode”’ of energy, something 
which carries along with it energy, appearing to us under 
the shape of mass, weight, and volume. The essence of 

1A System of Metaphysics, p. 227. 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 117 


energy is twofold—quantity and intensity—and although 
energy is multiple, it is capable of being transformed from 
one species into another. Electrical energy may be trans- 
formed into heat energy, or chemical, light, gravitation, 
nervous, etc. Energism thus reintroduces into nature the 
principle of quality which was banished therefrom by the 
different theories of Mechanism. As to the ultimate nature 
of energy, Energism is silent. As a scientific hypothesis 
it goes no further than the assertion that energy is energy; 
what lies behind is a matter for metaphysical speculation. 

That Energism possesses many advantages over the 
older mechanical ideas, and is a more exact theory of nature, 
few will deny. Its weak point is the way in which it exag- 
gerates the réle of energy in the universe. Space, extension, 
mass, time, and distance, for example, cannot be conceived 
as forms or elements of energy without doing them violence. 
Moreover, matter is not gotten rid of by analyzing it into 
mass, weight, and extension and calling these attributes 
energy, as Ostwald does, thereby rendering the idea of mat- 
ter useless. We hasten to ask: How do these qualities con- 
tinue to exist and influence one another, if they are not 
bound together by some connecting link? It seems neces- 
sary to postulate the existence of some ground which com- 
bines these elements into a whole if we ever hope to under- 
stand how they can act together.! 


Arguments in Favor of Mechanism.—Like so many other 
terms, Mechanism has not had a constant meaning. Often 
it is used in its most rigid sense; again, its meaning is 
softened to include actions other than the purely mechani- 


1 For an exposition of the theory of Energism read Ostwald, Energism; Duhem, 
L’ Evolution de la Méchanique; Rey, L’Energetique et le Mechanism; Mach, Science 
of Mechanics, trans. by M’Cormach. For a critique, Nys, Cosmologie, pp. 574- 
589; Mercier, Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy, pp. 139-143; Ward, J., 
Naturalism and Agnosticism, pp. 155-181, 


118 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


cal, or to comprehend but a portion of reality.1 That a 
partial Mechanism can be defended scientifically, we shall 
see later. Here we are discussing only the theory which 
claims to be an exclusive explanation in terms of mass 
and motion of the universe both physical and mental. 
This might be called Pure Mechanism. 

The arguments advanced to prove the truth of Mechan- 
ism are, in the main, of a nature extrinsic to the problems 
involved. A priori, it cannot be maintained, and all are 
agreed on this point, that the universe must be explained 
mechanically. However, the fundamental conceptions of 
science are of such character that, unless we assume the 
truth of Mechanism, we are obliged to admit many inco- 
herencies, no less than unbridgeable gaps, in the continuity 
of scientific knowledge. The argument ‘from prejudice” 
is nowhere more patent than in the field of mechanical ex- 
planation. The majority of scientists assume the mechan- 
ical theory to be correct because they wish it to be so. 

In the first place, mechanists argue that their theory is 
scientific in contrast to the medieval and “‘romantic’’ idea 
which would explain things in terms of demons, or of some 
purely metaphysical principle, like the soul, entelechy, or 
élan vital. Now we cannot accept external interference of 
any kind in the orderly workings of the universe unless we 
are ready to sacrifice all hope of ever attaining a strictly 
logical and scientific explanation of reality. Continuity 
demands that all the sciences be reducible to a single science 
whose principles are determined, that is, to mathematics. 
To explain a thing on the basis of some hidden quality, or 
so-called ‘‘form,’’ is simply to throw dust in our own eyes. 
It does not add a whit to our knowledge to assert that man 
is man because he possesses a substantial form, the soul, or 


1 See Broad, article ‘‘Mechanical Explanation and Its Alternatives”’ in A ristotel- 
ian Society Proceedings, Vol. XIX, for an analysis of the different ways in which 
the term “‘mechanism” can be understood. 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE ee 


that electricity and heat differ, because of differences in 
their underlying substances. 

Moreover, Vitalism is productive of mental lethargy in 
this, that, like a drug, it soothes us to sleep in the presence 
of problems which cry out for more than a purely verbal 
solution. Mechanism, on the other hand, is a vigorous 
manly tackling of all problems, not a reveling in an ab- 
surd logomachy. The mechanistic hypothesis may not 
solve all questions, but it has at least the hardihood to at- 
tack all. If it had done nothing more than free science from 
the absurdities of final causes, souls, entelechies and such 
stuff, it would have conferred a priceless boon on human 
knowledge. 

To the above criticism we may reply, that no one can 
question the good results which have followed the intro- 
duction of the mechanical explanation into the natural 
sciences. Mechanism has helped to liberate physical science 
from the domination of anti- or, at least, non-scientific ideas. 
For this reason, and rightly, it has been called the ‘‘ Magna 
Charta’’ of science. And this is no small claim to honor. 
But we must beware of exaggerating the place of Mechan- 
ism in the philosophy of nature by according it a place out 
of all proportion to its accomplishments. As a “‘charter of 
autonomy for the physico-chemical sciences’’ ! its place is 
secure; as an exclusive philosophy of nature, there are many 
grave reasons for disputing its pretended supremacy. The 
argument, therefore, is purely negative, and in default of 
positive reasons it neither proves Mechanism true nor false. 
It does not even create a prejudice in its favor. 

Another argument in favor of Mechanism is deduced 
from the fundamental laws of applied logic. An explana- 
tion, it is contended, which purports to be more than a mere 
tautology, must explain, that is to say, it must pass from 

1 Hoernlé, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, p. 179. 


120 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the better known to the less well-known, and not vice versa. 
Science is not a mere description of phenomena. It attempts 
to explain why and how they occur; and this can be done 
in no other way than by reducing any unknown phenomenon 
to its known antecedents. Mechanism takes precisely this 
attitude. In the face of a phenomenon which seems to defy 
explanation it does not go in search of hidden meanings or 
outside forces. Within the thing itself is its own explana- 
tion, and we can find that explanation if we diligently search 
for it where it should be sought, namely, in like phenomena. 

Final causes are useless as explanations. Setting aside 
the many illusions which naturally arise from the injection 
of the personal equation into all our statements relative to 
ends or purposes, these final causes are not verse caus@ in 
any true sense of the word, and serve us no better than 
‘“‘forms” in explaining things. What is a final cause? It is 
the end for which a thing is done. But the end may not 
exist until after both the efficient cause and its effect have 
ceased to exist altogether. The final cause, therefore, can- 
not be a cause in any sense of determining what shall be. 
In order to influence the effect it would have to be a cause 
before it exists, which is manifestly absurd. 

Moreover, final causes teach us nothing about the nature 
of things. To say that an ear is an ear because it is made to 
hear tells us nothing about the ear as a physiological struc- 
ture, or what part it plays in the function of hearing, to say 
nothing of a hundred other things we wish to know when 
we ask the question—What is the ear? Final causes, there- 
fore, give us no information about what a thing is, how it 
works, and what its relations are to other things. Such 
explanation is no more effective than the so-called formal 
cause which explains a thing by itself. 

For the above reasons the mechanist contends that science 
is helpless before phenomena if it attempts any other ex- 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE I2I 


planation than one in terms of efficient causes. The com- 
plex must be explained by the simple; the new by the old. 
Now, at the bottom of all activities we find mass and mo- 
tion. This is true of biological, no less than of physical and 
chemical phenomena. Of course, it is possible to explain 
the facts of life in terms of purpose, or motive, or character. 
But such explanation is wholly unsatisfactory, as every one 
knows. Until we have reduced all phenomena, not exclud- 
ing vital, to a physical basis, we shall eternally lack a com- 
plete understanding of them. There is no gap in the order 
of nature, and none can be introduced without throwing us 
immediately into the domain of the misleading, the tauto- 
logical, of the explanation which does not explain. 

It is very difficult, we admit quite frankly, to give an 
adequate reply to the above objection, compounded as it is 
of misrepresentation, truth, and half-truth, without going 
too far afield. Briefly, however, we may state that the 
mechanistic conception of formal and final causes is a gross 
caricature of these philosophical concepts. No one denies 
that the complex must be explained by the simple, nor 
that many phenomena are explainable in the terms of Mech- 
anism. Neither can we deny that formal causes are not 
_ explanatory causes. To explain a thing by analyzing it is 
to do away with its “‘form” entirely, which is a synthesis of 
all the qualities of a thing. Form means unity, individuality, 
and you destroy this in every process of analysis. Because 
“‘forms”’ do not explain is no reason for denying that they 
exist or for contending that they are useless. 

Final causes, as conceived by mechanists, are not final 
at all, but efficient causes. To assume that the only kind of 
cause which can exist is the efficient cause, and then to argue 
that, since final causes do not determine an effect in the 
mode of efficient causes, they cannot exist, is certainly 
strange logic. But is there one, and only one way of deter- 


122 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


mining an effect, that is after the manner of the “efficient ” 
cause? Experience rebels against any such assumption. 
Certainly in the world of man, if not in the physical world, 
ends and purposes play a determining réle. The universe, 
as we know it, is not made up exclusively of results, and by 
the universe we mean, as we hope to prove below, not merely 
the universe of consciousness, but of nature as well. 

No vitalist criticises the validity of the explanations 
based on mechanical law for certain restricted realms 
of nature. He disapproves, however, the extension of 
Mechanism to the whole field of nature and of knowledge. 
While sympathetic with the ideal of continuity in scientific 
explanation, he feels that this continuity must bow before 
facts which refuse, and stubbornly so, to be bound within 
the limits of a narrow mechanical standpoint. The phi- 
losopher, no less than the scientist, accepts the principle 
that causes must not be multiplied without a sufficient 
reason. This is primary in every discussion relative to 
the cosmos as a whole. But in the presence of ends 
and purposes in nature, and nothing seems more undeni- 
able than that they exist, the philosopher makes over 
his theory of continuity and shapes it to meet facts rather 
than have the facts meet his theory. No thinker, on 
purely a priori grounds, wishes to narrow the sweep of 
the mechanistic interpretation of the universe. He must 
insist, however, on Mechanism explaining in mechanical 
terms all the facts of the cosmos, physical, chemical, 
biological, no less than psychological, before he can consent 
to banish everything but quantity from this world. 

Again, it is argued by the mechanist that his theory, in 
spite of its many defects and the difficulties which it in- 
volves, has given us the only really consistent and synthetic 
view of the universe yet formulated. This consistency 
is proved by the fact that it actually succeeds. The history 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 123 


of modern science is but the record of the progress of scien- 
tific knowledge in terms of the mechanistic hypothesis.! 
Not only has it succeeded in the fields of dynamics, physics, 
and chemistry; but by freeing biology from such concepts 
as design, purpose, and end, it has created at last a true 
science of life. It has explained the phenomena, even 
the most complex, of biology as the results of certain definite 
physical and chemical causes. What is more, the truth 
of these explanations is evidenced by the fact that we 
can even predict what an organism will do, given certain 
conditions. This forecasting of events, as a result of our 
investigation of their causes, speaks volumes in favor 
of Mechanism, and effectively silences any doubts which 
may arise as a result of the limitations which our insuf- 
ficient knowledge places upon the mechanical hypothesis. 

No one questions the successes of Mechanism, nor does 
the recognition of entelechies, souls, or design in nature 
do away with the mechanical explanations of physics, 
chemistry, or even of biology. That the mechanists in their 
enthusiasm often over-state the successes of their theory, 
the history of science proves only too well.? In spite of 


1 Paulsen states the difficulty thus: ‘‘Let us not be deceived! Natural science 
will never again be decoyed from its path, which seeks a purely physical explanation 
of a// natural phenomena. There may be a thousand things which it cannot explain 
now, but the fundamental axiom that these too have their natural causes and there- 
fore a natural-scientific explanation, will never again be abandoned by science. 
Hence the philosophy which insists that certain natural processes cannot be explained 
physically without a remainder, but necessitate the assumption of a metaphysical prin- 
ciple or a supranatural agency, will have science for its irreconcilable foe. The two 
can live in peace only on condition that philosophy absolutely refrain from inter- 
fering with the causal explanation of natural phenomena, and allow natural science 
quietly to finish its journey.” (Introduction to Philosophy, p. 161.) 

2 Broad, in Proceedings of Aristotelian Society, to18-roro, writes apropos of this 
assertion: ‘‘I do not think that pure mechanism deserves to shine in the light re- 
flected from the successes of the atomic theory in chemistry or of the electron theory. 
The atomic theory contradicts homogeneous mechanism and makes no assumption 
in favour of pure mechanism. It is useless to say that perhaps the differences be- 
tween an atom of oxygen and one of hydrogen are merely differences between the 
number and configuration of two different groups of precisely similar particles, whose 
laws are mechanically analysable. Perhaps they are. But since chemistry has no 


124 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


their exaggerations, all thinkers are willing to acknowledge 
that the scientific approach to certain problems is un- 
doubtedly mechanical. We definitely associate, and rightly 
so, the mechanical with the scientific temper of mind. But 
from this admission to the exclusive use of the mechanical 
explanation for every single kind of reality, is a far cry. 

Nor does the fact that we can predict phenomena on 
account of the knowledge of causes obtained through 
mechanical investigations, argue to the truth of Mechanism. 
The role which prediction plays in present-day science 
is strangely and persistently over-emphasized by many 
scientists. From their statements one would gather that 
the peculiar function of science is to be able to predict, not to 
discover causes. Prediction, however, is merely the by-prod- 
uct of scientific generalization. What science is intimately 
concerned with is the discovery and formulation of laws, 
not the prediction of future events. In the field of applied 
science, the function of prediction enjoys a well-merited 
position. It has nothing to do with pure science as such, 
which can very well dispense with all predictability, and 
still remain the source of proved incontestable knowledge. 
As Hoernlé, who analyzes prediction so well, remarks: 
“Prediction is by no means identical with deduction in 
general. It is a special case of deduction, possible only 
under special conditions.” ! 


need to make any assumption on the question one way or the other, the success of 
the atomic theory up to the present can have no tendency to support this view, and 
therefore can reflect no credit on homogeneous or pure mechanism. Again, the 
fundamental laws assumed on the electron theory are not of the nature of central 
forces, so that whatever credit the success of the theory may reflect upon homo- 
geneous mechanism it reflects none upon pure mechanism.” 

1 Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, p. 152: ‘‘It is a mistake when the typical 
formula for a scientific law:—If A, then B, is read off as essentially a prediction:— 
If A happens, then B will happen; or, If you do A, then you will get B. Funda- 
mentally, a law is a statement of a functional correlation between variables. ‘If 
A, then B’ means ‘A implies B,’ and there is no exclusive or essential reference in 
this formula to the anticipation of future events. It would, moreover, be wholly 
false to restrict science to a preoccupation with the future. Science is as much 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 125 


The appeal to continuity begs the whole question by 
assuming that vital processes can be explained in physico- 
chemical terms. If the differences between the organic 
and inorganic, the living and non-living, are merely dif- 
ferences of degree, that is, mathematical differences, of 
course it is possible to understand them as diverse cases 
of one and the same principle. But what if they are not 
mere variations of mass endowed with motion? In this 
case the differences will not fit nto the neatly ordered 
mathematical categories which have been framed to hold 
them, and either one of two things must happen—the 
forms must be changed or the facts whittled down. 

Again, we may ask whether the idea of continuity, 
which for many scientists has become a veritable mono- 
mania, demands a construction of the sciences on the 
basis that the principles and laws of one particular science 
must always and in every instance become the starting 
point of the other. Leaving to one side the consideration 
that little, if any, progress has yet been made towards 
such a comprehensive scheme or organization of the sciences, 
we may even question with propriety whether the ideal 
is within the realm of possibility. That the universe is 
an ordered whole seems to be a rational assumption, but 
that this assumption requires the explanation of all its 
manifold differences in physico-chemical terms is more 
than questionable. Facts are against the assumption. 
interested in the past as in the future, and its problems as often take the form of 
discovering the causes of given effects, as of predicting the effects of given causes. 
And, lastly, the treatment of an implication as a prediction is false, not only to the 
character of an implication, but also to the character of a prediction. Prediction, 
in the proper sense, is not hypothetical, but categorical. You do not predict so long 
as you merely say, If A, then B. But you do predict when you say, Here is an A, 
and in virtue of the law, If A, then B, I infer that there will be a B. A law, in short, 
is not a prediction, but may make a prediction possible when applied to a particular 
case, or to put it differently, when a definite value is given for one of the correlated 


variables. And even then the correlation must be of the kind which involves tem- 
poral sequence or order.” 


126 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Driesch has proved conclusively that biology presents a 
multitude of facts which defy the possibility of mechanical 
explanation. To seek to explain them mechanically 
is to close one’s eyes to their most characteristic qualities, 
namely, that they are the functions of living things. A 
true and consistent explanation of the universe cannot 
result from a theory which continues to ignore the hetero- 
geneity of nature, and, in place of its apparent and evident 
discontinuity, insists on erecting everything upon a purely 
theoretical continuity. To quote Hoernlé once more: 
‘“‘A unified theory of nature does not require the reduction 
of all universals to one kind, or the restriction of all vari- 
ables to one type of values. We have laws correlating 
geometrical, physical, chemical phenomena among them- 
selves in each group, as well as laws correlating phenomena 
of one group with those of another. There will then result 
a scheme, or an order, in which differences are preserved 
and ‘saved,’ instead of being ‘reduced,’ and in which a 
unified theory is achieved by the correlation of different 
types, or groups, or levels, of phenomena which follow 
also among themselves each its own characteristic laws.” 1 


Criticism of the Mechanistic Theory.—The difficulties 
which are advanced against the acceptance of a purely 
mechanistic interpretation of the universe are so grave, 
and so important, that in recent years even the over- 
weening confidence of many scientists in their pet theory 
is beginning to be dissipated. Few, if any, philosophers 
are theoretical mechanists; and while many scientists 
still cling to the mechanical hypothesis with grim tenacity, 
some of them are beginning to sense its inadequacy without 
experiencing the much heralded corresponding feeling 
that, without Mechanism, science is doomed. Broad 

! Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, p. 157. 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE £27 


states the present situation in the following terms: ‘‘So 
far as I am aware, practically no scientist, whatever may 
be his theoretical predilections, actually works with the 
theory of pure mechanism (which indeed has begun to 
acquire a faintly Mid-Victorian flavour like crinolines, 
backpartings, and the philosophy of Mr. Spencer). Even 
homogeneous mechanism is hardly used by any one; the 
electron theory, which gets nearest to it, has its positive 
and negative problems.” ! 

In recent controversies anent the problem of life, it has 
been customary to wage the battle on the field of biology 
alone. Both mechanists and vitalists appeared to take 
for granted that Mechanism was impregnable in its special 
camps of physics and chemistry. But later thinkers have 
carried the battle even to the enemy’s fortified camp, 
and have gained notable victory after victory. This is 
as it should be. Mechanism, as a philosophy, is an empirical 
generalization based on the study of certain physical and 
chemical facts. But does it interpret these facts correctly, 
and does it interpret all the facts? A theory is justified, 
and assumes a rightful place in science only on the condition 
that it investigates all the facts, and, what is more sig- 
nificant, interprets all correctly. 

Mechanism, as science, offers a host of difficulties. It 
does not explain the diversity and constancy of atomic 
weights; it has no sufficient theory for the tendency in 
bodies of a like nature to make certain definite combina- 


1¥For a criticism of Mechanism from the idealistic point of view, read Ward, 
Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. I, pp. 92-302; from the biological standpoint, 
Driesch, Science and Philosophy of the Organism, Vol. I, pp. 76-240; from the 
standpoint of philosophy, A. Balfour, Foundations of Belief; also Nys, Cosmologie, 
pp. 44-164; McDougall, Body and Mind, pp. 235-271. Symposium, ‘Are Physical, 
Biological, and Psychological Categories Irreducible?’ in ‘‘Life and Finite Individ- 
uality,” Proceedings, Aristotelian Society, 1918; Henderson, The Fitness of the Environ- 
ment, The Order of Nature; Haldane, Mechanism, Life and Personality. For the his- 
tory of Mechanism, Merz, A History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century. 


128 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


tions, that is, for chemical affinity; the relative constancy 
which atoms manifest when uniting with one another finds 
no explanation in the laws of motion; the recurrence of 
chemical species, the peculiarities of chemical compounds 
are other phenomena for which Mechanism is an admittedly 
insufficient theory. In the physical realm, Mechanism 
cannot explain the process of crystallization, nor the remark- 
able regularity with which bodies manifest certain salient 
characteristics despite the almost infinite number of changes 
or transformations which they undergo. From the me- 
chanical side, Mechanism fails to explain the assumptions 
upon which is based the kinetic theory of gases, or to give 
a consistent idea of what weight is, because it eliminates 
from matter the idea of force and substitutes in its place 
that of motion. And, it must be noted further that, not 
only is Mechanism incapable of explaining many of the 
difficulties, but that the explanations which it does give 
of other facts seriously distort them and introduce into 
our conceptions of the universe a series of theories which, 
because of their contradictions, it is impossible to accept. 
Nys concludes his searching criticism of the mechanistic 
theory from the standpoint of its inability to answer 
certain fundamental scientific questions with the following 
well-merited rebuke: ‘“‘On rejette les forces occultes, 
sous prétexte qu’elles ne tombent jamais sous les prises 
de l’expérience directe. raiment, sont-ils moins occultes 
ces mouvements inconstatables par lesquels on prétend 
concrétiser le pouvoir virtuel de la pesanteur, de l’affinité 
chimique et en général de toutes les forces de la nature?” ! 

When we pass to the field of biology, the difficulties in- 
crease with startling frequency.? No one, of course, ques- 


1 Cosmologie, p. 140. 
2“<Astronomy, physics and chemistry can infer causes from given effects as 
definitely and confidently as they can derive effects from causes. But in the organic 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 129 


tions the value of the innumerable researches which have 
been made into the physiological concomitants of life and 
whose purpose has been to reduce them all to certain fun- 
damental physico-chemical processes. That these explana- 
tions are not always sufficient, Driesch has shown beyond 
the peradventure of a doubt; that they bring us no closer 
to a formula which will explain life every fair-minded 
thinker must admit. Many biological processes defy any 
kind of generalization in mechanical terms. The phe- 
nomena of morpho-genesis, the physiology of movement, 
many facts of morphological and physiological adaptation, 
the striking characteristics of inheritance, when viewed 
cumulatively, yield a mass of difficulties which render an 
exclusive acceptation of pure Mechanism impossible. The 
mechanico-biological viewpoint is an unnatural one in this, 
that it abstracts altogether from the very category which 
differentiates a living body from a non-living body. For 
example, a study of the place which the three most common 
chemical elements, oxygen, hydrogen, and carbon, hold 
both amongst animate and inanimate things is no proof of 
the chemical nature of life. Bio-chemistry, in its study of 
vital phenomena, abstracts from life; it disfigures, there- 
fore, these phenomena to that extent. From its abstrac- 
tions, biology must always return to the world of actual 
fact, that is, to the individual, under the penalty of setting 
up an abstraction for reality. The trouble with Mechanism 
is that it fails to perceive that life, mind, end, purpose, etc., 
are as necessary, in fact more necessary, for a complete 


world the case is very different. Here it is always the effect that is given,—whether 
we term it ‘life’ or the ‘preservation of the individual’ or the ‘preservation of the 
species’ or ‘form.’ The factors which produce the effect are, on the other hand, so 
manifold and so inconstant that we can never argue with any certainty to a particular 
causal connection. A simple mechanistic theory of vital phenomena is consequently 
both impracticable and valueless, however sure we may be that, at bottom, organic 
processes are as universally subject as inorganic to the law of cause and effect.” 
Kiilpe, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 149. 


130 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


understanding of a living organism than are any number of 
physical or chemical processes, and that because these proc: 
esses always occur, under certain set mechanical condi- 
tions, is no reason to conclude that they are purely mechan- 
ical. 

Another difficulty arises from what has been called the 
irreversibility of cosmic events. Viewed historically, noth- 
ing turns back to a state or condition which it formerly 
occupied. Thus, the fruit does not return to the flower, the 
flower to the bud, the animal to the embryo, etc. Motion, 
on the other hand, is essentially reversible. If an object 
can traverse the distance from x to y, it can as easily go 
back over the same space and traverse the distance from y 
to x. Everything, therefore, cannot be motion, and this 
objection receives added force in the face of certain phenom- 
ena of the living organism, in whose case reversibility is 
not only improbable but manifestly impossible. It is incon- 
ceivable that we should see something before the object is 
present to our eyes, or that a leg be amputated before the 
surgeon applies his knife.? 

The doctrine of motion itself, as elaborated by mechan- 
ists, cannot be maintained without doing violence to the 
correct idea of movement. The place of motion has been 
unduly emphasized by them and, in particular, is it an exag- 
geration to maintain that every change which takes place 
in the universe is but an aspect of motion. While it is true 
that the activities of all bodies are accompanied by move- 
ment, thus making possible the science of mathematical 
physics, it must, at the same time, be acknowledged that 
matter also possesses properties which are essentially qual- 
itative in character, and which cannot be brought within 


the purview of a purely mechanical explanation. 

1 For an exhaustive statement of the biological difficulties involved in Mechanism, 
consult Driesch, Science and Philosophy of the Organism, Vol. I. 

2 de Munnynck, Article ‘‘ Mechanism,” Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. X, p. 101. 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 131 


But it is as philosophy that Mechanism exposes itself 
to the gravest objections. In the first place, if the complex 
is to be explained by the simple, then Mechanism stands 
convicted as an unsatisfactory hypothesis for the reason 
that to understand even perfectly, the elements of a com- 
plex, gives us eo zpso no understanding of the complex. 
There still remains to be explained the combination of 
these elements into a whole, the unity of the complex. 
The complex is by no means the same as the compound of 
its simple elements. This is an elementary distinction 
which most mechanists fail to take into consideration. To 
suppose that every new phenomenon can be reconstructed 
in terms of an old phenomenon is to misconstrue the most 
salient feature of the former, namely, its novelty. The new 
is not the old, and it cannot be reduced to a simple elemen- 
tary law of which the novelty is but a functional relation. 
If this theory has any great advantage in the way of a real 
explanatory cause over the so-called formal or final causes, 
we would like to see that advantage pointed out. 

According to the most consistent defenders of final 
causes, they are purely metaphysical ideas and have no 
place as explanations in science. One thing is assured. 
They do not distort and disfigure reality as do efficient 
causes, aS understood by those who believe them the sole 
causes worthy of consideration. No one wishes to deny 
that it is of the highest importance to know what has pre- 
ceded any given effect, and also to know as much about the 
cause as possible. But to view these anterior efficient causes 
as true explanations of any subsequent effect is to lose sight 
of precisely what is most striking in these events, the fact 
that they are effects, while the others are causes. This sort 
of a universe as reconstructed by mathematical science, 
when compared with the world of common sense, ‘‘is so ab- 
stract as to be quite spectral and merits the appellation (so 


132 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


often quoted from Mr. Bradley) of ‘an unearthly ballet of 
bloodless categories.’”’ ? 

Finally, Mechanism, by banishing purpose, end, and 
value from the universe, misrepresents actuality to just 
that extent. That purpose exists and controls to a certain 
extent our actions; that we achieve results under the 1m- 
pulse of desired ends; that our actions have a value over 
and above that which may result from their mere perfor- 
mance, seems to be incontestable. To one who would deny 
outright this plain and obvious truth, there is nothing 
to be said. No argument which we could advance would 
have any effect in changing his preconceived ideas. Yet 
there is a great deal to be said for teleology, both negatively 
and positively. On the negative side, one may rightly con- 
clude that since Mechanism is inadequate, the presumption 
in favor of teleology attains the proportions of a very prob- 
able theory. Mechanists are constantly telling us that they 
can explain life in physico-chemical terms, but when we ask 
what particular physico-chemical function is similar to life, 
no reply is forthcoming. 

Again, the living body which is so constantly referred 
to as a “‘living machine” presents many evidences of being 
so entirely different from every other kind of machine 
known to science that to confuse the two is but to pervert 
the true meaning of the word machine. A machine attains 
ends for the reason that it has been fashioned by an agent 
capable of perceiving and desiring ends. Its purposes are 
external to it, while the purposes of man, and of animals, 
are internal. Moreover, a machine which for one reason or 
another ceases to work, must be repaired by some one out- 
side itself, but the living machine repairs itself, and while 
undergoing the process of rebuilding, does not cease al- 
together to function. We can only compare, even the most 

1 James, Some Problems of Philosophy, p. 207. 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 133 


highly organized machine, with the living body on the sup- 
position that we shall ignore what is most fundamental in 
the living machine, its immanent purposiveness. 

From the positive side, the réle which purpose has played 
in the history of mankind points to the important place 
which teleology must occupy if our explanations of the uni- 
verse are to be really philosophical, that is to say, total 
views. Nature is not blind, except in a metaphorical sense. 
Man, at least, consciously, and often freely, seeks definite 
purposes. All the natural processes of evolution are not 
outside our control. The mind of man, too, has created 
novelty after novelty. Our culture, our institutions, art, 
science, and religion are the results of teleological activity, 
not of the mechanical workings of atoms in motion. We 
may wilfully close our eyes to the whole panorama of 
human achievement, but we can do so only under pain of 
surrendering all hope of ever being able to understand and 
appreciate what life is. 


Vitalism.—The cardinal principle of Vitalism is that there 
exist in the universe processes which are vital, that is to 
say, not of the mechanical kind, and whose nature and func- 
tionings are intimately bound up with the attainment of pur- 
poses, or of ends. These processes are mainly biological 
and psychological. The vitalist, however, would not ac- 
knowledge that, even outside the sphere of biological func- 
tion, Mechanism is an acceptable theory. He feels that it 
takes no adequate account of many facts in the physical 
realm, which are as important as those revealed, for ex- 
ample, by an exclusively behavioristic analysis of bodily 


1 Royce, Spirit of Modern Philosophy, pp. 287-201: ‘“‘If there is anything true 
in a philosophy of evolution, then there is something more than mere physical causa- 
tion, mere mechanism in the world; for how there can be history in the world, no 
causal explanation, no appeal to mechanism as such, can ever directly express. In 
so far as you find mechanism only in the world, you find neither growth nor decay; 
you find no story at all.’”’ Op. cit., p. 290. 


134 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


function. In casting about for a theory explanatory of 
reality, Mechanism strikes him as decidedly weak from 
whatever point of view it is defended. Mechanically, it is 
insufficient for it assumes too much; biologically, it in- 
volves out-and-out contradictions; philosophically, its status 
is that of a false theory, pure and simple. 

The vitalist is a spiritualist and a dualist, but not in the 
sense that by a living thing he means something which de- 
fies the laws of physics and chemistry, and is governed by a 
spirit or a demon which acts by mere caprice and whose 
actions are not only unpredictable but unexplainable as well. 

On the positive side, he stands for the concepts of purpose, 
end, and value whose presence in the functioning of every 
organism cry out as insistently for an explanation as do 
the merely external manifestations of activity. And the 
vitalist has every presumption of fact in his favor. Cer- 
tainly the scientist, no less than the plain man, acts as if 
purposes were real. They may not be, but this is something 
which the mechanist must prove, not assume, as very often 
he is wont to do. For the burden of disproof falls on the 
mechanist in this case, and not on the vitalist, despite the 
contrary practice current amongst mechanists. 

Vitalism has had a long history in philosophy, paralleling 
in fact that of Mechanism. It also has been received in 
many different meanings. To-day it presents both an ideal- 
istic and a dualistic side. The central doctrine of Vitalism, 
however, does not stand or fall with either hypothesis. 
While we defend the dualistic theory, we do not intend 
thereby to deny that Neo-Vitalism, as it is called, has 
contributed greatly to the establishment of the recognition 
in nature of a principle other than the mechanical. Driesch, 
the leading defender of Neo-Vitalism, has stated this ac- 
complishment thus: ‘“‘What is not a mere belief and not a 
matter of feeling is the existence of factual wholeness in 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 135 


Nature, the existence of something that is certainly more 
than a mere sum. And to have proved this, and thus to 
have given a sound foundation to all further speculations 
about natural and metaphysical wholeness, is the merit of 
vitalism.” 4 

On the other hand, Vitalism is not defended as an ex- 
clusive interpretation of the universe. Hoernlé expresses 
this concept of a union of Mechanism and Vitalism when 
he calls the theory he defends ‘‘ Mechanism and Teleology.”’ 
The vitalistic hypothesis does not call upon us to sacrifice 
anything which has been acquired through scientific research 
during the past century. Mathematical physics still re- 
mains, despite the fact that Mechanism as a theory is 
false. We may continue to deal with the qualities of matter 
in the terms of algebra, although we believe that these 
numbers do not adequately represent anything more than 
an aspect of the qualities studied. Mechanism has done a 
great service to science in that it has broadened the ap- 
plicability of mathematical formule so as to include other 
than the purely quantitative aspects of physical objects. 


Arguments in Favor of Vitalism.—The evidences which 
prove Vitalism are of many kinds. Some are strictly em- 
pirical, from the domain of physica] science and of biology; 
others are of a philosophical character. Taken together 
they make up an argument whose cumulative force is 
absolutely convincing. 

The first argument in favor of Vitalism is derived from 
experimental Embryology. Driesch ? points out, and proves 
at great length, that the facts of active adaptation, par- 
ticularly functional adaptation, and of regeneration cer- 


1 Problems of Individuality, p. 8x. 
* For the biological arguments, see Driesch, Science and Philosophy of the Organ- 
tsm, especially Vol. I. 


136 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


tainly point to the operation of teleological factors in the 
life process. The phenomena attending the develop- 
ment of the embryo, prove that the embryo does not 
develop along the lines of a machine. No physical or 
chemical factor explains how, for example, from only a 
portion of the egg of a sea-urchin, not a partial but a 
complete embryo, though reduced in size, is developed. 
These, and other facts of embryology, cannot be accounted 
for on the mechanistic hypothesis, for they contradict the 
very idea of what a machine is. 

Another proof is derived from the fact that the ovary, as 
an example of the origin of any complex system, develops 
from a single cell which experiences a multitude of divisions 
before the ovaries themselves are produced. To suppose 
that the original cell is a machine in this case would be to 
ask us to accept the impossible, as well as to believe that a 
machine can go on dividing and sub-dividing itself and yet 
produce that very complex machine, an ovary. 

A third argument is based on a study of the physiology 
of movement. For example, man does not behave like a 
machine. ‘There is a marked individuality in the actions 
of every man. Besides, he reacts to a stimulus, each man 
in his own individual way. A complete contrast of the 
behavior of an animal and of a machine shows beyond the 
peradventure of a doubt that the machine explanation is 
wholly inadequate when applied to an animal. 

The universe is an orderly whole. In spite of the multi- 
tude of substances which compose it, in spite of their almost 
infinite number and infinitely different kinds of activities, 
there results from this complexity of things and functions, 
an order which is conducive to the welfare, not merely of 
the whole, but of the individual as well. Can this order be 
explained on the assumption that it does not exist at all, 
or if it does, that it is extrinsic to the things themselves? 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 137 


Unless we assume an immanent finality present in all things, 
organic and inorganic, nature becomes an absurdity. 
Within things there is imbedded a purpose by virtue of 
which, in obedience to law always, each thing maintains 
its own individuality as well as acts upon things outside 
itself. This inherent purpose is, we admit, not easy to 
define if we fail to acknowledge the dualistic concept of 
substance and its accidents which form a composite, con- 
taining within itself the basis of all similarities, as well as 
the ground for all the differences which distinguish one 
body from another. But if substance and accident do form 
a substantial union, the finality of nature is understand- 
able. 

A final argument arises from the consideration, borne 
in upon us by a multitude of facts, that living things are 
all units. This is especially evident in the case of man, 
where unity of consciousness assumes a significance which 
cannot be ignored without doing violence to the testimony 
of consciousness itself. Mechanism, with its conception 
of the living body as an aggregate of atoms bound together 
in a purely accidental way, cannot explain the persistence 
of these atoms in the compound and, at the same time, 
understand why we do not attribute our actions to the 
individual atoms but to the compound. If, however, we 
conceive the living body as animated by a vital principle 
we readily appreciate how transformations can occur 
at the same time preserving something which does not 
change. 

1Many will object to the above argument because it involves hylomorphism as 
well as assumes the truth of the existence of God, design, etc. Rather it proves 
hylomorphism and lays a secure foundation for the argument from design. Con- 
temporary philosophy is strangely adverse even to the mere mention of God. There 
are, however, many encouraging signs which point to a recognition by philosophers 
of the necessity of considering the Deity in every philosophic formulation which 


deserves the name of such. To construct a philosophy and to ignore God is but 
another instance of playing Hamlet without the Prince of Denmark. 


138 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


In presenting the above arguments it was not considered 
necessary to add anything to the statements already ad- 
vanced concerning teleology in nature. That ends, purposes, 
and values exist, appears to us incontestable. Such an 
acknowledgment leads us naturally and logically to an 
acceptance of Vitalism, understood of course in its widest 
sense. The increasing recognition given to this standpoint 
has been one of the chief results of recent philosophic 
speculation, as well as a sign of the movement of thinkers 
away from the unhealthy theorizings of the naturalistic 
school which so completely dominated the thought of the 
last century. 


Criticism of Vitalism.—Besides the arguments urged in 
favor of Mechanism, the following objections, taken from 
Paulsen’s Introduction to Philosophy, represent best the 
reasons which prompt many mechanists to reject the 
vitalist theory.1 

The first objection may be formulated thus: “‘ Everything 
must occur and be explained physically; and everything must 
be considered and interpreted metaphysically.” 2 From which 
we conclude that Mechanism is the only tenable theory 
so far as the activities of nature are concerned. Meta- 
physics has a place in knowledge, but it is only as an in- 
terpreter of the results achieved by mechanistic science 
that we may recognize it. On no other basis can we ever 
hope to end the age-long struggle between science and 
philosophy. 

The argument is a manifest fallacy—a petitio principi 
pure and simple. If everything must occur and be explained 

1Tt is impossible to translate the full force of these objections in the short com- 
pass we allow them. The student should therefore consult Paulsen’s Introduction 
to Philosophy, pp. 158-206, if he fears that we have understated the arguments 


advanced against the teleological point of view. 
2 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 162. 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 139 


physically, the very ground is cut from under our feet and 
we are obliged to accept Mechanism, bon gré mal gré. It 
is, moreover, an assumption, which cannot be substan- 
tiated, to assert that on no other theory than the mechanico- 
parallelism of Paulsen is it possible to reconcile the 
diverse, and apparently conflicting, results achieved by 
science and philosophy. McDougall points out that such 
scientists as Stokes, Lord Kelvin, Maxwell, Sir Oliver 
Lodge, J. A. Thomson and many others, have not felt 
compelled to explain the evolution and life processes of 
animals solely in mechanistic terms, nor have they seen in 
teleology a theory which is contrary to the proved results 
of physical science. 

The second objection is drawn from a consideration of 
the place which so-called ‘‘ends” are supposed to hold in 
nature. If ends exist, the necessary means to attain these 
ends must also exist. Paulsen then develops at great length 
a fearful picture of the cruelty of nature, pointing out by 
many examples how nature most prodigally wastes millions 
of possible beings in order to bring one to complete develop- 
ment. ‘‘A single female fish lays hundreds of thousands of 
eggs a year,’ writes Paulsen. He also cites the uselessness 
of certain organs, as the vermiform appendix, to show that 
nature creates without any idea of value and for no in- 
telligible purpose. Life is merely a ruthless struggle for 
existence. -Moreover, if life, even human life, had a value 
we should be able to discover it. But what vitalist has 
pointed out to us a complete scheme of the ends to be at- 
tained by even one species, to say nothing of all species, of 
nature as a whole? Paulsen goes to great pains to demon- 
strate that in the history of the human race, no less than in 
that of the individual man, a scientific formulation of values 
is impossible. ‘‘History looks like a series of divine inter- 
| ; 1 Body and Mind, p. 253.°' 


140 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


positions,” but is in fact but the record of those who have 
conquered their enemies and imposed upon us, as the best 
possible thing and as truth, the results of their victory. 

The most obvious answer to the above objection is that 
if Paulsen is determined not to perceive ends or values in 
nature, nothing that we can say will help him to see them. 
To the unprejudiced thinker, however, we may reply— 
look at the world as a whole, sum up its cruelties, its evils 
moral and physical, balance these against the good which 
one has also encountered, and then conclude whether the 
idea of value is useless. 

Moreover, Paulsen assumes that to prove the existence 
of ‘‘ends” in nature it is necessary beforehand to be able to 
chart every influence which will affect things as well as 
every goal which they must reach. What he therefore 
demands in man is the knowledge which God alone pos- 
sesses. Vitalists have not been so exacting of their oppo- 
nents. Because mechanists could not explain every natural 
occurrence in mechanical terms they did not cry out 
triumphantly that mechanism is false. Mechanists ac- 
knowledge in their own case the limitations of human 
knowledge. As a matter of philosophic courtesy, should 
they not concede to the vitalist the self-same advantage 
which they claim for themselves? 

It is not a question of whether we know ail the ends to be 
attained by nature, but whether any end, even one, exists 
and can be proved by us. If such be the case, a rigid mech- 
anism falls to the ground by the sheer weight of its own 
stupendous assumptions. We may find a parallel to this 
objection in the one so often brought against the doctrine 
of free will, where it is argued that man is not free because 
in so many cases his acts are determined by motives or 
events over which he has had no control. But to prove the 
freedom of the human will, it is not necessary to demon- 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 141 


strate that man is free in all and every one of his actions. 
If he be free in any of his actions, freedom of the will must 
be acknowledged. 

In conclusion, we may say that the examples of ruthless- 
ness in nature collected by Paulsen prove nothing. No one 
denies the struggle for existence, nor that nature, and some- 
times man, is cruel. Whether certain organs are useless 
or not, is a problem for biology to determine. Any one 
acquainted with the progress of biological science appre- 
ciates full well that in this matter no man knows what 
judgment the next day will bring. The dysteleology of one 
day is the teleology of the next. 

But what is generally considered the most serious objec- 
tion to Vitalism is that which arises from the triumph of the 
theory of evolution. As Paulsen argues, ‘‘The former 
theory, which assumed that animal and plant species owe 
their origin to an intelligence acting from without, is thereby 
finally overthrown as a natural historical theory—over- 
thrown, not by being refuted, but, like every worn-out 
hypothesis, removed by the entrance of its legitimate 
successor, the better theory.” ! 

To answer this objection adequately would require a 
detailed examination of the theory of evolution, both in its 
scientific and philosophical aspects, as well as of the con- 
clusions which, we think, Paulsen illogically draws from this 
‘acceptance. Briefly, however, we may call attention to the 
following facts. From the point of view of science, evolution 
is neither proved nor unproved. We may accept it as the 
most plausible theory yet advanced to explain certain facts, 
without, at the same time admitting that we must throw 
overboard all conceptions which involve purpose and value 
in nature. Mechanical evolution which supposes that every- 
thing has evolved from a primeval undifferentiated mass to 

1 Introduction to Philosophy, p. 18t. 


142 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the state which it now presents not only is not proved, but 
is manifestly incapable of proof. We can only assume it by 
smuggling into the mechanical theory a kind of teleology 
which has no place therein.t As for biological evolution, 
not even Darwin denied that teleological factors influenced 
development. 

Perhaps a sufficient reply to the objection from evolution 
might be formulated by setting out the limitations which 
Howison concludes must be acknowledged as a presupposi- 
tion to every philosophical use of the evolutionary hypoth- 
esis.? These conclusions may be summarized under the 
following headings: (1) Evolution cannot cross the chasm 
which separates the phenomenal from the noumenal; (2) It 
cannot pass from the inorganic to the organic; (3) There is 
a further break between the purely physiological and the 
psychological or mental; (4) Another fact which it cannot 
explain is the gulf which separates the unknowable and the 
explanatory; (5) Finally, the passage from non-rational 
nature to rational nature, that is, to the mind of man, is 
impossible in the theory of evolution.* 

From our examination of the contending theories of 
Mechanism and Vitalism we conclude that a mechanistic 
metaphysics is incapable of explaining many of the facts of 
nature, and that, in particular, the facts of mind rebel 
against the limitations within which a rigid mechanism 
endeavors to compress them. Mechanism has its place, as a 
regulative and heuristic principle. But as a philosophy it 

1 Read Ward, Naturalism and Agnosticism, Vol. I, pp. 185-271. 

* Limits of Evolution, pp. 1-50; also Montague, in Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 
vy Arisa Ai Article “‘ Evolution,” in Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol.V, pp. 654-670, 
especially his general conclusions; also Windle, What is Life?, The Church and Science; 
Gerard, The Oldest Riddle and the Newest Answer; Wasmann, Modern Biology and 
the Theory of Evolution, The Problem of Evolution; Gemelli, L’Enigma della Vita e 


I Nuovi Orizzonti della Biologia; Morgan, A Critique of the Theory of Evolution; 
Johnstone, The Philosophy of Biology; Schiller, Riddles of the Sphinx. 


THE PROBLEM OF LIFE 143 


is totally inadequate. True evolution, the historical point 
of view, a conception of nature which is dynamic, escape the 
mechanistic philosophy. All that it sees is the framework, 
and that but partially. To understand the whole of nature, 
the framework built up into a living pulsating cosmos, we 
must view it teleologically, that is, from the standpoint of 
immanent purposiveness. The significance of teleology for 
the future lies precisely in this, that it demands the totality 
of vision through which alone the whole truth may be dis- 
covered. 


REFERENCES 


BAINES: The Origin and Problems of Life. 

Butter: Life and Habit. 

Catholic Encyclopedia: Article “‘ Mechanism.”’ 

DriescH: The Problem of Individuality; The Science and Philosophy 
of the Organism. 

FULLERTON: A System of Metaphysics. 

GEMELLI: L’Enigma della Vita e I Nuovi Oriazonti della Biologia. 

HALDANE: Mechanism, Life, and Personality. 

HENDERSON: The Fitness of the Environment; The Order of Nature. 

HoERNLE: Matter, Life, Mind, and God; Studies in Contemporary 
Metaphysics. 

Howson: The Limits of Evolution. 

JoHNSTONE: The Mechanism of Life in Relation to Modern Physical 
Theory. 

Keown: Mechanism. 

Kure: Introduction to Philosophy. 

McDoucatt: Body and Mind. 

Mercier: A Manual of Modern Scholastic Philosophy. 

Nys: Cosmologie. 

PAULSEN: Introduction to Philosophy. 

WarD: Naturalism and Agnosticism. 


CHAPTER VI 
THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 


In our investigations of the problems of philosophy, we 
have confined our attention so far to, what might be called, 
the external aspects of reality. Reality also presents an 
inner side which, on reflection, bristles with problems as 
numerous and as truly fundamental as those which we have 
attempted to solve. We have thought about the world as 
one or many, as material or spiritual, as mechanical or 
teleological, but we have assumed always that there is a 
world external to our minds. It is necessary, now, to ex- 
amine critically this assumption, and to ask ourselves 
whether we are justified in supposing that a world really 
distinct from ourselves exists. 

To the man in the street, the question as to the extra-men- 
tal reality of the world is received with questioning surprise. 
For him it approaches the absurd to doubt about the reality 
of the universe, since he has always believed that he is 
surrounded by material things, and feels that he can directly 
perceive them. But is this belief well grounded? A 
thorough examination of the act of knowing, together with 
the factors which influence it, causes doubts as to the valid- 
ity of our knowledge. 

If we know the world at all, we must know it with and 
by our minds. Now, all knowledge begins with perception, 
but perception carries with it no definite guaranties of its 
own accuracy. Our senses deceive us often. Not only do we 
see things which do not exist, as in illusions, dreams, etc., 

144 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 145 


but we fail often to perceive many things which actually 
exist. Again, our perceptions are transformed radically by 
the action of one sense upon the other, to say nothing of the 
transmutations which take place as sensations affect our 
thoughts. How can we put confidence in our thoughts when 
we know that we have inferred the existence of the things 
they are supposed to represent from data given to us in 
sense experience? Granting that we can perceive a blue 
flower, who has ever seen ‘‘blueness”? What right have we 
to pass from the data of sensation to the highly organized 
statements of which thought is capable? The problem we 
must face, therefore, is this—What is the value of our 
thoughts? Will they, upon critical analysis, be found to be 
truly representative of reality outside the mind? Or must 
we say that ideas reflect only what is taking place in our 
minds, and have no representative value as far as outside 
things go? The world, if it exists, is certainly outside our 
minds; thoughts are within the mind. How can these two 
ever be brought together? 

But other problems, no less serious, follow quickly upon 
any solution we may give to the above questions. What is 
the relation of these thoughts of ours to reality? Are they 
a part of it, or do they merely represent reality? The mental 
may be everything, while what we call reality is only a 
shadow or an appearance. If this be so, what is truth, and 
what is error? Is error possible, supposing that nothing ex- 
ists outside the mind? At the bottom of these questions 
lies the problem of what is the metaphysical nature of 
reality. | 

Yet further problems await us. What do we mean when 
we say that we know a thing? In other words, what is 
knowledge? Knowledge implies three things, a knower, a 
thing known, and the act of knowing. Now, we must 
examine thoroughly all three of these necessary factors in 


146 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


knowledge, if we would determine how much of truth is due 
to one and how much to another. The knowledge act 
implies a subject and an object. But what do the terms, 
subjective and objective, connote? To speak of subject and 
object is to imply a duality; it is to say that the thinking 
subject must be distinguished from the object thought. We 
speak about arriving at truth, but what justification have 
we for asserting that truth is possible? This last question 
involves the validity of knowledge, and carries along with 
it the problem of the criteria which determine our accept- 
ance of the deliverances of mind. Few thinkers deny that 
we can know the truth. They are not agreed, however, on 
what it is precisely which induces us to accept one statement 
rather than another. Science has its own way of inves- 
tigating truth; religion follows another path, entirely differ- 
ent. Shall we say that the only truth is that which is 
acquired experimentally? Religious knowledge would then 
not be knowledge at all, but mere opinion. 


Epistemology.—It is evident, therefore, that the mere 
statement of the problem of knowledge gives rise to nu- 
merous questions which call for investigation, if we are to 
accept the beliefs of the plain man about truth and reality. 
An examination of these problems is the function of that 
branch of philosophy which we call Epistemology. Epis- 
temology is the theory or science of knowledge. As the 
end of all knowledge is certitude, it may also be called ap- 
propriately the study of certitude. 

Now, this study of certitude entails three principal prob- 
lems, to each one of which we must give a reply if we hope 
to attain a well-rounded, adequate theory of knowledge. 
In the first place, our inquiry centers about the psycholog- 
ical factors which are involved in the process of knowledge. 
We must know what cognition is; in other words, we must 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 147 


examine the functions of perception, of conception, and the 
relations of one to the other. Secondly, our ideas have a 
relation to reality. What are these ideas, what is reality? 
This is the problem of the metaphysical conditions which 
surround knowledge. Finally, we are to inquire into the 
nature and value of truth and the tests which must be ap- 
plied to different statements in order to compel assent, 
which last question is, in the strict sense of the word, the 
epistemological problem. 

The inquiry, therefore, divides itself naturally into three 
parts. But, since we have already in Chapter II outlined 
the different replies given to the problem of reality, it will 
' not be necessary to speak at any great length of the meta- 
physical conditions of knowledge. The different ways of 
interpreting reality are three: Absolutism, Pluralism, and 
Realism, to which, logically enough correspond three 
theories of knowledge, Idealism, Pragmatism, and Realism. 
It is our purpose to examine these three theories, both from 
a psychological and an epistemological point of view with 
the idea of determining which one is best suited to meet the 
demands of both experience and reflective thought. 

While the word Epistemology is recent, the problem it- 
self is as old as philosohpy. Ever since men began to spec- 
ulate they have been worried about how we can know things, 
and whether or not our knowledge is certain. To review 
the history of this, one of the most remarkable of philosophi- 
cal controversies, would add little or nothing to the informa- 
tion necessary to solve the problem as it is presented to-day. 
Let us, therefore, confine our attention to the modern, and 
especially to the contemporary solutions which have been 
offered, never forgetting that these theories have their roots 
deep down in the past, and that, when stripped of their 
modern dress, they present to us the very same answers 
which were given to problems which are hoary with age. 


148 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


The Greeks had their idealists, realists, and even pragma- 
tists. Conceptualism, Nominalism, and Realism are the 
medieval counterparts of very modern theories. The his- 
torian of philosophy is fully aware that the old questions 
recur again and again with startling frequency. And the 
new replies are not quite so new as many of their supporters 
would like the world to believe. 


Idealism.—The first reply given to the problem of 
knowledge by contemporary thinkers is called Idealism.} 
Its commanding position in modern thought is due mainly 
to the efforts of Kant, who formulated the fundamental 
principles upon which the theory is based. Kant, however, 
owes a great deal to his immediate predecessors, especially 
to Berkeley, whose arguments in behalf of Idealism still 
remain the classic proofs for the theory. The Kantian 
philosophy differs from that of Berkeley in this, that its 
chief characteristic is what may be called its ‘‘critical” form. 
Kant believed that although reality may exist outside the 
mind, it was mental as far as we are concerned. The cate- 
gories which he formulated as the necessary conditions of 
knowledge did not entail a corresponding ideal existence 
of things; they did, however, necessitate that in as far as we 
can know things, they must be mental.? 

1 For a history of Idealism, see Willman, Geschichte des Idealismus; Kiilpe, The 
Philosophy of the Present in Germany, trans. Patrick, pp. 134-235; Turner, History 
of Philosophy, pp. 528-553; Stéckl, Handbook of the History of Philosophy; Weber, 
History of Philosophy. 

2 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 143: ‘‘Kant, although he was the 
founder of a new idealism, was not himself an idealist, im the metaphysical sense. 
He defined the categories as conditions imposed on things by the knowing of them; 
but he asserted that reality was under no necessity of conforming to these condi- 
tions, except in so far as known. That a thing must be known in order to be, he ex- 
pressly denied. But the promptness and apparent ease with which Kant’s view was 
transformed into a metaphysical idealism, is proof of the instability of the situation 
as he left it. Having established the essentially formative and constitutive char- 


acter of knowledge, nothing can be independent of knowledge except that which lies 
beyond even the possibility of knowledge. The forms of the cognitive consciousness 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 149 


Kant’s Idealism is, therefore, logical. In his successors 
it developed both a logical and a metaphysical strain, repre- 
sented by the intellectualistic idealism of Hegel, and a vol- 
untaristic or ethical strain, called the voluntaristic idealism 
of Fichte. Neo-Kantians have endeavored to preserve the 
critical side of the Kantian philosophy as against the meta- 
physical introductions into Idealism by Hegel and Fichte. 
The followers of the latter, Neo-Hegelians and Neo-Fich- 
teans, have emphasized the commanding position in knowl- 
edge of intellect or will, according to the leanings of each 
individual thinker. 

Kantianism is based on two far-reaching principles which 
have played a directive réle in every form of critical Idealism 
since his day. One is the principle of unity in difference; 
the other, the reconciliation of antitheses in a higher syn- 
thesis. Dissatisfied with the arguments generally advanced 
against the sceptics by spiritualist thinkers, Kant contended 
that the starting point of the defenders of religion and of the 
spiritual in nature had been wrong. Instead of assuming 
certain axioms and principles of thought to be true, it 1s 
necessary first of all to examine them critically in order to 
discover what is necessary for knowledge, and to distinguish 
it from what is not necessary. Mathematics and physics 
had followed this method of inquiry, and the startling 
results obtained fired Kant with the desire to revolutionize 
metaphysical knowledge by applying to it the critical 
method which had been so fruitful an ally of science. He, 
therefore, concluded that on a parity with our understand- 
ing of nature, in which we force individual data to conform 
to definite general laws formulated by the mind, so in the 
world of ideas, the object known must conform to certain 


underlie all that is or can be experienced. So that Kant’s ‘thing-in-itself,’ like the 
material substratum which Berkeley had so effectually disposed of, is no more than 
a symbol of nescience.” 


150 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


a priori forms or categories of the mind in order to be intel- 
ligible. It was Hegel who carried this idea to its logical 
conclusion, contending that ideas are purely relative, and 
have no representative value outside the mind. Things can 
be known only as a whole, for the whole alone exists. To 
know completely and adequately, we must know the whole. 
From which it follows that there is no such thing as 
stable truth. Truth, as we know it, is no better than an 
approximation. What then becomes of our approximations, 
half-truths, errors, illusions? They must remain to plague 
us till they can be absorbed in the Unity which reconciles 
all differences, antitheses, and antinomies. The Unity of 
ground amidst structural differences is a philosophic con- 
ception of post-Kantian thinkers, but it is implicit in the 
writings of Kant. Thus, the categories of Kant, which as he 
framed them were merely to represent the phenomenal 
world as it appeared to the mind, have been transferred 
by his disciples to external reality itself, doing away alto- 
gether with the so-called ‘‘thing-in-itself,’’ and making the 
unity of thought, the unity and ground of reality as well. 
From a logical and critical theory, Kantianism thus passed 
through epistemology to an out-and-out metaphysics. 
Arising as a result of the application of a priori critical 
principles to the field of knowledge, Kantists concluded to 
the essential relativity and immanence of all knowledge. 
It was but one step further, through the doctrine of unity 
amongst differences, to the belief that the ground of knowl- 
edge and the ground of reality were one and the same thing. 
As Walker remarks, ‘‘Thus Absolutism is Criticism self- 
realized. Finding that thought and being are one, from a 
Theory of Knowledge Criticism has grown into a Theory of 
Reality. The categories are no longer regarded as constitu- 
tive of a phenomenal, but of a real world; and that last 
condition of all knowledge—the Transcendental Unity of 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE I51I 


Apperception—is hypostatised, becoming the real Subject 
of an universal consciousness, an Absolute which is the 
Ground of all things, and yet is nothing in abstraction from 
that of which it is the Ground.” ! 


The Psychological Basis of a Knowledge Theory.— 
Approaching the problem of knowledge from its psycho- 
logical side, and this is precisely what Kant did, he distin- 
guished two questions—one having to do with the recogni- 
tion and analysis of the mental forms which exist in the 
mind, and the second, or transcendental problem, concern- 
ing itself with the value of these mental categories. The 
critical attitude is, therefore, founded upon and, to a great 
extent, dependent on the kind of psychology it professes. 
So true is this that the pragmatists constantly complain of 
the narrow and false psychologism which characterizes all 
idealistic constructions. 

Now, the problem of knowledge, like every other prob- 
lem, presents certain facts, which every one, no matter 
what his explanation of these facts may be, must accept 
as the starting point for further argument. Without these 
presuppositions, postulates, data, or generally accepted 
principles, it is evidently impossible to progress in any 
inquiry beyond the stage of merely stating what the prob- 
lem to be considered is. As far as a theory of knowledge is 
concerned, the point of departure must be the experience 
of the individual epistemologist. This experience is obvi- 
ously complex, but it is the only experience which we can 
call our own, and which, therefore, we can ever hope to 


understand.? 


1 Theories of Knowledge, p. 11. 

2 The pragmatist insists that we make a beginning with the ‘‘data of pure expe- 
rience.” Passing over the fact that psychology knows no “‘ pure experience,” how are 
we to analyze what is without question so foreign to our everyday habits, that it is 
next to impossible to conceive any mental state where the subject-object distinction 
is not implied? 


152 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Beginning thus with my own experience, I can distinguish 
two fundamentally different kinds of acts—one is called 
perception, the other, intellection. Perception is the first 
source of all my knowledge, and it appears to me to bear a 
direct relation with reality. What I see, and hear, and touch 
are not my sensations, but objects external to myself. Fur- 
ther investigations may possibly demonstrate that I have 
not read correctly the deliverances of my senses; that what 
I perceived were not things but my own sensations; that 
the color, shape, size which I thought to be in things was 
not really in them at all but in me. My consciousness, how- 
ever, does not tell me this. It says simply that I saw, heard, 
and touched objects. Neither do I find in the act of per- 
ception any note of personal responsibility for the qualities 
of the things perceived nor of purpose which so modified 
these things that I should perceive them as I did. Of course, 
there may exist cases where I am directly responsible for 
things being what they are. Likewise, ends and purposes 
often compel me to consider one object rather than another. 
Perception, however, viewed simply as an experience of 
my mind, carries along with it no direct and essential note 
of individual responsibility or of purpose. 

Moreover, although no one can deny that both universal 
ideas and inferences are involved in practically all of my 
perceptions, as, for example, when I say, ‘‘ Yesterday I saw 
my friend, Smith the psychologist, having a heated argu- 
ment with an eminent philosopher on the steps of McMahon 
Hall”; yet this fact is the result of an analysis of the per- 
ception in question, and is not in any way “ given” in the 
perception itself.1 

1‘*Both universal ideas and inferences are involved in perception, as even the 
plain man may be forced to admit. Strictly, however, and as applied to perception 
in general, this is not a datum of perceptual experience, but belongs to theory. 


Ordinarily, what we perceive, whether it be natural objects, or their qualities, 
colours, shapes and distances, we perceive immediately. Our subsumption is not 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 153 


Again, while it must be admitted that there exist cases 
in which we do perceive our own sensations, these are not 
numerous, and are of so indefinite and vague a character, 
that they cannot be compared with the clear, vivid, and 
distinct perceptions which form the basis of our ordinary 
experiences. In these latter, any reference to the sense 
process is absolutely wanting. What we mean to assert is, 
that in the act of perception we perceive objects, not sen- 
sations. That these objects may, after examination, be 
reduced to sensations is quite another thing. Such a con- 
clusion is certainly not given to us in our ordinary percep- 
tual experiences. 

Sensations integrate to form what are called “‘sensation- 
complexes.”” The percept which results is, neither the sum 
of the individual sensations analyzed out of the complex, 
nor is it equivalent to the complex. The percept, which 
has meaning and a relation to things other than the per- 
ceiver, is something altogether different from the sensations 
which have been compounded, as it were, to make up the 
percept. What happens in every percept is that we sub- 
sume individual experiences under general headings, that 
is, under universal ideas. Moreover, it is very important 
to distinguish between ideas as thoughts, and ideas as in- 
struments by means of which we think of objects other than 
ourselves. While ideas exist in the mind, certainly it is 
not of ideas we think, but of the things existing outside the 
mind which they represent to us, except in the case where 


deliberate. Our universal ideas function unconsciously. The assertion that all 
perception involves subsumption under universal ideas and is really inferential in 
character is itself an inference based on particular cases in which perception halts 
and stumbles. That universal ideas exist, and function in sense-perception can 
readily be verified in experience; but whether or not all perception is inferential is 
quite another matter. Indeed, if it were, it would be difficult to conceive how pet- 
ception could begin.” (Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 46.) 

I have summarized in the above paragraphs the analysis by Walker of the data 
of sense experience. 


154 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the mind expressly constructs ideas without any reference 
to reality, as, for example, in imagination. 

The mind, therefore, delivers to us, as a fundamental 
datum, a belief in the existence of mind-independent 
realities. This belief may turn out to be false, but no one 
can deny that we have it. Neither is it required to per- 
ceive a thing by means of the senses to know that it exists. 
Many real objects cannot be so perceived, yet we are cer- 
tain of their existence; for example, the movement for World 
Peace, or Bolshevism. It is one of the characteristics of 
an idea that it functions perfectly well in ordinary use with- 
out being analyzed. As a matter of fact, few of our ideas 
are ever analyzed as to their content, nevertheless they pos- 
sess a very definite meaning for us. 

Ideas, too, affect our actions, impelling us to try to real- 
ize something which exists as yet only in the mind. How- 
ever, purpose does not control ideas to the extent that it 
does away with the objective reference of thought. The 
content of our thought remains the same, no matter what 
our purposes may be. Purpose impels us to a certain course 
of thought, but it has no control over the results of our 
thoughts. These results are determined partly by cerebral 
action and partly by mental habit, with habit playing the 
most important réle. 

Consciousness “‘gives” us this much. It points to a log- 
ical nexus amongst our thoughts. But how does this nexus 
arise? The only satisfactory reply to this question is that 
sense experience, with its direct reference to extra-mental 
reality, lays the foundation for the orderly sequence which 
governs our thoughts. ‘The succession of our thoughts is 
due partly to physiological and partly to intellectual habits, 
both of which presuppose and have been built up by objec- 
tive experience, the strength of these habits depending, 
other conditions being the same, upon the intensity and the 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 153 


frequency of repetition of those experiences or of our re- 
flections upon them. Purposes which in constructive 
thought consist in a general grasp of the problem in hand 
have little to do with the succession of ideas as such, though 
they control it throughout. By them the relevancy of as- 
sociated ideas is determined, but not the particular order 
in which they arise.” ! 

To return to the Kantian theory of knowledge. Kant 
began with the assumption that we cannot know reality 
as it is, or better, that the mind does not conform to the 
object thought, but that vice versa, the object conforms to 
the mind, which possesses certain a priori forms without 
which it is impossible to think. This is called the postulate 
of Apriorism. Knowledge, therefore, has a twofold source; 
it comes partly from experience, is a posteriori, and partly 
from the constitution of the mind, is a priori. Sensations 
are the raw material out of which knowledge is constructed. 

Empirical knowledge, however, gives us no certainty as 
to what things really are, since it is dependent on certain 
mental forms, namely, those of time and space. All we can 
know is the appearance, not the reality of things. The 
“‘thing-in itself”’ is unknowable. 

Our judgments are of two kinds, synthetic a posteriori 
and synthetic a priori. The synthetic a posteriori judg- 
ments are those which begin with experience and are 
grounded in experience, as, for example, the truths of phys- 
ics and chemistry. These are truths, and universally true, 
but their universality is of an experimental character. It 
is in no sense of the word absolute or pure. Only synthetic 
a priori judgments are truly universal, that is, independent 
of all experience, for they rely solely on certain mental 
forms for their universality, and as such are independent 
of experience. These forms are “‘transcendental,”’ that is 

1Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 69. 


156 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


to say, prior to all experience, and a necessary condition 
for the understanding of experience. 

Thus, Kant’s peculiar contribution to the problem of 
knowledge consists in the ‘“‘categories,” under which all 
experiences must be subsumed, and without which knowl- 
edge is impossible.! 

The arguments advanced by Kant revolve about his 
attempt to discredit the Humian scepticism, the central 
doctrine of which is that the mind as a substance does not 
exist. Mind is simply a mass of perceptions, having rela- 
tions to one another, but in no sense constituting an under- 
lying unit. There are, therefore, no such things as necessary 
and universal judgments. 

Kant agreed with Hume that the terms of experience are 
essentially phenomenal, and conceived of the physical order 
underlying these phenomena, as also mental. Phenomena, 
both physical and mental, therefore, come together in a 
unity of apperception. Our experience is contingent and 
particular, from which it would be impossible to derive a 
necessary and universal judgment unless the mind con- 
tained some form or other capable of synthesizing individual 
experiences. That the mind, even conceived as sense ex- 
perience, possesses such a native function is proved by the 
fact that we cannot think anything, nor can we represent 
to ourselves any sensible object without localizing it and 
assuming that it exists at some definite moment. ‘The cat- 
egories of time and space are universal and, therefore, can- 
not arise from any particular experience. They are a prior. 

Kantianism, in the second place, is based on the assump- 


1 For a fuller exposition and criticism of the Kantian doctrine of Categories, con- 
sult Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. I, pp. 168-197; Vol. II, pp. 184-202; Turner, History 
of Philosophy, pp. 530 et seq.; Sentroul, Kant; Mercier, Crilertologie Générale, pp. 
207-223; Ward, James, A Study of Kant; O’Sullivan, Old Criticism and New Prag- 
matism; Prichard, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge; Paulsen, Introduction to Philosophy, 
pp. 398-470; Ladd, Philosophy of Knowledge. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 157 


tion that knowledge is prior to existence, which latter de- 
pends upon the a priori conditions of knowledge both for its 
understanding and possibility. Experience is true only in 
as far as it fulfills the conditions of unity which lie at the 
basis of every thought process. The ground of all being is 
knowledge, not of the individual knower, but of the syn- 
thetic activity which is of the essence of thought itself. 
Mind is essentially an organizing principle. In this way, 
Idealism hoped to do away with the subjective note which 
had been so essential a mark of the earlier Idealisms, and to 
attain thereby an objective character. Thus, metaphysical 
knowledge has its conditions no less than scientific knowl- 
edge, and is preserved by the same token. As a mat- 
ter of fact, upon critical examination, all the principles of 
science and of mathematics are found to be nothing but 
synthetic a priori judgments. 


Criticism of Kant’s Idealism.—An argument often 
adduced in favor of Kantianism is that it is the only possi- 
ble theory which can save us from, on the one side, the 
errors of extreme subjectivism, and on the other, the scep- 
ticism of Hume. By justifying the universality and neces- 
sity of our judgments in terms, both of experience and of 
mind, it creates a via media which offers a safe road past the 
extremes of subjectivists and of sceptics. To this, however, 
we reply that there is another possible theory explanatory 
of the validity of our judgments, that of Realism, and be- 
fore accepting Kantianism it would be well to examine the 
postulates upon which it is built, in order to discover if they 
are sound enough to carry this theory. Fairness, too, de- 
mands that both Pragmatism and Realism be given an op- 
portunity of presenting their cases. 

The fundamental principle of Apriorism is that the syn- 
thetic activity of the mind presupposes the existence of 


158 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


categories which precede and are a condition of every ex- 
perience. Despite the ambiguity to which this proposition 
obviously leaves itself open, certainly it meant, in the phi- 
losophy of Kant, a metaphysical, as distinct from a logical 
or psychological, condition. Knowledge is, therefore, con- 
ditioned by an extra-mental reality which makes all knowl- 
edge purely subjective or, if this be not so, then Kantianism 
fails altogether to explain the real ground of our knowledge. 
For the mind of man is certainly no less contingent than his 
experience, and a priori forms do not explain why knowledge 
must be universally valid. They only explain why knowledge 
is valid for each individual, and for other individuals with 
minds constituted like his. If, on the other hand, it is not 
the individual mind which attains truth, but mind in general, 
a transcendental being, then truth is forever unknowable by 
us because, by supposition, the ground itself is unknowable.! 

Perry points out that Kant falls into the self-same diffi- 
culties which beset the theory of Berkeley because he as- 
sumes that, since we know a thing, everything is knowledge, 
or to put it negatively, nothing can exist which is not an 
idea.” Moreover, it is impossible to mention a thing which 
is not an idea, from which he deduces, though wrongly, 
that everything is idea. 

Kant’s doctrine of sense perception stands or falls with 
the truth or falsehood of his descriptions of space and time 
as a priori forms. As a matter of fact, there seems to be a 
great deal of confusion in the Kantian idea of space as a 


1 Coffey, Theory of Knowledge, Vol. I, pp. 201-231. 

2Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 125 et seq. Read Perry for an 
excellent statement of what he calls the error of ‘‘definition by initial predication”’ 
and the ‘‘ego-centric predicament.’’ The first argument is false because it describes 
a thing by a characterization which is not fundamental at all Because we know 
things, it need not follow that for things to exist they must be ideas. Similarly, the 
ego-centric predicament proves nothing. It is merely a difficulty of method. That 
everything mentioned is an idea is obviously true. But it is a far cry from this fact 
to the statement that everything which exists is only an idea. Also Kiilpe, Intro- 
duction to Philosophy, p. 197. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 159 


priori. The root of his erroneous interpretation appears to 
be that he failed to distinguish sufficiently between the 
three different kinds of space—real, ideal, and imaginary 
space. Our idea of real space is an abstraction from data 
derived from experience, because when I behold two bodies 
occupying two distinct positions, I immediately infer a re- 
lation of distance between them—this is real space. Ideal 
space Is simply an extension of this idea, obtained empiri- 
cally, to cover an infinite number of possible bodies; while 
imaginary space is capable of increase or decrease as I wish. 
Kant confuses, therefore, real with ideal space. In fact, 
his whole treatment of the space concept contains manifest 
incoherencies. Because my idea of space results from a 
mental abstraction is no proof that the idea is not objec- 
tively determined. The same observation holds true of 
time. Our ideas of space and time can be thought of only 
as a priori forms, if we are careful to exclude real space and 
veal time, which are abstractions and are necessarily con- 
tingent and limited. ! 

It is no solution of the many difficulties involved in 
our perceptions to contend that their truth depends on the 
truth of certain a priori forms which the mind possesses, 
and to which they must conform in order to be valid. Such 
an answer only pushes back the original problem to an 
examination of the conformity which is said to exist between 
the mental forms and the act of perceiving. Assuming 
the existence of space-time categories, the problem of 
the reality of an extra-mental world still remains, and 
all the arguments brought against the objectivity of our 
sense perceptions by the sceptics are valid when directed 
against the Kantian formulation. 


1 For a full treatment of our notions of space and time, consult Nys, Le Notion de 
Temps, pp. 66 et seq.; Nys, Le Notion d’Espace, pp. 292-432. 

For a detailed critique of the Kantian theory of Sense Perception, Coffey, Epis- 
temology, Vol. Il, pp. 184-207; Prichard, Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. 


160 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Again, it is objected against Apriorism that the mental 
forms which it postulates are purely static. Nor does 
the Hegelian idea of the Absolute unfolding itself bestow 
upon these forms a developmental character satisfactory to 
those who press the claims of a psychology which demands, 
if it is to be in any way an adequate picture of the human 
mind, a gradual growth in knowledge. Knowledge is not, 
as Kantians assert, a mere progress towards a better under- 
standing of the structure of the mind. Such development 
may well be logical, but it is not real in any true sense of 
the word. Ideas, no less than men, present to the observer 
a story, and it is one of the chief merits of genetic psy- 
chology to have pointed out this growth of ideas. But 
do the a priori forms of Kant likewise grow? we may well 
ask. If they do, and judging from experience no one can 
safely deny the fact, what becomes of the universality 
and necessity which these forms are supposed to bestow 
upon our perceptions of phenomena? To which question 
might well be added the other, no less embarrassing one, 
which Walker asks, ‘‘How is it that, if all men use 
the same a _ ~priort ‘schema’ and ‘framework,’ no 
one is conscious of it, and no two philosophers have 
ever agreed as to its structural form? How comes it 
that no one yet has constructed a self-consistent ‘nat- 
ural’ system if ready-made within him every one has 
its plan? ” 4 

Neither is it required of us to assume the existence of a 
priori forms in order to explain the elements of necessity and 
universality in our judgments. Although it is undoubtedly 
true that judgments are expressed, as a general rule, in 
the subject-predicate form, yet it is not necessary to think 
in such a way. Wecan think without expressly thinking a 
subject-predicate. Moreover, we can account for this prac- 

1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 244. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 161 


tice of formulating our judgments in this way on an empirical 
basis since objects come to us piece by piece, and what we 
predicate concerning objects is not spontaneously revealed 
to us, but is the result of observation and of study. If the 
mind could take in everything as a whole and at one glance, 
it would then be true that we should not have to turn 
successively from one aspect of a thing to another aspect 
in order to understand it. As a matter of fact, the mind 
proceeds step by step in its predications, and this accounts 
sufficiently well for the characteristics, even of universality 
and necessity, which we bestow mentally upon things. 
There seems then to exist no need of calling in a priori 
categories to permeate all our judgments and perceptions 
thereby rendering them objectively valid. And what has 
been said of the subject-predicate form of our judgments, 
as well as of our notions of space and time, may be repeated 
of our predications in quantity and quality. The origin 
of these latter characteristics may also be explained a 
posteriori, assuming that the mind possesses the power 
of abstraction. 

The cardinal error of every form of Apriorism seems 
to be its assumption of the identity of thought and reality. 
Beginning with this principle, it pretends to deduce all 
reality from a few fundamental a priori forms. Such a 
task is hopeless, and the majority of modern thinkers see 
no solution of the epistemological problem by starting 
from the transcendental standpoint. Instead of proceed- 
ing from mental categories and then passing downward 
to reality, the tendency to-day is to start with experience 
and move upwards. While one may not agree with the 
pragmatist idea of divorcing metaphysics from epistemol- 
ogy, realizing that the two have a necessary relation to 
each other, yet one may be thankful for the pragmatic 
assaults on the fanciful character of much of the specula- 


162 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


tion which has characterized a priori philosophy. If we 
are ever to solve the problem of knowledge, we must 
start from the data of human consciousness. These data 
should be criticised, and quite thoroughly, but it is one 
thing to criticise the data of human experience, it is another 
to do away with them altogether. 4 


The Theory of Knowledge of Absolutism.—Kant did not 
go the way of logic and pass from his principles of Aprior- 
ism and Immanence to an out-and-out Absolutism. ‘These 
principles, he maintained, held good only for the phenom- 
enal world. It remained for his successors, Fichte, Schell- 
ing, and especially Hegel, to do away with all reality 
except that which, in some way or other, is directly con- 
nected with the Absolute One. Kant believed in the ‘‘thing- 
in-itself”’; his starting point was human knowledge, no 
matter how wrongly he interpreted it. But later Idealists 
would have none of the dualism inherent in the system 
of Kant. They did away with his illogicalities and half 
measures, and boldly plunged into the all-embracing waters 
of the Absolute—the ground, the reason, the beginning, 
and end of all things. 

The starting point of the Hegelian? philosophy is the 
concept of the Absolute. Viewing this Absolute logically, 
not ethically, as had Kant and Fichte, nor from a romantic 
standpoint as had Schelling, Hegel contended that only 
the Absolute or rational is real. The fundamental principle 
of his thought is that ‘‘all being is thought realized, and 
all becoming is a development of thought.’”’ The Absolute 


1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 238-256, for a critique of Apriorism. 

* Caird, Hegel; Royce, The Spirit of Modern Philosophy, The World and the Indi- 
vidual; Croce, What is Living and What is Dead in Hegel’s Philosophy?; O’Sullivan, 
Old Criticism and New Pragmatism; Turner, History of Philosophy; Weber, History 
of Philosophy; Windelband, History of Philosophy; Bosanquet, The Meeting of 
Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy; Kilpe, Philosophy of the Present in Germany. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 163 


is dynamic, always in the process of evolving Itself. 
As Idea, it is the ground of all reality; it is, in its process 
of development, the beginning of change and the end 
which reconciles all differences in Itself. 

The Criticism of Hegel, is, therefore, much more than 
a method; in his hands it has become a philosophy, a theory 
of reality. All Absolutisms are of an essentially similar 
character, for while one thinker may interpret the Final 
Ground as thought, another as will, a third as sentiency, 
all are agreed that the Absolute, which is some form or 
other of consciousness, alone is real; it alone possesses 
truth and validity. Later absolutists, ike Green, conceive 
of reality as an order of relations which demands the 
existence of a mind to make them intelligible,! while others, 
for example, Bradley,” identify consciousness with sentient 
experience. But sentiency is, for these thinkers, at bottom 
one and the same thing as thought. However, in spite of 
the manifold inconsistencies and contradictions which arise 
from the appearances of things, reality is one. The char- 
acter of this one is essentially positive, not negative. Al- 
though everything that we know or can know is merely 
appearance, this appearance is itself the Absolute which 
reconciles all differences by bestowing upon them whatever 
truth they may be said to possess. 


Criticism of the Theory of Knowledge of Absolutism.— 
To criticise Absolutism it seems best to inquire briefly 
into the value of ideas, like the Absolute, Immanence, and 
Unity in Difference which are given a position of such 
prominence in every absolutist formulation of the theory 
of knowledge. That these ideas have a right to exist, 
and that they possess validity, no one can deny. ‘The 


1 Prolegomena to Ethics, passim. 
? Appearance and Reality, especially Chapter XX. 


164 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


universe is certainly a whole, differences exist therein, 
but to identify the whole with its differences is either 
to do away with the whole altogether or to deny that any 
difference is possible. Again, thoughts are assuredly 
immanent. But immanent to what or to whom? To 
our minds, we would reply, but not necessarily to a uni- 
versal mind, which is over and above the mind of each 
and every individual. 

If only the Absolute Mind really exists thoughts are im- 
manent to it alone, and by consequence, all individual minds 
co ipso cease to exist. Similarly, there is a unity in difference 
but only on the hypothesis that man is unity, not that 
the universe is the whole of unity. For if man is not a 
unit, then the universe must be one; but if the universe 
is the only one, then man ceases to be a real unit. As 
Walker points out, ‘‘It seems to me that there is only one 
way of avoiding these difficulties, and that is to hold 
fast to our finite organisms, to our finite unities-in-difference 
and to our finite minds in which thought is really immanent, 
since these alone are known with comparative immediacy 
and certainty. Then, if our theory of an organic universe 
can be squared with the facts, well and good. But if it 
cannot, we must still abide by our facts, and in regard 
to theories must either attempt a modification or renounce 
them altogether. For Absolutism to adopt the latter alter- 
native would perhaps be a mistake, since there are many 
ideas in Absolutism the value of which for human thought 
is very great. Nevertheless, its theory of the Universe 
as an Organic Whole cannot stand in its present literal 
form. It leads not merely to inconsistencies, as I have 
endeavoured to show; but it makes error, evil, pain, and 
man himself a hopeless mystery.” ! 


1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 294. Read this whole Chapter (X), and 
especially the portions relating to the theories of Green and Berkeley. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 165 


Perry finds three serious objections to Absolute Idealism ! 
which he calls by the following names: formalism, equivoca- 
tion, and dogmatism. By formalism he means, that in 
erecting its categories as all-sufficient explanations of reality, 
Absolutism, as a matter of fact, assumes too much, since 
its explanations fail to cover all that it pretends to explain. 
General concepts explain much, it is true; they are never 
quite adequate to explain all the richness, diversity, and 
manifoldness inherent in concrete objects. ‘‘Why this 
particular world should be as it is, one does not in the least 
understand from the bare conception of significance or 
meaning. ‘This sacrifice of sufficiency to generality, this 
neglect of the insufficiency of purely logical categories, is 
what I mean by the error of formalism.” ? 

The fallacy of equivocation arises from the use in an 
univocal sense of concepts which are purely analogical. 
While it is true that an analogy may carry us with security 
up to a certain point in our argument, beyond that point 
we may not pass without assuming that the applicability 
of the analogy in question is unlimited. Absolutism falls 
into this very error when it extends the logical concepts 
upon which it is based so as to comprehend all the realities 
of nature and of life. It generalizes concepts which are 
true of logic, and asserts them to be true likewise of all 
being. This error of equivocation, which runs through the 
whole of Idealism, and is particularly manifest in its use of 
such terms as “‘spirit,” ‘‘mind,”’ ‘‘personality,” “good,” 
and ‘‘evil,” is, as Perry points out, the direct result of the 
efforts made to avoid that formalism which the logical 
categories essentially involve. 

Absolutism is dogmatic, because it assumes a “‘maximum 
of knowledge” to be a full expression of the principle itself of 


1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 166-188. 
2 Op. cit., p. 167. 


166 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


knowledge, and further, that this maximum is then synony- 
mous with reality. If by this is meant that the Absolute 
possesses a knowledge of all things, such a statement adds 
nothing to our knowledge of what reality is. If, however, 
is meant the acceptance of the existence of one who knows 
everything as a whole, we can readily agree, with the 
animadversion that we are no nearer to an understanding 
of what reality is now than we were before. “But if there 
is any virtue in the absolutist principle itself, it must be 
possible to define a cognitive ideal in other than quantita- 
tive terms, not a knowing of everything merely, but a 
perfect knowing of everything. From what it is to know 
well, it must be possible to infer what it is to know 
best.” 


Pragmatism.— Pragmatism * came into being as a protest 
against the ‘‘ vague and meaningless abstractions of Absolu- 
tism.”’ Its origin, like that of Objective Idealism, dates 
back to the critical philosophy of Kant. But it differs from 
Absolutism in this, that it is a development of the principles 
of the Critique of Practical Reason, while Absolutism 


1Qp. cit., p. 186. We may be pardoned for quoting this estimate of the weaknesses 
of idealism—‘‘The source of the failure (of idealism) lies in the extravagance of the 
claims which it has made for those branches of knowledge which it has successfully 
vindicated. For idealism has sought to prove not only the universality, but also 
the spirituality of logic; it has sought to prove not only the independence of moral 
science, but its logical or universal character as well. And the result has been to 
confuse logic, and to formalize life.’ Op. cit., p. 192. 

2 For an exposition of Pragmatism, see James, Pragmatism, A Pluralistic Universe, 
Some Problems of Philosophy, The Meaning of Truth; Schiller, Humanism, Studies 
in Humanism; Bergson, Creative Evolution, Matter and Memory; Stewart, A Critical 
Exposition of Bergson’s Philosophy; Lindsay, The Philosophy of Bergson; Dewey, 
Studies in Logical Theory, Creative Intelligence, Reconstruction in Philosophy, Human 
Nature and Conduct, How We Think; Bowden, The Principles of Pragmatism. 

For a criticism, Walker, Theories of Knowledge; Coffey, Epistemology; Perry, 
Present Philosophical Tendencies; Pratt, What is Pragmatism?; Schinz, Anti-Prag- 
matism; Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics; Leighton, Man and the Cosmos, The 
Field of Philosophy; Driscoll, Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea; Turner in 
Catholic Encyclopedia, Article ‘‘ Pragmatism.’’ 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 167 


stresses the principles of Apriorism and Immanence found 
in the First Critique. 

The viewpoint of Pragmatism is experimental, practical, 
and evolutionary; it emphasizes the function of will as 
against the theoretical character of Absolutism, where the 
faculty of intellect is almost solely stressed. Absolutism 
is metaphysical; Pragmatism is dominantly epistemologi- 
cal and very contemptuous of metaphysics as such, despite 
the fact that it acknowledges what James calls meta- 
physical “affinities.” The tendency of Absolutism is 
monistic, that of Pragmatism is pluralistic. At almost 
every point the two theories clash. 

In trying to evaluate Pragmatism, it must always be 
remembered that its defenders claim for their viewpoint 
nothing more than that it is an approach, or better, a 
method of testing the truth or falsehood of theories. Few 
wish to dignify it with the title of a systematic philosophy. 
The somewhat inchoate and unsatisfactory state in which 
Pragmatism finds itself, because of the admittedly tentative 
character of its fundamental principles, makes a final and 
definitive statement of its position impossible. James 
himself frankly admits that his system is too much ‘“‘like 
an arch built only on one side.’ ! Due to the present 
unpopularity, which is on the increase in philosophical 
circles, of the pragmatic philosophy, such a statement may 
never be forthcoming. The only thing, therefore, remaining 
for us is to examine this theory as it is presented by its 
leading exponents, ever mindful of the fact that all of them 
are not agreed even on fundamentals, and that one’s exposi- 
tion as well as one’s criticism of Pragmatism must be, in the 
nature of the case, highly provisional. 

Pragmatism is, first of all, an epistemology which has 
come about as the result of the adoption of a method “of 


1 Some Problems of Philosophy, p. VIII. 


168 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


- settling metaphysical disputes that otherwise might be 
interminable.” ! In the face of problems which for genera- 
tions have seemed well-nigh insoluble, the pragmatist takes 
courage, for, by the use of the empirical method, he feels 
confident that he can sift the wheat from the chaff and 
attain a truth which, although it may not be absolute, is 
perfectly capable of ‘‘working.’”’ There has been too much 
theorizing, speculation, a priori constructions in the past; 
what is needed, above all things, in present-day philosophy 
is the application of the experimental method, and the 
thinking and evaluating of principles in terms of human 
experience. It makes little or no difference to the scientist 
whether an hypothesis be true; it is of supreme moment 
whether his hypothesis works. The “working” of a theory 
is the test of its truth, not only in science, but in philosophy 
as well. For the philosopher, as for the scientist, “‘theortes 
thus become instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which 
we can rest.’* ‘The touchstone of truth is experience, 
especially human experience.* Pragmatism is, therefore, 
“the attitude of looking away from first things, principles, 
‘categories, supposed necessities; and of looking towards 
last things, fruits, consequences, facts.” * 

In the application of this method to knowledge, the 
pragmatist is very insistent on the point that what engages 
his interest is the process itself, and not the product, of 
thought. He studies knowing rather than knowledge. Now, 
knowing is essentially a human, a practical thing, and it is 
of value only in as far as it helps us to get in closer relation 

1James, Pragmatism, p. 45. 

2 James, Pragmatism, p. 53. 

3 Humanism and Pragmatism are practically one and the same philosophy. Both 
accept the principle that what counts is human experience; that the value of an 
idea is to be measured by its possible adaptation to human purposes. For a detailed 
statement of the philosophy of Humanism, consult Schiller, Humanism, Studies in 


Humanism, and particularly, “‘Axioms as Postulates” in Personal Idealism, 
4 James, Pragmatism, p. 54. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 169 


with life. Experience alone counts, and any idea which 
assists us to understand a part of experience, or puts us into 
relation with experience, is true in so far as it does. Ideas 
are instruments, working devices, short cuts to truth. 

Now, anything may be an idea, the only requisites being 
that it possess both meaning and utility. The fundamental 
principle underlying every form of Pragmatism is known 
as the principle of Postulation. In the search for knowledge 
we constantly postulate, that is, we try out truths for the 
purpose of discovering their consequences. All thought 
is of its very nature purposive; to be true it must satisfy 
certain ‘‘felt needs.” Of course these needs include some- 
thing more than the practical, in the narrow sense of the 
word. The term “practical”? must be accepted in a very 
wide connotation, to include such needs as those of logical 
consistency, mental satisfaction, the harmonious grouping 
together of different concepts. ‘The test of the practical 
is its “‘cash value” in terms of human experience, and the 
secret of the test is a universal postulation which, starting 
with a more or less provisional hypothesis, by experiment 
and observation, arrives at a truth which can be relied upon 
to work. The necessary and universal judgments of the 
older intellectualistic philosophies are thus done away with 
altogether. So-called axioms are nothing but postulates. 
Truth is not static; it is “ambulatory,” progressive, relative 
to the individual thinker and his needs. 

The pragmatic theory of knowledge is, as we have pointed 
out, an experimental one. All our knowledge arises from 
the data of pure experience, and is ultimately resolvable 
into sensations. What we know are our sensations. All 
reality is experience and nothing more, and knowledge can 
come to us in no other way. Ideas are, therefore, instru- 
ments or tools with which we work, and their truth depends 
on the practical consequences which flow from our use of 


170 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


them. Moreover, knower and known are one and the same 
thing, for unless knowledge is experienced it cannot exist. 

Now, our ideas do not represent any reality, at least in 
the sense that they copy reality. They represent merely 
our different experiences in this that they are substitutes 
for actual experiences. As such they have a useful purpose 
because they help us to economize in the matter of actual 
experience. Concepts are thus labor-saving devices; they 
are symbolic, not representative of reality. But the concept 
is evidently something more than a mere percept. It 
entails a synthesizing aspect which no percept as such 
presents. In order to explain the synthetic character, as 
well as the objective reference of thought, the pragmatists 
have invented what they call “‘felt-relations.” Thoughts 
hang together because we feel the relations which must 
exist amongst them. The world of thought is nothing more 
than a world of experience in which thought is stripped of 
every characteristic of necessity and universality, and 
becomes simply a series of experiences bound together by 
“‘felt-transitions” and “‘felt-relations.”’ 

The evolutionary viewpoint is largely responsible for 
the reduction by pragmatists of all mental experience to 
sensation. While it is unquestionably true that sense ex- 
perience lies at the basis of all knowledge, the pragmatist 
goes a step further than this fact and identifies all possible 
knowledge with sensation. This is an exaggeration. The 
symbolic, purposive character of our concepts, although un- 
doubtedly a prominent mark of cognition, is generalized 
into a principle explanatory of the nature of our concepts 
themselves. There is no need for this generalization. For, 
while concepts may be useful, it is false to generalize and 
contend that utility is the very essence of conception. The 
principle of “‘thought-economy” expresses well a certain 
side of the knowledge process. But it should not be erected 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE LL 


into a generalization explanatory of the truth or falsehood 
of our ideas. Pragmatism has applied the evolutionary 
theory to the origin of our knowledge with the result that 
it has confused thought with will and the emotions, while 
it has sought to explain all three in terms of mere sense ex- 
perience. Even granting the truth of evolution, it does not 
help a theory of knowledge to insist on leveling down all 
our mental experiences by attempting to explain them by a 
simplicity which is pseudo, and in no sense of the word real. 
Because knowledge arises from the united action of sensa- 
tion, intellection, and volition, is no justification for assert- 
ing the three functions to be one and the same, unless we 
are determined to make all experience fit neatly into cer- 
tain categories which we have fashioned beforehand. 

To sum up, although Pragmatism is at first glance only a 
method of attacking problems, an attitude which we may 
take, it turns out to be, on examination, an epistemology. 
Since to know we must possess ideas, the pragmatist has 
analyzed for us his theory of ideas. Ideas are purely func- 
tional, the instruments with which we work. They are not 
representative of reality, which consists alone in experience. 
Experience is manifold but, when sifted down, amounts to 
what we call sensation. From this experience we arrive at 
truth, which is purely relative. Truth is not static; neither 
can it be verified. It is constantly, however, in the process 
of verification, and ideas, principles, or axioms are true, 
just as in far as (and no further) they assist us to attain a 
richer and wider experience. Ideas do not exist for them- 
selves, but for us. The same must be said of truth. Not 
in any theoretic sense, but only from a practical and utili- 
tarlan point of view, may we judge the truth or falsehood 
of a statement. Any other value accorded to ideas, judg- 
ments, or to our processes of reasoning is purely fictitious, 
and can only land us back in the very midst of the useless 


172 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


and interminable metaphysical discussions which have al- 
ways disgraced the fair name of philosophy. 

A great deal of the vogue which Pragmatism has enjoyed 
has been due, not so much to the reasons advanced by its 
proponents, as to its supposed suitability as a philosophy 
of life consistent with the approved principles of modern 
science. Intellectualism has failed altogether to satisfy 
mankind. To express life and knowledge in voluntaristic 
terms, and to test the validity of these deliverances solely 
on the basis of their value as instruments for the develop- 
ment of the same, appears to be a possible way out of an al- 
most impossible situation. Pragmatists bespeak, therefore, 
for their theory an opportunity of demonstrating that it is 
quite as capable of solving problems and of reconstructing 
reality as any of the now much discredited idealisms. 

As a matter of fact, Pragmatism lies at the heart of every 
philosophy, even though we may not recognize its presence 
there. For whether we know it or not, purposes dominate 
all our thoughts, giving to them both reality and validity, 
since ‘‘human motives sharpen all our questions, human 
satisfactions lurk in all our answers, all our formulas have 
a human twist.” ! So true is this that we may assert, with- 
out fear of contradiction, that Pragmatism is the univer- 
sal philosophy. Nolens volens one uses it, whatever his 
position may be. It iscompatible with any and every 
philosophy as long as that philosophy possesses conse- 
quences of a practical nature for life. As a method, it has 
always been used, quite unconsciously at times it is true. 
It remained for modern thinkers to conceive of it as a prin- 
ciple which might unify all speculation, and it is in the wid- 
est, most methodic, and general extension of the principles 
of Pragmatism to every field of knowledge and of life that 
we must look for its truth. 


1 James, Pragmatism, p. 242. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 173 


Criticism of Pragmatism as a Theory of Knowledge.— 
Two difficulties, external to the question at issue, are 
urged with great vigor by all pragmatists against every 
critic of the pragmatic theory. In the first place, it is in- 
sisted that the majority of criticisms are unfair in this, that 
they fail to represent truly the position of Pragmatism. 
Anti-pragmatists, as a rule, are guilty of the psychologist’s 
fallacy, for they read into an opponent’s theory what really 
takes place only in their own minds. Secondly, pragmatists 
deny in no uncertain terms the assumption of their oppo- 
nents that Pragmatism is a philosophy. It is nothing more 
than a method, an attitude, and not a systematic philoso- 
phy at all. Now, it must be evident to all that to the above 
strictures no reply can be given which will satisfy the de- 
fenders of Pragmatism. The unprejudiced thinker, how- 
ever, will take with a grain of salt the oft-reiterated state- 
ments that Pragmatism is not a system. Since it pretends 
to be a philosophy, pragmatists may call it by any name 
they please. Every one else will know it for what it is—a 
systematic philosophy. Similarly, we must use every possi- 
ble precaution to guard against an unfair statement of the 
pragmatist position. But, granting that we have studied 
this theory in its leading exponents and practically formu- 
lated it in their own words, we may then, with an easy con- 
science, proceed to its refutation, disregarding altogether 
such statements—and many others to the same effect— 
that ‘“‘the critics of Pragmatism seldom face this issue 
squarely.” ? 

In the first place, underlying the epistemology of Prag- 
matism is the doctrine, or rather the philosophy of pure 
experience, according to which all reality is nothing but 
experience. In experiencing reality we literally make truth 
as well as reality, in as far as reality is capable of being 


1Moore, Pragmatism and Its Critics, p. 132. 


174 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


modified by our actions. Exactly what the pragmatist 
means by the phrase “ making reality” isnot clear. If by it 
he means to confound knowledge with action, he must deny 
that there exists a clear-cut distinction between the two, 
a distinction which no psychologist would give up without a 
bitter struggle. On the other hand, if “to make reality” 
must be understood in the sense that knowledge is equal 
to knowledge added to action, he is uttering a mere plati- 
tude. To extend the proposition to everything that appears 
to be objective is manifestly impossible. It fails altogether 
to explain the apparent contingency of that reality with 
which we are surrounded, and with which we must deal from 
day to day. 

Moreover, the process of making reality, as far as men 
are concerned, could never have had a beginning. On no 
other supposition than that of Panpsychism can the philos- 
ophy of pure experience be made intelligible, and it is a 
fact worthy of notice that the leading defenders of Prag- 
matism and Humanism do not deny that their theories 
demand a world which is altogether mental. But Panpsy- 
chism leaves the origin of human knowledge as deep a mys- 
tery as it was before the theory was advanced. 

Again, in a panpsychic world, what becomes of the self, 
of the Ego? My thoughts, my feelings, my experiences can 
mean nothing if there is no basis, no ground to group to- 
gether the thoughts and feelings experienced by me. Such 
fundamental facts of consciousness as memory, conation, 
and purpose are both fanciful and fruitless unless they are 
the memories, the conations, and the purposes of somebody. 
If everything is experience, we are face to face with as un- 
satisfactory a set of abstractions as it is possible to conceive. 
Pragmatism has done away with the soul, but in doing so 
it must, at the same time, surrender all hope of ever being 
able to understand the unity of consciousness, and with 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE L75 


what necessarily follows upon that unity, the faculty of 
synthesizing the many in the one. ‘The pragmatic theory 
of knowledge, therefore, if logically carried out, either drives 
us back in Kantian Scepticism with its wholly useless and 
meaningless Ding-an-sich; or, if interpreted metaphysically, 
leads us on to a philosophy of Pure Experience which, of 
all philosophies, is the most hopeless, for its power of ex- 
plaining the universe is absolutely mJ, and as soon as an 
intelligent meaning is put on its atrocious terminology it 
at once bursts with discrepancy and leaves us no better off 
than when we started.” ? 

It is objected again, that the much praised pragmatic 
method, when analyzed, means nothing more than that 
every problem must have a meaning, or if it does not, it is 
scarcely worthy to be discussed, and that furthermore, this 
meaning is dependent on our experience. Every one, no 
matter what his philosophy, will concede that much. But 
“when pragmatism attempts to go beyond these somewhat 
commonplace precepts, it lands in dogmatism and absurd- 
ity,” remarks Pratt.? 

Nor is the pragmatic conception of the category of 
utility, as a test of the truth of a proposition, of any great 
epistemological significance. While no one can deny that 
concepts have a practical side, the practical certainly does 
not exhaust the whole of the truth of any principle or con- 
cept. Ideas are indeed instruments, but they may be, and 
very often are, something more. The prime fault with 
Instrumentalism is that it generalizes an aspect of the 
thought process, making of it the sole function, while in 
reality it is only a part of conscious intelligence. 

Pragmatism is individualistic, for it makes the experience 
of the individual, with the consequences to the individual 


1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 345. 
2 What is Pragmatism?, p. 45. 


176 AN INTRODUCTION TO; PHILOSOPHY 


of every experience, the exclusive test of all truth. In this 
way, it hopes to avoid the note of ‘“‘transcendental”’ which 
has always been a salient characteristic of the older knowl- 
edge theories. But it seems impossible to do away with the 
transcendental in every case where thought has for its 
object something other than itself. This is particularly true 
if our thoughts are of something within the experience of 
another man, as when I think of another man’s toothache. 

Finally, Pragmatism is nominalistic, that is, our knowl- 
edge turns out to be a knowledge of names, not of real 
things, and therefore never can be true knowledge. Accord- 
ing to the pragmatist, ideas do not correspond to any reality 
outside the mind. They are merely mental processes, and 
possess no truth of themselves unless we adopt the prag- 
matic conception of truth, which holds that anything which 
satisfies one is, in so far, true. In this case, two men may 
have diametrically opposite experiences concerning one and 
the same object, and yet both would have experienced iruly, 
despite the fact that both experiences cannot on hypothesis 
possibly be true. Error, or mistaken opinion, is therefore 
unthinkable on the pragmatic assumption. Here evidently 
is the crux of the whole knowledge problem. The pragma- 
tist cannot deny that we are often mistaken. Yet how is it 
possible to explain a mistake, when the perceiver was 
entirely satisfied with his experience and, moreover, his 
experience worked out? Unless one is willing to acknowl- 
edge that things possess truth outside of any individual 
experiencing of this truth; or, to say it another way, unless 
one is willing to inject the transcendental note into our 
everyday experience, it seems impossible to draw any line 
of division between truth and error. 

Truth or error cannot ultimately depend on my experi- 
ence. There must exist outside of me some kind of criterion 
by which I can ascertain the truth or falsehood of any one 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 177 


of my experiences. For experiences do not merely exist, 
they mean something. And this meaning is not solely . 
dependent on my experiences. There is a transcendental 
element in every cognitive experience, and we do not get 
rid of it by refusing to recognize Its existence. Pragmatists 
contend that transcendence is a mystery; that until we 
solve it by simplifying all our knowledge processes and 
explaining them in terms of the most elementary proc- 
esses of sense, both psychology and epistemology must 
forever remain full of mysteries. But “if transcendence 
is a mystery, it is at least a very real mystery, and the at- 
tempt to ignore it or to explain it away is bound to end in 
failure. It is not true that everything is like everything 
else. There are several things in this world which are swi 
generis—and one of these is knowledge.”’ } 


The Theory of Knowledge of Realism.—By Realism, we 
understand the doctrine which maintains that a real mind- 
independent world exists. Our thoughts correspond to this 
reality external to the mind of the thinker, and, by means 
of them, we both know and are justified in asserting that 
things exist. The plain man believes that he sees real 
objects; that his house, his automobile, his office are not 
creations of the mind, but entities possessing their own 
existence and certain definite qualities independent of any 
knowledge he may have of them. He likewise accepts the 
reality of his own thoughts, emotions, and feelings, and 
recognizes that others may have thoughts and feelings 
similar to those which he possesses. These beliefs of the man 
in the street are the foundation of every theory of Realism. 
From them the philosopher must start, and to them he 
must return when, in the course of his speculations, theo- 


1 Pratt, What is Pragmatism?, p. 71. We recommend that the student read the 
whole lecture ‘‘Pragmatism and Knowledge,” pp. 135-171; also Chapter XII, ‘‘The 
Philosophy of Pure Experience,’ Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 220-236. 


178 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


ries seem to demand a reversal of these common-sense 
acceptances. 

This does not mean that the philosopher accepts all the 
beliefs of the plain man without first subjecting them to 
criticism and investigation. He does, however, acknowledge 
as self-evident the universal belief that knowledge is pos- 
sible. Moreover, he views the belief in the existence of the 
real world as a fundamental one, which demands explana- 
tion and even scrutiny, but which must not be assumed to 
be false preceding an investigation of its validity. It is 
altogether possible to tear our common-sense beliefs to 
pieces, and in the process we may discover many, if not all 
of them, to have been false or altogether Inadequate. But 
it is illogical to commence a study of knowledge by an a 
priori statement that knowledge itself is impossible, or, if 
it be possible, that real things cannot be known by us. 

The history of philosophy reveals to us many different 
kinds of Realisms. Very early, if it was not the first philos- 
ophy of mankind, the theory called to-day, Naive Realism, 
held sway. Since then, with every refinement of philo- 
sophic and scientific knowledge, there has arrived a cor- 
responding change in the attitude and the exposition of 
Realism. Modern thought has experienced many divergent 
statements of the realistic position. The Scottish School of 
Common Sense conceived it in one way; what we commonly 
call the New Realism, in quite another and different way. 
Our own position is realistic and dualistic, and is generally 
known as the Correspondence or Causal Theory of Knowl- 
edge. Historically, this theory dates back to the days of 
Aristotle. It was the dominant theory of medieval 
epistemology, and, to-day, it is accepted by practically all 
those thinkers whose fundamentai principles are Aristote- 
lian, and whose viewpoint is that of a reasoned common- 
sense: 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 179 


Naive Realism or the Copy Theory of Knowledge.— 
According to Naive Realism, the real object is the original 
of which the idea is a copy. Our ideas copy reality much in 
the same fashion as a sensitized plate reproduces objects to 
which it has been exposed. External objects are blue or 
red, hard or soft, long or short, and our ideas reproduce the 
same qualities. The relation between the object and the 
idea is explained by the contention that things give off 
particles or make pictures which, affecting the organs of 
sense, cause the mind to reproduce a copy of the object. 

That this theory fails to explain how we come to know 
things is evident from the mere statement. For if Naive 
Realism were true, it would be impossible to understand 
how it is that our senses often deceive us. Moreover, an 
object may appear one color to-day and quite a different 
color to-morrow; or it may appear large when viewed closely 
and small when seen from a distance. These, and many 
other similar variations in our sensations, cannot be ac- 
counted for by anything in the object. Their source must 
be sought at least partially in our ideas. Finally, the many 
instruments perfected by modern science prove beyond a 
doubt that our perceptions of color, distance, size, weight, 
etc., are mere approximations. Things as they really exist 
and are brought to us through the telescope, the microscope, 
and instruments of weight and measurement are very 
different from the same things as we perceive them by and 
through the unaided use of our senses. 

However, it must be recognized that in spite of the falsity 
of the Copy Theory, the fundamental contention of Naive 
Realism, that we actually and immediately perceive 
external reality is true. The falseness of the explanation 
does not necessitate a corresponding falseness in the fact. 
This point must be emphasized for the reason that many of 
the difficulties leveled against the Copy Theory, while 


180 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


altogether justifiable as difficulties, do not entail, as their 
authors wish us to infer, a rejection of Realism as such. 


Realism or the Correspondence Theory of Knowledge.— 
As a preface to our exposition of the realistic position, it 
should be recalled that Realism is not merely a knowledge 
theory or a method of approaching the knowledge problem. 
It is a systematic philosophy, with a very definite meta- 
physical basis. It must be presented and judged, therefore, 
as a whole. To separate one’s metaphysics from one’s 
epistemology is a sheer impossibility; and to judge of one’s 
epistemology, divided from the metaphysical position he 
has taken up, is no less impossible. Such an attitude can 
only result in a patchwork criticism, or in a false evaluation 
of the total significance of the system itself. Realism pre- 
sents innumerable difficulties, both as a metaphysic and an 
epistemology; no one is more aware of this fact than its 
defenders. But it also manifests a coherence, a consistency, 
a marvelous compatibility with the facts of life and of 
consciousness which merit for it the utmost consideration 
on the part of every one who is searching for philosophic 
truth, and is determined to embrace this truth, no matter 
where it shall be found. 

As the bed-rock upon which every true Realism is built, 
we find the idea of God. God is the beginning and the 
end of all things. As God, He is unchangeable, One. 
He is also the source of all change, the final Unity in Dif- 
ference. Being infinite He embraces all things, although 
free Himself from the limitations and inconsistencies 
of finite being. God is the necessary Being, and as such 
is dependent on no one or no thing. All other beings 
existing outside of Him are dependent upon Him to such 
an extent that without God they would cease to exist 
altogether. This does not mean that God and things 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 181 


are one; neither does it mean that the two are separated in 
a, way that one cannot influence the other. On the contrary, 
things depend on God both for their existence and their 
every act. But there is no identity between God and things. 
There is, however, a resemblance between God and ob- 
jects which grows more marked as we proceed up the 
scale of existences to man who is made “in His image 
and likeness.”’ 

Another fundamental fact to be noted is that each 
finite being is a unit, complete in itself and distinct from 
every other being. Existing per se it is a substance, 
a unity in difference, and it possesses, moreover, qualities 
or functions by which it acts, and is capable of being acted 
upon by other substances. 

But, it is the so-called accidents which make things 
different from one another. Since the accidents, no less 
than their ground, the substance, are real, the unity of the 
thing, its wholeness, is not destroyed whenever, for one 
reason or another, one of the accidents ceases to exist. 
Substance and accidents form a structural whole. But 
even substance is a composite of matter and form, an 
essential dualism necessitated by the phenomena of change 
which cannot be explained on any other basis. Accidents, 
too, are subject to differences, the accident of quantity 
corresponding to matter, while the other accidents cor- 
respond to form. These accidents receive determination 
from without as well as from within. Everything in 
the universe, therefore, is both active and passive, which 
distinction is particularly prominent in the higher animals, 
and especially in the sensitive and intellectual life of man. 
Neither animals nor men act haphazardly. Their actions 
arise as a result of certain needs, the main one of which 
is the instinct of self-preservation. Thus, to preserve 
their existence living beings are constantly performing 


182 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


certain functions, that is to say, they are the causes of 
certain effects. 

For the realist then, this universe is something more 
than a mere organism. It is a whole, and a very systematic 
one at that, which consists of an infinite God and a multi- 
tude of finite beings, each one a composite and each one 
a whole. ‘There is change in the universe, but it comes 
about as a result of definite laws, and not by blind chance. 
Of course, we do not comprehend either the nature of things 
or the laws which they obey, but this is due to the fact 
that we are finite. So conceived, this is the universe which 
man knows; it is the object of his knowledge. Included 
in it is, of course, man himself, who possesses consciousness 
and with it, the power of knowing. For him, through 
sensation and thought, the universe is brought within 
himself. Since he alone, of all existents, is rational, for 
him alone therefore things possess meaning. 

The world is the object of man’s knowledge. But in 
order to know, certain conditions must be fulfilled on the 
part of the knower. These conditions are satisfied by the 
functioning of the cognitive processes with which every 
knower is endowed—namely, sense perception and in- 
tellection. Sensation is both an active and a passive 
power or faculty, as also are intellect and will. Now, 
the problem of knowledge centers about the possibility 
of a knower coming into contact with what is known in 
such a way that he can be said to bring the known within 
himself. That we possess knowledge is an unquestionable 
fact; but how and by what means we come to it is a question 
altogether different. Since knowledge is an ultimate 
fact, no explanation other than a description of itself 
can possibly be given. Every man thoroughly understands 


1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 346-372. Read the whole chapter of which 
I have given a very inadequate resumé, 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 183 


what it is to know; few are able to define with exactness 
the conditions which must be fulfilled, both in the object 
and in the subject, before knowledge is possible. 

Now, on the supposition that both knower and known 
exist as two independent beings, how, we may ask, can 
one affect the other in such a way as to make knowledge pos- 
sible? The answer to this question may be stated simply 
in these terms, known and knower interact. Objects 
must somehow act upon the mind, and they do this by 
means of the body. Objects affect the end-organs of sense, 
setting up a series of neural movements which, after 
transmission to the brain, result in what we call sensations. 
Material objects, like light, heat, sound, etc., produce 
in the peripheral organs definite neural reactions which 
determine the kind of sense impression of which the mind 
becomes aware. By means of these impressions, the 
mind is in a way conformed to the object, but not in the 
sense that both become physically one. What occurs 
is that an image or likeness of the object is produced by 
means of which the mind perceives. It is this image 
as revealing objects, not the objects themselves, which 
we directly perceive. Some realists contend that we im- 
mediately perceive reality itself, the image being only 
a medium through which we perceive external objects. 
The epistemological question is not involved in this psy- 
chological dispute, since the problem at issue is whether 
the given in consciousness is external to the mind knowing, 
and both theories of sense perception answer this ques- 
tion in the affirmative.! 

But the mind, as we have said, perceives something 
more than a mental image. It perceives objects, and the 


1 Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. II, pp. 64-60, and pp. 124-138. For a full statement 
of the psychology of sense-perception, see Maher, Psychology, pp. 42-96, and Mercier, 
Psychologie, Vol. I, pp 218-247. 


184 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


reason for this is found in the nature of the perceptual 
process, which is to perceive objects by and through 
mental states. That these mental states possess an ob- 
jective reference, is due first of all to a spontaneous judg- 
ment of external existence which underlies all perception, 
as well as to the principle of causality which assures us 
that the qualities which we think we perceive in things 
must actually exist there, otherwise we would have an 
effect without an adequate cause. 

Supposing the sense organs to have been stimulated, 
and an image corresponding to the stimulation to have 
been formed in the brain, we next arrive at sensation 
proper. Now, the primary office of sensation is not to 
help us to discriminate every shade of difference which 
exists in objects, but to assist us in distinguishing one 
object from another. Sensations tell us nothing about 
the nature of objects, but they do tell us very well that 
objects differ, and they help us to understand these dif- 
ferences. If sensation gave us anything more than the 
ground lines which manifest qualitative differences in 
objects, its réle as an instrument of knowledge would be 
considerably lessened, if not done away with altogether. 
Thus, sensations are accompanied by something more 
than a spontaneous judgment in the existence of extra- 
mental reality. They tell us a great deal about the qualities 
of things, both primary and secondary. We not only 
perceive objects to exist, but we perceive them as colored, 
hot or cold, of a definite shape and size, situated in space, 
etc. From which it follows that the qualities of things 
do not exist in the thing altogether independent of our 
perception of them. Neither must we confound the datum, 
as presented to the mind by perception, with any judgment 
we may make concerning the datum itself, nor with the 
processes of analysis and synthesis which are constantly 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 185 


taking place in the mind at the same time that we perceive 
individual things. 

Further, it must be noted that the so-called illusions 
of sense are no argument against the doctrine here set 
forth, which accords to sensation, over and above its af- 
fective, a representative value. Our senses certainly do 
not deceive us, unless conditions either in the object or 
knower are abnormal. No one can deny that there is 
a certain amount of relativity im every act of sense per- 
ception, but this only means that in order to perceive, 
conditions must be normal. Given these normal condi- 
tions, the otherness or externality of the objects which 
we perceive follows as a natural consequence from their 
perception by us.! 

Passing from sense perception, we come to intellectual 
cognition which is knowledge in the true sense of the word 
for it alone connotes meaning and significance. That 
intellect and sense differ is not given in consciousness, 
but is a deduction from the differences we perceive in the 
objects which sense and intellect present to consciousness. 
Sensations make us aware of concrete individual things, 
together with their qualities. The intellect, being both 
a passive and an active power, not only receives the concrete 
presentations of sense but, abstracting from the limiting 
conditions of space and time, fashions a concept which 
is universal, that is spaceless and timeless. Latent in 
every individual thing, therefore, is a universal. By 
abstraction the intellect beholds this universal implicit 
in the sense impressions which are presented to it. 

Intellect, therefore, depends upon sense for the material 
upon which it works. It must get its ideas from somewhere 
and, unless one accepts the doctrine of innate ideas, the only 
alternative remaining is that it is sensation which supplies 


1 Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. II, pp. 89-153. 


186 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


them to the intellect. Viewed as process, conception is an 
individual act. But its product, the idea, is a universal. 

Now this content of the intellect, that is, the idea, may 
be studied subjectively and, as such, it is a modification of 
the mind; or objectively, and it is a means by which we know 
something outside ourselves, it is an aspect of the concept 
which reveals to us something objectively existing outside 
the mind. These concepts of ours we call universals, or 
universal ideas. And it is of these precisely that the epis- 
temologist asks—Are universal ideas solely products of the 
mind with no objective reference of any kind, or do they 
refer to an extra-mental reality which really exists and which 
is known by means of these ideas? 

Realists contend that universal ideas have a real signifi- 
cance, for the reason that they originate in perception, and 
are determined by the objects directly perceived in sensa- 
tion. Ideas, therefore, correspond to the entities which 
they represent. If intellect and sense functioned as two 
disparate entities, our general ideas would be the product 
of intellect solely, and by them we could never hope to ar- 
rive at anything like a knowledge of what things really are. 
As a matter of fact, intellect and sense function in unity. 
One may object that such a view makes of man a very com- 
plex machine. And such he is. But unless we view him as 
a unity, with a unit mind, knowledge itself would be impos- 
sible. 

Intellectual cognition, therefore, is an interpretation of 
objects which functions through concepts or thought- 
objects which we predicate concerning other objects. The 
objective aspect of thought comes from sensation, not by a 
process of intuition, but by a process of abstraction, since 
objects contain the elements which the mind, rising above 
sense limitations, perceives and fashions into abstractions. 
Thus, for example, abstractions like being, substance, 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 187 


change, causality, are contained by implication in all the 
data of sense experience. As a matter of fact, these ideas 
are so ultimate, so universally valid, that unless they possess 
objective reference all our knowledge would fall to pieces. 
Moreover, in spite of their abstract character, or really 
because of it, they are capable of being indefinitely multi- 
plied and realized in individual concrete things. 

To sum up, the position of the realist is that our concepts 
and our judgments, whether intuitive or not, are valid. 
They carry along with them a direct reference to extra- 
mental reality, they tell us something about things as dis- 
tinct from mind. The same is true of reasoning, which is a 
complex form of judgment. While it cannot be denied that 
all reasoning involves postulation, still postulation is only 
the product of a more or less complicated process of the 
intellect and the will. Knowledge, therefore, whether we 
view it as a perceptual or an intellectual process, puts us 
into direct contact with reality. This contact involves a 
relation, a certain correspondence between the thing and 
the intellect. If this correspondence exists, we have true 
ideas; if it does not exist, we have false ideas. ‘Truth is 
something more than a subjective conformity of our ideas 
with one another. Truth is objective, it possesses the qual- 
ity of being impersonal, that is, of transcending any limita- 
tions which may be imposed on account of the fact that the 
individual knower is himself a contingent being. And upon 
this conception of knowledge and of truth must be built 
our philosophy of the criteria which determine for us the 
validity or non-validity of any particular fact of human 
experience. 


Arguments in Favor of Realism.—lIf our analysis of the 
thought process be correct, it follows that all our judgments 
are ultimately dependent, both for their existence and their 


188 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


objective relation, on the material which has been presented 
by way of sensation to the mind. Not theory, but facts 
revealed by means of introspection, acquaint us with this 
dependence of intellect upon sense. We assuredly perceive 
individual objects. Through sensation we are made aware 
of countless things, events, feelings. By means of abstrac- 
tion from these sensibilia, we store up a mass of general 
abstract thoughts, out of which we afterwards interpret 
the new data presented in our manifold experience, as well 
as build up the framework of what is known by us as human 
knowledge.? 

No direct proof, other than the testimony of conscious- 
ness itself, need be adduced in favor of the objectivity of 
the stimuli which cause our sensations. That the I, the 
subject of sensation, is essentially passive during the sense 
process seems an incontestable fact. If this be so, some 
explanation must be sought for this fact. Where can it pos- 
sibly be found except in an acknowledgment of the exist- 
ence of real beings capable of producing impressions within 
one? Real beings are, therefore, the causes of our sensa- 
tions, and they must differ both from the subject who per- 
ceives and the sensation which is perceived, otherwise the 
whole perceptual process becomes a function altogether 
unintelligible. 

One has only to contrast the dream image with that given 
by direct perception to become convinced of the fact that, 
besides images of a more or less subjective character, we 
also possess Sensations whose objective relation is beyond 
all doubt. 

Now, if sensation presents an essentially objective ref- 
erence, we are bound to conclude that intellection too is no 
less other-regarding, for it is upon and out of sensations that 


1 For a full statement of the abstractive power of the intellect, read Maher, Psy- 
chology, pp. 294-313; also Mercier, Psychologie, Vol. II, pp. 40-82. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 189 


all our thoughts are constructed. Our sensations refer to 
this man, this color, this sound. But a man cannot be this 
man, unless he is first of alla man. By sensation, therefore, 
we perceive in particular what the intellect conceives in 
general. One cannot be real without the other. To deny 
reality to the objects which produce our thoughts, there- 
fore, is to deny reality to our sensations as well. In a word, 
knowledge becomes impossible. 

The above argument opens up the whole question of Uni- 
versals, one of the most difficult of the problems of philoso- 
phy. Our contention is that the universal has a real foun- 
dation in the thing outside the mind, admitting at the 
same time that itis necessary to postulate the existence 
of a mind in order to give actuality to the universal. But 
supposing that mind does exist, we assert that the universal] 
really is in the data perceived by sensation, since by and 
through intellect we may disregard whatever is temporal, 
whatever is particularized in individual things, and fix the 
mind solely on the qualities of things which are most gen- 
eral, as, for example, substance, life, matter, etc. Our 
thoughts and objects are thus brought together in a unity 
which makes clear to the perceiver that both his sensations 
and his thoughts refer directly to an object really existing 
outside himself. 

Modern psychology proves beyond cavil the intimate 
dependence of mind on bodily functioning. Injuries to the 
brain or to the sense organs result in mental disturbances. 
Adults who have been born blind or deaf lack all concepts 
corresponding to the fields of visual and auditory sensations. 
Our mental activity is usually accompanied by correspond- 
ing sensations and imagery. On no other basis than an 
acceptance of the position that the object perceived both 
by sense and intellect is the same reality, can this depend- 
ence be understood. The senses perceive objects as con- 


190 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


crete; the intellect conceives the selfsame objects as ab- 
stract. But it is the same real object which is apprehended 
in both cases. 

Moreover, the senses, especially those of sight and touch 
mutually confirm the deliverances of one another and point 
to the real existence of a material universe outside the mind 
as the ground for this remarkable agreement. While ex- 
hibiting the tri-dimensional character of material things by 
widely different imagery, they agree as to the spatial rela- 
tions of parts to parts of the objects perceived. If by means 
of sensations we come into contact with an actual world in 
which these spatial relations are real relations, it is easy to 
understand how the senses can agree. But if the world is a 
mere mental poem, it is very difficult to understand how 
witnesses, so widely divergent in their methods of approach 
and of statement, can be in such remarkable agreement. 

There seems to be little or no difficulty, even amongst 
idealists, in acknowledging the real existence of minds other 
than our own. Such an admission is necessary to preserve 
us from the manifest absurdities of Solipsism. But minds 
do not reveal their existence to us except by external changes 
in the organisms which possess minds. I do not see the 
minds, I see the bodies of other men. That they possess 
minds is an inference from my perception of their speech, 
gestures, and actions. It is impossible, therefore, without 
grave offense to logic, to reject the deliverances of my senses 
concerning the reality of the universe, and to accept the 
same concerning the bodies of other men. 

Modern science universally and freely acknowledges the 
real existence of the material universe. With the exception 
of a few scientists, who are what might be termed ‘‘sym- 
bolists,”’ all physicists are agreed that it is the object ex- 
isting outside the mind, and that alone, which determines 
the truth or falsehood of physical law. The scientist in his 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE IQI 


investigations, it is true, is influenced by purpose, but only 
to the extent of selecting what objects he shall study and 
in what manner they shall be studied. When it comes to 
accepting the truth or falsehood of a theory, only facts as 
determined objectively influence his judgment. As Walker 
remarks, ‘“‘The scientist freely admits that if scientific con- 
cepts and laws are to be verified, they must be determined 
by their objects and their objects alone; and the aim of ex- 
periment is to place conditions precisely in order that such 
a determination may take place. ”’ } 


Criticism of Realism.—It cannot but appear to the plain 
man little short of astounding that any thinking person 
should question the real existence of the material universe 
or our power to know that it does exist. So widespread, if 
not universal, is this belief that one can call it into question 
only under pain of bidding defiance to the accepted dic- 
tates of common sense. In spite, however, of the univer- 
sality of man’s belief in the objectivity of our perceptions, 
many philosophers question their validity impelled to this 
position by the arguments of Kant who, after a very severe 
analysis of the knowledge process, came to the conclusion 
that the subjective element in it was of such major impor- 
tance that it completely overshadowed the apparent ob- 
jective element. Knowledge, according to Kant, is depend- 
ent on sensation, but sensation is not a simple act. It is a 
synthesis, in which experience and certain a priori cate- 
gories join together to produce the so-called data of sense 
experience. The manifold which comes to us by and 
through sense intuition is caught up in the pure categories 

1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p.475. The student should read the two chapters 
on ‘Pragmatism and Physical Science” and “Realism and Physical Science” in 
which latter it is proved that scientific concepts, as a matter of fact, are more than 


symbols since they are founded on experience. They correspond, in a very real 
sense, with reality and are therefore valid. 


192 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


of the understanding, which confer upon them the uni- 
versalizing element so characteristic of our scientific knowl- 
edge. Sensation gives us no true knowledge of reality when 
divorced from these a priori forms. Since sensation is a 
mere receptive faculty, it cannot produce anything sepa- 
rated from the mind, which is active and productive. With- 
out the mental forms of space and time, sensation is mean- 
ingless, because it is particular and contingent. There is, 
therefore, included in every sensation something more than 
experience, something more than exists in consciousness at 
the moment of perception. There are elements which trans- 
cend any particular impression and, because of this trans- 
cendence, we must acknowledge them to be universal. 
Now, neither the element of space nor of time, both being 
universal and unlimited, is given in experience. 

The principal difficulty which confronts the supporter 
of Realism hinges on his supposed inability to show how 
the mind, viewed as a conscious process, can possibly put 
us in touch with anything outside itself. Ideas are internal, 
are within the mind. Of these ideas the mind is certainly 
aware. But how can it, without divesting itself of its very 
nature, know something outside itself? The difficulty of 
understanding how any mental process can really represent 
something which is so remarkably different from itself as 
the material universe seems insurmountable. 

In reply, the realist would deny the whole foundation 
of the above objection. Only on the Cartesian hypothesis, 
which sets up a false dualism between mind and body, can 
the objection stand. But it is not true that body and mind 
are two disparate substances, by their very existence cut 
off from ever interacting on each other. Mind and body 
form a unity, and the chasm which Idealism has dug be- 
tween the mental and the physical is a purely imaginary 
one. No more mischievous error has come into modern 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 193 


philosophy than the extreme dualism of Descartes. Until 
thinkers retrace their steps and acknowledge that mind and 
body form one living organism, the epistemological problem 
will ever remain the complete mystery it is claimed by some 
to be. 

The fact that I can know, speak to, touch, converse with 
persons other than myself seems obvious. To deny this 
fact, because a suitable explanation is not at hand, appears 
to us very illogical. But the fact can be explained, if we 
are willing to acknowledge that the mind can and does per- 
ceive external objects by and through the organism of 
which it is the vivifying principle. Without the peripheral 
organs of sense, by means of which sensory impressions 
are received and later, through the sensory nerves, relayed 
to the brain, the mind would remain forever closed to exter- 
nal reality. But given the central nervous system, the ob- 
jectivation of sensation becomes immediately intelligible. 
Nor is there any need for calling in habit or mental associa- 
tion to explain this process of exteriorization. In fact, every 
such explanation presupposes as already proved the very 
point at issue, namely, that the mind has begun to refer to 
external reality as the source of its own perceptions. 

The realist will not question for a moment the fundamen- 
tal conviction of every idealist that, without ideas, it is 1m- 
possible to know. Manifestly, we cannot know any extra- 
organic reality save through sensation. But this is only 
half the truth. For the very essence of sensation is to ac- 
quaint us with the extra-mental. Sensation, viewed sub- 
jectively, is a mental function, but viewed objectively, it 
gives us information about things outside our minds. Al- 
though a process of the mind, it is at the same time an ex- 
perience of the extra-mental.! 


1 For a full treatment of the psychology of external perception, Maher, Psychology, 
pp. 161 et seq. 


194 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


To many minds, the most serious objection brought 
against the doctrine of epistemological realism is derived 
from a study of the tremendous influence which psycholog- 
ical and physiological states, antecedent to our perception of 
things, have upon our judgment of the same. Perception 
varies not only in different individuals, but in the same indi- 
vidual, according to the condition of the peripheral and cen- 
tral organs. The state of mind, too, of the individual, his 
feelings and prejudices, both color and shape the resultant 
mental product. Idealism has made much of this fact, 
exploiting it in countless ingenious ways. But the difficulty 
does not prove that sensations, in spite of the admittance 
of the mental which characterizes every one of them, have 
no extra-mental reference. Quite the contrary is true. Des- 
pite the great influence of mind in determining the na- 
ture of perception, perception itself is always other-regard- 
ing. The reference to external objects is clear and precise, 
as well as spontaneous. It is only after reflection and study 
that we arrive at a knowledge of the extent to which physio- 
logical and psychological states have affected the content 
of the perceptual process. This influence may or may not 
make our senses untrustworthy in any specific case. But 
that is a problem for psychology, and should not be con- 
fused with the truth or falsehood of the proposition which 
we maintain, namely, that through sensation we actually 
know the external world. 

The argument of Berkeley, invoked in one way or another 
by all his successors, to the effect that, since a mind is neces- 
sary to perception, things cannot exist unless they exist 
in and for the mind, is an evident equivocation. In this 
argument the idealist falls mto the “error of defin- 
ition by initial predication,’’ since he assumes that the 
world to exist must be approached from the standpoint 
of knowledge. With him knowledge and real existence are 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 19% 


convertible terms. No realist would agree to any such 
assumption, for many things, as well as the qualities of 
things, may and do exist which are not known to any mind. 

Nor is it a valid objection to contend that when we per- 
ceive sounds, etc., these sensations are totally different 
from the physical phenomena which produce them. In- 
deed, we may not know what vibrations of ether or air are, 
but we do perceive something vibrating, which is all that 
any realist shall contend for. Asa matter of fact, both the 
order of ideas and the order of being exist, and any particu- 
lar thing may belong to the one or other of these orders; for 
example, that of real existence, without, at the same time, 
belonging to the order of thought. While it cannot be de- 
nied that there is a very close connection between things 
and our ideas of things, this connection gives us no right to 
conclude that one cannot exist without the other. If we 
think a thing, manifestly it must exist in the mind; but, 
the converse proposition, namely, that because we do not 
think, therefore the thing cannot exist outside the mind, 
or that our thinking causes the thing to exist, is assuredly 
false. 

The great influence which the Kantian view of perception 
has had on modern thought undoubtedly prevents many, 
even to-day, from accepting the position of Realism. They 
seem to feel that the Sage of Kénigsberg has analyzed more 
fully the conditions of knowledge than any of his predeces- 
sors, and that, therefore, his construction, in spite of the 


1Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 126 et seq. ‘‘*The tulip which I 
see’ is idea; and it belongs to the essential character of ideas that they should be in 
mind; hence it is contradictory to assert that ‘the tulip which I see’ is exterior to 
mind. If all redundancy and equivocation is eliminated, this amounts to the assertion 
that a tulip when seen, or defined as seen, isnot atulip unseen. But what Berkeley 
sought to establish was virtually the proposition that the tulip which I see can never 
be unseen; and this does not follow. For it is not contradictory to assert that the 
tulip which I see today was unseen yesterday, or that many tulips are ‘born to blush 
unseen’ forever. Berkeley’s error lies in his inferring that because the tulip zs seen, 
therefore its being seen is its essential and exclusive status.” 


196 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


difficulties it entails, is more acceptable than Realism which 
appears to them as a simple, even naive, theory. No one 
questions for a moment the ingenuity of the Kantian analy- 
sis, nor the almost perfect logic which he displays in the 
elaboration of his fundamental theses. It is his fundamen- 
tal theses, though, which are open to question, and it is 
against these that modern realism has directed its principal 
arguments. 

For it is not at all necessary to assume, as Kant does, that 
because our sensations are particular and contingent, the 
elements of space and time, which enter into every one of 
them, cannot be given by experience but must come from 
universal and necessary a priori forms independent of in- 
dividual experience. As we have already remarked,! Kant 
confuses real space with ideal space or imaginary space. 
Ideal and imaginary space come to us after reflection. Real 
space 1s given in each perception. We spontaneously at- 
tribute the ‘‘where” to different things and events as they 
occur. The same may be said of the time element in our 
perceptions. We do not, for example, say that a certain 
event occurred at such a date because our idea of it corre- 
sponds to any a priori forms, nor that an object is square, 
round, to the right of another object, for a similar reason. 
The temporal occurrence, no less than the spatial position 
of anything, is altogether independent of any or every 
percipient. 

Kant was undoubtedly correct in his contention that the 
temporal and spatial elements enter into all our perceptions. 
We always perceive things both in space and time. But 
cannot this be explained on the natural assumption that 
all things really do exist in space and time? No one will 
deny that it is possible to call to our aid a priori forms as 
an explanation of this phenomenon. They seem, however, 

1 Supra, p. 159; also Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. II, pp. 184-202. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 197 


to become altogether superfluous if we follow the lead of our 
daily experience and acknowledge the real existence of an 
external world. In such a case it is altogether unnecessary 
to establish space and time as ideas prior to every expe- 
rience. On the contrary, if we distinguish clearly between 
ideal and real space, we shall see that our idea of space is 
furnished by experience itself and that, without an expe- 
rience of real space, we could never come to the abstract 
conception of space which Kant assumes to be at the 
bottom of all knowledge. 


The New Realism.—The philosophy of Idealism was, 
until the beginning of the century, the dominant thought 
of the intellectual world, both European and American. 
Realism played a most inconspicuous réle in modern 
philosophy during the nineteenth century. It has, how- 
ever, experienced a decided renaissance, and is to-day 
recognized as one of the most important philosophical 
tendencies. “Natural realism, so long decently buried,” 
remarked James,! “‘raises its head above the turf and finds 
glad hands outstretched from the most unlikely quarters 
to help it to its feet again.”” The pragmatist made the 
initial breach in the fortress so long held by Hegelian Ideal- 
ism. The new realists have poured their forces through the 
opening made, and are to-day on the point of raising the 
flag of victory over the battered ruins of a defeated spec- 
ulative philosophy.’ 

1 Essays in Radical Empiricism, p. 40. 

2 For an excellent statement of the history and philosophy of the New Realism, see 
Kremer, Le Néo-Réalisme Américain; also the chapter “Recent Realism” in Leighton, 
The Field of Philosophy, pp. 280 et seq.; Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 
211-309. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 306 et seq., gives an author- 
itative statement of the realistic theory of knowledge. The following works will 
introduce the student to the philosophy of the New Realism: Essays Philosophical 


and Psychological in honor of William James; Perry and Others, The New Realism; 
Drake and Others, Essays in Critical Realism; Sellars, Critical Realism; Holt, The 


198 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


The New Realism began as a polemic. Like Pragmatism, 
its pretensions do not rise higher than those of a philosoph- 
ical method, an attitude towards the object of knowledge. 
Even now its followers are not agreed as to all its fundamen- 
tal principles. They are, however, united in believing that 
the external world exists independent of our knowledge of 
it. Many even accept the position that the so-called first 
principles of knowledge, as well as those of logic, ethics, 
mathematics, and physical science, have an existence which 
is not dependent on our knowledge of them. However, the 
New Realism is not dualistic. It is ‘‘closer to the monistic 
realism of ‘ideas,’ suggested by Hume, than to the dualis- 
tic realism of mind and matter, propounded by the Scottish 
School.” ? It has been called a ‘‘neutral monism” because it 
practically reads out of the universe the independent exist- 
ence of mind. Consciousness is not a unique kind of real- 
ity, and it does not differ very much from matter. The 
distinction between sentient and insentient should not be 
allowed. Most neo-realists are very chary of accepting an 
out-and-out materialism. Body and mind are made of the 
same stuff, we are informed. By calling this fundamental 
stuff, which is neither physical nor psychical, ‘‘neutral,” 
they hope to escape the inconveniences of the older material- 
istic theories. 

While the older realisms were all frankly dualistic and 
spiritualistic, the New Realism tends to a monistic and 
materialistic conception of the universe. Founded on a 
very radical empiricism, and in spite of its decided intellec- 
tualistic tone, the New Realism has not been able to shake 


Concept of Consciousness; Marvin, A First Book in Metaphysics; Spaulding, The 
New Rationalism; Riley, American Thought from Puritanism to Pragmatism. The 
many controversies born of the realistic philosophy can best be followed in the 
volumes of the Philosophical Review and the Journal of Philosophy, Psychology, 
and Scientific Method, beginning about 1905. 

1 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 307. 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 199 


off the positivistic character which seems to cling so tena- 
ciously to every kind of empiricism. Its second character- 
istic, that of monism, is a result of its efforts to do away with 
the dualism which arises from an admission of the double 
distinction between mind and body, and between thoughts 
and things. In the place of this dualism, Neo-Realism 
advocates a relational view of consciousness. The idea of 
substance and accident is cast aside, and in its place is 
substituted the theory that the relations in which ideas 
find themselves constitute the whole of consciousness.? 

That there is a great deal of good in the New Realism, no 
thinker can doubt. Its acceptance of the immediate pres- 
ence in consciousness of the object known, its respect for 
the objective value of the truths of logic, its belief in the 
continuity of both the physical and psychical, are doctrines 
to which every dualist will subscribe. Its protests against 
the subjectivistic and essentially sceptical character of 
Idealism, no less than of Pragmatism, are sound and 
acceptable. 

The materialistic and monistic aspects of. Neo-Realism, 
however, are unacceptable for many reasons. In the first 
place, if the doctrine of neutral monism be true, there does 
not seem to be any adequate basis for the distinction be- 
tween thought and its object.2, Neither can it make clear 
to us why we acknowledge such differences, as we most 
certainly do, between objects actually perceived and objects 
merely imagined or dreamt. Memory, too, becomes an 
unexplainable function, since its very existence involves a 
definite continuity of the self. Finally, neutral monism is 


1‘’The New Realism, while it insists, as all realism must, that things are inde- 
pendent, asserts that when things are known, they are ideas of the mind. They may 
enter directly into the mind; and when they do, they become what are called ‘ideas.’ 
So that ideas are only things in a certain relation; or, things, in respect of being 
known, are ideas.” Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 308. 

2 Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, p. 288; also Bosanquet, The Meeting of Ex- 
tremes in Contemporary Philosophy, pp. 127-149. 


200 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


only another, albeit a new, form of Materialism, since it 
regards the brain as the sole agency which attends to and 
selects out the objects which are to be presented to con- 
sciousness. 

Both the facts of experience, and our reflection upon them, 
seem to point unerringly to the doctrine of dualistic Realism. 
Idealism, in whatever form it has appeared, is so remote 
from real life and the everyday experiences of each one of 
us, that only by defying the deliverances of common sense 
itself can we accept its philosophy. That the clue to an 
understanding of reality can be found only in the mind 
which perceives, since reality and mind structurally are one, 
seems to put back beyond all possibility of human effort the 
understanding of what reality is. We are, indeed, grateful 
for the unusual prominence given to the spiritual by objec- 
tive idealism in its philosophical creations, but its insist- 
ence on the all-inclusive character of the mental, we feel, 
is out of all proportion to our human experience and, as a 
matter of fact, does not harmonize with it. 

Realism is much closer to the truth in this, that it ac- 
knowledges that one can know truth by means of one’s 
perception of objects existing outside the mind. That 
truth exists and is knowable by us, that the propositions of 
logic and mathematics, that the principles of ethics are 
valid, seem incontestable. The realist starts from expe- 
rience and his analysis, most often, confirms the data of 
experience. ‘The idealist starts from the structure of the 
mind, and ends up in a scepticism which casts doubt upon 
the very existence, not only of things but of the mind it- 
self. 

As for the New Realism, it has a great distance yet to go 
before it can hope to supplant the older realisms based on 
Dualism. In the first place, the ultra-behavioristic atti- 
tude which it has assumed in psychology will have to be 


THE PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 2050) 


considerably toned down, if not done away with altogether. 
Its fear of the idea of substance, amounting in many cases 
to a veritable phobia, will have to be conquered. The 
theory of external relations is not strong enough to support 
a realistic epistemology. But the mind, as a living spiritual 
force, which ‘‘informs”’ the body is a conception which, if 
introduced into the New Realism, would do a great deal in 
leading that theory away from the monistic and materialis- 
tic tendencies which seem at present to dominate it. 

Consciousness is not merely the presence of an object. 
It is an active force which declares to exist or not to exist 
that which it perceives or fails to perceive. Reacting to 
these perceptions, the mind, by means of judgment, dis- 
closes the truth or falsehood of any proposition. An 
epistemology which fails to take a definite stand in behalf 
of a dualistic metaphysic can never hope to combat 
successfully the inroads of a militant idealism upon its 
fundamental belief, namely, the reality of the existence of an 
external world.! 


REFERENCES 


BERGSON: Creative Evolution; Matier and Memory. 

BosANQuEt: The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy. 
CatrpD: Hegel. 

CoFrFrEy: Epistemology. 

DEWEY: Reconstruction in Philosophy. 

DRAKE and Others: Essays in Critical Realism. 

Driscott: Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea. 

Dusray: Introductory Philosophy. 

Hott: The Concept of Consciousness. 

James: Pragmatism; The Meaning of Truth; A Pluralistic Universe. 
Kremer: Le Néo-Réalisme Américain. 

Ku pe: The Philosophy of the Present in Germany. 

LeicHton: The Field of Philosophy. 


1 Kremer, Le Néo-Réalisme Américain, pp. 281-304. 


202 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


MERCIER: Critériologie Générale; A Manual of Modern Scholastic 
Philosophy; Psychologie. 

Mivart: On Truth. 

O’SULLIVAN: Old Criticism and New Pragmatism. 

PEILLAUBE: Théorie des Concepts. 

Perry: Present Philosophical Tendencies; The Approach to Philos- 
ophy. 

Perry and Others: The New Realism. 

PIATL ade, 

Pratt: What Is Pragmatism? 

PRICHARD: Kant’s Theory of Knowledge. 

RickaBy: First Principles of Knowledge. 

RotuHer: Truth and Certitude. 

RovuseEtxot: L’Intellectualisme de St. Thomas. 

Royce: The Spirit of Modern Philosophy. 

SCHILLER: Humanism. 

ScHINZ: Anti-Pragmatism. 

SELLARS: Critical Realism. 

SENTROUL: Kant. 

SPAULDING: The New Realism. 

VANN: Reality and Truth. 

WALKER: Theories of Knowledge. 

Warp, JAMES: A Study of Kant. 

WILLMAN: Geschichte des Idealismus. 


CHAPTER VII 


THE PROBLEM OF THE NATURE AND CRITERIA 
OF TRUTH 


Philosophical analysis, as we pointed out in the last 
chapter, seems to confirm the generally accepted point 
of view that our perception of the external world is not 
illusory. Idealism, which would make ideas and things 
synonymous, as well as Pragmatism, for which ideas rep- 
resent reality only as long as and in as far as these same 
ideas are useful, must yield to the superior evidence which 
has been advanced as favorable to the claims of Realism. 
We, therefore, take it as a settled matter of our philosophy 
that it is possible for the mind to perceive a reality existing 
outside itself. 

The question now arises as to the value of these same 
perceptions of the external world. Do our ideas represent, 
and with truth, things outside the mind? If they do, 
how may we be assured of this fact? Again, if things 
and ideas correspond, how is such a thing as error ever 
possible? That many of our perceptions are erroneous, 
no one can deny. Our judgments, too, may often be in 
error. What is the difference, then, between true and 
false perceptions, true and false judgments? Are there 
any tests, guides, criteria which will assist us in giving 
or witholding assent to a fact or proposition when it comes 
before the mind? 

All of us believe, almost instinctively, many things. 
We accept as certain the facts of daily life, the events 
of history, certain mathematical and logical formulas. 

203 


204 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Spontaneously, assent is given to such a proposition as 
that a straight line is the shortest distance between two 
points, or, that two and two make four. Upon reflection 
and analysis, will such spontaneous beliefs be found le- 
gitimate and rational? In other words, can our every- 
day judgments stand a rigorous examination, both as 
to their origin and as to their content, and come out of 
the same stamped as true by us? That we do actually 
perceive an external world is in itself no justification for 
asserting that all our perceptions and judgments are true. 
Bitter experience proves to us, only too often, that many 
of our judgments may be false, despite the fact that we 
felt that they mirrored, and truly, reality. Something 
more than confidence in the real existence of the external 
world, and in our power to come into relation with it by 
means of sensation and thought, is necessary to justify 
our ordinary interpretations of reality. 

No one can deny, without taking refuge in a suicidal 
scepticism, that we accept certain propositions as true. 
But are these propositions true, both in themselves and in 
our perception of them? Is what we call knowledge 
valid, or is it merely an approximation, more or less true, 
more or less workable, but never quite approaching an 
absolute standard which suffers no change? This is 
precisely the question of the validity of knowledge, which 
carries along with it another very closely related one, 
as to the grounds or criteria upon which truth or certitude 
must be founded. 

Before dealing at length with this problem, however, 
it is necessary to take up one or two other problems, the 
solution of which very materially affects the reply one 
shall give to the question of truth and certitude. Not 
a little of the difficulty encountered by modern thinkers, 
in their attempts to settle this knotty question of epis- 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH = 205 


temology, has arisen from either a false statement of the 
problem itself or from a false conception of the position 
and influence which must be accorded to the theory of 
evolution as explanatory of the origin and development 
of our ideas. 


Scepticism.—The problem of the criteria of knowledge has 
been made unnecessarily complex because of the insistence 
placed by some thinkers on the elements of relativity 
found in all our perceptions and thoughts. It is pointed 
out that both the quality and intensity of our sensations 
are affected by the condition of the sense organs at the 
moment of perception, as well as by the sensations im- 
mediately preceding the one experienced. Not only the 
stimulus, therefore, but other factors modify the charac- 
ter of our sensations. For example, our judgment as to 
the temperature of a room depends upon whether we come 
into it out of the cold or have been in the room for a con- 
siderable time. The phenomenon of color contrast is too 
well known to need more than a passing mention. Now, 
may we not say the same of thoughts as we do of our 
sensations? ; 

Of course, there is one sense in which all knowledge 
is relative, that is, objects must come into relation with 
a mind which knows them before knowledge is possible, 
and only is as far as they are present, can they be known. 
Moreover, psychologists acknowledge the presence of 
a certain amount of relativity in all our sensations. This 
does not mean, however, that the essence of sensation 
consists merely in the perception of differences. Quite 
the contrary is true. The fundamental note of the per- 
ceptual process is an awareness of a positive quality exist- 
ing in an object outside the mind, not of a relation between 
two feelings. The condition of the bodily organs, of the 


206 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


state of the mind, both previous to and consequent upon 
any given perception, affect, no one can doubt, our in- 
terpretation of thesame. The quality of the thing perceived 
is in the thing, however, not in the mind, and given a 
perceiver who is in a normal physical and mental condition, 
what he perceives will be the quality of the thing and not 
his own mental states.! 

As for intellectual knowledge, our thoughts, no less 
than our sensations, attain to the nature of reality. By 
this we do not mean to assert that there is no element 
of relativity in our intellectual processes. ‘This relativity, 
however, is of such character that it does not affect the 
validity or worth of knowledge. Nor does this relativity 
come from the mind itself, which because of its peculiar 
construction, so shapes all the data presented to it that 
in the process of presentation and cognition these data 
are transformed by mental factors, of which we have 
no knowledge and for which we cannot make allowances. 

The human mind is limited as far as the possibility 
of knowing goes, nor can it know unless objects are mani- 
fested to it. There are many things which escape the 
sweep of the human intellect, yet, of the things we do 
know, it must be said that our knowledge is legitimate 
and certain. The intellect does not simply copy or mirror 
reality. It is an active function and, as such, even con- 
structs ideas which are purely subjective. But in this 
process of construction, the intellect clearly differentiates 
between what is objective and what is subjective. As 
Coffey points out,” the mind “through the exercise of its 
power of reflective introspection on its own cognitive 
processes can and does discriminate between the real 


1 Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. II, pp. 89 et seq., ‘‘Relativity of Sense Qualities to Per- 
ceiver’; also Maher, Psychology, pp. 171 et seq. on ‘‘Illusions.” 
2 Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. I, p. 211. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH = 207 


which is given it to interpret, and its own subjective 
products, the various logical relations whereby it carries 
on this interpretation, so that these subjective, ‘construc- 
live, or ‘constitutive’ factors of intellectual cognition do not 
unconsciously fuse with, and transform or transfigure, the 
extra-mental reality which is given to intellect and which 
intellect interprets by means of them.”’ 

Another distinction of primary significance for epistemol- 
ogy is that of the vital difference which must be acknowl- 
edged to exist between sensation and intellection. Sensa- 
tion is not knowledge, strictly speaking. It is a mere 
awareness which, independent of the intellect, does not 
even necessitate our acceptance of the actual existence 
of the qualities perceived. While it furnishes the data 
and material for knowledge, it is only in judgment that 
truth or falsehood is asserted, and in which, therefore, 
there is true knowledge. While it is very difficult, as every 
psychologist will testify, to separate from our judgments 
the many sense elements contained therein, neverthe- 
less these sensa are not to be confused with the purely 
intellectual factors in knowledge, like concepts, judgments, 
and reasoning, and upon which factors the truth or false- 
hood of our thoughts depend. 

The sceptic, impressed by the relativity which he per- 
ceives in all mental processes, comes to the conclusion 
that, in order to attain truth, it is necessary beforehand 
to assume an attitude of doubt concerning the absolute 
validity of the knowledge process. He begins, therefore, 
by doubting about everything, even about the possibility 
of ever arriving at truth.1 This is the method which Des- 

1 There is one characteristic of the sceptical attitude, to which Ladd calls atten- 
tion, and which the student must understand if he would appreciate the reasoning of 
many modern thinkers. ‘‘At present the Zeitgeist is inclined to be confidingly dog- 


matic toward metaphysical postulates put forth in the name of physical science, but 
intensely sceptical toward those upon which repose the traditional views on subjects 


208 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


cartes used, and since his day the usual manner of formulat- 
ing the knowledge problem has been profoundly influenced 
by this sceptical attitude. Modern thinkers, instead of 
asking whether our ideas are true or false, formulate the 
question in another way. ‘They ask whether the mind 
can possibly attain a knowledge of reality, or how can 
the mind be convinced that its products truly represent 
the extra-mental. To state the problem thus is to mis- 
state it. We can never know things in themselves, or 
as they really are, if by the ‘‘thing-in-itself’? we under- 
stand things divorced altogether from the knowledge 
process. In order to be known, a thing must be brought 
into relation with the mind. Moreover, the mind is an 
active power and cognition an immanent act. [If this 
be true, we cannot possibly have a cognition in which 
the subject plays no part. 

Another point to be noted is that knowledge of reality by 
no means exhausts all the kinds of knowledge of which we 
are capable. Certainly, the most important part of the 
cognitive process does not have to do with reality qua 
reality at all, but with the relations between objects, 
whether these objects exist here and now or not. To narrow 
our inquiry to real things is to suppress altogether the 
problem of truth in so far as it affects all the abstract 
propositions which lie at the basis of science. 

Scepticism proceeds from a wrong starting point. In- 
stead of beginning with our judgments, it starts from sensa- 
tion. But truth does not lie in sensations, as we pointed 
out. Truth consists in perceiving the agreement or dis- 


of morals and religion. An hypothesis like the conservation or correlation of energy, 
or like Darwinian evolution, gains a comparatively easy credence from otherwise 
sceptical minds. It may even put forth the virtual claim adequately to represent 
the ultimate principles of the life of all that is really Existent. But the dogma of 
Theism, that this really Existent is One self-conscious and rational Person, can with 
difficulty obtain a fair hearing even when it appears in the shape of a modest peti- 
tioner for the place of an hypothesis.” Introduction to Philosophy, p. 147. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH = 209 


agreement between a subject and predicate, that is, between 
a thing now perceived and an abstract idea known before. 
Scepticism puts the cart before the horse, and in doubting 
about everything, becomes hopelessly involved in the meshes 
of its own doubts. Obviously, it is impossible to construct 
any test which will stand up under an attitude which doubts 
the truth of all tests, and even of the validity of the mental 
process itself in its function of validating the claims to 
truth of any proposition. We must begin, therefore, by 
accepting the possibility of knowledge, and that the mind 
can attain truth. Walker calls this starting ‘‘from method- 
ical and rational assurance.” This does not mean that we 
should not be sceptical concerning many of the deliverances 
of mind, nor that we must accept uncritically all that bears 
a specious resemblance to truth.! Error is a fact. What 
we must look for then are criteria which will help us to 
determine when we are in error. When these criteria have 
been discovered, we will then be able to point out the causes 
of error, and thus avoid it. 


Evolution and the Validity of Knowledge.—While few, 
if any thinkers of the present time, are out-and-out sceptics, 


1 Kiilpe, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 191—‘‘Many of the ideas that ‘occur’ to 
us, and many of the observations that we make are wholly lacking in the permanent 
value and universal validity that would entitle them to rank as scientific results. 
Hence what Hume called the ‘academic doubt’ is a necessary concomitant of all 
honest zeal for knowledge. It prompts to manifold variation of conditions, to 
repeated consideration, to unceasing test and trial. Under this aspect scepticism 
is an important part of the education of every investigator. And its methodical 
advantages will be especially fruitful in metaphysics, where it teaches the enquirer 
rightly to appreciate the worth of reasons and the force of arguments, and so helps 
him to take the concepts and theories of previous systems at their true value.” 

As for methodical scepticism, Kiilpe rightly states: ‘‘The sceptical standpoint 
cannot be made consistent except by the complete renunciation of the right to judg- 
ment or assertion. Even the statement that we cannot know anything, and the 
reasons alleged for it, must be adjudged dogmatic from the point of view of a radical 
scepticism. - He who holds that nothing is demonstrable will not attempt to demon- 
strate that he can know nothing. In other words, scepticism in its absolute form 
is self-destructive.” 


210 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


many are imbued with the sceptical tendency. The 
theories which they profess as to the origin of mind, as well 
as to the genesis and development of knowledge, logically 
lead to a denial of the possibility of the human mind ever 
attaining certitude. For if no knowledge can possibly be 
absolute, and all knowledge is in constant flux, in a state 
of making, then what is true to-day may be false to-morrow, 
and vice versa. Truth, for the evolutionistic psychologist, 
is a matter relative to the state of culture of the individual 
or the race. Now, there is progress in truth as there is in 
life. Just as the universe has evolved out of a simple 
primordial mass into the highly complex and differentiated 
forms which we call living things, so mental life, and its 
product, knowledge, have had an analogous development. 
Truth, too, is constantly changing. The whole trend of 
Evolution seems to caution us against putting any limits to 
the possibilities of the human mind, neither can we, with 
any assurance, contend that any body of so-called truths 
will be able to stand up unchanged under the critical 
examination of a more scientific age than the one in which 
we live. 

Particularly in the fields of religion and philosophy are 
the traces of development found. Religious belief has 
passed through a series of changes, beginning with animism 
and ending with the spiritual interpretation of Christianity 
now prevalent. That a future generation shall accept our 
religious ideas is declared to be unthinkable. The same 
must be said of philosophy. The feverish philosophical 
activity of the last one hundred years, coupled with the 
astounding advances made in scientific knowledge since the 
days of Copernicus, bid fair to produce a new philosophy 
totally different from anything which has, up to this, been 
presented to the human mind for its acceptance. From 

1 Maher, Psychology, p. 286; Mercier, Psychologie, Vol. II, pp. 40-04. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH = arr 


the modern evolutionary point of view, the culture of 
humanity, religion, philosophy, science, art, are the prod- 
ucts of growth. Just as mind has evolved from the lowest 
forms of sensation to the most highly complex types of 
reasoning, so the cultural history of the race has been a 
progressive advance from the crude beliefs of prehistoric 
man to the achievements of modern science. 

Without entering into a discussion of Evolution, either 
from the biological or psychological angle, certain facts 
should be pointed out which negative, to a great extent, 
the sweeping conclusions drawn from Evolution by many 
contemporary thinkers.! In the first place, “the extension 
of evolution,’ as Howison remarks,” ‘“‘from this limited 
and lowly scope in the region of life into a theory of cosmical 
reach, and, still farther, into a theory of the origin of life, 
and then of the origin of mznd, is an act for which science 
furnishes no warrant whatever.” 

That human knowledge is capable of increase and 
progress seems so obvious that no one would question the 
fact for a moment. But growth in knowledge does not 
necessarily involve the falsehood of previous truths. On 
the contrary, it seems to postulate a certain amount of 
stability if we would understand how truth grows. Growth 
simply means that our knowledge has been widened, not 
that the old knowledge has been rendered false by the new. 
Since such is the ordinary progress of growth in knowledge, 
the substitution of one theory for another does not require 
an acceptance of the statement that what is true has be- 
come false. Often a theory considered true by many people 
is found false, but from this it does not follow that all our 
so-called truths are mere approximations. Because the 


1 Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. II, pp. 235-244, and Walker, Theories of Knowledge, 
pp. 419-448. The whole chapter ‘‘ Development and Validity ” should be read. 
2 Howison, The Limits of Evolution, p. 11. 


212 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


ancients accepted the Ptolemaic astronomy, while to-day 
we know that this system is false, assuredly we cannot 
argue that knowledge itself is relative. ‘The Ptolemaic 
System was never true. Theories, hypotheses, viewpoints 
change, but the very fact that they change indicates that 
they were not considered absolutely and universally true. 
The recognized instability of many hypothetical formula- 
tions is justification for asserting that certain established 
truths are beyond the possibility of being changed, or 
proved false by means of further research. 

The history of human culture is a record of constant 
advance. Both individuals and the race have gone forward. 
There has undoubtedly been a great deal of adaptation 
going on, both in the realm of ideas and of institutions. But 
have there been changes in truth itself, in the evolutionary 
conception of the word change? As far as common-sense 
knowledge goes the reversals “have for the most part 
affected only (1) traditional and irrational beliefs which 
were by no means universal, and (2) hypothetical interpreta- 
tions of natural events which were little more, and as a rule 
claimed to be little more, than rough guesses.” In the- 
oretical knowledge, there has occurred a number of more or 
less significant reversals. We must not forget, however, 
that the science of antiquity was of a specially tentative 
kind, and its advocates were well aware of that fact. Many 
of our modern theories are, it is true, contradictions of the 
older views. In other cases, they are but developments 
of truths already quite generally accepted. In no case, 
can we maintain with assurance that an established truth 
has been completely reversed and proved to have been false. 

Finally, knowledge consists in, as we shall demonstrate 
below, the conformity of reality with our thoughts of reality. 
Our judgments are true if they correspond to objective 

1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 438. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH = 213 


reality, otherwise they are false. Now, it is manifestly 
impossible that objective reality be one to-day, and quite 
another to-morrow. Reality is reality. If my mind truly 
represents reality, my judgments are true. No other mind 
can represent it differently than mine, and represent it 
truly. For truth is not of one mind. The quality of im- 
personality, of objectivity, which adheres to every truth, 
manifestly lifts truth above the fluctuations of time and the 
limitations of the individual mind. If this be a valid con- 
ception of what truth is, then the process of evolution does 
not affect it in the slightest. As a matter of fact, evolution 
accounts neither for the origin nor the genesis of our ideas. 
Much less then should it be invoked as an argument favor- 
able to the sceptical attitude towards the epistemological 
problem, which views knowledge as intrinsically and es- 
sentially modifiable, and finds in it changes of so sudden 
and radical a nature that what appears to be knowledge 
may not be knowledge at all. 


Dogmatism.—To approach the problem of truth, either 
from the sceptical or evolutionary angle, is to seal before- 
hand the doom of all our efforts. Either one of these at- 
titudes, if consistently and logically followed out, can beget 
only confusion and misunderstanding. Many thinkers, 
recognizing this fact, start with the postulate that we can 
know truth. This is called the dogmatic attitude, and since 
the days of Kant the word Dogmatism has been given to 
every system which assumes, before investigation, the valid- 
ity of any assumption at all, with reference either to the 
nature of truth or to the possibility of attaining the same. 
Used in its widest sense, Dogmatism would include all 
kinds of knowledge, even the investigations of science. 
Ordinarily, however, the term is narrowed to the field of 
philosophy, in which it signifies a school of thought which 


214 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


puts no limits to the acquisition of knowledge on the part 
of the human mind. Accepted in this sense, it is practically 
synonymous with Rationalism. Descartes, Leibniz, and 
especially Spinoza, are good examples of this type of thinker. 

There is, however, an aspect of Dogmatism which, if 
correctly understood, can be defended. Certainly, we are 
not justified, preceding all investigation, in asserting that 
the mind can attain truth. But if, after an inspection of 
our mental acts, it is proved that our assent to certain prop- 
ositions is truly objective, then we need have no fear in 
holding that the mind can attain truth. Such procedure, 
we believe, is both possible and legitimate, as proved by 
daily experience. 

With reference to our judgments, it is necessary to dis- 
tinguish the immediately evident from those (and they are 
by far the majority) the identity of whose predicate with 
the subject is not evident. These latter, of course, we can- 
not accept until after they have been subjected to close 
criticism and study. Propositions immediately evident 
we accept the moment we understand what the terms imply, 
for example, that 5+ 7 = 12. It is true that many such 
judgments involve other general propositions, upon the 
truth of which they depend. But finally we must come to 
a proposition, or propositions, incapable of further demon- 
stration. The truth of these latter indemonstrable prop- 
ositions arises from a comparison of the very terms which 
compose them. We see immediately that subject and pred- 
icate cohere. Their truth is practically forced upon the 
mind, which reflects upon them; and their very evidence 
makes it impossible to demonstrate their truth, since dem- 
onstration would entail other propositions more funda- 
mental than the one in question, which by hypothesis is 
impossible. 

To approach the problem of truth, therefore, with any 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH ars 


hope of solving it, two assertions of a quasi-dogmatic char- 
acter must be made: first, that we do assent spontaneously 
to certain propositions, and secondly, that the mind can, 
by means of reflection, examine these assents so as to deter- 
mine their validity. This position, however, does not in- 
volve us in the assertion that scepticism is eo ipso false, nor 
that we must accept dogmatically the truth of the thesis, 
prior to investigation and criticism, that the mind is ca- 
pable of knowing truth. Such an attitude has practically 
disappeared from modern philosophy, and is now of merely 
historical interest.! 


Criticism.—Criticism is an attitude which contends that 
before accepting as certain any principles or postulates 
whatsoever, as likely to be of value in the solution of the 
problem of certitude, it is necessary to subject these as- 
sumptions to a severe examination. Even the faculty of 
reason itself must be critically tested in order to find out to 
what extent it is capable of leading us to truth. 

Kant is the father of modern Criticism, and he was 
brought to this position by the inconsistencies and illog- 
icalities apparent in the thought of his predecessors, who, 
arguing from certain principles of more or less universal 
applicability, arrived at the most absurd consequences. 
Kant argued that we must proceed in an entirely different 
way, and he began by studying reason itself so as to dis- 
cover how far and how much of truth we were capable of 
perceiving over and above all possible experience. The 
human intellect is fixed in its range of knowledge, and this 
range is determined by the amount of experience possible 
to the mind. The mind, therefore, not only recognizes 
but constitutes knowledge. 


1 Kiilpe, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 187; Mercier, A Manual of Modern Scho- 
lastic Philosophy, pp. 357-361; Perry, Approach to Philosophy, p. 186. 


216 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Positivism accepts the principles of Criticism, but de- 
nies the right of metaphysics to exist, a right which Kant 
did not question. It differs from Criticism in this, that it 
confines all knowledge to “positive knowledge,” that is, 
knowledge acquired by experimental methods. Only upon 
the basis of information which we have secured by means 
of scientific investigation and research, can truth be at- 
tained. It is the work of philosophy to organize and 
systematize our scientific achievements. Speculative phil- 
osophy, as such, is fruitless, as the history of thought abun- 
dantly proves. Comte, the founder of French Positivism, 
has had many followers, especially in England, the most 
prominent of whom were John Stuart Mill and Herbert 
Spencer. 

The specific contribution of Criticism to the epistemolog- 
ical question is its method. Before Kant it was customary 
to view the world as either a unit or a composite of real 
beings. He reversed this standpoint and transformed the 
world into objects of consciousness. At the basis of his 
attitude was the postulate of apriorism, by which he as- 
sumed that the object known conforms to the mind, and 
not vice versa, according to certain internal factors which 
are a necessary and constitutive part of the mind itself. 
His method naturally led to scepticism, against which he 
fortified himself by contending that the only secure founda- 
tion for transcendental truth lies in the moral subject. 

The followers of Kant, especially Hegel, developed the 
absolute elements contained in the master’s philosophy, 
while not forgetting his critical approach. Although many 
of the doctrines of Kant are not accepted to-day, Criticism 
still wields a great influence. To state the epistemological 
problem otherwise than Kant did, in the opinion of many 
thinkers, is to misstate it. ‘‘Since Kant the philosophical 
spirit has been strongly imbued with the critical principle. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 217 


No attempt at the construction of a new synthetic philoso- 
phy can now gain attention without appearing, at least, to 
stand toward all previous schools and thinkers in the posi- 
tion of a free sceptic and critic. And yet it is since Kant 
that the most stupendous systems of philosophical dogma 
have arisen—though chiefly upon German soil—which the 
world has ever known. Fichte, Schelling, Hegel, and all 
the earlier luminaries shining largely by light borrowed from 
them and from Kant, and now later Schopenhauer, Von 
Hartmann, and Herbert Spencer have built up great syn- 
thetic structures with extreme scepticism toward the re- 
sults of previous thinking, and with equally extreme confi- 
dence in their own power to attain something approaching 
a final philosophy. Each thinker has perhaps contributed 
something permanent toward that completer system of 
associated principles of all Being and Knowledge which 
constitutes philosophy. But each system seems destined 
in turn to have many of its positive conclusions regarded 
as unwarrantably dogmatic, and subjected to a new process 
of sceptical analysis and critical reconstruction.” 1 

Even Pragmatism has not been able to divest itself en- 
tirely of the critical starting point. In this the New Real- 
ism has been more successful. While recognizing the need 
of a careful analysis of the reasoning faculty before making 
assertions as to its capabilities, Realism has refused to sub- 
mit to the Kantian viewpoint and has begun its synthesis 
at the only point from which success can be expected, 
namely, by accepting the proposition that truth itself is in- 
dependent of our knowledge of it. 


The Meaning of Truth.—Assuming that we can know 
an external world, it does not follow, as we have already 
pointed out, that our knowledge is true. For truth is not 


1 Ladd, Introduction to Philosophy, p. 153. 


218 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the same as objectivity. We may know things without 
knowing them truly. But if we can know, certainly there 
must exist standards by means of which it is possible to 
ascertain the truth or falsehood of our knowledge. As error 
is a fact, so also is certitude. We will begin, therefore, our 
treatment of the criteria of truth by outlining, first of all, our 
conception of truth. What do we mean when we say, I 
know that this is true? 

To the plain man, not only our knowledge, but even 
things possess truth. A thing is true when it corresponds 
to the idea or type by which we represent the nature of the 
thing perceived to ourselves. Truth so understood is ob- 
jective or ontological. But there is another kind of truth, 
which is a possession of our intellects, and consists in that 
quality of judgment which follows upon a pronouncement 
of the intellect to the effect that two ideas are identical 
and represent an identity which exists objectively between 
the things so thought of. This is formal or logical truth, 
and is purely a relation between ideas. 

A true judgment, it should not be forgotten, means some- 
thing more than the perception of the identity or non- 
identity of two ideas. Over and above this perception, 
there is also a mental affirmation or assertion that the 
predicate and subject are identical. Truth, therefore, 
consists in a relation of correspondence between our judg- 
ment and the thing. Whenever a proposition is presented 
to us, and it is clearly perceived that the terms of the same 
correspond, in other words that the relation is one of iden- 
tity, the mind accepts this proposition and declares it true. 
If, on the contrary, the identity is not perceived, we assert 
either the proposition to be false, and this is error, or the 
mind remains in a state of suspense, a state which we call 
doubt.! 

1 Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. II, p. 245; also Mercier, Criteriologie, pp. 30-38. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 219 


Neither absolutists nor pragmatists, we shall see below, 
accept this idea of truth. Both of them rebel against the 
correspondence theory, yet both can scarcely fail to admit 
that the object must in some way assist in determining the 
truth or falsehood of our judgments.t The idea of corre- 
spondence is found in the critical philosophers who see 
truth only in a systematic whole, Reality, yet recognize 
that there must exist a conformity between our finite minds 
and this Real Whole if we are to possess truth. Pragma- 
tists, too, acknowledge that for working purposes, and pro- 
visionally, at least, it is necessary to hold the correspond- 
ence theory. Therefore “‘the correspondence notion has 
an excellent claim to our attention since it would appear 
that after all there must be some kind of correspondence 
between the mind of the knower and the object which he 
knows.’”? 

Truth, therefore, according to the realist, is a conformity 
or correspondence of the intellect knowing with the thing 
known. In order to determine the validity of this cor- 
respondence, certain criteria must be formulated which 
will clearly demonstrate whether our thoughts have been 
determined objectively or not. To make clear what we 
mean by this correspondence or conformity, certain facts 
must be kept constantly in mind. A great deal of the pres- 
ent-day opposition to the Correspondence Theory has arisen 
from a failure to understand correctly what is meant when 
we say that to possess truth the intellect must conform to 
the object perceived.’ 

First of all, the relation of correspondence is a relation 
for which we cannot find an exact analogy in nature. As 
thought is thought, and unlike every other operation, so 


1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 621. 
2 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 622. 
3 Coffey, Epistemology, pp. 248-251. 


220 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the conformity of the mind and its object is a very special 
conformity, for which it is impossible to give illustrations. 
To compare it with painting or photography or any similar 
physical process which reproduces an object as a picture, 
is unjust to a relation which differs toto celo from photo- 
graphic reproduction. Joachim falls into this error when he 
writes: ‘‘What the painter sees in the face, that he expresses 
in his portrait; and the portrait will be more or less ‘true’ or 
‘faithful’ according to the painter’s insight, and, again, ac- 
cording to the mind of the spectator who sees and compares 
both the original and the picture. Even the photogra- 
pher’s camera ‘ can lie,’ i. e., fail to produce a ‘true’ repre- 
sentation of its subject. And though a chronicle may, 
from one point of view, ‘correspond’ detail for detail with 
the historical events, yet for its reader, even if not for its 
writer, it may be radically false. For it may entirely miss 
the ‘significance’ of the piece of history, and so convey a 
thoroughly false impression.” 1 

Every realist will agree with Joachim that the mind not 
merely reproduces but interprets reality. Yet from this 
admission, it is a far cry to the statement that “correspond- 
ence appears to give us at best the mere externals of what 
constitutes truth.” ? A photograph gives the mere exter- 
nals, but mental correspondence cannot exist unless it gives 
us reality. The mind is not a camera; it is the mind, and 
when it acts it acts asa mind. Again, because the corre- 
spondence between mind and object is admittedly inade- 
quate, is no justification for the statement that ‘‘ correspond- 
ence is a symptom of truth.” ? No judgment, no matter 
how penetrating, conforms the mind completely with reality, 
for the simple reason that the human mind is finite, limited. 


1 The Nature of Truth, p. 16. 
2 Joachim, The Nature of Truth, op. cit., p. 17. 
3 Joachim, The Nature of Truth, op. cit., p. 17. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 221 


We know things, and truly, but beyond our knowledge there 
always remains something further to be known of the real 
before we can say that our knowledge exhausts all the possi- 
bilities of the object. This limitation is purely negative. 
In no sense of the word does it make what knowledge we 
actually possess false. It is quite different, therefore, from 
the positive lack of correspondence which signifies for us an 
erroneous judgment. 

We must repeat again that truth is only of judgments, 
not of sensations, not even of concepts. And judgment 
consists in a judging, in an assertion by the intellect of 
the agreement of a thought with reality. It is not a copying 
of reality. In spite of all our expostulations to the contrary, 
many thinkers, and in this the pragmatists sin most often 
and grievously, insist on expounding correspondence in the 
terms of a copy theory. But grant that the real is given, the 
mind actively takes up this real which it interprets, and, 
by analysis and synthesis, affirms or denies the correspond- 
ence of this real with its thoughts concerning the same. 
If the reality has been presented correctly, a correct inter- 
pretation, other things being equal, will result. But if, 
on the other hand, the reality is falsely presented or, if we 
fail to interpret it correctly, error naturally results. 

Finally, on the part of the reality known, no realist under- 
stands by a real thing, the thing as it is in itself. The “‘thing- 
in-itself”’ is and always remains a nonentity as far as 
knowledge goes. In order to be known, the thing must be 
brought into relation with a mind. Now, if this condition 
or requirement be interpreted as vitiating the validity of 
our knowledge, then that is an end to the whole question 
of knowledge. For knowledge is a process essentially in- 
volving relations. To try to understand it without taking 
this fact into consideration is to attempt the impossible. 
Unless a. datum is given or presented, the mind would for- 


222 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


ever remain closed to all reality. As a matter of fact, 
the real is presented by means of both our perceptual 
and conceptual processes. These presentations we inter- 
pret. If we affirm the correspondence of our ideas with 
these data, we have truth, because our affirmation ex- 
presses an identity which is truly objective; otherwise, 
we have error. 


The Coherence Theory of Truth.—Absolutism ! views 
the universe as One, which according to the laws of logical 
necessity, is continually unfolding and expressing itself in 
human centers of experience in a multitude of forms, each 
one a partial expression of the ideal content of reality.” 
There is development in knowledge, but this development 
consists not so much in additions to what we already possess, 
as in reconciling differences in a higher synthesis. Truth 
cannot be stable. It is in a process of constant modifica- 
tion and can only and finally be attained when we have 
arrived at a complete and final synthesis of all knowledge. 
Reality is one, is a whole, and to be known adequately, 
must be known asa whole. ‘‘As such it is the Object which 
we seek to know, the Ideal towards which our knowledge 
tends, and the Criterion by which it must be judged.” ® 

If knowledge and reality are one, what then is truth? 
Joachim tells us that “anything is true which can be con- 
ceived. It is true because, and in so far as, it can be con- 
ceived. Conceivability is the essential nature of truth. 
And to be ‘conceivable’ means to be a ‘significant whole,’ 
or a whole possessed of meaning for thought.” * Although 


1 For a complete statement of the Coherence Theory, see Joachim, The Nature 
of Truth; Bradley, Appearance and Reality; Green, Prolegomena to Ethics; Bosanquet, 
Logic. Fora critique, Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 506-526; Coffey, Episte- 
mology, Vol. II, pp. 286-290. 

2 Cf. supra, p. 30. 

3 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 506. 

4 The Nature of Truth, p. 66. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH = 223 


not all absolutists conceive reality in the same way, all 
agree that truth is a manifestation of the Absolute in finite 
minds. If those truths experienced by us cohere and form a 
systematic whole, we have truth. Now, truth of its very 
nature reflects the constitution of the mind as well as the 
constitution of reality itself. Only as a systematic whole 
can it be known, and ‘‘the work of intellectually constitut- 
ing that totality which we call the real world is the work of 
knowledge.” ! And ‘‘the truth, the fact, the reality, may be 
considered, in relation to the human intelligence, as the con- 
tent of a single persistent and all-embracing judgment, 
by which every individual intelligence affirms the ideas 
that form its knowledge to be true of the world which is 
brought home to it as real by sense perception.” ” 

Both the nature and the test of truth, therefore, consist in 
the harmonious systematic coherence of all our judgments 
with one another. As Leighton puts it, “‘the Absolute pos- 
tulates of knowledge are the logical identity of every object 
of thought with itself, and the harmonious organization or 
relevancy of all true judgments to one another in a system- 
atic whole.”’* This test, of course, assumes certain definite 
principles, which require examination before they ought 
to be accepted. In the first place, consistently with the 
principles of Absolutism, it postulates for the mind a final 
and determining influence in effecting what is true. It 
likewise denies that single judgments have any truth when 
made alone and out of relation to the whole body of truth 
which is One. Neither can any single judgment be classed 
as necessary, in the sense that it is independent of the whole. 
Finally, its doctrine of relations is one which concedes to 
relations the power of modifying their terms.* 


1 Bosanquet, Logic, Vol. I, p. 3. 

2 Bosanquet, Logic, op. cit., p. 3. 

3 The Field of Philosophy, p. 541. 

4 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 508. 


224 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Criticism of the Theory of Coherence.—The standard 
which is set up by absolutists as a criterion to determine 
the truth or falsehood of our judgments appears, on exam- 
ination, not only inadequate, but even false, if we are to 
understand that coherence is put forward as the exclusive 
test of truth. What is the meaning of the phrase that 
truth is “the systematic coherence of a significant whole” ? 
If truth and reality are one, the only reality we can speak 
of is the reality known to us, that is, reality as revealed to 
us in the whole system of judgments which mankind re- 
gards as making up knowledge. Naturally, any judgment 
which fails to be in coherence with this set of accepted 
judgments is false. And as knowledge advances the co- 
herence becomes more and more systematic and, therefore, 
better able to represent real things as they are. Coher- 
ence, therefore, is a test of truth, or better, a condition of 
truth, because new truths cannot contradict old truths. 
The force of this standard, however, is purely negative, 
since we can easily imagine a series of judgments which do 
not contradict one another, yet are as a matter of fact 
false. For practical purposes, the coherence test is of little 
value, since to compare two theories in order to find out 
which one coheres the more systematically with the whole 
body of truth is, if not impossible, at least very difficult. 

Moreover, the coherence theory presupposes a certain 
amount of correspondence between thought and reality, 
because our apprehension of the consistency or inconsist- 
ency of any particular judgment in relation to the whole 
demonstrates that we have weighed the evidence before- 
hand and found the judgment true or false. If there be any 
doubt in our minds of the coherence of a particular judg- 
ment with the generally accepted body of truth, we begin 
immediately to reflect, to weigh the evidence favorable 
or unfavorable, and we decide the coherence on the basis 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH = 225 


of this evidence. No one can question that the harmony 
of one judgment with what we already know points to the 
truth of that judgment. Coherence unquestionably makes 
that judgment appear most probable; it becomes for us 
a good working hypothesis; we may even assert it provi- 
sionally. But to prove the truth of the same, something 
more than consistency is required. We want to know 
whether it conforms with reality, and not reality as a whole, 
but reality as expressed in the individual judgment 
which asserts or denies conformity. If we do not possess 
some true judgments which are independent of the truth 
of the Whole, then it would be impossible to have any 
knowledge at all. We must begin somewhere. It is mani- 
festly impossible to begin with the Whole of Reality. 

Again, to assert that only the Whole is true, and that 
isolated judgments cannot possess truth until they are 
caught up in the coherence of a systematic whole, is a mere 
corollary from the fundamental assumption of Absolutism 
that truth is in the whole, not in its parts. Both reason 
and experience rebel against any such assumption. In fact, 
all men accept as true many judgments of a contingent 
character. I can say with truth, that to-day it rained, or 
that John Smith is a banker. This contingency of fact 
cannot square itself with the universal and necessary note 
which must characterize knowledge revealing itself to us 
as an unfolding of the Absolute in finite experience. No 
one can deny that we experience facts of a contingent 
character. In contrast to this experience, psychology is 
witness to the presence in the mind of ideas which reveal 
a necessary relation obtaining between certain abstract 
objects of thought. This distinction between contingent 
facts and necessary relations is one which our daily ex- 
perience forces upon us. 

Finally, we cannot grant that, because each related 


226 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


judgment bears a relation to the whole of truth, it is thereby 
intrinsically affected and modified to the extent that it 
must change as we progress in our knowledge of the whole. 
However, the matter “‘rests entirely upon the view that one 
takes of relations. If relations are a kind of physical nexus 
binding objects together and arising simultaneously and 
on the same level within an organic whole, then it is doubt- 
less impossible to know an object without knowing its 
relations; but if the relations are essentially dependent 
upon the nature of the objects related, though not vice versa 
as well, then it zs possible to know an object without know- 
ing its relations; and, as those relations become known, 
one’s previous notion of the object will not necessarily have 
to be changed, but will merely become larger, fuller and 
more significant.” 1 


The Pragmatic or Utility Theory of Truth.—In contrast 
to both the Coherence and Correspondence theories of 
truth, the Pragmatic theory is anti-intellectualistic. It 
does not discover truth in the intellect, nor in any relation 
between the intellect knowing and the object known, but 
in the will which is, by its very nature, drawn towards 
truths which are ‘‘useful.”” Pragmatism, therefore, dis- 
cards intellectual ‘criteria as tests of truth in favor of 
voluntaristic criteria.? 

What is truth in the pragmatist philosophy? Truth is a 
working process which leads us to reality. But the mind 
does not copy reality, and it in no sense of the word repre- 
sents reality as it exists outside the mind. Ideas are mere 


1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 520. 

2 For an exposition of the pragmatic theory of truth, see especially James, Prag- 
matism, The Meaning of Truth; Dewey, Studies in Logical Theory; Schiller, Studies 
in Humanism; Humanism. 

For a critique, Walker, Theories of Knowledge; Driscoll, Pragmatism and the 
Problems of the Idea; Schinz, Anti-Pragmatism; Pratt, What is Pragmatism?; Jean- 
niere, Criteriologia. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 227 


symbols or tools with which we work. Truth is, therefore, 
essentially relative. Its provisional character must be 
recognized, for what is true to-day may not work to-morrow. 
Truth is in evolution just as nature is. We cannot accept 
our immediate experiences as they appear to us. We must 
distinguish in them between appearance and reality, be- 
tween primary and real reality. Now, our experiences 
which work are true—at least provisionally. Truth is not 
static, but “ambulatory.” It is essentially a process, not 
a product, for it is constantly being made. And it is an 
individual process, since it changes with each individual 
mind. ‘There is no such thing as Truth. Only truths can 
exist. ‘‘ True ideas are those that we can assimilate, validate, 
corroborate and verify. False ideas are those that we cannot. 
That is the practical difference it makes to us to have true 
ideas; that, therefore, is the meaning of truth, for it is all 
that truth is known as.” ! 

While many thinkers will agree that Pragmatism as a 
psychological description of the making of truth is fairly 
accurate, they cannot accept its philosophy of the truth 
relation for the reason that pragmatists confuse two things 
totally different from each other, namely, truth as it exists 
in our minds and truth as trueness, that is, the quality of 
an idea which makes it true. As Pratt points out: ‘“‘We 
all agree that verification is essential to the making of a 
claim into a truth, but the pragmatist draws from this the 
conclusion that the truth (trueness) of the claim depends on 
and consists in its verification. This, I maintain, is a 
flagrant case of using the word ¢ruth in two perfectly dis- 


1James, Pragmatism, p. 201. Schiller takes a wider view of truth. He looks 
upon it both from the evolutionary and humanistic side, in which the true gives 
way to the good, the dominant element of human experience. At the bottom of 
all our postulates are human purposes and these in turn are determined by their 
usefulness. Action is primary both in life and knowledge, and all truth is founded 
on practical consequences. 


228 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


tinct senses as if it meant the same thing both times and as 
if it had but one meaning. It is a confusion between a 
‘truth’ and ‘trueness.’”’ } 

Moreover, the pragmatist definition of truth as a process 
which leads to reality fails to take account of the very 
obvious distinction which exists between the nature of 
truth and the consequences which follow upon the posses- 
sion of truth. No one doubts that when our ideas work 
out successfully we are very apt to consider them true. 
But it is not the functional aspects of truth which constitute 
truth. Functionings follow upon truth already constituted, 
are an added justification for accepting the correspondence 
already perceived by the mind to exist between its thoughts 
and external reality.2, We do not, therefore, “‘make”’ truth 
in the sense in which James uses the word, namely, that 
truth and the verification process are identical. 

Finally, the pragmatic conception of truth is pure sub- 
jectivism, and leads logically to scepticism. Pragmatists, 
as a rule, openly and with some heat, repudiate the sceptical 
conclusions inherent in their principles. Nevertheless we 
cannot escape the sceptical tendency of pragmatism, if we 
accept their descriptions of truth to mean what they say. 
Both James and Schiller are fond of painting the almost 
dominant influence which each man’s ideas and ways of 
looking at things have in the making of truth. Moreover, 
they insist that our needs and interests color and even 


1 Pratt, What is Pragmatism?, p. 88. 

2 Pratt, What is Pragmatism?—‘In spite of the fact that all ideas in some sense 
work themselves out, it is not true that all ‘ideas,’ judgments included, are merely 
plans of action. A judgment has at least two different aspects. From one point of 
view, it is indeed a motor idea which influences conduct and works itself out. From 
another point of view it is an assertion about some reality not itself, and between 
it and that reality there is a relation which simply is not to be identified with the 
results of the judgment.” The student should read the whole chapter; also the 
chapter “‘ The Value of Pragmatic Truth” in Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 
550-588, 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 229 


“transfigure” truth. All knowledge, therefore, is human, 
that is, it is relative to our faculties, and if this does not 
mean that truth is purely subjective the words have no 
meaning. Pragmatists, to escape this conclusion, invoke 
many arguments, but to no avail. They claim that in the 
verification process truths are subject to a certain control 
from the side of objective fact and experience. But, as 
Walker remarks, even allowing that ‘‘the ‘ workings’ of 
thoughts may be controlled by real objects, they can have 
no strictly cognitive significance if their origin is subjective, 
their value determined by interest and purpose, and if 
they do nothing more than enable usto manipulate ex- 
perience.”’ 4 

There is a great deal of truth in Pragmatism, as there is 
in every philosophical theory. The fault with the theory is 
that it fails to view the truth relation as a whole. Certain 
elements are brought out, overemphasized, and made to do 
duty as exclusive explanations, when as a matter of fact 
they are only partial explanations. Truth does possess a 
regulative value, and it often corresponds to felt needs and 
purposes. Both of these conditions will be admitted readily 
by every frank intellectualist, as he will also admit that the 
older epistemologists did not make enough of these facts. 
But do they prove what the pragmatist wishes them to 
prove, namely, that truth is purely personal, a subjective 
relative affair, or rather do they not prove that our knowl- 
edge is only partial, that it never exhausts the full content 
of reality, and that all knowledge, even of the most highly 
speculative kinds, corresponds to certain felt needs and, in 
the last analysis, satisfies them? Neither life nor knowl- 
edge is static—a fact beyond all controversy. But to hold 
that knowledge is dynamic need not mean that it cannot 
possess consistency and absoluteness, neither does it mean 

1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 581. 


230 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


that the only human needs worthy of satisfaction are those 
of a purely practical kind. 


Criticism of the Utility Theory.—It is impossible to 
separate the pragmatist’s description of the truth relation 
from his criteria of truth, since he identifies the relation 
itself with the processes by which we arrive at truth. For 
the pragmatist, truth and the process of verifying truth are 
identical. Now, verification when analyzed means practical 
consequences or utility. A judgment is true when it works 
out, when it supplies human needs or furthers human pur- 
poses and life. But these practical consequences, one will 
say, aremany. The criteria of truth, therefore, are as numer- 
ous as the practical consequences which can be observed to 
follow upon our acceptance or rejection of any judgment. 

The fundamental, and most far-reaching criterion of 
truth for the pragmatist is one based on the relation of any 
idea to action. ‘‘Truth must make a difference to action,” 
they tell us. Now no one can doubt that truth influences 
action, or that, as the psychologists say, ideas tend to 
exteriorize themselves. But that this cannot be a com- 
prehensive test of truth is apparent when we consider that 
many truths exist which do not make any difference so far as 
action goes. 

Consistently with his principle of reading out of court all 


1That the practical point of view, looked at merely as a reaction against the 
older and narrowly intellectualistic conception of the problem of knowledge, pos- 
sesses elements of value which we are obliged to recognize, and should appropriate, 
no one can deny. Pragmatism represents this tendency, which it has pushed to 
unacceptable extremes when it subordinates the intellectual and the abstract to the 
biological and the practical. The present-day thinker should use what there is of 
truth in the biological viewpoint. He must not succumb to the false idea, however, 
that truth is exclusively a biological process, and that the only test of what is true 
must be found in its human values. Truth is not merely a means to an end. It is 
an end in itself, and as Pratt declares, ‘‘it is time to call a halt and to reassert the 
old and trite thesis that to know the truth is worth while for its own sake.’ (Op. 
cit., p. 237.) Lecture VI ‘‘The ‘Practical’ Point of View” is both a clever and 
exhaustive analysis of the pragmatic attitude and should be read in toto. 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH — 231 


intellectual criteria, the pragmatist substitutes for them 
emotional tests. He tells us that for a thing to be true it 
must “‘satisfy our emotional needs.” But every one must 
recognize that emotional criteria are the weakest imaginable, 
even if we grant them the right to be called tests at all. So 
unstable, so variable are our emotions that to appeal to 
them as to the truth or falsehood of a judgment would be to 
introduce nothing less than anarchy into the truth relation. 
That our emotions prepare us for the acceptance of truth, 
that they have a controlling influence, at times, in our 
assent to truth, is a matter of everyday experience. Pascal 
pointed this out. But man is not a thinking animal in the 
sense that thought is all and animal nothing. He is a com- 
plex of intellect, will, and emotions. Human emotions and 
their satisfaction must, therefore, be given a place not only 
in every true psychology, but also in every true epistemol- 
ogy. Neither the functions of intellect, nor of will, nor of 
the emotions, must be exaggerated. In the determination of 
truth, intellectis supreme. We believe a thing because the in- 
tellect is convinced, not because our emotions are satisfied. 

Further, we are told that ‘‘utility”’ is a criterion of truth. 
Utility may mean many things, and we can readily imagine 
a meaning of it which would include ideas which are useful 
but which cannot possibly be true. If utility is a test, we 
may well ask ourselves—useful to whom? Surely the 
individual cannot be the final judge of the usefulness or 
non-usefulness of an idea. And even if the consequences of 
a truth are unquestionably useful, they can only be so 
provided beforehand our knowledge was justified, that we 
knew the thing to be true. “The pragmatic criterion of 
utility, therefore, is not of the least value when it is a ques- 
tion of distinguishing between facts which are ‘really real,’ 
and facts which only claim to be real.” ? 

1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 600. 


232 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Utility is at bottom the pragmatist’s criterion and, though 
he expresses the idea in countless different ways, these may 
all be sifted down to that particular one. We are told that 
‘truth must be consistent,” that it is ‘‘at bottom a habit,” 
that “social agreement” makes truth, or that everything 
“is true which gives us the maximal combination of satis- 
factions.”’ All of which translated means that judgments 
are true if they are useful, false if they are not useful. 

The pragmatist, therefore, is a subjectivist both as to his 
conceptions of the nature and of the criteria of truth. He 
rejects the correspondence view and, quite logically, con- 
tends that if our ideas do not represent reality, we must 
accept or reject them on the basis of the practical results 
which follow their possession. Fundamentally, it is a 
question of whether the true comes first or the good comes 
first. If a thinker starts from the voluntaristic assumption, 
he will inevitably land in Pragmatism. But if voluntarism 
is false, and we believe that it is, then it is impossible to 
accept the pragmatic epistemology without doing violence 
to both our fundamental conceptions of the rdéle of the 
intellect in the knowledge process, as well as to our every- 
day experience of fact. ! 


The Correspondence Theory.—As was demonstrated in 
the discussion on the meaning of truth ? it is impossible to 
conceive of truth outside of a relation of correspondence or 
conformity between the intellect perceiving and the object 
perceived. The realist not only believes that objects really 
exist, but also that our ideas truly represent these real 
objects to which they are conformed. Between “esse” and 
““percipi’”’ we claim a fundamental distinction. A thing may 


lWalker, Theories of Knowledge,—the whoie chapter ‘‘ Pragmatic Criteria of 
Truth ” pp. 589-620, contains a trenchant critique of Pragmatism. I have tried to 
reproduce, but very inadequately, a few of the arguments contained in that chapter. 
2 Supra, pp. 217 et seq, 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 233 


exist and not be perceived, and things may be perceived 
which do not really exist. But if our ideas truly represent a 
reality which does exist, then our ideas are true. 

Both absolutists and pragmatists reject the correspond- 
ence theory as a final explanation of how we know things, 
notwithstanding the fact that both admit knowledge to be 
impossible unless some sort of correspondence is acknowl- 
edged to exist. This correspondence, however, they feel 
is only a provisional, a beginning step in our understanding 
of the knowledge process. It does not make clear what 
knowledge is and upon what precise factors knowledge 
depends. 

Knowledge is suz generis. A great deal of the misunder- 
standing of its nature arises from the futile attempts made 
to discover in nature some sort of process which is like the 
knowledge process. Knowledge is neither a photographic 
copying of reality nor is it a slavish reproduction of what 
exists extra-mentally. For an object to be known it must 
come into relation with the mind, it must become abstract. 
Now, psychologically, the thought-object is neither singular 
nor universal, if looked at from the side of its content. 
Universality is not a primary property of our ideas. Upon 
reflection, and after comparison with the same impression 
from which it has been abstracted, the mind will determine 
whether it be singular or universal. But in itself, as an ob- 
ject of thought, it is merely abstract. This is a most im- 
portant consideration whose significance for the correct 
solution of the knowledge problem can scarcely be exagger- 
ated. 

Moreover, things are singular. But when they are taken 
up into the mind they lose their concrete characteristics, 
that is, their time-space conditions, and become abstract. 
Because we cannot know the thing-in-itself is no justifica- 
tion for arguing that we cannot know the thing as it is pre- 


234 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


sented to the mind. Further, by an act of reflection the 
intellect declares this object-in-itself to be capable of being 
applied to a great number of concrete things, that is to say, 
it universalizes the abstract thought. Universality in no 
sense of the word is a part of the concrete things to which 
the universal idea is applied. Thought only is universal. 

In the making of truth, the mind conforms to the object. 
If our universal ideas are applicable to real objects, a cor- 
respondence arises between them and things, and we have 
truth. But some one may say that to assert a correspond- 
ence seems to leave the problem unsolved, or, at most, to 
tell us very little of what the truth relation is. This would 
be a justifiable objection if we were dealing with two ob- 
jects whose natures are the same. But the mind and things 
are on entirely different levels—one is material, the other 
is spiritual. If the mind conforms to reality, it can do so 
only according to the laws of its own nature. To be known, 
things must become thoughts. And our thoughts are true 
when they have been determined by the thought-object in 
the manner which has no analogy elsewhere in nature. Of 
course, this does not mean that the mind operates in a hap- 
hazard fashion or that we cannot lay down certain rules 
which will help us to know when, as a matter of fact, 
thought has been determined by its object. Such rules are 
not only possible, but we shall attempt to formulate them. 
They are, however, rather criteria of error than criteria of 
truth. The realist proceeds on the assumption, a very nat- 
ural one, that the intellect can and does attain truth. Not 
only knowledge, but truth is possible—this is his starting 
point. It is as natural for the mind to know as it is for a 
bird to fly. Therefore, whenever the intellect functions 
normally the realist is convinced that it arrives at truth. 
What he is interested in then is not in trying to prove that 
the intellect cannot know truth, but in seeing that it acts 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH = 235 


normally, and in laying down, after a close psychological 
study of the knowledge process itself, those conditions which 
are required to preserve it from going wrong. 

Error, therefore, assumes a very important place in the 
realist’s construction of truth criteria. Error is lack of cor- 
respondence. It is a positive disconformity between the 
content of thought and the nature of the object which it 
pretends to express. What brings about this disconform- 
ity? Something other than the object, for if the object 
conformed we would have truth. Therefore, if we can point 
out all the different ways in which the lack of correspond- 
ence may possibly arise, we shall know at what times the 
intellect is not to be trusted, and, by exclusion, we will also 
know that under every other circumstance it is to be trusted; 
in other words, we shall know when we possess truth. Over 
and above the negative tests there is a positive criterion of 
truth, namely, evidence, which we shall examine later on. 

Truth is only in judgments, but our judgments are 
of many kinds and are made up of materials acquired in 
many different ways. Sense images affect judgments; habit 
influences them, and, finally, thought itself, viewed as an 
active process, is often determined by the purposes which 
it seeks to realize. From each and every one of these three 
sources, erroneous judgments may develop. 

In the first place, error may arise because our senses do 
not report faithfully concerning the objects about which 
they give us information. Sensation as such never gives 
more than the appearance of things, what I see, what I 
hear, what I taste. At times these appearances are false, 
due not to the essential relativity of the sense process, but 
because of certain irregular conditions either in the object 
perceived or in the senses perceiving. For example, if 
I look at an object through colored glasses it will appear 

1 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 627 et seq. 


236 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


colored, or if I am suffering from color blindness I will not 
be able to perceive a certain color which actually exists in 
an object. 

Much is made of the so-called illusions of the senses. 
However, they are relatively few, compared to the large 
number of admittedly true sensations we daily experience, 
and, moreover, we are able to guard against any error, even 
in them, if we see to it that all abnormal conditions, both | 
objective and subjective, are carefully considered before 
passing a final judgment. In the case that doubt still re- 
mains or that we desire a more accurate account than our 
perceptions furnish us with, we should have recourse to 
instruments whose reliability is beyond question. 

Imagination, too, is a fertile source of error, since it some- 
times produces illusions, hallucinations, dreams, and other 
abnormal mental phenomena which deeply influence our 
judgments of reality. The psychologist, however, has ex- 
amined these illusions and found their sources to be either 
certain mental or non-mental influences, and has set up a 
series of rules which will guide us in differentiating between 
true and false images. For the normal man there is no rea- 
son why illusions should falsify his judgments, except rarely. 
Even in these infrequent cases, he can readily discover upon 
reflection, the source of this error and correct his judgment 
accordingly. 

Again, there can be no question of the fact that habit 
plays an important part in the making of our judgments. 
It is operative particularly in the field of memory. Now, 
in spite of the great interest manifested in the investigation 
of memory processes by modern psychology, little is known 
of the real nature of memory. ‘That memory has a physio- 
logical basis, few will deny. It is this working of the brain 
centers and connected nervous tissue which may be the 
occasion of error. If we accept this fact, no matter what 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 237 


our theory may be as to the exact manner in which the re- 
sidual effect of each nervous action or thought is impressed 
on the brain, then, when there arises any question as to the 
accuracy of the deliverances of memory, we must have re- 
course to written records or to other tests in order to check 
up its truthfulness.! 

Pragmatists insist at great length on the distortion of 
truth caused by the overwhelming influence of purpose in 
the constructive activity of the mind. Now, while it is true 
that purpose may lead us into error, it does not do so gener- 
ally or as a matter of course. On the contrary, the influence 
of purpose as often as not seems to be quite the opposite of 
that which the pragmatists declare it to be. For purpose 
determines the “intent” but not the “content ” of thought; 
and the facts which the mind, led by purpose, studies re- 
main facts, although we may select for study one set of facts 
in preference to another.? 

The conclusion from the above seems to be that no intel- 
lectual function considered in itself leads us into error, 
unless we assume, as the Hegelians do, that thought neces- 
sarily transforms its objects, or, as the pragmatists do, 
that purpose essentially modifies all our thoughts. 

In particular, judgment functions correctly when all con- 
ditions are normal. Our judgments are of two kinds. Some 
have to do with contingent facts, and are determined by 
facts as they really exist outside the mind. Others relate 
to necessary principles, that is, are our immediate judgments 
of the ideal order, and are determined by the very nature 
of things as known by the mind. [If our single judgments 


1 Walker, writing of the functioning of habit, as it expresses itself in expectancy, 
says: ‘‘Expectancy is seldom the cause of error. It may lead to a momentary illu- 
sion, but this is usually corrected spontaneously and immediately. Only in abnormal 
cases does expectancy lead to a false judgment, as in pathological cases, and in pre- 
perception, where the conditions are those placed by the experimental psychologist.” 
Theories of Knowledge, p. 633. 

2 Walker, Theories of Knowledge, p. 635. 


238 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


are to be trusted, assuredly the same must be said of our 
reasonings which are simply explicit statements of the 
truths already contained in true judgments. 

Every one must and does recognize that we do not give 
full assent to all the judgments we make. But in these cases 
of doubtful adherence, we do not think that we are in error. 
We simply know that we have not yet arrived at a truth 
to which we can unconditionally assent. In cases where no 
doubt or hesitation remains, we assent fully, and we possess 
truth. 

Now what, one may ask, is the inner fundamental 
motive for assenting? It is the very evidence of the ob- 
ject itself as presented to the mind. We believe because 
the object forces us to. It is evident, it is obvious to the 
mind that two plus two equals four. Not only does the 
mind see the ground upon which it bases its acceptance of 
that proposition, it also sees that it must assent because 
the ground is really there as it is perceived. Objective evi- 
dence, therefore, is the determining factor in our acceptance 
of every proposition. It is, likewise, the controlling motive 
of the mind’s assent. Many may not think this a very 
strong criterion of truth, but it is the only positive criterion 
there is, and it is the one which every man uses. ! 

Realism acknowledges the existence of other criteria than 
the supreme criterion of objective evidence. These criteria 
are, however, secondary and derived, and while they possess 
undoubted methodological value, are in no sense of the 
word ultimate. In fact, if taken singly and independently 
of the supreme criterion, they are altogether insufficient. 
The realist knows but one final test of truth, the evidence 
which follows upon a careful study of anything we wish to 
know. 

To the objection that such a test gives us only a proba- 

1 Coffey, Epistemology, Vol. II, pp. 256 et seq. 


Oe ee ee ee eee eel eee 


ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee eee 


ee 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 239 


bility, we may reply that unless certitude is something quite 
different from what the great majority of men believe it to 
be, objective evidence gives us not probability but certitude. 
Neither is objective evidence some sort of magic key which 
opens up the kingdom of truth. The intellect must labor 
to acquire this evidence, it must analyze and scrutinize all 
the data presented to it. If, after a careful examination, 
the intellect is convinced, then we may be assured that the 
terms of the proposition presented are evident. For no 
other reason would the intellect give its assent.! 
Pragmatists often contend that the test of objective evi- 
dence would make the process of attaining ultimate truth 
mere child’s play in every realm of human knowledge. 
Such, however, is not the case. This objection is a mere 
travesty of realism for every realist knows that it is impos- 
sible to possess the same kind of evidence for the ultimate 
questions of philosophy or of religion as we have for the 
ultimate problems of mathematics. There is quite a differ- 
ence between the cogency of the evidence we may possess 
for one set of truths as against another, and the distinction 
between the truth of judgments and the credibility of 
judgments is a very real distinction. Some judgments 
are spontaneous. We are compelled to assent to them by 
an irresistible impulse, as is the case in the self-evident 
axioms of mathematics. Other judgments do not compel 
universal assent. I feel certain of their truth, I am con- 
vinced that my judgment is correct because the evidence 


1The student should read Newman, Grammar of Assent, Chaps. VIII and IX, 
where is described in a masterly way the Illative Sense. While Newman approaches 
the problem of certitude from its psychological side, nevertheless his conclusions 
justify the epistemology of the realist who believes that we can know truth, and 
that the primary test of truth is its objective evidence. Newman knew well all the 
criteria propounded by Pragmatism, but he did not exaggerate their place in the 
knowledge process. With him, ‘‘product is not confused with process, content 
with intent, the various processes and methods by means of which truth is attained 
with the real objective validity of truth itself.” Walker, Theories of Knowledge, 
p. 648. 


240 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


justifies my belief, notwithstanding the fact that many are 
not convinced as I am. 

The conclusion that we are forced to, after this somewhat 
lengthy examination of the problem of knowledge, is that 
man can know truth and that there exists a criterion by 
means of which he can distinguish truth from error. Both 
of these conclusions are based upon a dualistic metaphysics 
and are confirmed by our everyday experience. It is pre- 
cisely here that Absolutism with its coherence theory of 
truth fails to measure up to the requirements of a workable 
explanation of reality. Absolutism, because of its monistic 
assumptions, can scarcely hope to represent adequately 
human experience. In particular, so lifeless, so other- 
worldly, so far removed from our manner of thought, is its 
fundamental postulate of an Absolute Whole that we can 
only accept it for metaphysical reasons and without relating 
it to the exigencies of our human intellects, which become 
in this theory nothing better than illusions. 

Pragmatism, on the other hand, is more dynamic, more 
human than Absolutism. But it exaggerates the human 
element in knowledge by making man the sole measure of 
the universe, and this attitude leads directly to Subjectivism. 
Pragmatism sacrifices truth in the interests of individual 
needs. Its metaphysics is both ambiguous and unaccept- 
able, and its epistemology little better than a glorifica- 
tion of personal opinion. Likewise, the place which is given 
to the human will in the making of truth is out of all pro- 
portion to the réle it actually plays. Both Pragmatism and 
Absolutism have their good points. The emphasis which 
Absolutism places upon the intellect in the truth relation 
is of great value, while the major claim to our recognition 
on the part of Pragmatism is its insistence on the dynamic 
character of human truth. 

Realism, by steering a middle course between the ex- 


THE NATURE AND CRITERIA OF TRUTH 241 


aggerations of both Absolutism and Pragmatism, hopes 
to obviate the difficulties of each of these theories. Realism 
acknowledges the supremacy of the intellect in the making 
of truth, although at the same time it does not deny that 
utility and human needs influence our mental acceptances. 
For the realist neither coherence nor utility is an adequate, 
or better, an ultimate criterion of truth. He accepts a truth 
because it is objectively evident, because it truly repre- 
sents what exists outside the mind. Unless we accept this 
criterion as our guide, it is impossible to arrive at any truth. 
To know secondary principles is not enough for the simple 
reason that unless we can know with certainty the first 
principles of the ideal order, which form the basis of and 
enter into every form of knowledge, we are doomed to utter 
scepticism. These first principles are implicit in all our 
judgments, and all our inductions from facts, as well as all 
our deductive explanations of facts depend upon them. As 
Coffey concludes, “‘the real truth-value of all our knowl- 
edge, 1. €., its value as giving us a genuine insight into real- 
ity, depends altogether on whether the intellect, when its as- 
sent to such principles is compelled, thereby gets an insight 
into reality. And this, in turn, depends on whether the 
compelling factor is objective evidence, 1. e., the reality ttself 
presented as necessarily representable by intellect through 
such axiomatic judgments, as having and displaying a real 
exigency for such representation; or whether on the con- 
trary the compelling factor is a subjective influence which, 
whether conscious or unconscious, has no claim to any ev?- 
dential value, 7. e., to any significance as manifesting reality 
to the mind.” ! 

1 Coffey, Epistemology, p. 279. Particularly noteworthy is the concluding chapter 
of Walker’s Theories of Knowledge, in which it is pointed out that Realism, when 
correctly understood, may well claim to be a higher synthesis of both Absolutism 


and Pragmatism, since it sums up in itself what is true and significant in both 
theories, while discarding what is false. 


242 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 
REFERENCES 


BOSANQUET: Logic. 

BRADLEY: Appearance and Reality. 

CatrD: Hegel. 

CorFEy: Epistemology. 

DEwEy: Studies in Logical Theory. 

DriscoLtt: Pragmatism and the Problem of the Idea. 
GREEN: Prolegomena to Ethics. 

HEGEL: Logic, trans. Wallace. 

James: Pragmatism; The Meaning of Truth. 
JEANNIERE: Critertologia. 

Joacum: The Nature of Truth. 

MacintosH: The Problem of Knowledge. 

MERCIER: Critertiologie. 

Mivart: On Truth. 

NEWMAN: Grammar of Assent. 

Pratt: What is Pragmatism? 

RotHER: Truth and Certitude. 

SCHILLER: Humanism; Studies in Humanism; Formal Logic. 
VANCE: Reality and Truth. 

WALKER: Theories of Knowledge. 


CHAPTER VIII 
THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 


The problem of freedom, although generally discussed 
in relation to the human will, borders closely on the ulti- 
mate problems of both metaphysics and psychology. As 
a psychological question, it has to do with the genesis and 
nature of the ability of the individual to choose between 
conflicting motives, which choice determines how he shall 
act in any given case. From the point of view of meta- 
physics, freedom is bound up with the wider question of 
indeterminism versus determinism as an explanation of the 
universe as a whole. It, therefore, transcends the limits of 
a purely ethical or psychological theory and has its roots 
deep down in a general philosophy of the cosmos. 

It is possible to treat of particular ethical questions with- 
out raising problems in metaphysics. One cannot, however, 
probe the depths of morality without coming face to face 
with the fundamental aspects of ultimate reality. Our at- 
titude towards reality as a whole will determine what our 
morality shall be. The foundations of every ethics are 
metaphysical. If we are determinists, there can be no place 
in our philosophy for freedom. If, on the other hand, we 
do not view the universe as a closed system in which the 
reign of mechanical law is held to be supreme, we are inde- 
terminists, and shall most certainly concede to the human 
will a proper measure of freedom.1 

Our conceptions of morality, therefore, are determined 
by the view we take of nature as a whole. Moreover, our 

1 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II, pp. 189 et seq. 
243 


244 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


theories of the self and of its place in the universe, together 
with our theory of the nature and validity of knowledge, 
influence the view of human freedom and of morality which 
we defend. If the self cannot be a vera causa, and cannot 
control its actions, there is an end of free will. Moral con- 
sciousness is a fact which requires both interpretation and 
explanation. The way we regard its deliverances will, in 
a large measure, depend on the fundamental metaphysical 
and psychological postulates which we accept. 

For these reasons, no statement or discussion of the prob- 
lem of free will would be adequate which failed to take into 
account the wider aspects of the freedom problem. We 
must, therefore, determine beforehand whether metaphys- 
ically we are to accept or reject the position of Determinism. 
A full analysis and answer to that problem is the proper 
function of metaphysics. Here, however, we shall but 
briefly state the position and our criticism of it. Then we 
shall pass on to the special problem of this chapter, that of 
freedom of the will. 


Determinism.—Determinism has very close connections 
with Mechanism for the reason that all mechanists, ex- 
plaining the universe solely in terms of mechanical law, 
necessarily conclude to the universality and all-inclusiveness 
of their principles, from which no act, whether of nature or 
of man, can be excepted. Indeterminists, as a rule, follow 
the philosophy of Vitalism, though it must be acknowledged 
that the history of philosophy gives us numerous examples 
of thinkers who were teleologists and, at the same time, 
advocates of moral determinism. Vitalists do not deny that 
the law of causality holds good for natural phenomena. 
Moral actions, however, they believe to be caused by the 
Self and, therefore, are not conditioned exclusively by the 
causes which operate in the material universe. As moral 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 245 


acts they are outside the world process, which is subject, 
from every point of view, to the causal law. Determinism, 
however, acknowledges no such exceptions to the universal 
validity of causation. The laws of nature have been laid 
down and each and every part of nature is determined in 
its operations by these laws. This holds good both for the 
events of the physical world and the events of man’s mental 
and moral life! Every event has its origin in a previous 
event and is determined by that event, of which it is a nec- 
essary sequence. When the determinist philosophy is ap- 
plied to human acts, it means that all our actions are the 
necessary result of the nature of the individual. Choice 
plays no part in these acts, which are causally conditioned 
in much the same way as the functions of matter. ‘‘One’s 
character and environment are regarded, by the determin- 
ist, as the product of conditioning forces which reach back 
in an unending chain of succession. ‘This position also 
means that if we had a full knowledge of the antecedents 
of any act, as in practice of course we cannot have, we 
should understand the act, and should see why the act is 
just what it is. Nothing in conduct would then appear 
blind or a matter of chance.” ? 

Now, the principle of causality which holds that every 
event must be preceded by another event which it succeeds 
according to a specific law, is of course a purely phenomenal 


1 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II, p. 201, puts the position thus: 
““No Causality is recognized in the Universe except the necessary connexion of 
thought between phenomenal antecedent and phenomenal consequent. . . . The 
actions which the individual self knows are not in any case whatever the events 
which it causes, but just the events which it cannot help. If Causality is recognized 
at all in regard to human actions, it is recognized only in the same sense in which 
Causality is recognized between one natural event and another. The fact that the 
antecedents of human action are facts of consciousness makes no difference to their 
essential character. We have a ‘psychological mechanism’ instead of a physical 
mechanism; that is the only difference. It is not the self (individual or universal) 
that is the cause of action, but an event in consciousness which is the cause of other 
events in consciousness.” 

2 Everett, Moral Values, p. 336. 


246 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


construction of causality. From this uniform succession 
of antecedents and consequents, a synthesis is made which, 
taking into consideration both the time and space cate- 
gories, concludes to a series of successions which must form 
what Fouillée calls a ‘‘systéme de simultanéités.”! Each 
event is influenced by its predecessor and, in its turn, in- 
fluences its successor. This is what Kant speaks of as the 
law of phenomenal causality. From a mechanical expla- 
nation of a part of reality, the law is transferred to all real- 
ity. Mathematical and physical determinism is looked 
upon, therefore, as but the outer aspect of an interior or 
intellectual Determinism. 

The ancients did not debate the problem of free will. 
Their ethics revolved rather about the question of good and 
evil. Destiny, even fatalism, took the place of Determinism 
in Greek and Roman philosophy. The problem of free will 
is a contribution of Christianity to the world of thought. 
For theological reasons, Christian thinkers were the advo- 
cates and defenders of free will. Very early, however, in the 
history of Christian thought, efforts were made to put the 
theological doctrine on a purely philosophical basis. 

In modern thought the importance of the problem has 
grown rather than decreased. ? Spinoza was an out-and-out 
determinist,? and his philosophy of the will has found ad- 
herents in every form of modern Idealism. The denial of 
individual freedom is a necessary conclusion of Idealism, 
no matter under what guise Idealism presents itself. For 
if the principle of the universe is an unconscious force, we 

1 Fouillée, La Liberté et Le Déterminisme, p. 183. 

2 This statement does not coincide with that of Paulsen: ‘‘Modern philosophy, 
which is an outgrowth of the new natural sciences, has not, it is true, solved the 
problem; it has simply dropped it.” (A System of Ethics, p. 455.) Recent philosophi- 
cal literature, in our opinion, does not bear out the contention of Paulsen. Monists 
would like to see the question dropped, but unfortunately for their system, it keeps 


bobbing up constantly to plague them. 
3 Ethics, Part I, prop. 35. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 247 


cannot but conclude that it manifests itself without any 
regard for individual liberty. Contrary to the well-known 
fundamental moral purposes which actuated Kant, his 
philosophy represents a determinist conception of moral 
consciousness which has done more than any other theory 
to impose on modern thought a false idea of freedom. 
Deeply influenced by the Empiricism of Hume and Locke 
on the one hand and the Rationalism of Wolff on the other, 
Kant found himself face to face with two divergent cur- 
rents of thought, both of which ended in a denial of free 
will. He, therefore, became a determinist, although he 
afterwards straddled the problem in his Critique of Prac- 
tical Reason by granting that the will is free. The Kan- 
tian freedom is based on the moral law which of itself im- 
plies freedom. 

Materialism is essentially deterministic. Idealism has 
arrived, by a different route, at the same conclusion. The 
determinism of Empiricism is mechanical; that of Idealism, 
a logical determinism. In the last analysis all phenomena, 
whether physical or mental, are determined causally, both 
for the materialist and the idealist, in which case freedom 
of every kind is done away with.! 

The determinist tradition has been very strong in English 
philosophy. Beginning with Hobbes, such thinkers as Locke, 
Hume, and John Stuart Mill, have upheld successively the 
necessitarian position. No little impetus has been given 
to the spread of determinist ideas by the wide acceptance 
of voluntarism and the increasing hold which mechanistic 
science has had upon men of science. Within recent years, 
however, there is manifest a decided tendency to tone down 
the grim and remorseless conclusions inherent in necessi- 
tarianism and to acknowledge that moral obligation and 
the development of morality, both mdividual and social, 

1Naville, Le Libre Arbitre, p. 232. 


248 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


are ideals not altogether unworthy of effort on our part. 
Just as contemporary Materialism has thrown overboard 
many of the radical principles and conclusions of its nine- 
teenth century predecessor, so present-day moral determin- 
ism, repudiates in theory and practice the absurdities of 
fatalism and attempts, vainly we think, to harmonize its 
beliefs with the moral aspirations of mankind.! 


Criticism of Determinism.—Determinism as metaphysics 
involves a conception of the universe which is not acceptable 
on many counts. The difficulties inherent in Mechanism, 
whether pure or modified, have already been pointed out.’ 
Many modern scientists and philosophers are ready to-day 
to admit a certain amount of freedom in the realm of physi- 
cal science from which, up to this, it has been most rigor- 
ously banished. As early as 1874, Boutroux in his De la 
Contingence des Lois de la Nature, pointed out that no 
physical law is absolutely precise. Physical law expresses 
merely a quantitative approximation, more or less exact, 
between phenomena. It can never hope to be a perfect 
expression of fact as it really exists, for back of quantity 
lies quality, and over and above the phenomenon there is al- 
ways substance to be considered. Boutroux discovered con- 
tingency in individual cases and, from these, reasons to the 
general law. Realists would come to much the same con- 
clusion, but from another starting pomt. Leaving to one 
side the question of which method is right, the fact remains 
that many modern mathematicians are indeterminists and 
that the postulate of universal validity, as far as it is ap- 


1The student who wishes to trace the history of English Determinism, as well 
as to read a fair but exacting criticism and evaluation of this most important move- 
ment, should procure Rickaby, Free Will and Four English Philosophers. 

For a complete history of the problem, see George L. Fonsegrive, Essai sur le 
Libre Arbitre, pp. 1-305; Piat, La Liberté, Premiére Partie, pp. 13-35, confines his 
history to the nineteenth century. 

* See supra, Chapter V. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 249 


plicable to natural law, does not receive general support 
to-day.! 

Renouvier, the founder of Neo-Criticism in France, has 
done much to discredit Determinism in scientific circles. 
Fouillée, in his La Liberté et le Determinisme, takes 
as his thesis that Determinism and Indeterminism are 
equally false, and endeavors to arrive at a higher synthesis 
by pointing out that the idea of liberty, because of its in- 
herent power, must eventually realize itself and become 
true. Bergson has emphasized the profound life of the 
Ego, and from the psychological point of view, arrived 
at practically the same conclusions as Boutroux and Ren- 
ouvier.? 

One of the most important by-products of Determinism 
has been to deny the very existence, or, at least, the utility 
for modern science and philosophy of the category of finality. 
Final causes have been relegated to the storeroom of an- 
tiquated philosophical trappings, and in their place efficient 
causes now reign supreme. But, as we have already pointed 
out,* this practice of modern philosophy is not justifiable. 
There still remains a place for final causes in a critical phi- 
losophy if we would understand reality. For what is a final 
cause, in the last analysis? It is an idea, an abstract repre- 
sentation of a purpose to be attained. Purpose is essentially 
qualitative, and, as such, differs radically from motion, 
which is essentially quantitative. Every motion may be- 
come a motive. Nothing more is required than that the 
intellect abstract from the limiting concrete conditions 
under which motion can exist. Motive, therefore, is wider 
than motion. It approaches infinity; in fact, it surpasses 


1 Fonsegrive, Essai sur le Libre Arbitre, pp. 284 et seq. 

2 See Fonsegrive, Essai sur le Libre Arbitre, pp. 560 et seq. on the ‘‘ Philosophie de 
la Contingence.” 

8 See supra, p. 131. 


250 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


infinity. For the ideas of justice, goodness, duty, virtue 
know no limits.1 

Determinism reduces everything in the universe to mo- 
tions, the relations between which are fixed and the quantity 
of which cannot be increased or decreased. But, as we re- 
marked before, it is not true that motion is an all-sufficient 
explanation of reality, including thought. To conceive of 
thought as only a special kind of movement is to think an 
absurdity. Thought in no way resembles any physi- 
cal phenomenon, least of all does it resemble physio- 
logical actions like the circulation of the blood or di- 
gestion. Consciousness presents itself to us an indivisible 
whole, and in its operations it manifests the same indivisi- 
bility. Now, movement supposes something which passes 
from one point in space to another point. Consciousness, 
on the other hand, is an immanent function and, there- 
fore, in no intelligible sense of the word, a movement. 
Each function of consciousness, sensation, judgment, the 
emotions, willing are simple and by that very fact, irreduc- 
ible to physical movement. ‘That acts of consciousness 
are always paralleled by physiological functions does not 
argue to a fundamental identity of these radically dif- 
ferent phenomena. Neither do the discoveries in the field 
of psycho-physics, as for example, the Weber-Fechner Law, 
nor those of reaction time point to an identification of the 
physiological with the psychological. On the contrary, 
psycho-physics confirms us in our view that mental proc- 
esses are radically different from every known kind of phys- 
ical motion.’ 

Must we then conclude that a different series of laws holds 
good for the mental than for the physical world? To which 


1See Piat, La Liberté, Deuxiéme Partie, pp. 131-188, for a thorough discussion 
of the philosophy of final causes; also, Janet, Final Causes, trans. Affleck. 
2 See Piat, La Liberté, Deuxiéme Partie, pp. 189-215. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 251 


we might reply, what arguments force us to conclude that 
between facts so diverse as the mental and physical, the 
same set of laws of necessity must obtain? Neither logic nor 
fact compels us to the conclusion that the mind does not pos- 
sess its own laws and its own kind of functions. 

Every philosopher respects the desire of the scientist to 
attain, whenever possible, unity, simplicity, and continuity 
in all his constructions of nature. He likewise desires to 
banish chance as an element influencing the workings of 
natural law. Moreover, it is a laudable scientific ambition 
to envisage a time when we shall be able to predict with 
unfailing accuracy the course of every natural event. But 
the absence of prediction in the realm of mind does not 
argue to an overthrow of science. Freedom, if it exists, is 
only demanded by the philosopher for man. In the re- 
mainder of nature philosophy may concede to science an 
undisputed and unchallenged sway of blind law, provided 
the facts of nature demand and warrant such a position. 

That the self can be a true cause follows logically from a 
correct conception of the nature of the self. The Ego is 
something real, just as real as matter or motion. It pos- 
sesses both unity and continuity, otherwise the manifold 
impressions of our daily life could never be built up into a 
single world. The acknowledgment of the existence of a 
self lies at the basis of all morality. And not only does the 
self exist, but it is a cause. This point shall be brought 
out somewhat in detail later on in this chapter. 

Determinism reads out of the universe ideas and ideals 
whose value is not only primary for our individual lives, 
but upon the absolute truth of which all civilization de- 
pends. Every doctrine of metaphysical necessity is fatal 
to all our conceptions of duty, merit, punishment, and value. 
That the individual self is a cause, and that certain actions 
must be attributed to this self; that, moreover, some actions 


252 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


are good and some bad, are primary postulates of all 
Ethics. These propositions may be illusions, or may be 
valid only on a certain plane of thought. At the present 
moment these statements need not be discussed. But that 
they are vital to morality and must mean something, every 
one will acknowledge who appreciates what the word 
“ought” entails in every rational scheme of morality. 
Morality is a datum of consciousness—of this fact there can 
be no dispute. Nor can we deny this if we are prepared 
to accept any of the deliverances of consciousness. 

Now, morality implies duty, merit, value. Determinism 
would do away with all this, and would therefore not only 
leave both mankind and the world poorer by doing so, but 
would distort human life beyond recognition. A morality 
which would be more than an aspiration cannot flow from 
material causes, nor exist in material things. As Rashdall 
so well remarks, ‘‘ For the man who regards all spiritual life as 
a mere inexplicable incident in the career of a world which is 
essentially material and as a whole essentially purposeless, 
there is no conclusive reason why all moral ideas—the very 
conception of ‘value,’ the very notion that one thing is 
intrinsically better than another, the very conviction that 
there is something which a man ought to do—may not be 
merely some strange illusion due to the unaccountable 
freaks of a mindless process or to the exigencies of natural 
selection.” } 


The Meaning of Free Will.—A great deal of confusion 
has been caused by the use of the word “freedom” in many 


1 The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II, p. 210. 

The efforts of some determinist moralists who attempt to show that Determinism 
is consistent with freedom, or that if responsibility and punishment are reinterpreted 
in a determinist sense they acquire a higher value for Ethics than the same ideas as 
understood by indeterminists, strikes one as a pure dialectical tour de force, or as an 
unworthy exit from the fatalistic consequences which logically follow upon every 
thoroughgoing system of moral determinism. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 253 


and often opposing senses. The word “Determinism” has 
also suffered in much the same way, so that to-day many 
thinkers call themselves determinists, in contrast to the 
indeterminist who refuses to accept any sort of determina- 
tion whatsoever where acts of the will are concerned. Many 
determinists, however, repudiate altogether the claims 
of metaphysical mechanism in the field of human act, 
and concede to the will the power of self-determination. 
Their determinism, therefore, is a ‘‘self-determinism.”’ As 
we shall see presently, this sort of Determinism is quite 
capable of being defended and need not clash with the idea 
of human freedom. 

The plain man believes himself to be free. He considers 
many, if not the vast majority of his acts, to be the products 
of free will, and therefore indetermined by any causes either 
within his own nature or in the universe at large. Some of 
his acts are good and some bad, but from his past no one 
can predict how he shall act in the future. His present 
character or nature, although it may deeply influence many 
of his actions, does not determine them to the extent that 
one who knew his character thoroughly would be able to 
predict how he should act in any given case. 

We believe the plain man to be right, at least in principle. 
A critical examination of these beliefs may not justify him 
to the extent to which he is committed to them, neither 
would it necessarily favor his peculiar theory of freedom. 
At bottom, however, he is correct when he asserts that the 
will is free. 

Freedom in general is absence from restraint. Restraint 
may be either external or internal. If there be no external 
restraint, the thing is free. Thus, for example, we would 
say that a river flows freely if no one constructs a dam to 
interfere with its normal flow. An animal is free if it be 
permitted to follow its natural desires. There is no ques- 


254 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


tion of this kind of freedom where the will is concerned. 
Both determinist and indeterminist readily admit that 
man is physically free. 

Again, a being is said to be free when it is not constrained 
by any internal force. Such is the freedom of the human 
will which is capable of determining its own actions. But 
we must be careful to distinguish between free acts and 
acts of the will which, although proceeding from an internal 
principle with an apprehension of the end to be attained, 
cannot be said to be free. Such are all our spontaneous or 
instinctive reactions. On the other hand, there are acts 
which proceed from the will but only after we have delib- 
erated upon an end which we have perceived and which 
we are conscious of to the extent that we prefer this rather 
than another course of action. This is human freedom in 
the strictest sense of the word. In this sense, freedom may 
and does imply that we act in obedience to reason, in which 
case only good acts are free. This, however, is a metaphys- 
ical use of the word and should be rigidly excluded from our 
argument. 

Freedom, in the narrow sense, means that our acts pro- 
ceed from the self which is not determined in its choice by 
any mechanical law. Freedom is self-determination. It 
does not involve, as we shall point out, the idea of chance, 
neither does it signify that our acts have no antecedent 
causes of any kind which may determine their course. 

Liberty may remain even though it be determined by 
something, if that something be the self. Freedom, there- 
fore, is not causeless. What libertarians wish to assert is 
that the cause of some of the phenomena of will is not to be 
found in any preceding phenomenon, but only in the free- 
dom with which the will itself is endowed. This distinction 
is of vital significance for it clearly differentiates our posi- 
tion from that of mechanical necessarianism, which looks 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM pee 


upon all actions as caused by other physical actions which 
precede them. If these meanings were always clearly held, 
little or no confusion would result from the use of the terms 
Determinism and Indeterminism. Unfortunately such has 
not been the case, with the result that on few questions is 
there so much misunderstanding. However, at bottom, the 
controversy is not one of words, and if one holds the will 
to be free, in the sense pointed out, it makes little or no 
difference what name he gives to his philosophy. 

Rational man alone is free.t There is no freedom where 
sensation solely is concerned. Unless man were able to 
choose between motives presented to his mind, there could 
be no question of liberty, which necessarily implies a meas- 
uring of the values of the ends presented to consciousness. 
Now, it is impossible to measure the value of a thing unless 
we can know its essence, and essences escape us except by 
reasoning upon what is presented to the mind. Liberty, 
therefore, would be a farce if man did not possess the power 
of reason. For, as Piat remarks, “‘to will freely is to choose; 
but no one can choose what he does not know and he can 
choose only in the proportion in which he does know.” ? 

Again, freedom is not motiveless willing. No rational 
action is possible unless it is inspired by a motive. The free- 
willist, however, denies that this motive must be confused 
with something either in a man’s environment or his char- 
acter. Motives are presented to reason, and reason chooses 
not without but between motives. If only one motive should 
be presented, the consequent act would not be free. 

Neither do we deny that man, in his choices, follows the 


1‘‘Pour trouver la liberté, ce n’est ni le fer doux ni l’amibe qu’il faut observer, 
mais soi-méme et dans soi-méme, ce n’est pas l’animal qu’il faut voir, mais ’homme, 
je veux dire cette partie supérieure de notre nature qui dépasse le monde des images, 
ou s’épanouit lidée. La seulement apparait et s’exerce cette puissance d’un ordre 
a part qui s’appelle la liberté.”—Piat, La Liberté, Deuxiéme Partie, p. 32. 

2 Piat, La Liberté, Deuxiéme Partie, p. 14. 


256 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


“strongest motive.” The very fact that he acts on a mo- 
tive makes the particular motive, as far as the individual 
goes, the strongest. But whether this motive is strongest 
in any other than a relative sense, we have no criterion for 
determining. Granted that we always act according to the 
strongest motive, what is it that makes a particular motive 
the strongest? If it is not man’s character, nor the mechan- 
ical laws of nature, but his inherent power to determine for 
himself the strength of motives, then such an objection 
proves nothing at all against the doctrine of freedom of the 
will. 

It is a pure travesty of the indeterminist position to speak 
as if he believed that willing is a causeless act. Thus, Ev- 
erett | asserts ‘‘that a choice which has no ground, no de- 
termining motive, cannot be a reasonable choice”; a state- 
ment with which all, even the indeterminist, will agree. 
But such is not the position of those who believe in freedom. 
On the contrary, there is a ground, a cause for our choices, 
namely, the self, which, because of its possession of the 
power of reason, is endowed with the faculty of choice. Nor 
does this view necessitate our looking upon the will as ‘‘a 
kind of special dynamo, held in reserve, to be used only on 
occasion.” * The will is one of the many faculties of man. 
It is in no sense of the word a distinct independent entity, 
entirely uninfluenced by sensation, feeling, or thought. 

Determinism, in order to deny all self-determining ac- 
tivity to the Ego, is compelled by sheer logic to unite effi- 
cient and final causality, or better, to reduce all finality to 
the status of efficient causes.2 But, from our point of view, 
it is an error to attempt to express physical and psycholo- 
gical causation in the same terms, for the way an Ego causes 


1 Moral Values, p. 348. 
2 Everett, Moral Values, p. 353. 
3 See Everett, Moral Values, p. 351, on the unity of efficient and final causation. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM an7 


something is not at all the same as the way in which me- 
chanical causation occurs. ‘‘The Self is not an event or a 
series of events.” 1 Neither are motives, feelings, nor any 
other psychical influence distinct and apart from the Self. 
On the contrary, they could not exist except for the Self 
which makes them what they are. 

Another aspect of causality must be kept in mind when 
discussing free-will. The will is self-moved; it is the cause 
of its own acts. This does not mean that it is a “‘causeless 
cause,’’ or that it has its nature from itself. At this point, 
it seems necessary to admit quite frankly that freedom, in 
any intelligible meaning of the word, postulates the exist- 
ence of a First Cause, God. But there is nothing in the 
idea of a First Cause which would require a toning down of 
our thesis which accepts self-determination on the part of 
the human will, nor of the fact of our responsibility for 
acts thus freely willed. We most stoutly affirm that the 
will cannot have any phenomenal cause outside itself which 
determines all its acts. At the same time, we cannot deny 
that our wills depend on God, the source of all life and en- 
ergy, from whom the will, like everything else, derives its 
nature and its power to act. Such an admission brings us 
face to face with certain theological aspects of the problem 
of free will. 

But what the relations of the First Cause to any second- 
ary cause are is without the scope of this argument. For 
the present, therefore, admitting the necessity of postulat- 
ing the existence of a First Cause for an intelligent and com- 
plete understanding of human activity, we simply affirm 
the Self to be the cause of its acts according to the laws of 
its nature laid down from the beginning. 

A great deal of the prejudice against free will current in 
scientific circles is due to the belief that indeterminists claim 

1 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II, p. 326. 


258 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


for free will a range of freedom which is incompatible with 
the facts of life as we know them. Now, some indetermin- 
ists, and the plain man may exaggerate the extent to which 
we are free. The philosopher, however, is quite frank in 
acknowledging that relatively few of our daily acts are free 
in the strict sense of the word. Neither does he fail to 
recognize the large réle which motive determined often by 
heredity, character, habits, or environment plays in the 
acts of every man. Again, it is quite possible to predict 
with accuracy what a given number of individuals will do 
under ordinary circumstances. For example, we can safely 
say that if something to drink is presented to a dozen thirsty 
men all will drink. It is also true that if we had a perfect 
knowledge of all the factors, hereditary and environmental, 
which operate on the individual, we would be able to pre- 
dict, with a certain amount of accuracy, precisely what his 
reactions would be to any given stimulus. 

Yet, in spite of the influences which from every quarter 
bear in upon us, are there not some acts which man freely 
performs, which no necessity forces upon him, for which 
there is no ‘‘must” but simply a “will”? The problem 
reduced to its ultimate elements is something like this— 
granting all possible limitations on the action of the 
will is man not able, in spite of these influences, to de- 
termine which motive presented to his mind is strongest 
and thus to determine actively what course of action he 
shall pursue? Or, to put the question in another way—is 
every act which we perform to be referred completely to 
such determining causes as heredity and environment, or 
are there not acts which, admitting these influences, cannot 
be explained without postulating another and entirely new 
fact, namely, man’s power to choose freely? To the ques- 
tion stated in some such way, the advocate of free will an- 
swers in the affirmative. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 259 


Arguments in Favor of Free Will.—The arguments 
ordinarily advanced by those who accept the freedom of the 
will may be classified under three principal headings. These 
arguments are drawn from psychology, ethics, and meta- 
physics. Taken singly they may not appear to be alto- 
gether convincing. If viewed as one argument their cu- 
mulative force is such that no doubt can possibly remain as 
to what our attitude must be in regard to the doctrine of 
freedom of the human will. 

If freedom is a fact, we should be able to find experimen- 
tal proof of its existence. Liberty is not merely an academic 
thesis to be proved by a priori reasoning. Men, we claim, 
are free. What then are the indications or signs which 
prove that they act freely? 

In the first place, it is a quite universal conviction of man- 
kind that it is possible for the will to choose freely. Nor do 
we get rid of this fact, attested so plainly by consciousness, 
by calling it an illusion. A survey of the different acts of 
consciousness demonstrates that my actions are not due 
to ignorance, nor to any lack of knowledge of the causes 
which are operative in my choice. On the contrary, I know 
with certainty that the Self is the cause of these processes. 
Some of my actions are not free. These are readily dis- 
tinguished from acts which I know to have been free. It 
may well be that in any given instance I do not analyze 
thoroughly the different motives which are presented to 
me. In spite of the lack of analysis, I am positively sure 
that in making a decision the act proceeded from me, and 
not from causes over which I have no control. Let us sup- 
pose, for the sake of argument, that our sense of freedom is 
an illusion. In this case, our consciousness of freedom 
would be in inverse proportion to the knowledge of the mo- 
tives which prompted our acts. An analysis of conscious- 
ness, however, proves that when I have the least knowledge 


260 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


of the motives which prompted my choice, it is then that 
I regard my acts as more or less irresponsible and do not 
look upon them as free. 

The belief of every man, whether plain or philosopher, 
in the fact of human freedom is borne out by an introspec- 
tive analysis of the various elements discoverable in our 
daily volitions. The process of voluntary attention, for 
example, gives a concrete and unmistakable expression 
of freedom in mental activity. Not only may I refuse to 
pay attention to any object of thought which is presented 
to my mind, but if I do decide to attend, my mind has the 
power to select out those particular elements which I wish 
to concentrate upon. These elements may not be the most 
appealing to me personally, nor need they possess the great- 
est intellectual cogency. However, it is the particular as- 
pect of the thought-object which I wish to consider, and 
who will deny that I may, in spite of any attraction in the 
opposite direction, concentrate on that aspect in preference 
to every other? Now, if this be not freedom, in what more 
explicit way could consciousness manifest to me the fact 
of my freedom? ! 

Again, the very act of deliberation implies freedom. 
Suppose, for example, that it is possible for me to select 
one out of many ways of doing a thing. Before the many 
possibilities I hesitate. I begin to evaluate the different 
courses presented to me. I decide to act on one possibility, 
or, better, I decide to defer my decision until a later time. 
Now, if I were determined to a course of action by my own 
character or nature, the aforesaid act of deliberation would 
be impossible. Such a conclusion is revolting to the com- 
mon sense of every man. Nor is my deliberation due to 
ignorance of the causes which are operating on me. I know 


1 Piat, La Liberté, Deuxiéme Partie, p. 253; Fonsegrive, Essai sur le Libre Arbitre, 
pp. 396-421; Naville, Le Libre Arbitre, pp. 110 et seq. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 261 


that I control the course of my deliberations. The proof of 
this last statement arises from a consideration of the many 
times when I vacillated between conflicting courses of ac- 
tion, or followed a course which was imposed upon me for 
one reason or another. 

Hesitation is not deliberation (a fact which many deter- 
minists ignore) for in the latter case I actively choose to do 
a thing because the reasons submitted to my mind are of 
such a character that I judge them to be sufficient justifica- 
tion for proceeding as I do. ‘‘This important fact,” as 
Maher remarks, “‘is constantly overlooked in attacks on 
the argument from introspection. Were I free in all my 
actions perhaps my knowledge of moral freedom would not 
be so clear. Were a man always hungry his conception of 
hunger would be imperfect. I have learned what free, se/f- 
determined, conative activity is by having been repeatedly 
the subject of conative activity which was not free or de- 
termined by myself, but the spontaneous and necessary out- 
come of my character and the motives playing upon me.”’ ! 

Not only am I free to attend and to deliberate, but I also 
freely decide what I desire to do. If my act is good, reason 
approves; if it is evil, shame and remorse follow upon the 
commission of the act. Now, I know from introspection 
that I have elected freely to do the thing which was done, 
and that it was possible for me to do otherwise. It is sheer 
nonsense to say that the decision was the result of my char- 
acter, and not of the Self. Even the determinist acknowl- 
edges that I may change the course of my life by changing 
the inclinations of my character. But in this very act of 
decision, is there not a surreptitious introduction of the 
idea of freedom into a context where everything is supposed 
to be determined? To our way of looking at the question, 
the only safe course for every thoroughgoing philosophy 


1 Psychology, p. 409. 


262 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


of determinism is to deny outright the claim of the individ- 
ual, based on the data of consciousness, to be able to decide 
upon one or another course of action. 

In all probability the most significant psychological tes- 
timony to the freedom of the will is the fact that we often 
do, in spite of the strongest temptation to the contrary, 
persevere in a certain course of action. Every motive for 
changing my way of acting is present or continually recurs. 
The pressure to change is at times terrific. No positive act 
is necessary for me to give in to the temptations which be- 
siege me. All I need do is to stop struggling and follow the 
line of least resistance. But I struggle on, and in spite of 
my desires or leanings, actually decide to do good. The 
whole struggle, and my final decision, are simply inexpli- 
cable psychological facts in any determinist philosophy. 
To contend that never was my decision free, that the whole 
struggle was an illusion, that it was ordained beforehand 
how I should act, that my final victory was not a victory at 
all in any true meaning of the word, is to uphold the incred- 
ible. The individual man may be deceived when he says 
that he is free morally, but if he is deceived, it is only fair 
to point out that the whole human race is deceived along 
with him. 

The ethical argument favorable to free will is of the ut- 
most importance and cogency. The moral consciousness 
is a fact no less than the physical universe, which must be 
interpreted and explained. Now, if it cannot be explained 
adequately on any other assumption than that the human 
will is free, we are forced to accept this doctrine. Perhaps 
our psychology or metaphysics may clash with such an as- 
sumption. But if the assumption is justified, and we think 
that it is, rather than refuse to accept the doctrine of free 
will, it might be well to revise both our psychology and met- 
aphysics so as to bring them into harmony with the facts 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 263 


of morality. Likewise, because the belief in free will had 
its origin in religious thought, and is intimately bound up 
with certain theological ideas, need not frighten the phi- 
losopher who is not imbued with the odium theologicum. 
That every man possesses the sense of moral obligation 
seems incontestable. No appeal to history is necessary to 
prove this fact. Every man, looking into his own conscience, 
appreciates only too well that there are certain acts which 
he must perform and others which he must avoid. Nor is 
this sense of moral obligation a mere generalization from 
experience or the result of hereditary factors over which we 
have no control. It is an immediate and intuitive expres- 
sion of every man as soon as he is capable of distinguishing 
right from wrong; it is a universal characteristic of every 
rational being. As Kant puts it: “‘Thou canst because thou 
oughtst.’”’ The conclusion is self-evident, for if one ought 
to do a thing, it must be possible for him not to doit. The 
categorical imperative is senseless unless we suppose that 
the individual has it within his power to act otherwise.! 
Obligation can have no meaning for ethical determination 
unless it be reinterpreted in a sense that shall include as 
obligations actions which were performed as the result of 
inevitable choices, which were themselves determined. 
Intimately bound up with the idea of obligation are the 
ideas of remorse, repentance, merit, and desert. These 
moral judgments have both validity and value—the uni- 
versal use of them by mankind is sufficient proof of that. 
But why should one be sorry for an act over which he had 
no control, or manifest repentance for an evil deed which he 
could not avoid? To question the rationality of remorse is 
to overthrow all our conceptions of the moral life. It does 
not add to an intelligent understanding of the universe to 
claim that the moral and the mechanical are identical. In 


1 Piat, La Liberté, Premiére Partie, pp. 37 et seq. 


264 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


fact, reason rebels against such a view. The mechanical can 
be made synonymous with the moral only on the assump- 
tion that we suppress all the noteworthy characteristics of 
the moral which make it what it is. What has been said 
of remorse, may be repeated of merit. The whole concep- 
tion of merit is foolish if my acts are but the result of my 
character, and not free. 

Determinists, as a rule, are frank to admit that these 
meanings have a “‘genuine moral significance for freedom 
and responsibility.” + They explain, however, such moral 
sentiments as responsibility, punishment, and merit in 
terms of necessity, and concede to them only a secondary 
role in the making of our moral judgments. Punishment, 
for example, cannot change the nature of an act already 
necessitated. It may however bring new motives into 
action and thus prevent me from doing wrong in the future. 
But, as we have already remarked, Determinism has dis- 
covered in this only a new ethical language or, better, given 
new meanings to old words consecrated to quite different 
meanings in the language and literatures of all peoples. 
That such reinterpretations of our commonly accepted 
moral emotions and sentiments have been made is no argu- 
ment for their truth. What the philosopher is interested 
in is not the manufacture of a new language for ethics, but 
the elaboration of a theory which harmonizes with facts and 
with the sentiments of the human race as far as morality 
goes, and which, based upon facts, explains them in an ade- 
quate and acceptable fashion. 

Determinism also rejects the value of such judgments as 
responsibility and justice, at least in the sense in which these 
terms are commonly understood. And how are these terms 
generally understood? In the first place, I feel myself ac- 
countable for all my acts, of which I am conscious at the 

1 Everett, Mental Values, p. 370, 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 265 


time of doing them, and to whose moral quality I had ad- 
verted. Not only are the acts judged good or bad, but I 
judge that I, the author of these acts, am responsible for 
their gooaness or badness. This sense of personal responsi- 
bility receives moral emphasis from the fact that, if I do an 
act which is not free, I in no sense feel responsible for it. 

Secondly, the idea of justice underlies all our conceptions 
of right and wrong, and justice means simply that we act 
according to law. But if all acts are determined by law, 
there remains no place for those which we call unjust. The 
whole fabric of our value-judgments, therefore, seems to 
rest upon a belief in the freedom of the will. So true is this 
that human freedom is undoubtedly a necessary postulate 
for the continued existence of social life itself. For social 
life is inconceivable unless a certain minimum of right living 
is generally accepted and lived up to by all. Character, 
nurture, patriotism, are but aids to the sense of moral obli- 
gation. They are, in no sense of the word, an adequate 
substitute for moral responsibility and obligation. Evil is 
not a theory; it is a fact, and a very unhappy one. Its 
suppression, both in the individual and in society, depends 
more upon a vigorous development of the sense of individ- 
ual responsibility than upon any other single factor. If 
society is to endure, it can only do so if it will frankly and 
openly acknowledge that man is free, that not in the laws 
of nature, but in his own sense of freedom and individual 
accountability rests the future both of the individual and 
of the social organism as well.’ 

The philosophical argument favorable to free will centers 
about the nature of the human will which is a rational ap- 
petite. The will is drawn towards that which is agreeable, 
namely, the good. The good is its proper object. But only 
the perfect good under every possible aspect possesses within 

1Maher, Psychology, pp. 398-406; Naville, Le Libre Arbitre, pp. 106-146. 


266 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


itself the power to force the will to accept it. Supposing, 
however, that our apprehension of the good is limited be- 
cause of the natural limitations of man’s faculties, it follows 
that the will is not drawn irresistibly to any perceptible 
good. In other words, man acts or refuses to act on the 
basis of his conception of the desirability of the good which 
is presented to his mind. In our present existence, since 
no good is perceived which can command at all times his 
total adherence, there remains the possibility of selecting 
that good which seems to him to contain the greatest pos- 
sibilities for his happiness. Freedom, therefore, is the nat- 
ural result of the possession of a faculty capable of appre- 
hending the universal good, but which, because of its natural 
limitations, must judge for itself, amid the manifold kinds 
of goods presented, which particular one is most desirable. 
Man’s judgment, of course, is often erroneous. That 
very fact proves that he is not determined by forces out- 
side himself to the acceptance of a necessitated line of 
action.! 

To the student it may seem strange that the will is inde- 
termined, but this is no stranger than that the intellect 
can think different thoughts. Both acts are, in the last anal- 
ysis, the acts of two faculties whose peculiar nature is to 
act in that special fashion. If the mind were like a furnished 
room containing pieces of furniture, it would indeed be dif- 
ficult to see how any changes could take place from day to 
day. But the mind is not distinct from its states in the 
sense that they are two different things. The mind and its 
states are one. It is the mind which is indetermined, and 
which freely determines what states shall exist. 


Criticism, of the Doctrine of Free Will.—In outlining the 
meaning of freedom as we understand and defend it, many 
1 Fonsegrive, Essai sur Le Libre Arbitre, pp. 435-452. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 267 


of the objections ordinarily leveled against this doctrine 
have been exposed and answered. Here, therefore, we shall 
confine our attention to those difficulties which have not 
been answered above, and which seem to possess more than 
a passing significance.? 

One of the principal difficulties brought against Free Will 
is that from physiology, which affirms that every psycho- 
logical act is conditioned by a previous change in the physical 
organism. All our mental acts are so determined by pre- 
ceding or concurrent physiological functions that in no in- 
telligible sense of the word can they be held to be inde- 
termined. To which we might reply, that no psychologist 
questions the dependence of the mental upon bodily func- 
tion. However, we cannot agree with the statement that 
the dependence is so close that bodily function determines 
and conditions absolutely every mental process. Eminent 
physiologists likewise agree with this point of view, and as 
strong a case can be made out by them for the conditioning 
of the bodily by the mental as vice versa. In the present 
state of our knowledge it may be asserted confidently that 
physiology has not discovered a single fact which militates 
against the belief in freedom.? 

The psychological argument brought against freedom 
may be stated briefly in the following manner. There is no 
such act as motiveless willing known to psychology. We 


1 The student who wishes to acquaint himself with all the objections should read 
Naville, Le Libre Arbitre, pp. 146 et seq., chapter ‘‘ Objections a4 la Liberté.” 

? Naville makes the distinction between the ‘‘période direcirice et la période 
executive’ in our acts and points out that only in the first case is there any such thing 
as freedom. ‘‘Vous formez,” he writes, ‘‘la résolution d’executer un mouvement; 
cette résolution se traduit par un phénoméne materiel primitif dans votre organisme 
cerebral. A dater de ce moment, tout dans votre corps se passe selon des lois abso- 
lument fixes. Le mécanicien d’une locomotive la dirige sur la voie dans un sens ou 
dans l’autre. A partir de son acte de direction, sa volonte n’a plus aucune influence 
sur l’exécution qui résulte uniquement de l’organisation de la machine et des lois de 
la mécanique. II en est de méme des rapports de la volonte avec le corps.” (Le 
Libre Arbiire, p. 147.) 


268 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


act because we are moved to do so by something within us. 
This something is the result of either heredity or education. 
Each new scientific investigation of the will brings out more 
clearly the fact that the will is influenced by many motives, 
but none of these is free. 

No one can deny that the act of volition is complex, often- 
times extraordinarily so. While admitting this fact, it is 
necessary to point out that there remains a very real dis- 
tinction, which this difficulty fails to take into account, 
between motives and the choice itself. Motives there must 
be before there can be any choice, but the two are not to be 
confused. The internal experience of each man proves 
beyond cavil that such a distinction is real, and that even 
in the presence of the strongest motive one may still choose 
and elect to do otherwise. 

Another difficulty arises from the fact that very often, 
knowing another man’s character, habits, and the environ- 
ment in which he lives, we are able to predict what he shall 
do under certain given circumstances. To which we might 
reply that such predictions are likely to be true in the ma- 
jority of cases of the actions of any man, but notinall. Lib- 
erty we must remember is essentially relative. However, 
it is real and defies anything like an exact scientific predic- 
tion as to what will be done under every circumstance. 
Again, our predictions are confined generally to merely 
external acts, the majority of which every one acknowledges 
to be determined. Unless they take in the field of internal 
acts, our prophecies are as often as not false. Finally, no 
libertarian denies the effect of heredity, environment, and 
education upon the formation of habits. Given a minute 
knowledge of these in any case, a fairly accurate estimate 
of the way a man will ordinarily act can be made. But such 
an estimate is not, and cannot be, as we know from expe- 
rience, infallible. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 269 


The scientific advances made in the study of morality and 
of society during the last half century have occasioned for 
some a formidable difficulty against human freedom. Social 
statistics, we are told, prove that a large number of acts, 
formerly considered free, are now looked upon as deter- 
mined. Morality is much more dependent upon climate, 
culture, social institutions, and other non-individual factors 
than we would have acknowledged before the rise of modern 
sociology. Statistics prove beyond a doubt that the number 
of suicides, for example, rises and falls in any given social 
ambient altogether independent of freedom of the will. In 
defense of this position determinists cite long lists of statis- 
tics which are invoked to show that crime is not so much an 
individual thing as it is the product of the general conditions 
existing in society itself. To which objection many possible 
answers may be given. Firstly, one must not be deceived 
by the superficial scientific character which statistics 
possess. Figures do not lie, but always supposing that the 
figures are correct. In no field, perhaps, is it more difficult 
to obtain accurate figures than in that of the social sciences, 
and in no field have figures been more abused. Even 
accepting the data ordinarily given as exact, what do these 
statistics prove? Nothing more than that groups of men, 
not individuals, act in a certain uniform way. Such 
uniformity is no argument against the freedom of the 
individual. It is simply a conclusion from our knowledge 
of the facts which, in the majority of cases, determine the 
actions of the majority of men. Even the most extreme 
defender of freedom quite willingly acknowledges that many 
of our acts are determined. He is likewise ready to admit 
the influence of both character and education upon the 
course of a man’s life. Such admissions, however, are a 
long distance from the acceptance of the thesis of Deter- 
minism that each and every act of man is inexorably de- 


270 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


termined by conditions over which he can have no con- 
trol. 

The most serious difficulty, for the modern mind, in- 
volved in the doctrine of freedom arises from the conception 
of the cosmos which holds sway in scientific circles, a 
conception which maintains that everything in this universe 
is determined, even the acts of the human will. The sci- 
entist sees no reason for making an exception of human acts. 
Any exception to the uniformity of nature’s laws offends 
against his ideas of simplicity and continuity. There is no 
place for chance in a reasonable universe, and free acts are 
merely the result of chance. If human acts have a begin- 
ning, then they cannot be accounted for on any other basis 
than that they are the outcomes of something already in 
existence before that beginning. New beginnings in an 
ordered world are inconceivable. 

To this difficulty many answers may be given. Perhaps 
it will be sufficient to point out that the causal explanation 
must be limited even in the realms of pure science. Time, 
space, matter set limits to causality. Why, we ask, cannot 
the same be said of intellect, will, the self, human personal- 
ity? Certainly, mind is as elemental as matter, and why 
should not its fundamental qualities be as good a criterion 
for our judging the applicability of causality as the 
elementary qualities of matter? Again, human action is 
not “‘chance”’ action. It is the result of the operation of the 
self which is the final and determining factor in all acts of 
volition. Of course, if the self cannot be a vera causa then 
we are compelled to reject a priori the possibility of freedom. 
But if the self may weigh, evaluate, choose, and decide, and 
it is our contention that it can, then it is a pure travesty of 
the nature of voluntary actions to describe them as without 


1 Fonsegrive, Essai sur le Libre Arbitre, pp. 311 et seq.; also Naville, Le Libre 
Arbitre, pp. 177-188. 


THE PROBLEM OF FREEDOM 271 


a beginning. They begin in the Self, whose proper nature 
is to initiate acts just as it is the proper nature of the 
intellect to think, or of a stone to fall to the ground when 
thrown in the air. And from where does the Self obtain this 
faculty of initiation? From the same source that the laws of 
nature emanate—God. 

That Free Will is a doctrine which can be maintained, 
and by abundant proofs, is the conclusion which we draw 
from the above examination of the claims of Determinism 
and Indeterminism. It is our belief that Determinism has 
not proved its case in the field of human activity. Both 
conscience and reason point to freedom of the will and, in 
this, philosophy agrees with the viewpoint of the plain man, 
who also believes in freedom. Common sense, it may be, 
exaggerates the freedom of our acts, while minimizing the 
freedom element in our evaluation of motives. In this it is 
probably wrong. However, at bottom, the philosopher 
agrees with the man in the street that we are free, and for 
human life this is the fundamental thing. 

No thinker, however, can close his eyes to the fact that 
the doctrine of freedom presents difficulties. These diffi- 
culties are many, but are not, we think, irreconcilable with 
a reasonable and scientific theory of the universe. At any 
rate, these objections are less formidable than those which 
may be brought against Determinism. On the side of free- 
dom is the testimony of each man’s consciousness, rein- 
forced by the fact that he lives and acts as if not only he, 
but all other men, were free. Against this universal belief 
and fact stands a theory which looks upon the universe 
as purely material, and reduces all manifestations of activity 
perceptible therein to different degrees of motion. Partic- 
ularly, it views the central factor of the world, man, as but a 
part of this huge cosmic machine and interprets, as Leighton 
points out, ‘‘the meaning and destiny of the whole life of the 


272 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


spirit in the light of an arithmetical average.” 1 But this 
interpretation is ‘‘untrue to the meaning of the whole. Not 
the so-called ‘divine average’ but the highest and rarest 
and most excellent that has been lived by men is the key 
to the meaning of spiritual individuality, of selfhood or 
personality in man.” 


REFERENCES 


ALEXANDER: Moral Order and Progress. 

Bain: Emotions and Will. 

BoSANQUET: The Value and Destiny of the Individual. 
DuBray: Introductory Philosophy. 

EVERETT: Moral Values. 

FONSEGRIVE: Essai sur le Libre Arbitre. 

FourttEE, A.: La Liberté et le Determinisme. 
GREEN: Prolegomena to Ethics. 

GRUENDER: Free Will. 

GUTBERLET: Die Willensfreiheit und thre Gegner. 
Hopcson: The Philosophy of Experience. 

James: Principles of Psychology. 

Kure: Introduction to Philosophy. 

Lapp: Philosophy of Conduct. 

Leicuton: The Field of Philosophy. 

LotzeE: Microcosmus. 

Mauer: Psychology. 

MarTINEAU: A Study of Religion. 

MLL: Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy. 
NAVILLE: Le Libre Arbitre. 

NoEt: La Conscience du Libre Arbitre. 

PALMER: The Problem of Freedom. 

PAULSEN: A System of Ethics. 

Prat: La Liberté. 

RASHDALL: The Theory of Good and Evil. 

RicKkaBy: Free Will and Four English Philosophers. 
Sipcwick: Methods of Ethics. 

Warp: Philosophy of Theism. 

Warp, JAMES: Naturalism and Agnosticism. 


1 The Field of Philosophy, p. 454. 


CHAPTER IX 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 


Morality is a fact which, in any philosophy worthy the 
name, demands both interpretation and explanation. A 
clear-cut adequate conception of what morality is, and upon 
what factors it is based, is as necessary for a well-rounded 
definition of the universe as is a consistent statement about 
the reality and nature of being or of thought. Human con- 
duct follows the lines laid down by the commonly accepted 
standards of right and wrong. ‘‘ But what is right and what 
is wrong?”’ some one may ask. What the average man, as 
well as the thinker, wishes to know is, whether there exists a 
safe criterion by which we can evaluate our actions, and if 
there is such a standard, how does it define the good, the end 
which we strive to attain in all our acts. 

Morality is as necessary for the reasoned, continued 
existence of the universe as are the laws of physics, chem- 
istry, biology, and psychology. Mankind cannot exist with- 
out morality. It is, therefore, not strange that, from the 
very beginnings of human thought, philosophers have made 
more or less successful attempts to answer the questions, 
‘What ought a man to do, and why must he do it?” 

No one can question the existence of the moral judgment. 
Its existence, however, implies that we distinguish between 
our acts and the standards which are set up to judge them 
by. Human actions are either good or bad. But this 
judgment necessarily implies both the existence of some 
common measure by which we discriminate between right 

273 


274 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


and wrong, as well as the assertion on the part of the mmd 
that a moral imperative exists which commands us to do 
right and to avoid wrong. Up to this point all philosophers 
would probably agree. A division takes place, however, 
when we ask them to define more clearly what this common 
standard of morality is, and to point out from what source 
it receives its justification. 

Intimately bound up with the fundamental problem of 
ethics is that other problem of values. Man is not a mere 
automaton. His thoughts, emotions, and feelings color all 
his acts. In the different processes of life he passes judg- 
ment both upon his own acts and on things about him. He 
wishes to know what they are worth, what their value is. 
And he controls and guides his life on the basis of his estima- 
tion of these values. Things have more or less value—this 
fact seems primary. Now, is this value absolute, in the 
things themselves, or is it merely relative, that is, only in 
the I perceiving? Man evaluates, but by what right and 
upon what basis, is what the inquiring philosopher tries to 
discover. 

The very concepts right and wrong involve reference to an 
end to be attained. What must be determined, therefore, 
before everything else is the end for which men act. We 
must fix beforehand the moral end in order to be able to 
reach a correct conception of moral righteousness. It is 
impossible to call an action good unless we have specified 
previously what goodness is, just as we cannot be certain 
whether an action is right unless we know the purpose for 
which it was performed. The determination of the moral 
end is the central problem of ethics. 

To this problem many replies have been given. ‘The 
ancient Greeks answered it in much the same way as 
modern philosophers. Christianity, which brought into 
the world a clearer vision of right and wrong, also established 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 275 


a more certain basis for morality in its conception of God as 
the ultimate end and rule of all conduct. The influence of 
the Christian philosophy of conduct, coupled with the 
ethical ideas which Christian thinkers have developed and 
worked out through centuries of speculation and practical 
application to the needs of humanity, have profoundly 
affected all Western Civilization, as well as all ethical 
theorizing. Based on a spiritualistic conception of the 
universe, Christian thought derives human actions from a 
spiritual soul as their source, and looks to a spiritual God, 
the very essence of all goodness, as their end and justifica- 
tion. For Christian ethics, God is an innate necessity. Not 
only is He the source of all being and of all thought, but He 
is, as well, the ground and end of all morality. This does 
not mean that human ethics is a purely arbitrary rule 1m- 
posed on us by a Being who, because of his infinity, cannot 
or will not understand our needs and limitations. On the 
contrary, the basis of morality, as far as we are concerned, 
is found in human reason itself which is the final arbiter of 
right and wrong. This basis is proximate and depends, in 
the last analysis, both for its existence and value, upon the 
ultimate rule, God; nevertheless, it is for all that a true rule 
of conduct. Obedience to the rules laid down by reason it- 
self is the test of all right conduct, according to the point of 
view which we accept and defend. 

This ethical philosophy has been known by many names. 
Some call it Supernaturalism; others, Intuitionism. It must 
be remarked, however, that the philosophy of Intuitionism 
is not always explained in the same way by all its defenders. 
A more understandable, and quite universally used, term 
for the ethical philosophy which we defend is the Christian 
philosophy of life, or the Ethics of Reason. 

Starting from a materialistic and positivistic psychology, 
many philosophers advocate what is known as Hedonism. 


276 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


The essence of this view is that only pleasure counts in 
conduct. ‘The maximum of pleasure, which an action 
produces either for the individual or for society, becomes in 
this thought the standard for all human conduct. Now 
pleasure may be either of the individual or of society. If the 
individual’s pleasure is made the criterion, we have Egoism. 
If, however, the greatest pleasure of the greatest number is 
our rule of conduct, we have the philosophy known com- 
monly as Utilitarianism. Both Hedonism and Utilitarian- 
ism have taken many forms, depending on the metaphysical 
standpoint from which the ethical problem has been 
approached. But, under whatever form Hedonism has 
appeared, the underlying motive actuating all its defenders 
has been to construct an ethics which would be altogether 
independent of morality and religion, in the sense in which 
these words are generally received and understood. The 
morality of Hedonism and Utilitarianism is known variously 
as positivistic ethics, lay morality, evolutionary ethics, the 
new ethics. 

Idealistic thinkers have been no less active than mate- 
rialists in attempting to formulate an ethics. Approaching 
the problem from the subjective side, they discover the 
determinant and sanction of morality in the autonomy of 
the will of man. That man ought to do certain things and 
to avoid others is for practically all thinkers a primary 
unanalyzable idea. “If any one denies the authority or 
validity (as distinct from the existence) of this idea of duty, 
such a vindication of its validity as it is possible to give 
belongs to Metaphysic. ... To deny the deliverances of 
our own Reason is to deprive ourselves of any ground for 
believing in anything whatever. To admit that our Reason 
assures us that there are some things which it is right to do, 
and yet to ask why we should believe that those things 
ought to be done, is to ask why we should believe what we 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 277 


see to be true.” + The ‘‘ought,” however, can receive no 
justification from any source outside man. The sole source 
and authority of every moral value is in our reverence for 
moral duty. ‘‘Act,’? Kant tells us, “as a member of a 
kingdom of ends.”” The individual, therefore, is the end of 
all morality as he is the guide to what is right and wrong. 
For Kant, the will is determined by certain rules which he 
calls categories. Since these categories are altogether 
authoritative, his ethics is known by the name of “‘Cat- 
egorical Imperative.’ While it must be conceded that the 
Kantian theory has many points in common with Intuition- 
ism and the Ethics of Reason, it differs from these latter 
theories in that it attempts to place morality on an exclu- 
sively scientific and philosophical basis by divorcing moral- 
ity altogether from religion. How it has succeeded, we 
shall see below. 


Hedonism.—Hedonism is an ethical theory which views 
pleasure as the ultimate test of the morality of human 
acts. Beginning with the Ancient Greeks, hedonistic the- 
ories have had a long and interesting history up to the 
present day. Aristippus, Epicurus, the Cyrenaics were 
representative Greek hedonists. Epicureanism exerted a 
profound influence on Greek thought, and also made its 
power felt deeply in Roman philosophy and life. With the 
advent of Christianity, Hedonism gradually declined and 
ceased to be accepted. In the sixteenth century it was 
resurrected by Hobbes and Locke. Hume, Paley, and es- 
pecially Bentham, Mill, and Bain have contributed the most 
in modern times to the revival of the pleasure philosophy. 
Perhaps the most profound difference between the ancient 
and modern theories is the shifting of emphasis by the 
moderns from individual to universal happiness as the basis 

1 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil,Vol. I, p. 102. 


278 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


for morality. Greek Hedonism was frankly egoistic. Mod- 
ern Hedonism is just as outspokenly altruistic, having 
abandoned altogether the individualistic ground of the 
ancient hedonistic theories.1 


Utilitarianism.—Hedonism in modern philosophy is 
generally known as Utilitarianism. Utilitarianism teaches 
that the end of human action is happiness and that the de- 
terminate of morality is the pleasure or pain which results 
from our actions. Happiness, however, need not be con- 
ceived as the happiness of any individual. As J. S. Mill 
points out,” “‘the happiness which forms the utilitarian 
standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent’s own 
happiness, but that of all concerned; as between his own 
happiness and that of others, Utilitarianism requires him 
to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent 
spectator.” In his famous work Utilitarianism, Mill states 


1 For a history of ethical theory the student may consult Paulsen, A System of 
Ethics, pp. 33-169. Paulsen’s review of the Christian conception of morality is a 
travesty pure and simple, a common fault amongst modern ethical philosophers. 
That Paulsen himself felt such to be the case follows from his admission that ‘‘many 
will fail to recognize in the above exposition of Christianity and its conception of 
life, the picture which they may have formed of it.” 

The following works will also assist the student in obtaining a fairly accurate idea 
of the development of moral theory: Turner, History of Philosophy; Zeller, History 
of Greek Philosophy; Weber, History of Greek Philosophy; Sidgwick, Outline of a 
History of Ethics; Janet, Histoire de la Philosophie Morale et Politique; Watson, 
Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer; Lecky, A History of European Morals; 
Rand, The Classical Moralists; Moore, A Historical Introduction to Ethics. 

For a statement of Hedonism, consult Hobbes, On Liberty and Necessity and 
Leviathan, Hutcheson, A System of Moral Philosophy; Locke, An Essay Concerning 
Human Understanding; Hume, Ethics; Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of 
Morals; J. S. Mill, Ethics, An Examination of Sir William Hamilton’s Philosophy, 
and Utilitarianism; Sidgwick, The Method of Ethics; Bain, The Emotions and the 
Will. 

For a criticism of Hedonism, see Rickaby, Free Will and Four English Philosophers; 
Fox, Religion and Morality; Ming, Data of Modern Ethics Examined; Green, Pro- 
legomena to Ethics; Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil; Martineau, Types of 
Ethical Theory; Bradley, Ethical Studies; Dewey, Outlines of a Critical Theory of 
Ethics; Human Nature and Conduct. 

2 Utilitarianism, Chapters II and ITI, presents Mill’s ideas in a very forceful way. 
See also Douglas, The Ethics of John Stuart Mill. 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 279 


the essence of his creed in the following forceful quotation: 
“Tt is the creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, 
utility or the greatest happiness principle, and holds that 
actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote hap- 
piness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happi- 
ness. By happiness is intended pleasure and the absence 
of pain; by unhappiness, pain and the privation of pleas- 
ure.” 

The Greeks had founded their pleasure theory on a quan- 
titative basis. Modern Hedonism rejected this viewpoint, 
and Mill introduced the qualitative element into happiness, 
recognizing that the quality of a pleasure may make it more 
valuable than another pleasure, although the quantity of 
the two might remain equal. Later hedonists refused to ac- 
cept this qualitative distinction, rightly arguing that it did 
away altogether with the whole concept of pleasure. Sidgwick 
takes this position, but tries to combine the pleasure crite- 
rion of conduct with a logical basis for his Ethics. He recog- 
nizes that morality is based upon reason and that the moral 
judgment which we express in the categorical imperative 
is something more than a mere affective state. His Utili- 
tarianism is, therefore, a rationalistic, as distinct from the 
psychological, hedonism of his predecessors. 


Criticism of Hedonism.—Hedonism appeals strongly to 
the beginner in Ethics for it appears, by its happiness theory, 
to correspond closely to, and at the same time to justify, 
the manner in which every man acts. Goodness causes us 
pleasure; evil, pain. From this fact, though quite illogi- 
cally, the conclusion is drawn that we always do that which 
causes us the greatest amount of happiness. 

Is happiness the ultimate sanction of morality? We 
assert that it is not. The element of truth in this theory 
cannot overshadow the significant errors to which it leads, 


280 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


nor the almost insurmountable difficulties which its ac- 
ceptance would entail. That the gratification of a desire 
gives us pleasure is an incontestable fact, and it is upon this 
simple fact that Hedonism bases all its exaggerations. 
Pleasure does influence, and is operative in a great number 
of our acts. That it is an exclusive principle and de- 
terminant of action is false both psychologically and 
ethically.1 

Hedonism is but the sensationalism of Locke translated 
into ethical terms. Its materialism is basic, and therefore 
quite unacceptable. The determinist and positivist tone 
which runs through all the modern constructions of Hedon- 
ism is, to be quite frank, very jarring to any one brought up 
on Christian principles. 

The psychology of Hedonism is only superficially true. 
Pleasure does not precede tendency, end, or good, but de- 
pends on a prior good or end. Hedonism places the cart 
before the horse by explaining desire in terms of an antece- 
dent pleasure. The very opposite is the truth. Moreover 
“to attempt to justify (on hedonistic principles) the per- 
formance of certain acts commonly called moral by their 
pleasantness, and then to explain their pleasantness by 
assuming that they are moral and so sources of conscientious 
pleasure or means of avoiding conscientious pain, is to argue 
in a circle.” 2 

Again, the whole assumption of Hedonism that pleasure 
is the only source of our actions is false. It is not true, and 
we appeal to every man’s moral éxperience to justify our 
contention, that the pleasurable and desirable are inter- 
changeable terms. Yet it is upon this false assumption that 
Hedonism has constructed the happiness theory. More- 


1 For the elements of truth in Hedonism, see Rashdall, The Theory of Good and 
Evil, Vol. I, pp. 31-37. 
? Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, p. 30. 





THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 281 


over, the pleasure standard, for practical purposes, is use- 
less as a sanction of morality. The measurement of pleasure 
or pain, not only for the individual, but a fortiori for the 
greatest possible number of individuals, defies all possibility. 
Bentham’s calculus of pleasure is nothing short of an absur- 
dity, as has been so often recognized since his day, and ad- 
mitted even by Mill. 

Fmally, no code of morality could exist if it were to re- 
ceive its sole sanction from the principles of the happiness 
theory. Pleasure is subjective, and its value as a determin- 
ant of action depends upon each man’s estimate of what 
is pleasant and what is painful. No objective standards, 
capable of withstanding the storm and stress of individual 
judgment, are possible under such a theory. To which 
might be added the further observation that moral obliga- 
tion or duty becomes a mere word in the hedonist philos- 
ophy. The worst that can be said about any action in this 
viewpoint is that the individual did not evaluate correctly 
the different pleasures presented to him and that, conse- 
quently, his choice was more or less imprudent. But that 
his act was morally wrong is a judgment which we are not 
justified in making. 

That Hedonism is an unacceptable theory of morality, 
despite the prominence it once held in British philosophy, 
is evidenced by the fact that neither Mill nor Sidgwick could 
accept it in its purely psychological form. Present-day 
moral philosophers are no less unanimous in their dec- 
larations that the construction of a code of morals 
upon hedonistic and egoistic principles is impossible. As 
a theory of value, Hedonism is no less false than as a 
theory of ethics. To identify happiness and good is to 
exaggerate the rdle which happiness undoubtedly plays in 
our morality. Any theory of moral values which hopes 
to command our allegiance must strive both to be objective 


282 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


and to satisfy the practical needs of conscience. Hedonism 
does neither.! 


Criticism of Utilitarianism.—Mill’s Utilitarianism pre- 
sents itself as a refinement of the older hedonisms, by its 
synthesis of the egoistic with his own altruistic principles, 
coupled with the substitution of the qualitative for the 
purely quantitative standards of his predecessors. Instead 
of the happiness of the individual, the “‘greatest happiness 
of the greatest number” has been put forward as the end and 
sanction of morality. For Mill, the pursuit of happiness is 
not only the end of all moral endeavor, it makes actions 
moral. Since happiness is the end of life, actions which are 
good yield a surplus of happiness; immoral actions yield 
pain—happiness always being understood in the sense of 
the ‘‘happiness of all concerned.” 

The psychological basis of Utilitarianism, namely, that 
by our very nature we are compelled to pursue what is 
pleasant, is plausible enough, but not universally true. 
Moreover, the principle of the ‘‘greatest happiness of the 
greatest number” is a sophism pure and simple. For the 
happiness of the greatest number does not, in any real sense 
of the terms used, equal the sum of all our individual happi- 
nesses. It cannot become, therefore, a principle guiding the 
conduct of the individual. 

Again, Mill acknowledges that virtue can be an end in 
itself, but very illogically it seems to us. For if virtue is 
per se desirable, it must contain in itself something which 
produces happiness. Pleasure, therefore, does not consti- 
tute, but follows upon, at least, some virtuous actions. The 
consequent pleasure cannot be the criterion which deter- 


1 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, pp. 7-38; Paulsen, A System of 
Ethics, pp. 268-286; Everett, Moral Values, pp. 104-145; Ming, Date of Modern 
Ethics Examined, pp. 57-80. 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 283 


mines whether the act is good or bad. By consequence, 
the good is not made by being pleasant, and in this affirma- 
tion Mill gives away the whole foundation of Hedonism. 
Mill openly admitted that the theory of Bentham, based 
as itis upon a calculus of pleasures, is untenable. He, there- 
fore, insisted that pleasures may differ not only in quan- 
tity, but in quality as well. But by this admission he did 
not succeed in bolstering up the happiness theory. As a 
matter of fact, he introduced into it an element which log- 
ically destroys the whole utilitarian philosophy. We can- 
not conceive of pleasures differing in quality unless we as- 
sume, at the same time, that the standard for judging one 
pleasure to be higher than another is outside the pleasure 
itself. Pleasures may differ qualitatively because they 
result from diverse faculties, or from different kinds of 
actions in which a hierarchy of values is recognized to exist. 
Now, if we judge some acts to be more pleasurable than 
others, according to any standard outside the pleasure it- 
self which results from these acts, we inject surreptitiously 
into the utilitarian position a principle which it has al- 
ready repudiated. Nothing daunted, Mill, in order ‘‘to find 
a ground of distinction of pleasures with regard to quality, 
falls back upon the existence of a scale of rank among hu- 
man faculties, and on the native tendency of the mind to 
approve of the conduct which is consistent with reason, 
regardless of how much happiness it procures. Resort to 
this principle for the determination of moral values is an 
abandonment of the first position of utilitarianism.”’ * 
Satisfied with the fact that human nature can desire 
something beside pleasure, later advocates of Utilitarian- 
ism, especially Sidgwick, admit that the happiness criterion 
is not universally admissible. It is, however, valuable as a 
means of correcting the generally received moral code. 
1 Fox, Religion and Morality, p. 266. The student should read the whole chapter. 


284. AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


This position involves the recognition of an “‘ought” and 
is, therefore, a definite giving up of the old egoistic theory. 

Sidgwick attempts to reconcile the hedonistic standard 
with a rationalistic acceptance of an ultimate basis for 
morality other than mere pleasure. The principal objec- 
tion to the theory of Sidgwick is that, although he acknowl- 
edges that morality cannot be established without postulat- 
ing the existence of God and a belief in immortality, yet 
his whole position, which is materialistic and positivistic, 
makes such an assumption impossible. To which might be 
added another serious difficulty, namely, that his theory 
makes both egoism and altruism equally ‘‘reasonable” as 
a sanction of moral values. But if such is the case, what 
possible meaning for ethics can the word ‘‘reasonable” 
possess? The building of Hedonism on a rational basis 
appears to be a logical impossibility, and it must be con- 
fessed that Sidgwick’s attempt has not succeeded in ac- 
complishing the impossible.! 


Evolutionary Ethics. Herbert Spencer.—In the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century, Utilitarianism under- 
went a series of profound changes through the application 
of the principles of world evolution to the theory of ethics. 
The main effect of this new standpoint has been to revolu- 
tionize the whole theory and outlook of present-day ethics. 
Principally through the efforts of Herbert Spencer, who was 
responsible for the first evolutionary ethical synthesis, the 
dynamic and naturalistic conception of morality has per- 
vaded all modern thought concerning conduct problems, 
both individual and societal. Many modifications have 
been made in the original thought of Spencer since his day.? 


1 For a detailed criticism of Rationalistic Utilitarianism, see Rashdall, The Theory 
of Good and Evil, Vol. I, pp. 44-69. For further works on Sidgwick, consult Bradley, 
Mr. Sidgwick’s Hedonism; Hayward, The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick. 

2See especially Stephens, Science of Ethics, and Alexander, Moral Order and 
Progress. 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 285 


In fact, it may be said without fear of exaggeration that the 
Data of Ethics is considered at the present time as old- 
fashioned as the other parts of the once famous Synthetic 
Philosophy. In spite of this loss of prestige, the Spencerian 
attitude and approach still deeply influence contemporary 
thought. A short statement and criticism of his ethical 
position, therefore, will enable us to understand and to 
evaluate correctly the ethical standpoints now current 
amongst us. 

Spencer started with the assumption that all being, man 
included, is the product of evolution. Nature is governed 
by mechanical law, and must be interpreted mechanically. 
This is true not only of physical or biological phenomena, 
but of moral phenomena as well. We cannot understand 
moral action scientifically unless we express it in terms of 
vital activity. Likewise, since the two kinds of actions are 
convertible, the only correct approach to the ethical prob- 
lem is by the observation of human conduct from the phys- 
ical, biological, psychological, and sociological angles. 

Moral conduct is considered to be a particular form of 
behavior, a particular adjustment of an act to an end. In 
essence the conduct of man does not differ from that of the 
amoeba. It is true that we must recognize in adjustments 
to environment some sort of an ascending scale. Now, 
some adjustments tend to develop the individual; others, 
societal life. But, as Fox points out,! ‘‘here we find Spencer, 
as is not unusual with him, inserting into his theory a postu- 
late which is in contradiction with it, but which he 
perceives to be absolutely necessary to make the theory 
compatible with the moral life. The substitution of the 
quantity of life for the quality as the aim of evolution, 
is a virtual admission that it is impossible to apply the 
doctrine of the survival of the fittest to the moral lie, 

1 Religion and Morality, p. 274. 


286 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


and that evolution does not explain morality.”' For Spen- 
cer, the end of moral development is simply the development 
of life itself. And what criterion tells me whether an action 
makes for this development? Pleasure and pain. We have 
already pointed out that this position entails a false psycho- 
logical reading of man’s nature and the ends for which he acts. 

Two characteristics of conduct manifest themselves as 
we ascend the scale of beings—homogeneity and heteroge- 
neity. The more moral man is he who displays the most 
coherence in his acts. Equilibrium in our actions is the 
final test of their moral perfection. The moral man fulfills 
all functions. In all this, of course, there is no question 
of moral obligation, but simply of biological function, and 
Spencer only brings the concept of obligation into his theory 
by means of a back-door entrance. He acknowledges, how- 
ever, that moral obligation exists, but looks upon it as 
purely vestigial, the result of moral compulsion which we 
generally associate with all moral judgments. When man- 
kind has reached the goal of evolution, this sense of duty 
will pass away and man will always do right because he will 
be incapable of doing wrong. Viewed biologically, human 
conduct must be put on the same plane as all other life 
functions. That Ethics cannot accept such a view is ap- 
parent from a mere statement of the same. 

1 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II, p. 365, thus states the elements 
of the Spencerian Ethics: ‘‘The ethical doctrine of Herbert Spencer may be said to 
contain three main elements: (a) the attempt to reduce the idea of moral authority 
or rightness in general to the inherited fear of social, regal, and divine or ancestral 
displeasure; (6) the attempt to explain by evolutionary forces, and particularly by 
the doctrine of natural selection, why this idea of moral authority or rightness came 
to attach itself to particular kinds of conduct to such an extent that the individual 
regards the moral rules in question as ‘self-evident’ or ‘a priori’; (c) the attempt to 
substitute a ‘scientific’ moral criterion for the ‘hedonistic calculus’ of empirical 
Utilitarianism.” 

The student should not fail to read the whole of Professor Rashdall’s criticism of 
evolutionary ethics. To our way of thinking, it is final and leaves little to be desired. 


He might also consult Schurman, The Ethical Import of Darwinism, or Huxley, 
Evolution and Ethics, 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 287 


Spencer’s psychological basis for conduct is no less false 
than the biological foundation. That simple feelings have 
control over remote feelings and that remote feelings must 
control more proximate feelings, is a theory at variance 
with all the facts of mental life as we know them. The 
very fact of control is absurd on the evolutionary hypothe- 
sis, where everything acts according to blind law. ‘‘The 
fundamental fact of the moral life is that, as the guide of 
conduct, reason pronounces a judgment, indicating that a cer- 
tain line of conduct ought to be followed, and the conscious- 
ness of the thinking subject manifests to him that he can 
comply with that direction of reason, or he can disobey it. 
There is no room in Spencer’s theory of conduct for this 
fact. Moral obligation and determinism are incompatible. 
He tries to smuggle it in by making the terms ought and 
must convertible, and by using the term authority to express 
the preponderance of one force over another.” ! 

Evolutionary ethics finds itself helpless before the task 
of constructing a practical code of conduct, for the reason 
that the individual plays a very minor part in its view. In 
the theory of evolution, society is looked upon as the pri- 
mary unit of which each man is but a fraction. The organic 
conception of the state nullifies all individual obligation and 
responsibility, since no principle is capable of being framed 
which would compel a man to work for the good of the state 
as against his own individual good. Unless the individual 
has within himself some criterion of right and wrong, it is 
useless to demand from him obedience to the laws of the 
universe. Moreover, the Spencerian account of the genesis 
and development of such primary ideas as justice, right, 
and duty, is inconsistent with the facts of moral conscious- 
ness and the history of the race as it is known to us. 

There is a great deal of truth in much of what Spencer 

1 Fox, Religion and Morality, p. 286. 


288 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


has written about the influence of natural selection in the 
formation of moral codes, but its réle has been unduly ex- 
aggerated by him. Likewise, his theory of the inheritance 
of moral ideas is more than doubtful. Even present-day 
evolutionists are not all agreed that moral ideas may be 
propagated by heredity.! Not only is the Spencerian the- 
ory relative to the origin of morality false, but the attempt 
which he makes to invest Evolutionary Ethics with the 
function of a guiding force for modern morality is doomed 
to disappointment. Nothing that evolution has yet dis- 
covered justifies us in assuming that a world in which pain 
will cease to exist or sin to be but a negligible factor in hu- 
man life, lies within the realms of possibility. As a guide 
to action or as a sanction of morality, evolution has been 
proved bankrupt, and even Spencer himself was forced to 
admit that his theory had not ‘‘furnished him the guidance 
to the extent he had hoped for it.” 


Egoism.—By Egoism the moral philosopher understands 
any system of ethics which looks upon self-love as the sole 


1“ There is a constant disposition to forget that the ‘struggle for existence’ as a 
fact was a well-known element in human history from the very earliest times. The 
originality of Darwin’s theory consisted in seeing its bearing upon the ‘origin of 
species.’ The struggle for existence certainly does not explain the ‘origin of Moral- 
ity’ in the sense in which it helps to explain the ‘origin of species.’ At most it repre- 
sents one of the complex forces which go to explain the fact of moral progress. It 
contributes an element to ethical history; but does it add anything to ethical theory? 
To a very limited extent I think that it does. It adds some shade of additional 
presumption to the other grounds which may be given for assuming that a rule of 
conduct which is de facto established in any society must have its origin in some 
consideration of social convenience, and that its observance must be in some way 
beneficial to that society. And, therefore, when we find ourselves feeling a strong 
repugnance to certain kinds of conduct, even though the repugnance be one which 
we find it difficult to justify on any rational principle, it is reasonable to assume that 
it probably possesses some utilitarian justification, which should make us unwilling 
to act against such an instinctive repugnance, unless we are very sure of our ground. 
Neither on Spencer’s principles nor on any other can it be contended that this con- 
sideration compels us to acquiesce without question in each and every apparently 
intuitive disposition to approve or to condemn any kind of conduct.” Rashdall, 
The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. II, p. 375. Consult Dubois, Spencer et le Principe 
de la Morale; Cathrein, Die Sittenlehre des Darwinismus, Eine Kritik der Ethik H. 
Spencers. 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 289 


sanction of morality. In its narrow sense, the term is ap- 
plicable to every system which makes pleasure, happiness, 
or the perfection of the individual the highest good. Ego- 
ism assumes that all actions are motivated by self-regarding 
purposes, and therefore refuses to acknowledge the exist- 
ence in man’s moral life of the sentiments of benevolence 
or of disinterested desires. Egoism, either in its frankly 
Epicurean form or disguised as modern Utilitarianism, ex- 
aggerates the fact that self does enter into all our acts, by 
making it the determinant of morality. But if the Ego is 
the center and end of all endeavor, morality becomes but 
the pursuit of each man’s happiness, and it is no less illog- 
ical to speak of obligation and duty than it is to endow with 
goodness acts of self-sacrifice, benevolence, or disinterest- 
edness, which have always and everywhere been looked 
upon by mankind as the choicest fruits of the human spirit. 


Altruism.—Aliruism is the opposite of Egoism, and 
designates an ethical doctrine which regards actions of no 
moral value unless they tend to the benefit of others than 
the individual performing them. The social value of an act, 
in this philosophy, is superior to its self-regarding value, 
and it is only in the development of these altruistic impulses 
that the welfare of the individual, as well as the welfare of 
the body social, can be brought about. The welfare of hu- 
manity is made the goal of all moral endeavor. 

Comte, the author of Positivism, developed the philo- 
sophical doctrine of Altruism along religious lines. The 
result of his efforts is known variously as the religion of 
humanity, humanitarianism, etc. Few of his followers 
have accepted his religious ideas, although philosophical 
Altruism manifests itself in the system of Schopenhauer 
in a very extreme form. 

Altruism exaggerates the conflict which exists between the 


290 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


self and other-regarding feelings. While it is quite true that 
no synthesis of the two can ever be made upon a purely 
subjective or psychological basis, nevertheless this antimony 
need not arise in an ethics which recognizes the existence of 
an objective norm for conduct. The principal difficulty 
which modern ethics has not been able to conquer is the 
false assumption that the ethically desirable and the 
psychologically desirable must be identified. The difficul- 
ties of choosing between acts, one of which is self-regarding 
and the other altruistic, are practical difficulties. They are 
not the result of the duties themselves. It is quite true that 
ethics must attempt to reconcile the often conflicting claims 
of self-love and benevolence, but it can only do so success- 
fully if it looks upon duty as the result of the supreme pur- 
pose of the Creator, and subordinates the value of every 
human act to the values which God has ordained for every 
act which man is called upon to perform.! 


The Categorical Imperative.—Kant’s theory of ethics is 
subjectivistic. He repudiates every determinant of morality 
which proceeds from the assumption that the moral worth 
of our acts may be judged by their effects. The human will 
is the ultimate and only arbiter of what is right or what is 
wrong.” These rules of conduct which arise from the will 
are, of course, purely subjective, but when applied to all 
mankind they become objectively valid. Since the ‘‘ought”’ 
of each man’s consciousness is both necessary and universal, 
it is an imperative. Happiness on the other hand is 


1 Paulsen, A System of Ethics—Chapter VI, “‘ Egoism and Altruism.” 

2See The Critique of Practical Reason, Metaphysic of Morality, or Selections from 
the Philosophy of Kant, by Watson, for an exposition of the Kantian morality. For 
a criticism, Schurman, Kantian Ethics and The Ethics of Evolution; Porter, Kant’s 
Ethics; Forster, Der Entwicklungsgang der Kantischen Ethik; Sentroul, Kant; Paulsen, 
Kant; Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil; Caird, The Critical Philosophy of 
Kant; Tilman-Pesch, Kant et la Science Moderne; Cresson, La Morale de Kant; 
Fulliquet, Essai sur L’Obligation Morale; Cohen, Kant’s Begriindung der Ethik. 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 291 


personal and empirical. It cannot, therefore, furnish a 
law, or universal principle of action. Morality, by con- 
sequence, can only be determined by its formal content, and 
not by any objective reference. The will is autonomous, is 
an end to itself, for as Kant remarks, ‘‘autonomy of will is 
the solid principle of all moral laws, and of the duties which 
are in conformity with them.” 1 Now, duty alone deter- 
mines the will, and it is perfectly clear to every man along 
what road lies the path of duty. But what is duty? Kant 
expresses It thus: ‘Act in such a way that, in willing to act, 
you can will that the maximum of your act should become a 
universal law.” This is the categorical imperative, from 
which two consequences necessarily follow. ‘‘In the first 
place, he assumed that out of this bare idea of a categorical 
imperative, without any appeal to experience, he could 
extract a moral criterion, i. e., that he could ascertain what 
is the actual content of the Moral Law, what in detail it is 
right to do. Secondly, he assumed that, so far as an act is 
not determined by pure respect for Moral Law, it possesses 
no moral value whatever.”’ ? 

There is much to be praised in Kant’s formulation of 
morality, although it is everywhere recognized to-day that 
his general principles, as well as his attempts to prove that 
any particular duty may be logically deduced from the 
Categorical Imperative, have been unsuccessful. The Kant- 
ian postulates of the existence of God and of the soul’s 

1 Watson, The Philosophy of Kant, Selections, p. 270. 

2 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. 1, p. 108. Rashdall criticises these 
assumptions and rightly concludes that they are unjustified. For without experience 
the mere idea of the Categorical Imperative will not enable us to decide in particular 
cases what is right. Like the coherence test of truth, its value is purely negative 
for it gives us no rule by which we can act until after we have already made up our 
minds as to what is good or bad. Duty for duty’s sake tells us practically nothing 
of what we must do in specific cases. Neither does a categorical law necessarily 
exclude exceptions if we either explicitly or implicitly recognize the exceptions. 


“Kant confuses the inclusion of an exception im a moral rule with the admission of 
an exception fo a moral rule.” p. 116. 


292 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


immortality, as well as his recognition of the fact that moral- 
ity cannot be based on hedonistic principles, are likewise the 
groundwork of every Christian system of Ethics. More- 
over, his insistence on the réle of reason as the source of 
moral authority, and his acceptance of the order of duty as 
more primary than the order of happiness, are all principles 
which we can readily accept. 

In spite of these acceptable principles, the Kantian Ethics 
cannot be defended. The “autonomy of the will,” as he 
explains it, does away very effectively with the existence of 
God, since morality is altogether independent of any sanc- 
tion on the part of the Deity. Not God, but the human will 
is the ultimate end of morality. Kant is quite right in 
contending that happiness cannot be the determinant of 
morality, but he falsely concludes that, since happiness is 
the motive of all our acts except in the case of those which 
proceed from reason, reason alone determines what is right. 
But, as we have pointed out above, it is false psychology to 
assume that the good and happiness are identical. Kant, 
therefore, since he makes happiness and goodness syn- 
onymous, in rejecting happiness as a determinant of moral- 
ity, rejects at the same time goodness. In this he errs. The 
“‘good”’ is the object-of desire, of all tendency on our part, 
and it must not be forgotten that the “‘good”’ is prior, at 
least logically, to the “right.” Kant, therefore, in re- 
jecting the good as the sanction of morality, could insist 
that only in reason would we find a formal source for Ethics. 
But his psychology is false, and the ethics built upon this 
defective psychology is no less false. 

Again, the Categorical Imperative is a pure abstraction.! 
Conduct, however, is a practical everyday thing. It is 


1 Rashdall quotes Schopenhauer to the effect that the Categorical Imperative is 
nothing but the ‘‘survival of the drill-sergeant theology of eighteenth century Prus- 
sia with the drill-sergeant turned into an abstraction.” Op. cit., p. 129. 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 293 


moral or immoral. Human acts, therefore, must receive 
from ethics a sanction which can be of practical everyday 
value. No such sanction can possibly be derived from the 
Categorical Imperative, for how can we ever hope to 
determine whether any particular action is such that, if it 
were universalized, no absurdity would follow? The exam- 
ples which Kant himself gives do not help to an under- 
standing of how we may practically apply the Categorical 
Imperative. If it is not from experience, how then are we 
to judge whether an act can be universalized without en- 
tailing something absurd? The autonomous will does not 
finally determine what is right or wrong without a reference 
to external reality. Moreover, as it is possible to conceive 
of acts being wrong which involve no internal contra- 
dictions, so conversely it is possible to imagine some acts 
which are right but which do involve contradictions. 

In the next place, if man determines what the laws of 
morality are, there can be no obligation in the complete 
sense of the word. For law is not something we impose on 
ourselves. On the contrary, it is something we recognize the 
existence of, and to which we must conform, if we would act 
morally. In spite of our will or inclinations, reason declares 
the law to exist, and if we violate this law, we do wrong no 
matter what the will desires. We would have very little 
reverence for the moral law if we felt that it was nothing 
but the human. will determining itself. If the will is au- 
tonomous, in the Kantian sense, there is no need for a 
aterorical Imperative at all. 

When Kant makes humanity the end of all moral action, 
he implicitly does away with his fundamental postulate of a 
Supreme Creator. Moreover, the criterion is in itself too 
vague to help us towards an understanding of what a man 
must do, unless we were certain beforehand what precisely 
is the end to be attained by mankind. Moral principles 


294 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


cannot be founded on purely intellectual axioms. The 
task has been attempted so often, and Kant’s system is but 
one more to be added to the many others in the history of 
moral philosophy, which have been shipwrecked on the 
rocks of formalism. 

His other fundamental principle that we should “‘act as a 
member of a kingdom of ends” is no less futile from the 
practical point of view. For what does it mean to be and 
to act as a member of a kingdom of ends? What is the end 
of society or of the individual’s life? The formula tells us 
nothing. 

There is a great deal of truth in the Kantian formulation. 
Through it all runs the magnificent strain that there is such 
a thing as morality which is both intrinsically right and 
reasonably acceptable. But this truth is so mixed up with 
false assumptions and illogical conclusions that the Kantian 
Ethics is altogether unacceptable. We have already pointed 
out that morality cannot be established from its objective 
side, if by that we understand simply happiness. Kant 
failed to derive it from its formal or subjective side. Does 
there remain any other possibility or must we conclude, as 
some have done, that morality cannot be made reasonable? 


Intuitionism.—Iniuitionism answers this question by 
affirming that morality is both objective and universal and 
must be derived from the will viewed as reason. Since right 
and wrong inherently involve a reference to an end to be 
attained, the determination of this end becomes the supreme 
task for moral philosophy. Intuitionists find this end in the 
rational will of man. If our acts tend to the acquisition 
of purposes approved by reason they are good, for the 
simple reason that the rational will cannot approve as 
wholly desirable any end which is not good. 

The word Intuitionism has been used in many different 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 298 


meanings. Naive Intuitionism, which supposes that con- 
science pronounces infallibly on the morality of every act 
as it presents itself is, of course, incapable of being defended, 
since both psychology and fact disprove any such belief. 
Philosophical Intuitionism, which asserts that our actions 
are moral if they follow laws which are universally and im- 
mediately recognized as right, is much more logical. How- 
ever, it cannot be maintained, without involving ourselves 
in serious difficulties, that the mind intuitively perceives 
right and wrong, without any comparison whatever insti- 
tuted by human reason. If such were the case, the moral 
sense would decide infallibly what is right without any re- 
course to reason, and there should follow unanimity of opin- 
ion about right and wrong.! This, however, we know to be 
false. 


Reason, the Sanction of Morality.—Other thinkers give 
the name of Intuitionism to a theory of Ethics which we 
prefer to call the Christian philosophy of life or the Ethics 
of Reason. The name, however, is unimportant. If the 
thinker views morality as a reasoned and reasonable thing, 
and looks for its sanction in the rational will, we would 
agree with his philosophy, no matter what title he desig- 
nates his ethical system by. 

The determination of the morality of an act depends on 
a correct and logical determination of the end towards 
which that act tends. Now, nature exhibits a multiplicity 
of ends. And in man there exists a multiplicity of faculties 
tending to a wide diversity of ends. Can these diverse tend- 
encies in man be reduced to unity and law? Harmony can 
be brought about, but only by the subordination of inferior 
faculties to those which are superior. Now, in a rational 


1 Recent advocates of Intuitionism are Porter, Elements of Moral Science; Calder- 
wood, Handbook of Moral Philosophy; Martineau, Types of Ethical Theory; Whewell, 
Elements of Morality. 


296 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


animal the controlling faculties are evidently reason and 
will. All activities, therefore, must be reduced to the end 
which the rational will judges good. ‘This rationalization 
constitutes the end of conduct, the moral good. Human 
conduct is good when it is rational, bad when it does not 
follow the dictates of reason. Since the will is guided by 
intellect, there must exist some standard by which the spec- 
ulative intellect determines whether or no an action is con- 
sistent with reason. What is this standard? The good of 
the whole. Will is tendency, intellect is judgment. When 
the intellect decides that a certain course of action will at- 
tain the end towards which the will naturally tends, the 
will of its very nature desires this perfect good. Just as 
there are first principles which the speculative reason ac- 
cepts as soon as their terms become known, so there is a 
primary and universal tendency in the will to that line of 
conduct which is presented as rational. The will can be 
satisfied only with a perfect combining of its own activity 
with that of the intellect.! , 

The assertion that the ultimate sanction of morality 
must be found in the rational will does not mean, as many 
suppose, that reason cannot make use of subordinate stand- 
ards to assist it in its judgment of the coherence or incoher- 
ence of the act in question with reason itself. As a matter 

1 “The intellect, as the guide of the will in the sphere of conduct, reads the nature 
of action in the various natures of all beings, in human nature objectively considered 
in all its aspects, corporeal and mental, in what pertains to the conservation and 
development of life, individual and specific, in the innumerable relations existing 
between man, his fellows, and all the objects with which life brings him in contact. 
As it perceives in the speculative sphere that certain conclusions are congenital to 
its natural bias, and therefore calls such conclusions true, it perceives certain rela- 
tions between actions and their object, which it judges to be harmonious with its 
own nature; and others it concludes to be wanting in that harmony. The former 
acts it pronounces to be right and the others to be wrong, inasmuch as the presence 
or absence of the quality renders them consistent or repugnant to itself. The moral 
standard, then, is reason itself perceiving the order manifested in the nature of 


things, objectively expressed in things, subjectively apprehended in the intellect.” 
Fox, Religion and Morality, p. 167. 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 207 


of fact, reason constantly avails itself of such secondary 
criteria as custom, convention, authority, utility, happiness, 
etc. While it is true that such criteria cannot in the last 
analysis justify actions, yet they are helpful in concrete 
cases. The final standard consists alone in the correspond- 
ence of an act with the order existing in the universe as it 
is perceived by reason. This fundamental judgment may 
be stated thus, ‘‘Right is to be done; wrong avoided,” and 
as such the judgment is universal, objective, and intuitive. 
By the application of this judgment to particular acts, we 
are able to determine, and infallibly, their morality. 

Moreover, the judgment of the rational will is expressed 
in an ‘‘imperative ought.’”’ It is not merely a speculative 
conclusion from premises, but entails the duty of following 
this judgment, if we would act rationally. Of course, we 
are not forced against our wills. However, the obligation 
is there and remains, no matter how we act in particular 
cases. We cannot attain the end towards which reason in- 
clines us unless we are willing to act in accordance with its 
decrees. Obligation, therefore, has its origin in the very 
nature of the mind which universally perceives and seeks 
for a rational order amongst the diverse and often conflict- 
ing activities of man. 

The moral law is, therefore, a part of human nature itself, 
and in the mind lies the sanction for morality. The moral 
man is he who lives according to the highest rule of reason, 
who lives for the development of those ends and purposes 
which his intellect points out to him as worthy of the best 
in human nature. Morality, therefore, is not an imposition 
from an outside lawgiver. It is inherent in our own nature 
and in the very order of the universe itself—this is the prox- 
imate basis and end of all morality. 

The Christian thinker, however, is not completely sat- 
isfied with this formulation for he is convinced that even 


298 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


though reason is the proximate end of morality, this end 
is not all-sufficient, and that without an ultimate, all- 
embracing, and all-satisfying end a great deal of the force 
of the moral ‘‘ought”’ would be lost on the majority of man- 
kind. Viewing the universe as an orderly unit, he looks 
upon God not only as the source of all being and thought, 
but as the final sanction of morality as well. Man, guided 
by reason, seeks out the moral good. But this good, as 
presented to him here below, is not really final because 
it is dominantly subjective. Is there not an absolutely ulti- 
mate good, objectively existing, which is the goal of the 
good of the subjective order? Is there not an ultimate truth 
and an ultimate good which, when the intellect knows and 
the will attains, perfect happiness must result? That such 
a good cannot be finite or created is apparent on its very 
face. Logic, therefore, forces us to the acknowledgment 
of the existence of a final good who is all-perfect and all- 
desirable, whose goodness is undetermined by the limita- 
tions of space or time, and in the acquisition of whom all 
our aspirations toward the good shall be completely satis- 
fied. Right and wrong, therefore, as a judgment is final, 
and is founded in the very order of the universe itself, 
which order proceeds from God and reflects in its own finite 
way the perfections of the Divine Nature. 

Since God is the ultimate sanction of morality, He is also 
the final standard of value. The Christian thinker, al- 
though not rejecting secondary standards, insists that the 
final test of all values is God. Not as they promote the 
happiness of the individual, nor even the race, can things 
be truly evaluated. Only when viewed sub specie eternitatis 
are we able to judge with finality as to the worth and value 
of everything in this universe.! 


1For a more detailed exposition of the Christian Theory of Ethics, see Fox, 
Religion and Morality, pp. 163-208; Ming, Data of Modern Ethics Examined, pp. 


/ 


; 
| 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 299 


Criticism of the Ethics of Reason.—A great deal of the 
criticism of the position which we are defending derives 
from the desire of moralists to define a sanction of morality 
independent of the existence of God and of the spirituality 
of will. But Christian ethics is incompatible with any met- 
aphysic whose basis is materialistic and whose approach is 
either positivistic or evolutionary. Arguments, therefore, 
whose bias is materialistic cannot be answered here. 

The objection which probably has the greatest influence 
with the beginner in Ethics is that which points out that 
the history of ethics seems to prove conclusively that there 
never existed a system of moral ideas which is innate, au- 
thoritative, and was or is now universally acceptable. 
What one race or one age considers a virtue, in another 
clime or time was looked upon as immoral. Evolutionary 
writers have at great length, and at great pains, ransacked 
the whole history of morality to point out these variations 
in the moral ideals of the different peoples. 

To which we might reply that the fact that the moral 
judgment of mankind has developed but slowly, or that it 
manifests itself at different levels even in individuals of the 
same enlightenment, proves nothing against the a priori char- 
acter of our moral estimates.!. Because many men reason 
badly or cannot understand mathematics is no argument 
against the validity of the principles of thought or of the 
axioms of mathematics. The same may be said of our 
moral judgments, all of which need not be infallible, even 
though we claim them to be intuitive. Moreover, we are 
contending only for the primary principles of morality, 
and do not question the possibility nor the fact of men err- 
ing when they apply these principles to actual modes of 


82-97 and pp. 117-146; Rickaby, Aquinas Ethicus; Feldner, Die Lehre des heil 
Thomas iiber die Willensfrethett. 
1 Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, p. 85. 


300 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


conduct. Very often the primary truths of morality are 
ignored or false conclusions are derived from them, yet the 
objective rule remains the same. We do not assert that 
reason is infallible. All that we contend for is that the pri- 
mary truths of morality are universal and binding on all 
men, as well as known to them if they do not deliberately 
close their minds to the light of truth. 

It is urged against our thesis that moral judgments are 
most often formed instantaneously, which precludes the 
possibility of inquiry into the relation of the particular act 
to the general order of nature. We might answer by ac- 
knowledging the fact, yet insisting that even those acts are 
judged according to general principles which we understand 
very easily. Moreover, authority helps us greatly to the 
acceptance of moral standards since we recognize, at least 
implicitly, that authority is worthy of credence. Finally, 
it is only in more or less extraordinary cases that we must 
reason as to the relation of our acts to the fitness of things. 
So many acts are patently contrary to reason that no long 
reasoning process is required to pass judgment upon them. 

A very common objection to the Christian standpoint 
in Ethics may be stated thus. The sanction of morality in 
every religious system depends solely on the will of a Divine 
Lawgiver who decrees an act right or wrong simply because 
He wills itso. Nietzsche calls this “slave morality.” This 
is one of the most stupid difficulties ever urged against 
Christian morality. For us, right is right and wrong is 
wrong, antecedent to and wholly independent of any law or 
any lawgiver. Rightness results from the very nature of 
man and of the universe. Just as God cannot square the 
circle, so God cannot decree that which is right to-day may 
be wrong to-morrow. 

Again, it is objected that we need not construct any 
standard of right or wrong outside of man himself. Man 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 301 


should be the standard of everything, not considered in 
himself but in the race as a whole. The happiness or wel- 
fare of mankind in general is the only worthy end for all 
our actions. The answer to this difficulty may be very 
brief. Humanity is a mere word, an abstraction. There is 
no humanity or society outside of the individuals who com- 
pose society. The end, humanity, is nothing. It is not 
the sum total of the happiness of each individual, neither 
is it attained unless every individual becomes perfectly 
happy. The good of the individual is supreme and, unless 
each individual is destined to an end which confers value 
on his moral life, it can make no difference to him what or 
how the welfare of humanity is to be attained. Salus popult 
suprema lex is very true as a legal maxim. It always pre- 
supposes, however, that the end for which the individual 
must act has been agreed upon and is of such a character 
that of itself it is sufficient to elicit the individual’s adher- 
ence. But “if the mdividual end and good is not sufficient 
to impart a supreme significance to life, and to consecrate 
with the stamp of authoritativeness the claims of duty and 
the obligation of self-sacrifice, it is idle to assert that life 
will derive this supreme value, which it lacks, by devoting 
itself to other lives as worthless as itself.” 1 

The moral order presents to the inquiring mind as signifi- 
cant and as sublime a system of truths as does the physical 
order. Morality is reasonable, but its true sanction and 
justification can only be discovered if we view correctly the 
end for which man acts. Neither Hedonism, Utilitarianism, 
nor Evolutionary Ethics supplies a convincing ground for 
moral obligation. That there are elements of truth in each 
one of these theories goes without saying. But the exag- 
gerated psychology, as well as the false metaphysic, which 


1 Fox, Religion and Morality, p. 179. Further difficulties will be found summa- 
rized from Sidgwick by Rashdall, The Theory of Good and Evil, Vol. I, pp. 80-102. 


302 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


furnish the majority of the arguments upon which these 
theories rest, are incapable of standing the fierce light of 
an unbiased scientific criticism. Neither the individual’s 
happiness, nor that of society as a whole, furnish a sufficient 
motive for avoiding evil and striving after good. The sat- 
isfaction of the Self is manifestly no rational guide to moral- 
ity. On the other hand, the happiness of others provides 
no motive why the individual should practice the self- 
regarding virtues. Evolutionary Ethics has developed 
historical investigation in the moral sciences, and for that 
it merits praise. Yet every one to-day is agreed that Natu- 
ral Selection is neither an explanation, much less a motive, 
of the origin and development of the moral sense in the hu- 
man race. 

The constant warfare made, during the last century, 
upon the stronghold of Christian morality has not, despite 
many predictions to the contrary, resulted in its capitula- 
tion. The distinction between good and evil, founded upon 
the intuitive judgment of each man, and objectively ex- 
pressed in the order of the universe itself, still remains the 
most reasonable and universally accepted standard of mo- 
rality. Above all things, it is a constructive theory of mo- 
rality, whose pragmatic sanction is no less evident than its 
a priori truth. Man has an ultimate end—God himself. 
When reason, therefore, points out to us where duty lies, 
we act not in the name of reason alone, but also in the name 
of Him from whom all things take their origin and towards 
whom all things tend. Endowed with freedom, the will may 
or may not follow the lead of reason. The moral imperative 
remains, no matter what our actual conduct is. If, however, 
we translate into living the mandates of conscience, our 
conduct, since it is free, possesses a value far in excess of 
any value inherent in the activities of the physical world. 

The Ethics of Reason is firmly grounded both in science 


THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY 303 


and in philosophy. Our analysis of its principles, as well as 
the contrast of them with other philosophies, confirms this 
judgment. If the student requires further proof, we point 
to the influence of this high morality during the last nine- 
teen hundred years. Not only in the course of society, in 
the many forms in which it has appeared, has this elevating 
and wholesome influence been experienced, but in the esti- 
mation of the plain man as well Christian Ethics has held 
almost universally the chief place as a guide and a sanc- 
tion of the highest morality. 


REFERENCES 


ALEXANDER: Moral Order and Progress. 

BAIN: The Emotions and the Will. 

CATHREIN: Die Sittenlehre des Darwinismus. 

Cresson: La Morale de Kant. 

DEWEY: Human Nature and Conduct; Outlines of a Critical Theory of 
Ethics. 

EvERETT: Moral Values. 

Fox: Religion and Morality. 

GREEN: Prolegomena to Ethics 

Haywarp: The Ethical Philosophy of Sidgwick. 

James: Principles of Psychology. 

JANET: Histoire de la Philosophie Morale et Politique. 

Lecxy: A History of European Morals. 

Martineau: Types of Ethical Theory. 

Mitt, J. S.: Ethics; An Examination of Sir William Hamuilton’s Philos- 
ophy. 

Mince: The Data of Modern Ethics Examined. 

Moore: A Historical Introduction to Ethics. 

PAULSEN: A System of Ethics. 

PortER: Kant’s Ethics. 

Ranp: The Classical Moralists. 

RASHDALL: The Theory of Good and Evil. 

RickaBy: Free Will and Four English Philosophers. 

SCHURMAN: The Ethical Import; Kantian Ethics. 

SENTROUL: Kant. 

Sipcwick: The Method of Ethics. 

Watson: Hedonistic Theories from Aristippus to Spencer. 


CHAPTER X 
THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 


In the brief and inadequate review of the central problems 
of philosophy which we have hitherto made, the existence 
of the Self was postulated throughout. No effort was ex- 
pended to analyze or to justify by argument this assump- 
tion. We proceeded on the theory that all men must ac- 
knowledge the existence of the Self and that all are agreed, 
at least in its large outlines, upon the essential elements 
which go to make up our conception of the nature of the Self. 
This postulate must now be analyzed somewhat at length. 

The philosophical position, that of dualistic realism, 
which has been taken and defended up to this point in our 
study, presages what our theory of the nature of the Self 
shall be. In fact, the conclusions which have resulted from 
an investigation of the different problems of philosophy 
have a direct bearing on the question of the Self. The Self 
is both the beginning and the end of every philosophical 
inquiry. Since we can only discover the nature of reality 
by way of the knowledge process, the mind thereby as- 
sumes an important significance in every definition of the 
Self. For it is the mind or the Self which knows, reasons, 
and reaches definite conclusions as to the reality and essen- 
tial character of this universe of which it also forms a part. 

On the other hand, our formulations of reality, of knowl- 
edge, and of morality react upon and help to decide our 
philosophy of the Self. If, perchance, we read the universe 
in terms exclusively of a physical reality, there remains no 

304 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 305 


place in our viewpoint for a philosophy of substantiality, 
spirituality, or immortality of mind. Contrariwise, if our 
approach to the problems of the Self lies along the road 
marked out by either spiritualistic or idealistic thought, we 
shall most certainly arrive at a quite different terminus than 
the one which modern materialism attains. The question 
of the nature of the Self, therefore, becomes cardinal in 
every systematic solution of reality. It opens the doors 
both to a philosophical view of the cosmos, and, at the same 
time, sums up in itself the conclusions of our best thought 
on the problems which the cosmos presents to the mind for 
its investigation and solution. There is little possibility, 
therefore, of overstating the importance of this problem 
for philosophy. Philosophy remains even to-day, despite all 
efforts to change its current, dominantly egocentric. Each 
generation wishes to know the answers to the questions— 
What are we? Why are we here? Whither are we tending? 
No adequate philosophy can hope to escape, or should de- 
sire to escape from these questions which every man asks 
Ofrit: 

Nor do we get rid of metaphysical questions by keeping 
them in the background or by refusing to discuss them in 
explicit terms. For, as Professor Dewey points out, ‘‘the 
philosophic implications embedded in the very heart of 
psychology are not got rid of when they are kept out of 
sight. Some opinion regarding the nature of the mind and 
its relations to reality will show itself on almost every page, 
and the fact that this opinion is introduced without the 
conscious intention of the writer may serve to confuse both 
the author and his reader.” 1 Furthermore, the refusal 
to discuss these problems has not strengthened, in our opin- 
jon at least, the scientific character of modern psychology. 
What is the Self? The ordinary man would answer by 


1 Psychology, page iv. 


306 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


saying that the Self is the I who lives, walks, eats, sleeps, 
feels, remembers, and thinks. For him there is no mystery 
at all in this. The Self presents itself as a series of activi- 
ties, differing somewhat amongst themselves, but all the 
result of the action of the Self, or the mind, person, soul, 
ego, consciousness, or what-not. Many psychologists to- 
day take this functional viewpoint and look upon the Self 
as a mere binder of activities. Now, no one can doubt that 
these activities are an integral part of the Self, that the 
Self reveals itself in its actions. But are they the whole of 
the Self? Do we describe the Self correctly when we describe 
all the functions which it is capable of performing? Many 
thinkers would answer that question in the negative, con- 
tending that the Self is something more than its functions, 
that it is substantial, although all would not agree as to the 
metaphysical ideas implicit in the word “‘substance.”’ 

It is often assumed, in present-day psychological dis- 
cussions, that when we have described the content of the 
mind we have given an exact picture of the nature of mind. 
This assumption, however, fails to recognize the truth that 
the content of consciousness and the activities of conscious- 
ness are by no means identical. For the “‘phenomena of 
consciousness are always conscious activities as truly as 
they are contents of consciousness.” + A mere description 
of the content of the mind, therefore, is no answer to the 
problem of the nature of mind. Nor should we confuse 
the opinions current amongst thinkers as to the idea of the 
Self, with the idea which is representative of the nature of 
the Self. There is a valid distinction, which in all this dis- 
cussion must never be lost sight of, between the idea of the 
Self and the Self. Of course, no scientific explanation of the 


1 Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, p. 86. Read the whole chapter ‘‘The Concept of 
Mind” for a review of the many false assumptions which clog, from the very outset 
of the discussion, a correct analysis of the problem of the Self. 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 307 


nature of the Self can begin otherwise than with a consid- 
eration of the manifold experiences of the Self. This state- 
ment, however, implies much more than the thought 
that the Self is a mere “collection or bundle of experi- 
encessait 

Intimately connected with, but quite different from the 
question as to the nature of the Self, are the other problems 
as to its unity and its abiding identity. That the Self is one 
appears to most of us in the nature of a psychological incon- 
cussum. But what is meant precisely when we speak of the 
unity of consciousness? The term “unity” may be inter- 
preted in many, and it must be acknowledged, conflicting 
meanings. Consciousness unquestionably presents a plural 
side. How can this multiplicity be reconciled with its as- 
sumed oneness? Because the term “I” expresses unity, we 
need not conclude that the ‘‘I” is distinct from its own 
states. Perhaps the ‘‘I”’ is simply a term which expresses 
the fact that my mental states are distinct from ‘‘your” 
states. Moreover, unity is of different kinds, ranging all 
the way from the accidental unity which, for example, a 
class presents to that which a substance, in the metaphys- 
ical acceptation of the term, undoubtedly must possess. 
Some psychologists see in the unity of consciousness only 
a unity of purposes, or of interests, or of meaning, or of 
relations between the mind and its idea of the Self.’ It shall 
be our function, therefore, to specify somewhat in detail 
what the unity of consciousness must mean. 


laird, Problems of the Self, p. 13. 

2 Parker describes his conception of the unity of the Self in the following terms: 
“The unity of the mind consists, in the first place of the contact of the self with 
content; and, in the second place, of the interweaving of the many activities, which 
are the self, one with another. The activities are interwoven amongst themselves 
and with the content, and this woven web is the mind.” The Self and Nature, p. 27. 

Of course, if Parker’s description of the Self as an ‘‘ interweaving of its activities’’ 
be correct, his conception of the unity of consciousness may likewise be sufficient, 
We cannot, however, accept as true his analysis of the Self. 


308 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


From what has been said there remains small need to 
emphasize the strategic position which the problem of the 
Self must hold in the face of the great questions presented to 
the philosopher, not only by his own philosophy, but by 
psychology, physics, and mathematics as well. The ques- 
tion is fundamental, and has always been recognized as 
such, throughout the whole history of human thought. It 
was discussed, and quite vigorously, in ancient Greek 
philosophy. It remained, however, for Christianity to 
emphasize the really central position which the problem 
must hold in philosophical speculation. The theological 
doctrines of the nature and destiny of the individual soul, 
coupled with the Christian scheme of ethics, was sufficient 
motive for going into this question more deeply and more 
thoroughly than Greek philosophy did. Modern thought, 
since the days of Descartes, has occupied itself very exten- 
sively with this same question. Contemporary philosophy, 
too, is making a great deal of the problem of the Self, thus 
reversing the position of the thinkers of the last century who 
saw in it nothing but a matter for useless metaphysical 
speculation. The study of mind from the experimental 
point of view had occupied so important a place since the 
days of Wundt that its metaphysical aspects had been 
practically ignored. The tendency of psychologists during 
the latter part of the nineteenth century was ‘‘to explain 
the self in terms of something else. The increasing tend- 
ency, nowadays, is to explain other things in terms of the 
self.’?/+ 

The question, therefore, is—What is the mind? Nothing 
seems more certain than the fact that minds exist. But 
when we proceed a step further and attempt to state in 
definite terms what the nature of mind is, difficulties begin 
to crowd in upon us. As has been pointed out, the majority 

1 Laird, Problems of the Self, p. 3. 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 309 


of psychologists refuse to entertain the problem, asserting 
that their position, being purely empirical, leaves no place 
for such problems. It is to metaphysics then that we 
must turn for a reply, and it must be confessed that on few 
questions are more divergent, not to say contradictory, 
views expressed. 


The Meaning of Mind.—A great deal of the confusion, 
which attends every attempt at an analysis of the concept 
of the nature of the Self, results from a lack of uniformity 
amongst thinkers in their use of such terms as mind, soul, 
person, consciousness, and Self. The situation as regards 
terminology is very unsettled, and resembles, according to 
Hoernlé, ‘‘a patient in a critical condition, with a multitude 
of doctors disagreeing on diagnosis and treatment.” } 
Although it would be asking too much of all philosophers to 
accept our definition of these terms, nevertheless we deem it 
vital to present our understanding of what the mind is, 
since upon this definition will depend, to a large degree, 
whether our theory of the Self can be made acceptable to the 
inquiring student. 

The word mind as used by us is practically synonymous 
with soul or person. This is common everyday usage, and 
nothing but verbal hairsplitting can take exception to such 
use. In making ‘‘soul”’ the practical equivalent of ‘‘mind,” 
there is no idea of introducing into a philosophical dis- 
cussion the many theological implications which are in- 
herent in or have grown up through the centuries about that 
much maligned term. Consciousness, too, might be re- 
garded as coextensive with mind or Self, despite the fact 
that the newer schools in psychology, by their very abuse 
of the term, have made it appear to imply the existence of 
certain mental strata which, when combined, make up the 


1 Matter, Life, Mind and God, p. 130. 


310 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


structure of the mind itself. Because the term ‘‘conscious- 
ness” entails few metaphysical assumptions, its almost 
universal use in psychology has given it the position of a 
consecrated word. This use has also left the door open wide 
to the functional or behavior view of mind and has, without 
sufficient argument, convinced many that when we describe 
the field of consciousness our task is completed, and nothing 
else need be attempted. For this reason, in our opinion, 
it seems much better to return to the use of such terms as 
person, mind, Self, and to state the problem in these terms 
rather than in those of consciousness, mentality, etc. 
Again, our knowledge of the mind or of its nature does 
not come by intuition of an abstract Self called the soul. No 
one contends that we possess intuitively or otherwise the 
concept of a pure spiritual being. If we are ever to know 
the nature of mind, there is but one way to discover it, 
namely, by reflective thought on the concrete experiences 
of which each man’s consciousness 1s now or has been in the 
past aware. This analysis does not create for us a new 
entity, which we call mind. It simply makes explicit what 
was all the time implicit in our different mental experiences 
and states. Nor do we deny that this product of reflective 
thought is itself a mental process. To suppose otherwise 
would be to suppose that the mind could possess a concept 
which is, in the last analysis, not a concept at all. 
Furthermore, as it is by a process of reflection that one 
arrives at a definite concept of self-consciousness, so the 
generalizations which we make after a study of such thought 
data imply thought activity, as well as the existence of the 
data which memory brings to such a process. Our concept 
of the individual consciousness, therefore, is a product of 
much thought. It is enlarged and corrected by daily 
experience. To no one, as far as we know, comes the 
ludicrous experience of Jean Paul Richter, who at a tender 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 311 


age had revealed to him the inner meaning of the 7.1. From 
my concept of the mind as presented in my own conscious 
_ experience, I reason to the nature of mind in general. 
These latter concepts are indeed abstract, but for all that 
they are no less real than the concrete experiences upon 
which their validity is founded. 

To sum up, mind designates for us a subject or a principle 
which is the ultimate source of mental life, the cause of our 
thinking, feeling, and willing. A Self is one who possesses a 
mind from which, as a final source, all the mental activities 
of the Self proceed. In this view, therefore, mind is some- 
thing more than a mere series of happenings, sensations, 
emotions, or thoughts. While our analysis has tended to an 
undue emphasis on the mental side of life, it must not be 
thought that from the activities of the Ego we wish to ex- 
clude those of a purely or dominantly physical nature, as for 
example, locomotion, nutrition, and reproduction. Such 
functions are the products of a nature which is at once 
material and spiritual. The mind, however, is the con- 
trolling force of all activity. It is the first principle of the 
life of the human compound, and as such, to it must be 
referred back, as to a principle or cause, all the diverse 
functionings of the compound itself. 

The above analysis of the meaning of the term mind 
eventuates into the thesis of the substantiality of mind, 
which we shall defend below. We need not return here, 
however, to a restatement of our idea of substance. This 
has been done above in the chapter which treats of the 
psycho-physical problem. Yet, it might be well to recall 
that the conception of mind-substance as a sort of inert 
mass upon which successively appear different mental 
processes, is a grotesque travesty of the idea of substance. 
The mind and its functions are not two different things 


1 See Ladd, The Philosophy of Mind, pp. go et seq. 


Br2 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


which may exist separated from one another. As there is no 
mind without its processes, so there can be no processes 
without a mind. The distinction between substance and 
accident as between two disparate things set up by the 
defenders of a function psychology, exists nowhere except 
in their own imaginations. A substance is that which 
stands by itself; an accident is that which inheres in another 
asin a subject. Asan accident cannot exist ordinarily except 
in a substance, so a substance does not exist without 
accidents. When, therefore, we assert that the mind is a 
substance we simply mean to state that mental action is 
inconceivable unless one supposes the prior existence of 
some one who so acts. If sensations, emotions, thoughts 
exist, then a subject who has sensations, emotions, and 
thoughts must also exist, to whom these functions are 
related as passing states, but which do not sum up in them- 
selves the totality of mental reality.! 

The history of the problem of the Self in modern philos- 
ophy begins with Descartes who, in his famous phrase 
“‘cogito, ergo sum,’ summed up amidst universal doubt his 
firm belief in the reality of the Ego. The extreme meta- 
physical dualism of Descartes, however, gave to the question 
of the nature of the Self a false trend and direction which it 
has never been able to correct. Locke accepted the doc- 
trine of a soul substance, while denying the possibility of our 
ever knowing what this substance is. To the days of Kant, 
who looked upon the Self as the organizing power of 
knowledge, no one, with the exception of Hume, denied the 
reality of the substantialistic theory of the Self. Hume, 
however, vigorously contested the philosophy of a mind- 
substance, insisting that the essence of Self consisted in 
activity, and that our knowledge of the Self could not pro- 


1¥or a further analysis of the idea of mind-substance, we refer the student to 
Mercier, Psychologie, Vol. Il, pp. 241 et seq. 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 313 


gress beyond an acquaintance with the impressions, sensa- 
tions, and feelings which we are constantly experiencing. 

Contemporary thinkers have followed in the main either 
the lead of Kant or that of Hume. Present-day Idealism 
sees the Self as the center of all experiences and the answer 
to all the riddles of the universe. Thinkers, like James, 
have accepted the Humian standpoint, and have developed 
the “‘stream of thought” hypothesis, or such like theories, 
in explanation of the nature of the Self. 

Materialism has been no less vocal than Idealism in 
urging its position on modern thought. However, the 
identity of matter and mind has not been expounded by 
this school in so many words. In outlining the nature of 
consciousness, the new materialists depart from the idea of 
consciousness as an entity or a subject, and view it more 
as a behavior or a function. Consciousness is thus regarded 
as a relation between objects. When we ask them to explain 
further this relational view of consciousness and to state in 
express terms between what things the relation exists, we 
are told that it is a special kind of relation between the 
brain made conscious and the object about which it is aware.! 

Recent studies in psychiatry and in psychical research 
have bestowed added importance upon the problem of the 
Self. However, it may be said that these investigations on 
the disorders of personality have added little of lasting 
value to our knowledge of the Self. Certainly, nothing 
has been discovered which tends to shake or, for that mat- 
ter, to confirm our beliefs, either in the unity of conscious- 
ness or in the substantiality of mind. ? 

1¥For a fairly complete statement of the neo-realistic doctrine of Consciousness, 
as well as for a criticism, see Macintosh, The Problem of Knowledge, pp. 258-309; 
also Kremer, Le Neo-Realisme Americain, pp. 234-256; Perry, Present Philosophical 
Tendencies, pp. 271-303. 


2 The recent literature on the different phases of personality is immense. We 
refer the student to works by Prince, Sidis, and Goodheart for a discussion of mul- 


314 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Materialism and The Ego.—Modern Materialism has 
its roots in the philosophy of David Hume. It must be 
acknowledged, however, that the principles and arguments 
set forth by Locke in his assault on the idea of substance 
led naturally and logically to the conclusions maintained 
by empiricists of every shade and hue since the days of 
Hume. According to this latter philosopher, all reality, 
including that of our conscious states, must be reduced to 
a series of mental processes in constant flux and movement. 
An abiding being, therefore, is an utter impossibility since 
the idea presupposes that something persists without any 
change. There is indeed such a thing as material identity, 
but beyond that we cannot go, for sensation gives us no 
data upon which to build a belief in any other kind of iden- 
tity. Later followers of Hume, especially the Associationist 
School, developed at some length his fundamental princi- 
ples. Present-day Sensism is largely the offspring of the 
Humian critique of the substance hypothesis. 


Criticism of Sensationalistic Phenomenism.—Many un- 
answerable arguments may be advanced against the po- 
sition maintained by empiricists relative to the nature of 
the Ego. In the first place, the empiricist has no right to 
speak of an “act of mind,” since his whole conception of 
mind is one which assumes that mind is nothing but a con- 
stantly changing series of mental states. In such circum- 
stances, the introduction of an act of the mind into our 
discussion is to grant the very point at issue.! 

Again, the sensist in order to deny the existence of the 
Self, postulates the existence both of the I and of other 
selves with the purpose of proving that such a thing as the 
Self cannot exist. This practice, of course, constitutes 


tiple personality, and to Freud and Jung for an authoritative statement as to the 
position of psycho-analysis; for a criticism, Laird, Problems of the Self, pp. 272-303. 
1 Laird, Problems of the Self, p. 326. 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF BTS 


nothing short of a reductio ad absurdum of every species of 
phenomenism. 

Furthermore, no believer in the mind-substance theory 
conceives of mind as a static, changeless entity, at least 
in the sense pictured by Hume. The Self is dynamic; it 
grows from day to day; there exist almost infinite degrees 
of selfhoods. The Self, too, organizes the material which 
is brought to it in our manifold experiences. This fact, 
however, does not prove that the underlying substance it- 
self changes with every change in activity from one species 
of reality into another or different kind of reality. There 
can be growth without substantial change—the material 
universe exhibits myriad examples of such growth. What 
then is there to prevent the mind from growing according 
to the laws of its own being? 

To the advocates of the function theory of consciousness, 
we ask an adequate and rational explanation of such pri- 
mary mental states as memory, reasoning, judgment, and 
self-conscious reflection. But such explanation is not forth- 
coming. Memory assuredly postulates the continued ex- 
istence of a subject capable of comparing the past with the 
present. Reason and judgment no less demand a single 
subject which can decide between two or more ideas as to 
their coherence or lack of coherence with one another. Self- 
conscious reflection implies a unitary being which is not only 
capable of reflecting on its past acts, but is conscious, at 
the moment of reflection, that it is reflecting. Much might 
be said of these primary processes of mind. Their very ex- 
istence is jeopardized unless we are willing to acknowledge 
that the Self is a unit which, despite constant fluctuations 
and changes, remains the same; in other words, that mind 
possesses an abiding identity which persists no matter how 
many or how diverse its states may be.’ 


1 Laird proposes what seems an unanswerable objection against the very basis of 


316 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Materialism has made a great deal of the disorders of 
personality, particularly as manifested in cases of patho- 
logical disintegration of the Self, to prove their thesis that, 
since brain and mind are identical, no theory which recog- 
nizes the Self as abiding is capable of defense. These 
cases of disintegration, however, do not prove the disin- 
tegration of the Self as such. The unity of selfhood remains 
throughout the disorder, despite the fact that it is obscured 
at times because of the overshadowing effects of the nervous 
condition from which the patient suffers. There is, in no 
intelligible sense of the word, a plurality of personalities 
in such individuals, but simply a series of ‘‘so-called selves.” 
To call such states ‘‘selves” is to indulge in a pretty, but 
unscientific metaphor.! ! 


The Stream of Thought Theory.—Materialism, either 
in its crude form, or as Associationism,” is regarded quite 
universally as having failed in its interpretation of the na- 
ture of mind. Mill himself admitted that he could not ex- 
plain how a series of feelings could possibly be aware of 
itself as a series, and by this admission, gave away the whole 
case for Sensism. In our own times, Professor James has 
returned to the associationistic theory, though in a slightly 
modified form. For James, the Self is a ‘“‘stream,” each 
part of which knows the preceding part, and by this knowl- 
edge is acquainted with the whole past of itself. Thought 
and thinker are one, and the Ego is but the thought of the 


Hume’s empiricism. To quote, ‘‘Hume believes that the only possible identical 
object is a changeless atom, but it is impossible to find such objects among impres- 
sions and ideas. . . . It is safe to say that if the only legitimate sense of identity is 
material identity, then there is no identity in the things we are wont to consider 
substances. A changeless atom may possess material identity, but stars and planets, 
plants and animals, the eternal mountains and the soul of man do not. And that is 
enough to give us pause.” Problems of the Self, p. 320. 

1 Leighton, The Field of Philosophy, p. 443; Maher, Psychology, pp. 487-492; Ladd, 
Philosophy of Mind, pp. 148-180. 

2 For a history of the Association Psychology, see Warren, History of the Asso- 
ciation Psychology. 


eS ee 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 317 


moment. How can this possibly be? By appropriation, 
for the “I or Self is a Thought at each moment different 
from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the lat- 
ter, together with all the latter called its own.” ! 

In criticism of the position of Professor James it may be 
pointed out that to call mind a “‘stream” instead of a ‘‘se- 
ries of states” possesses a higher descriptive value perhaps, 
but is no nearer the truth of what the mind actually is. 
Mind is not solely a stream or a series, although when 
viewed from one angle it does present a dynamic character. 
Neither has the method of “appropriation” any great ad- 
vantages over the view that the series becomes aware of 
itself as a series. It is more plausible when first presented, 
we admit, but when analyzed it is very difficult to under- 
stand how any preceding mental state can possibly sum up 
in itself all the mental experiences of a lifetime, as de- 
manded by James, and, of which, by the way, the state it- 
self is totally unconscious. But the most formidable argu- 
ment against the Stream of Thought theory is that from 
the facts of memory. James admits that his theory ‘‘begs”’ 
memory. But memory must be explained if any theory is 
to be at all representative of the totality of mental life. At 
all events, the empiricist in psychology is the last man on 
earth who should offer for our acceptance an explanation 
of mind which fails to explain the réle of memory in man’s 
conscious processes.’ 

The more recent accounts of the nature of the Self, pro- 
posed by advocates of the neo-realist school, have not over- 
come the objections ordinarily leveled against the older 
materialisms.2 To define mind as ‘‘action and contents,’ 4 


! Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 401. For the full statement of the Stream of 
Thought Theory, see Vol. I, pp. 224-402. 

2Maher, Psychology, pp. 477-481. 

3 For the neo-realistic definition of mind, consult Perry, Present Philosophical 
Tendencies, pp. 271-305; also Holt, Concept of Consciousness. 

4 Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 304. 


318 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


in which definition the word ‘‘action” summarizes interest 
and nervous system, is not to give a satisfactory or a total 
picture of consciousness as psychology presents it to us by 
means of introspection and experiment. The sum of the 
activities of mind, coupled with its content, does not equal 
mind, for mind is something more than a mere aggregation 
of its own states. Asa matter of fact, this definition is only 
another way of saying that the brain equals mind, a postu- 
late which has not been proved and is wholly unintelligible. 
Moreover, to speak of consciousness as ‘‘a selective re- 
lation among things,” ! does not advance our knowledge of 
what the mind is, even supposing that we agree with— 
which we do not—the view that consciousness is merely a 
relation. Present-day realism of the monistic type, based 
as it is upon the prejudice that only one reality exists, has 
not succeeded in its efforts to interpret consciousness in 
terms of brain activity in a way that would be acceptable. 
Although this theory is not so obnoxious to the defenders of 
a spiritualistic view of mind as was the frank and outspoken 
materialism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
nevertheless its influence has been altogether bad, both in 
psychology and philosophy, since it has served to keep alive 
opinions which should have been discarded long ago. ” 


Idealism and the Ego.—Idealism, although concerned 
more with the problems of the content of consciousness and 
the value of knowledge than about the nature of conscious- 
ness, has given us a theory of the Self in line with its funda- 
mental assumption that all reality is mind. This position, 
generally referred to as Idealism, might much better be 
called Mentalism or Psychism. 


1McGilvary, Journal of Philosophy, 1X, p. 240, 19012. 

2 On the differences between the points of view of American and English neo- 
realists relative to consciousness, consult Macintosh, The Problems of Knowledge, 
pp. 289-292. 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 319 


Kant’s theory of the Ego is the source of all the contem- 
porary idealistic interpretations of the Self. His immediate 
disciples, Fichte and Hegel, developed the Kantian thought, 
Fichte emphasizing the moral side of selfhood, while Hegel 
tended to submerge the individual self in the all-embracing 
Absolute. Modern followers of Kant have stressed either 
the intellectual or volitional aspects of his doctrine of the 
Self, according to each thinker’s estimate of the supreme 
place which intellect or will must hold in a sound synthesis 
of reality. 


Kant’s Theory of the Self.—Kant’s well-known objections 
to a substantialistic theory of the soul were based on his 
distinction between phenomenal and noumenal knowledge. 
Experience, he contended, gave us no argument for con- 
cluding to the existence of a soul substance. Likewise, the 
a priori idea of substance is not necessarily involved in the 
idea of self-consciousness. The ‘‘Ich denke”’ is merely a 
formal condition of thought. Translated, it means, ‘I 
am the logical subject of my own thoughts.” But it is 
quite illogical to pass from this formal logical subject to the 
conclusion that a metaphysical I, or an I as substance, ex- 
ists. The I is purely formal; it is a subject, not a substance. 
If the I were a substance, I should be able to see it. But it is 
as impossible to perceive a substance as it is to see space and 
time. Substance, no less than space and time, is an a priori 
category, which may be understood but cannot be perceived. 
The whole of rational psychology, therefore, is built upon 
a series of paralogisms. Kant, however, did not deny that 
the Self may be a substance of a noumenal kind, and be- 
lieved, by this admission, that he had saved for knowledge 
the reality of the I who thinks." 


1 Laird, Problems of the Self, p. 633. ‘‘The noumenal, or hyperphysical substance 
of what appears as matter might, in fact, be not composite but simple, and the 


320 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Most modern philosophers are altogether too ready in 
admitting that Kant destroyed for all time the doctrine of 
soul substance. But such a belief can only be accepted by 
those who are willing to agree with the Kantian distinction 
between noumenon and phenomenon. There is an in- 
creasingly large number of philosophers to-day who do not 
acknowledge that this distinction is based on facts or is 
necessary for an understanding of the knowledge problem. 
Likewise, his assumption that our consciousness of the Ego 
is that of a purely formal principle, and not of an empirical 
self, cannot be maintained. This position is defended only 
by those already convinced that our knowledge is relative, 
and that, therefore, knowledge can never give us any 
iformation about a substanice as real, nor point to the real 
existence of a substance. 

Furthermore, even granting the truth of the distinction 
between pioneer and noumenon, we can only extend 
this principle to the mind’s knowledge of its own acts by 
falsifying altogether the nature of human knowledge. It 
is possible that the mind may be deceived in its knowledge 
of the extra-mental world. But such deception is hardly 
possible in the immediate consciousness which the I pos- 
sesses of its own states. In the mind, at least, when re- 
flecting on its own processes, there is no reason for conceding 
the existence of appearance, phenomena, or such like 
possibilities of error. 

Finally, the Kantian criticism of mind-substance supposes 
that the Self should be able to attain a clear and perfect 
vision of the abstract Ego, divorced from every particular 
or concrete experience. But, as we have already pointed 


appearance of composition be due to the fact that it is revealed to us in space. Such 
a substance, Kant maintains, might be the substance both of thought and of matter, 
or of the self and the matter.’”’ Laird gives both Kant’s theory and his arguments 
in a very fair, concise way. See also Weber, History of Philosophy, pp. 453-456. 





See 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 321 


out, such a vision is manifestly impossible, no less than 
unnecessary. What the transcendental Ego may be is a 
matter for poets to dream over. The philosopher can per- 
ceive his own mental states, can analyze them, and on this 
analysis erect a synthesis which will tell him a great deal 
about the real nature of the Self. It is the concrete expe- 
riences of the Self which open the way to an exact knowl- 
edge of the nature of the Self. To begin with an abstract 
or pure Ego, however, is to start from the wrong place in our 
philosophical journey, and it is to end up in a scepticism 
such as enveloped the whole body of speculative thought of 
the Great Sage of Koénigsberg.! 

For Hegel, substance, in as far as it related to a soul, was 
abandoned because he viewed substance not as a substrate 
of anything, but as the sum of all the modes of a thing. 
Since substance could not become the object of experimental 
research, it was a mere chimera. The thing expresses itself 
in the unfolding of its modes. The soul, therefore, is not a 
static substance, but a living totality which, as an effect, 
reveals the cause thus manifested. Cause and effect are in- 
separable ideas. Everything that is in the effect is in the 
cause, and vice versa. As for man, he is essentially mind. 
But besides the individual mind, there is also the objective 
mind, or society, and, as the beginning and end of all devel- 
opment, both individual and societal, there is the Absolute 
Mind. This position of Hegel has been criticised already in 
Chapters III and VI, both from a metaphysical and an 
epistemological standpoint.? 

1 For a detailed criticism, see the authors cited above in the chapter on the Theory 
of Knowledge. 

2 Laird, Problems of the Self, p. 335. ‘‘The Hegelian universal, splendid, active, 
self-completing, is fitted to arouse admiration in some minds, and something akin to 
despair in others. But the Absolute is not the human mind, nor the human mind, 
the Absolute. If the Hegelians are right in contending that substance is too narrow 


a category to express the nature of mind, we must also remember that they maintain 
that personality is too narrow for the truth. We may readily admit that, if the Self 


322 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Dualistic Realism and the Self.—Dualistic Realism 
presents a solution of the problem of the Self in terms of the 
theory that mind is a spiritual substance existing in time, 
and that because of its nature as a spiritual being, con- 
sciousness possesses an essential unity. The Self, according 
to this philosophy, is a composite of two substances, one 
material and the other spiritual. Both substances are real, 
and both possess activities which reflect the nature of these 
substances. They are not, however, two disparate sub- 
stances in the sense of Descartes, but act and interact upon 
each other according to the laws governing the operations of 
matter and of mind. The Self, therefore, in spite of its 
composition, presents a substantial unity, the unity of 
consciousness. Its acts are not the acts solely of one element 
of the composite, but are all directly referable to the whole, 
from which they proceed. This statement must not be 
interpreted as meaning that physiological function, for 
example, is ultimately reducible to mental function. On the 
contrary, the body performs actions which are bodily or 
physical, while the mind is capable of processes which 
clearly transcend every physiological function. But all acts 
of whatsoever nature are the products of the Self, and are 
directly referable to the Self as subject and as cause. 

This theory of the Self received its definitive state- 
ment in the treatise of Aristotle, On the Soul. Medizval 


is substance, its substantiality is not identical with that of a physical thing. And, 
again, if it is substance, it is not unvariable to the point of tediousness, or barren to 
the point of simplicity. None the less, the self is substance.” 

1 Hoernlé points out its striking resemblances to the position of modern realists. 
However, the agreement is not so exact as Hoernlé seems to indicate, for Aristotle 
accepted without reservations not only the doctrine of the substantiality of mind, 
but its spirituality as well. It is quite true that, like all realists since his day, Aris- 
totle emphasized the functional aspects of mind. ‘‘Aristotle’s theory of the soul is 
clearly, in our modern jargon, ‘functional’ or ‘behaviouristic.’ In fact, his ‘soul’ is 
what we mean by ‘behaviour,’ especially if we take the latter term in a sense suffi- 
ciently wide to include all the rational activities which are specifically human. Some 
of our modern behaviourists, like E. B. Holt, are fully aware that their theory is a 
return to Aristotle’s position.” Hoernlé, Matter, Life, Mind, and God, p. 150. 





THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 323 


thought developed and clarified the position of the Stagirite, 
especially in the light of the supreme place accorded human 
personality by the Christian doctrines of man’s immortality 
and final end. With Descartes began the attacks on the 
doctrine of a substantial Ego. Locke, Berkeley, and espe- 
cially Hume, laid the foundations for the critical attitude 
towards the soul problem. On the Continent, at this period, 
the conception of mind was avowedly materialistic. Kant 
attempted to reconcile the conflicting positions of Hume and 
Berkeley, but only succeeded in arousing a more intense 
disregard for animism than had existed before his time. 
Modern philosophy almost gave the deathblow to the soul 
theory. In spite of the vigorous defense of the older doc- 
trine by such thinkers as McDougall and Bergson, the 
ground lost has never been entirely recovered. As Professor 
James remarked, ‘‘Souls are out of fashion.”’ “This is 
where we stand now. ‘The ‘soul’ (as substance) is gone. 
‘Consciousness’ if not going, is threatened. Between the 
‘unconscious’ of the psycho-analysts and the ‘behaviour’ 
of the behaviourists, what is the outlook for psychology? 
Can we discern anywhere the promise of a movement to- 
wards synopsis?” 4 

The promise looks bright. The soul theory, if correctly 
stated, can be defended on philosophical, psychological, and 
biological grounds. The greatest obstacle to its acceptance 
to-day is the mass of misunderstanding, misrepresentation, 
and even prejudice, which has grown up during three 
centuries of philosophical controversy about the idea. 
Many, too, rebel against animism because they dislike the 
supposed theological implications imbedded in or associated 
with the term. The realist, however, is not so enamored of 
words that he need insist on the term “‘soul”’ to the exclu- 
sion of every other or a better word. If the concept of mind- 

1 Hoernlé, Matter, Life, Mind, and God, p. 153. 


324 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


substance is preserved in its entirety, he would be quite will- 
ing to make any verbal sacrifice that modern sensibilities 
and prejudices demand. Truth is not now, and never has 
been, a matter of mere words. 


Arguments in Favor of Dualistic Realism.—There is no 
need to repeat here the defense of the nature of substance 
or of the theory of interaction as explanatory of the relations 
between body and mind, which we have already made.! 
That substance is a valid category appears to us undeniable. 
If we define it as it should be defined, as that which exists in 
itself, and not as a mere inert substrate, support, or ground 
upon which accidents appear,’ as it is so often misrepre- 
sented, the value of the substance-concept for philosophy 
is beyond question. Now, a substance is ultimate. Every 
kind of reality must be either substance or accident, for 
there is no middle ground. An infinite series of accidents is 
plainly impossible. Sometime, somewhere, we must come 
to a subject which exists per se, that is, to a substance. 
Moreover, if a substance may exist, no one can deny that it 
is capable of acting. That substances do act is a matter of 
everyday experience, and by their actions substances 
make their nature known to us. 

The following reasons justify us in our belief that the 
mind is a substance. In the first place, consciousness 
testifies in unmistakable terms to the fact that we think, 
feel, remember, etc. Now, what is the subject of these 
thoughts and feelings? It is either a substance or our mental 
processes are accidents, in which case they demand a sub- 
ject, for the very nature of an accident is to inhere in a 
subject. In both cases, therefore, we must conclude to the 
existence of a mind-substance. A word of explanation will 


1 Cf. above, pp. 94-101. 
? Coffey, Ontology, pp. 225 et seq. 





THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 325 


make this clear. What do we mean when we use the terms, 
thought, feeling, memory? We infer always that some one 
exists who thinks, who feels, who remembers. It is im- 
possible to conceive such a thing as thought separated from 
a subject who thinks. Therefore, there can be no mental 
activity without a mind-substance, the source and subject 
of this action. Nor does the present-day psychologist make 
more clear our ideas of the mind as subject by describing 
mental activity in the terms of mental chemistry, stream of 
thought theory, or by comparing the unity of consciousness 
to the unity of a plant. Such descriptions are wholly fanci- 
ful. Professor James himself pointed out the absurdities 
of such “integrating and gumming” of thoughts as a picture 
of the unity of consciousness, and concluded that ‘“‘all the 
incomprehensibilities which we saw to attach to the idea of 
things fusing without a medium apply to the empiricist 
description of personal identity.” ! 

Consciousness testifies in clear terms, therefore, to the 
identity of the I who thinks with the I who feels or remem- 
bers or performs any other action. Of my own reality and 
of the reality of my thoughts there can be no question. I 
think, I know that I think, I know that Iam the cause of my 
thoughts. If all this be but an illusion, assuredly there can 
be nothing in this universe of which man may be certain.’ 

Again, no one questions the fact that the mind, in its 
states, presents to our consideration a remarkable ex- 
ample of change. It is this characteristic of our mental 
processes which the empiricists seize upon and from which 
they wrongly conclude that the mind must be identical with 
its states. On the contrary, the changes are very small 
and gradual. They can and do exist without destroying 


1 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 338. 

2 On the consciousness of identity, consult Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 148-208; 
McDougall, Body and Mind, pp. 281-300; Laird, Problems of the Self, pp. 337-3793 
Lotze, Metaphysic, edited by Bosanquet, Vol. II, pp. 169 et seq. 


326 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the mind. ‘There is no reason why the mere fact of change 
should be a bar to identity. . . . A substance has all its 
qualities which it possesses at any time during its existence, 
but it cannot have them altogether. A thing is or is not the 
same, according to the unity and continuity of properties 
which it has at any one time and at any other.”’! A sub- 
stance is not merely the composite of all its attributes, 
neither does it of itself entail the idea of permanence amidst 
change. As a matter of fact, the mind-substance does thus 
endure, and if it can be proved that such permanence is a 
characteristic of mind, its claim to being acknowledged as a 
substance is doubly reinforced. 

The proof of the abiding identity of mind, in spite of the 
constant modifications of which it is the subject, is a psy- 
chological one. Introspection points out the endless chang- 
ing of our mental states. The processes of mind are in a 
constant state of becoming. Thoughts, feelings, sensations 
follow one another in endless series. However, we are 
assuredly conscious, by contrast, that an Ego persists 
amidst all these fleeting modifications; in a word, the con- 
sciousness of personal identity never leaves us, no matter 
how numerous or how sudden the mental changes may be. 
Each man adverts to the changes which take place in him- 
self. Very often we hear a man say that he is ‘‘completely 
changed.”’ Such comparisons are plainly unintelligible un- 
less a certain standard is recognized according to which we 
can estimate the amount of change. ‘‘This consciousness 
of being ‘the subject of change,’—for it is J, and not another, 
that am changed—involves the consciousness of identity in 
such manner that the two cannot be divorced.” ? 

By repeated acts of reflection, all men form a more or less 
exact picture of what personal identity means. This iden- 


1 Laird, Problems of the Self, pp. 350-351. 
2 Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, p. 157, 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 327 


tity of the Self becomes particularly obvious ! when I turn 
over past acts in my mind, reconstruct them, and identify 
them, as I often do, with myself. Iam no less certain that I 
actually performed an act yesterday than that I did the same 
act countless times before, or experienced similar sensations 
and feelings. These marks of similarity between my present 
and my past experiences point unerringly to the necessary 
identification of my present self with my past self. I may 
be deceived in this conclusion, but no one can question the 
logic by which both reason and memory lead me to such an 
opinion. Consciousness, therefore, is a unit, and the unity 
of consciousness would be impossible on any other assump- 
tion than that, as a substance and being, the mind is a unit 
too. This is the only satisfactory theory at hand, despite 
the obvious dualism which it entails. To contend that psy- 
chology would be better off by interpreting mind exclu- 
sively in terms of its own states, or, what is the same thing, 
in terms of behavior, is to close the doors forever to a pos- 
sible and complete understanding of what our mental life 
actually is.” 

The sense of moral responsibility with which every man 
is endowed is possible only on the assumption that the I is 
an abiding subject, responsible for its successive acts. Not 
only is every act of volition an indivisible act and, therefore, 

1This argument, it may be pointed out, does not assume nor require that the 
consciousness of Self as a unity be present in every mental state. As Lotze points 
out: ‘‘Our belief in the soul’s unity rests not on our appearing to ourselves such a 
unity, but in our being able to appear to ourselves at all. . . . What a being appears 
to itself to be, is not the important point; if it can appear anyhow to itself, or other 
things to it, it must be capable of unifying manifold phenomena in an absolute 
indivisibility of its nature.’ Metaphysic, Vol. II, Bk. III, Chap. I. See also, 
Microcosmus, trans. Hamilton and Jones, Bk. II, Chap. I. Line) 

2 Every one is acquainted with Taine’s view of mind as the “ permanent possibility 
of sensation.” If this phrase has any meaning at all, it can only mean that in nature 
there exists an abiding subject, capable of doing all that is necessary, given the 
required conditions, to produce sensations. This “ permanent possibility,” therefore, 


is nothing but the Self which remains unchanged, despite the ephemeral sensations 
to which it is subject, 


328 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


incapable of proceeding from a series of distinct states or 
principles, but unless this were so the whole conception of 
moral duty and the individual’s responsibility for his own 
acts would fall to the ground. An analysis of volition shows 
conclusively that the unity of consciousness manifested 
in acts of the intellect is no less a necessary and prominent 
note of volitional than it is of intellectual activity.? 

To many the metaphysical and psychological arguments 
in favor of the substantiality of mind are not altogether 
convincing. These thinkers demand an explanation of 
consciousness in physiological terms, or, at least, a proof 
that its unity and continuity cannot be explained ade- 
quately, as has been so often attempted of late, by the per- 
manence and stability of the brain-substance. Here we 
need not go over again the ground so well traversed by Mc- 
Dougall in his Body and Mind.? His conclusion, how- 
ever, may be quoted. ‘‘The demonstration that the fusion 
of effects of simultaneous sensory stimuli does not take 
place in the nervous system thus forces upon us the problem 
of the ground of the unity of individual consciousness in a 
form which brings out clearly the impossibility of finding 
any solution compatible with the fundamental assumption 
of all forms of Parallelism; and it forces us to choose be- 
tween adopting the plain and straightforward solution 
offered by Animism and leaving this fundamental fact ut- 
terly mysterious and unintelligible. The issue is simple and 
direct.”’? Again, ‘‘the facts of the relation of sensory con- 
sciousness to cerebral events thus render the conception 
of a unitary psychic being, call it soul or what you will, a 


1 For an exposition of the place which unity and continuity hold in the affective 
side of consciousness, see Laird, Problems of the Self, pp. 237 et seq. 

2 We advise the student to read the chapters, ““The Unity of Consciousness” ; 
“The Psycho-physics of Meaning’”’; ‘‘ Pleasure, Pain and Conation ” ; ‘‘ Mem- 
ory,” pp. 281-346, in that work. 

3 Body and Mind, p. 297. 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 320 


necessary hypothesis; for the rejection of this hypothesis 
involves either Pyrrhonism or the acceptance of a confused 
tangle of obscure conceptions (conceptions of fantastic 
entities such as the ‘threshold of consciousness,’ or un- 
attached fragments of consciousness, sensations flying 
about loose and coming together to yield up their own na- 
tures in creating new entities), and, even if the prejudice 
against the conception of the soul is so strong as to lead one 
to prefer to it this tangle of fantastic ideas, this still proves 
to be inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Paral- 
lelism.”’ } 


The Spirituality of Mind.—From what has been said, 
we feel justified in concluding that the mind should be re- 
garded as one. What this unity means, when applied to 
the soul, can only be learned from the deliverances of the 
mind itself in terms of self-consciousness. A great many 
experience difficulty in imagining how a being, endowed 
with so many and different functions as consciousness un- 
doubtedly is, can be a unit. Such multiplicity of function, 
however, only seems to make more evident the mind’s 
unity, since in the acts of mind every function, intellectual 
or volitional, either actually engages or is latent. More- 
over, the mind’s unity would not be made more clear sup- 
posing, for example, it were the subject of a single unchang- 
ing state. Its very nature is to change. Self-consciousness 
is essentially a process of becoming. If it were not dynamic, 
as it unquestionably is, we would never be able to conclude 
to its essential unity. While different from material sub- 
stances in this, that its unity is not the result of a combina- 
tion of distinct parts, yet it is a unity in the higher sense of 
the word, in fact, it is a unit substance in the most funda- 
mental meaning of the term. Experiences come and go, 


1Qp. cit., p. 299. 


330 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


but experiences could not even exist unless a permanent 
subject already existed and continues to exist after they 
have disappeared. The soul, therefore, is a substance in 
the best sense of the word. It is a substance in the generic 
sense like every other substance in this universe. It differs. 
from all others in this, that it is both a simple and a spirit- 
ual, that is to say, a very distinctive kind of substance. 
But because the mind is not a material substance is no 
reason for denying that it is a substance. 

The notes of mind-substance which transcend all others 
are its simplicity and spirituality. The acceptance of the 
attribute of simplicity leads us logically to the affirmation 
that the mind is a spiritual entity, in other words, that both 
for its existence, and, up to a certain point, for its activities, 
it is not dependent on matter. The proposition is one which 
every one who accepts the doctrine of the mind’s substan- 
tiality will readily concur in. The arguments consist in a 
review and a delineation of the nature of the activities of 
the mind-substance in order to point out their essentially 
spiritual character, from which facts it is but one step to 
the conclusion that the subject of such spiritual acts must 
itself be spiritual. The validity of this reasoning must be 
altogether convincing to every man. It is unthinkable that 
the soul should possess functions, which can be shown to be 
quite independent of any material organ, unless it itself 
were spiritual.! 

In the first place, physiological psychology has demon- 
strated clearly that for all sensations a certain definite time 
for recovery from the effect of a stimulus, especially if it be 
very strong, is required before the sense in question can 
perceive another stimulus, even of a weak intensity.? But 


1 For these arguments, see Mercier, Psychologie, Vol. II, pp. 248-262. 
2 For a detailed statement of recovery time, due to the inertia of the nervous 
system, consult Ladd, Elements of Physiological Psychology, pp. 472 et seq. 





THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF Bak 


the intellect is not handicapped in this way. It experiences 
no fatigue or difficulty in passing from a concept of the 
most abstract character to a truth which is simple and 
known to all. From which observation it follows that sen- 
sitive and intellectual operations are conditioned in widely 
diverse ways. Sensation is a product of the sense organs 
and the brain, which are material; thought, on the other 
hand, is a function which acts in independence of any phys- 
ical organ. 

The abstract character of thought demonstrates clearly 
the spiritual nature of mind. Thought is not something 
which exists anywhere in nature. It exists in the human 
mind, is an immediate act, and is therefore a modification 
of the mind which knows. If thought, viewed objectively, 
presents spiritual characteristics, we must conclude that 
the subject of thought is likewise spiritual. What then of 
the thought-object itself? ‘That we possess universal ideas, 
such as humanity, the League of Nations, justice, etc., is 
beyond all question. Moreover, the mind thinks such ab- 
stract thoughts as God, it formulates the necessary truths 
of logic and of being, it understands and accepts the axioms 
of mathematics, it examines the infinite possibilities of act 
or of being, it perceives the relations, both general and 
specific, which exist between our ideas, and, above all, it rea- 
sons, and correctly, from given premises to certain conclu- 
sions. There is no need to contrast at length these deliver- 
ances of the mind with the concrete products of sensation. 
It is evident at first glance that an unbridgeable gap sep- 
arates the two kinds of activities. That the brain, concrete 
and individual as it is, is quite incapable of such functions, 
both reason and physiology demonstrate. For what is the 
brain? Simply a mass of chemical atoms at any given mo- 
ment combined in certain precise proportions. Shall we 
conclude that this organ is capable of producing such 


332 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


acts as reasoning and judgment which clearly trans- 
cend the sensible, or that knowledge can be explained to 
our complete satisfaction in terms of cerebral physio- 
logy? Wecan do so only by bidding defiance to all logic 
and observation. ! 

Again, the power of reflection, by which the mind turns 
back both upon its own acts and even upon itself, indicates 
a type of mental function which is wholly supra-sensible. 
Consciousness not only thinks thoughts, but it can think 
of its own thoughts. This study of our own states, in which 
we compare them with our previous mental states, recognize 
them as having belonged to us at some time in the past, and 
conclude to the identity of the I now thinking with the I 
who thought years ago, can find no rational explanation 
outside of the assumption that thought is the product of a 
faculty essentially spiritual. Of particular significance is 
the act of self-consciousness, which entails the tremendous 
function in which the mind literally turns back upon itself. 
In this case, the Self is both subject and object, the mind 
thinking, and the thought thought about. Does matter 
ever act thus upon itself? A part of one body can act upon 
another and a different part, but no body has ever yet suc- 
ceeded in acting upon itself. The conclusion is obvious. 

Furthermore, the spirituality of mind is a logical conclu- 
sion from an analysis of the functions of will. That the will 
is free, we have already attempted to prove. In such case 
it is evident that will cannot be explained in purely mechan- 
ical terms. If we are free, then we necessarily determine, 
under certain limitations and conditions already pointed 
out, what we shall do and how we shall act. Self-determina- 
tion, however, is beyond the power of any and every purely 
physical being. Nor need we insist again upon the fact 
that the very validity of all our conceptions of moral obliga- 

1 Ladd, Philosophy of Mind, pp. 396-412. 





THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF Vigiae 


tion and moral duty depends upon accepting the doctrine 
of moral freedom. The moral life of man is so intimately 
bound up with the question of his freedom that their union 
must be looked upon as indissoluble, if we wish to save 
either notion from complete destruction. 

Or, to look at this question from another angle. The will 
desires the good, not any particular good, but good in the 
most abstract and universal sense of the term. The moral 
history of man proves that he has always sought after the 
best, that he has loved justice and hated iniquity, that he 
has never been satisfied completely until he has done the 
right simply for the reason that it is right. What can all 
this striving after righteousness, this search for the highest 
moral good mean except that the will of man is not tied 
down to individual sensible purposes and desires? The 
animal desires nothing but its pleasure of the moment, or 
to avoid an unnecessary pain. Man’s aspirations, on the 
other hand, are infinite and find their end and satisfaction 
only in Him Who is the alpha and omega of all things. 


Criticism of the Soul Theory.—On no other philosophical 
doctrine has such widespread and terrific assaults been 
made as on the belief in a soul. And so successful have 
these objections been that the majority of psychologists 
to-day are convinced anti-animists to such an extent that 
they appear even unwilling to entertain the possibility of 
an argument favorable to the mind-substance theory. The 
modern mind is tormented by many prejudices. There are 
few comparable in strength and tenacity to what might be 
called the ‘‘soul complex.” 

The objections to the soul theory from ‘‘inconceivabil- 
ity,” evolution, and the law of the conservation of energy 
have been examined in another place.! We refer the 


1 See supra, pp. 102-105. 


334 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


student to the answers given there. Here we shall 
examine only the objections of a philosophical tenor 
ordinarily brought against the thesis we have been defend- 
ing. 

Psychologists tell us that the soul idea is meaningless, 
that psychology can and does get along very well without 
accepting a doctrine which involves such a strain upon our 
reasoning powers. Moreover, modern psychology, whether 
introspective or experimental, has made the most marvelous 
advances in spite of the fact that it refuses to believe in the 
reality of the soul. To which we might reply that if modern 
psychology is thoroughly satisfied with its various, and be it 
said often conflicting theories of the mind, then there is no 
place for the soul. But this is the whole question under 
dispute, and it assuredly is not settled by assuming as true 
the very point at issue. There are some psychologists, and 
their number is on the increase, who are not at all satisfied 
with the associationist, stream of thought, or behaviorist 
theories. ‘‘Psychology without a soul’ has accomplished a 
great deal, be it admitted quite frankly. That it has set up 
in the place of mind-substance a theory of mind to which 
both psychologists and philosophers can subscribe, is to 
make a claim without the slightest vestige of proof. So 
widespread, in truth, is the dissatisfaction with the as- 
sumptions of present-day psychologists, especially those of 
the behaviorist school, that many thinkers have almost 
concluded that the only safe classification for modern 
psychology is to put it alongside of alchemy, astrology, and 
the countless other pseudo-sciences which have always 
plagued the human mind. We are not ready to put our 
name to such a sharp rebuke. However, it must be ad- 
mitted that the time is here when psychology, if it is to 
endure, must repudiate its wild escapades of the last half 
century and settle down to the even tenor of a life, bounded 


THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 335 


~e) 


by facts and hedged in, if you will, by respect for the truth, | 
come what may.? 

A favorite objection of the function psychologists may be 
stated thus. The soul idea, even though it were true, is 
“useless.” Given the brain, thought of necessity follows. 
We add nothing to our understanding of brain processes by 
saying that beneath these processes the soul exists as a sort 
of ground or subject for the same. As James puts it, “We 
ought certainly to admit that there is more than the bare 
fact of coexistence of a passing thought with a passing brain- 
state. But we do not answer the question ‘what is that 
more?’ when we say that it is a ‘soul’ which the brain- 
state affects. This kind of more explains nothing.” ? 

Professor James, in this objection, misstates, we think, 
the whole question. It is not a problem of the soul ex- 
plaining how thought and brain-state act and interact upon 
each other. The problem is, how can you explain the evi- 
dent unity of consciousness which exists, despite the fact 
that at every moment of our waking lives change is taking 
place in our mental states? The soul explains this unity, 
how it is that our present thoughts are the thoughts of one 
who has before experienced similar thoughts. The whole 
raison d’étre of the spiritual theory of the self is to explain 
this unity amidst diversity. In no sense of the word is the 
soul set up as an explaining cause of the relations which 
exist between brain and mind. Moreover, if our mental 
states did not inhere in some subject, how could they 


1 Laird states this argument in a somewhat different manner. “T do not wish, 
in this place, to defend the theory of psychology without a soul. On that point, 
indeed, I find myself in substantial agreement with Husserl: ‘The attempt to defend 
a psychology without a soul, corresponds to the theory of a science of nature without 
bodies. The first theory speaks of a psychology which abjures every metaphysical 
assumption with regard to the soul; the second rejects in advance every theory that 
touches the metaphysical nature of the physical world.’” In both cases, as is evi- 
dent, the theory spells the bankruptcy of science.—Problems of the Self, p. 49. 

2 Principles of Psychology, Vol. I, p. 346. 


336 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


possibly exist? It is all very well for the experimentalist to 
turn his back on the problem and say that it is the thoughts 
alone which interest him. ‘As psychologists,” writes 
James, ‘‘we need not be metaphysical at all. There is, and 
can be no compulsion for the empiricist to admit the exist- 
ence of a soul.” This is a position, however, which in 
stubbornness and stupidity surpasses that proverbially 
taken by the ox. 

Neither can we agree with the statement that the very 
concept of the soul is an empty one. On the contrary, it 
implies certain characteristics of most far-reaching signif- 
icance. The positive content of the term “‘soul”’ only comes 
to us after a detailed and thorough examination of all the 
activities of mind. It thus sums up in itself and connotes 
such things as substantiality, spirituality, individuality, 
unity, permanence amidst change, the subject of intellec- 
tual, volitional, and sensation activities, the source and 
ground of all life activities—assuredly these are not mere 
negative concepts or illusory terms.! 

Another objection, epistemological in tone, is derived 
from the fact that we have no immediate experience of the 
soul, its existence is the result of inference. But we know 
from experience itself what consciousness is. We are not 
justified, therefore, in assigning a higher grade of reality to 
the soul than we do to its activities.2 This objection is 
based on the assumption, altogether false, that the sensible 
and knowable are coterminous, or that sensible knowledge 
possesses more cogency than intellectual knowledge. No 
one but a convinced positivist would subscribe to such an 
epistemology. Moreover, it supposes that the soul and 
consciousness stand out, as it were, in contrast to one 


1 For a reply to the contention of James that the argument from the freedom of 
the will is not convincing except to those who already believe in a soul, see Maher, 
Psychology, p. 484. 

2McDougall, Body and Mind, p. 123. 





THE PROBLEM OF THE SELF 337 


another, the soul, a dark unknowable thing; consciousness, 
clear and understandable as the meridian sun. Such a 
description of the soul is burlesque pure and simple. The 
soul cannot be separated from its activities, just as we can- 
not have the activities without a soul. Neither can the 
soul continue in existence if consciousness ceases to exist, 
and vice versa. Of course, no theory should hope to escape 
misrepresentation. But the pass to which some modern 
thinkers go in building up a straw man which they call the 
“soul” is unequaled, we think, in the whole history of 
controversial thought. 

Finally, a word may be said about the substitute for the 
individual soul which is manufactured by certain psycholo- 
gists who, like James, become ‘‘at times metaphysical.” 
These thinkers find some solace in the theory of a world 
soul which lies back of and seeps through, as it were, all our 
thinking. That the world soul cannot hope to usurp the 
place of the individual soul is evident from a moment’s 
consideration. For such a concept involves all the diffi- 
culties involved in the acceptance of an individual soul and 
possesses few, if any, of its advantages. In the first place, 
it is a purely a priori theory with scarcely a shred of evidence 
to back it up. Built up on a parity, namely, that since 
consciousness points to the existence of a soul in ourselves, 
so also the world may possess one, the whole analogy falls 
like a house of cards to the ground, when one reflects that 
between the human living organism and the so-called 
organic unity of nature, there exist differences no less wide 
than they are fundamental. Any comparison of man with 
the universe can only be of the most shadowy and un- 
convincing kind, a fit subject perhaps for poets and dream- 
ers, but quite without the pale of the rigidly scientific 
thought which is supposed to characterize a philosopher. 

Furthermore, the very concept of a world soul is self-con- 


338 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


tradictory, incapable of being stated in rational terms, 
replete with assumptions which demand an unusual amount 
of credulousness on our part, and finally, pantheistic, both 
in tone and in its consequences. We have examined the 
claims of pantheism already and have found them un- 
acceptable from a metaphysical point of view. The psycho- 
logical formulation of the same theory, in terms of a world 
soul, has not made the belief in a universal mind any 
easier to accept. 

An examination of modern theories, relative to the nature 
of the Self, cannot but convince one of their utter inad- 
equacy in the face of the problem as it presents itself to us. 
To translate mental function into behavioristic terms is not 
to clarify the difficulties inherent in the problems which 
revolve about the Self, but to make more unintelligible the 
question under discussion. Materialism as metaphysic has 
been recognized for a long time to be a decided failure. 
Materialism disguised in its present-day psychological 
forms, as associationism, epiphenomenism, parallelism, or 
behaviorism, has not had any greater success than the 
older theories which frankly believed in thought as a func- 
tion of the brain. The advance in philosophical thought 
during the last quarter of a century has brought out nothing 
more clearly than the fact that no reliance can be placed on 
Materialism, either in its liberal or reactionary forms, to 
solve the problems which turn about man, the nature of the 
Self, and the place of human personality in the universe. 
As a matter of fact, these problems do not and cannot exist 
for any form of Materialism, since it denies the very 
existence of the problem itself and views it much in the light 
of a nonsense question. 

Idealism is not burdened with the insuperable difficulties 
which a materialistic psychology must face. For the ideal- 
ist, thought, at least, is a reality, if it be not the whole of 


THE PROBLEM OF SELF 339 


reality. But in this, Idealism goes to the other extreme. 
By denying the existence of matter it erects a formidable 
barrier to a complete understanding of the Self. It calls 
upon us to deny existence to something of whose reality we 
are completely convinced, namely, our own bodies. And its 
insistence on the reality of mind does not compensate us for 
the sacrifice we are asked to make by refusing to acknowl- 
edge the actuality, or, at least, that we can have a knowl- 
edge of matter and its properties. Founded on a false, one- 
sided psychology and epistemology, it is no wonder that the 
idealistic conception of the Self is one which, for many 
reasons, is altogether unacceptable. 

Realism presents a synthesis of the materialistic and 
spiritualistic conceptions of reality which, if correctly 
expressed, can scarcely fail to attract our support. But it 
is only in a dualistic formulation of the principles of Realism 
that we shall find a true statement of the philosophy of the 
Self. Dualistic Realism views the Self as a composite— 
partly material, partly spiritual. The body is matter, mind 
is spirit. Mind depends upon body, but the dependence is a 
purely extrinsic one. The soul vivifies and vitalizes every 
operation of the composite. It possesses, however, func- 
tions of its own which no physical being can possess. The 
soul is a substance, which is spiritual, simple, and, by 
consequence, immortal. 

Dualistic Realism, therefore, preserves for philosophy 
both the reality of the body and the reality of mind. It does 
not submerge the mental in the bodily, nor does it do away 
with the independent reality of the Self, as every form of 
idealistic monism must do. Accordingly, it offers an ex- 
planation of the Self which harmonizes with reality as we 
know it, which gives to human personality the place it 
deserves in the hierarchy of nature, and which saves for 
morality the only sanction that will bestow validity upon 


340 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


its obligations and, for the human individual, the only kind 
of immortality worth having, that of the spiritual Self. 


REFERENCES 


BERGSON: Matter and Memory. 

BosaNqQuET: The Principle of Individuality and Value; The Value and 
Destiny of the Individual. 

BRADLEY: Appearance and Reality. 

Farces: Le Cerveau, L’Ame, et Les Facultés. 

GRUENDER: Psychology Without a Soul. 

HALpANE: Mechanism, Life, and Personality. 

HoERNLE: Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics; Life, Matter, Mind, 
and God. 

Howson: The Limits of Evolution. 

James: Principles of Psychology; Will to Believe. 

Lapp: Philosophy of Mind. 

Larrp: Problems of the Self. 

LercHtTon: The Field of Philosophy. 

McDovucA.Lt: Body and Mind. 

MacrintosH: The Problem of Knowledge. 

MAHER: Psychology. 

MERCIER: Psychologie. 

PARKER: The Self and Nature. 

PAULSEN: Introduction to Philosophy. 

Perry: Present Philosophical Tendencies. 

Ranp: The Classical Psychologists. 

RASHDALL: Personal Idealism; Personality, Human and Divine. 

Royce: The Problem of Christianity. 

THoMSON, J. A.: A System of Animate Nature. 





CHAPTER XI 
PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 


Few problems are more vexing or have divided thinkers 
more sharply in recent years, than the problem of the na- 
ture of science and of philosophy, and of what should be 
their relations to each other. To the man in the street 
nothing seems more obvious than that science and philos- 
ophy, as he is acquainted with them, present very clear-cut 
lines of division. He is more than apt to look upon science 
as a subject which deals with truths of undisputed validity. 
The great, almost awe-compelling achievements of modern 
science are well known to him. He reads daily of some new 
and more wonderful discovery; he experiences in his home, 
the factory, shop, or office the practical value of scientific 
research in terms of increased industrial efficiency, or of 
added human comfort; he is acquainted with the airplane, 
the automobile, the submarine, the X-ray, the radiophone, 
and comes quite naturally to the conclusion that science 
is all-powerful, that no one in sane mind can question either 
the truth or utility of the principles which underlie such 
astounding accomplishments. At least to that part of 
philosophy which touches closely his daily life, he is apt to 
give a more or less unqualified assent. However, when we 
penetrate the farther reaches of philosophical thought, and 
endeavor to explain its more abstruse problems, he begins 
to lose patience with such questions because of their sup- 
posedly impractical character. The contrast between the 

341 


342 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


results of modern science and those of philosophy, both pure 
and applied, reacts to the disadvantage of the latter. 

The problem, as it unfolds itself before the plain man, is 
fundamentally the same problem which agitates opposing 
camps of scientists and philosophers. Stripped of popular 
errors and crudities, the ordinary view becomes the view of 
those thinkers who look upon science as the sole source of 
truth, as the fountain head of knowledge in the strict sense 
of the word. With great dexterity and a formidable mass 
of concrete achievements, science 1s paraded before us, fact 
after fact marshaled in battle array, theory after theory 
backed up by facts. In striking contrast is the disorderly 
appearance of philosophy. Here fact jostles theory, one 
theory contradicts another, personal opinion vies with per- 
sonal opinion, and instead of presenting an aspect of unity, 
philosophy seems nothing more than a confusing picture of 
the many disagreements which have, from the beginning of 
history, divided philosophers amongst themselves. 

Philosophy, we are told, has been hampered too long by 
the shackles of a false method. Particularly harmful to 
the progress of philosophical insight has been the centuries- 
old domination of religious and ethical motives. Science 
shook off both these incumbrances over two hundred years 
ago. Since that time its history has been but the recital 
of one marvelous discovery after another. Philosophy, if 
it would go forward, must divorce itself likewise from these 
hindrances of the past. It must turn to science where it will 
find both a guide and the inspiration necessary to achieve 
that for which mankind has been waiting so long and so 
expectantly. What these thinkers ask, in a few words, is 
that philosophy become science, in the sense not only that 
it base its explanations upon the results achieved by science, 
but that it adopt, with the necessary changes, the methods 
of science. As Hoernlé remarks, ‘‘It is a tempting sugges- 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 343 


tion. We hardly know how to resist it, for the spell of sci- 
ence 1s upon us all.’’4 

But there are thinkers who resist the temptation, strong 
as itis. They admit, and quite readily, that science has 
gained notable triumphs, that scientific method is for science 
the only practicable method, but they are very adverse to 
the statement of philosophical problems in terms solely of 
science, or to a narrowing of philosophical method to the 
single method of experiment. For the true philosopher 
there is something more than a question of method involved 
in this controversy. Beneath the assumption that scientific 
method, in the narrow sense of the word, will alone produce 
noteworthy results, is that more fundamental and more far- 
reaching assumption that the only kind of knowledge worthy 
the name is that which is acquired experimentally. To ac- 
cept such a proposition would entail a limiting of the sub- 
ject-matter which philosophy now treats to the field of 
phenomena observable by the senses. ‘This in itself is a 
philosophical position, that of Positivism, and cannot be 
accepted until after it has been most seriously examined and 
evaluated. 

Realists have attempted, at all times, to avoid the ex- 
tremes inherent in an exclusive acceptation of either the 
position of those who rely solely on the analytic method or 
of those who tie themselves down to the method of a priori 
speculation. Either of these methods, taken singly, is 
inadequate and false. A synthesis of them, however, can 
be made. Aristotle succeeded in formulating a synthetic 
philosophy; likewise, Thomas Aquinas in the Middle Ages. 
Modern realists, except those of the monistic school, have 
all felt that such a synthesis is not only possible, but that 
its actualization is much nearer to us than our critics in the 
field of science are willing to admit. 

1 Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, p. 29. 


344 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


Philosophy, in this viewpoint, must not be looked upon as 
synonymous with science, neither is it true that science is 
nothing and philosophy everything. There is a middle road 
which leads to a synthesis of the results of all the sciences 
with the formal principles which underlie them in a philo- 
sophical construction, whose fundamental purpose is to 
study these facts and principles of science in their highest 
and most ultimate aspects. Both science and philosophy 
study the same facts. The difference is one of approach, 
since science is concerned with secondary causes, while 
philosophy pushes its investigations to the last causes de- 
termining all things. 

Now, to return to our problem. The aim of philosophy is 
to know. Knowledge is likewise the aim of science. Does 
it then follow that science is philosophy, or that philosophy 
is science? If they are not the same, which should have 
precedence over the other? Perhaps we must look upon sci- 
ence as autonomous, the principles of which must be re- 
garded as totally independent of philosophy. Or possibly 
philosophy is the more fundamental, because the principles 
of all knowledge, including science, depend in a most direct 
fashion upon the principles of metaphysics. If neither of 
these positions be acceptable, what possible answer can be 
given to the problem of the nature of philosophy and of its 
relations to science? 

In order to answer these questions adequately, it will be 
necessary to investigate somewhat in detail both the nature 
of science and of philosophy, as well as the functions and 
limitations of each of these disciplines. From this investi- 
gation it shall result that a satisfactory reply to the ques- 
tions can be given, and that a workable systematization of 
the functions and purposes of both science and philosophy 
follows upon a correct view of what these two approaches 
to knowledge essentially imply. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 34 


The contending claims of science and philosophy in the 
field of human knowledge did not disturb ancient thought, 
which generally looked upon science as a mere branch of 
philosophy. Of the Greek thinkers, Aristotle saw best that 
a problem was involved in the relations of the two. Aris- 
totle, as is well known, was both scientist and philosopher, 
and succeeded in laying the foundations for a conception 
of the place of science in philosophy which harmonizes very 
well with the aims and purposes of both. 

In modern times, Descartes gave the question new life 
by asserting that the principles of the special sciences should 
be directly subordinated to those of philosophy. This view 
strongly influenced subsequent thinkers, especially those 
of an ethical or a religious bent. On the other hand, Locke 
and Hume disagreed with this view and laid great emphasis 
on the strictly scientific aspects of philosophy. This latter 
tradition reached its fulness of expression in the philosophy 
of Positivism, the underlying concept of which is that 
each science is autonomous in its own field and must 
not be subordinated to philosophy as to a “‘scientia 
rectrix.”” 

Contemporary opinion favoring the supremacy of the 
experimental view of philosophy is expressed by the theories 
of Bertrand Russell and John Dewey. For Russell, since 
science manifests itself best in the mathematical sciences, 
philosophy must have recourse to this particular method if 
it would succeed. Now, mathematics has a close affinity 
with logic, to which it can be reduced. The method which 
philosophy should employ, therefore, is the “logico-ana- 
lytic.’ We thus return to the deductive method which 
played such a prominent part in the philosophical specula- 
tions of the early modern thinkers of the mathematical 
school. Dewey, on the other hand, makes laboratory science 
the ideal means of attaining knowledge. All thinking is but 


346 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


an instrument in our progress towards truth. But the only 
kind of thinking of value is that which is of an experimental 
character. It is solely by experiencing, by trying out ideas 
that we learn their value. Results thus attained are the 
only genuine test of the truth of our concepts. This view is 
known as the philosophy of “Instrumentalism.” 

Finally, the position of those who advocate what might 
be called the ‘‘analytico-synthetic” view describe science 
as a particular field of knowledge of which philosophy is 
the end and crown. Neither analysis nor synthesis must be 
overlooked in our search for truth. The final emphasis, 
however, must be placed upon synthesis. From the side 
of the matter treated, both philosophy and science go over 
the same ground. The fundamental difference between the 
two is the manner of approach to the problems considered. 
Science confines its investigations to secondary causes; 
philosophy, accepting these results, passes on to the consid- 
eration of the ultimate causes underlying all the phenomena 
of being and of thought. It is, therefore, not merely a 
science, but the science of sciences. 


The Nature of Science.—The word Science, like Philos- 
ophy and many other kindred abstract terms, has been al- 
most personified by popular usage. We talk of Science, 
capitalized, and forget that there is no such thing. There 
are sciences, the mathematical and physical sciences, but 
there is no Science. In the same way, one speaks of scien- 
tific method and of the progress of scientific thought, when 
it is a well-known fact that a single method applicable to 
all the sciences does not exist, and its very possibility is a 
matter for grave questioning. Unless, therefore, we state 
with exactness what is the meaning of the terms used in this 
discussion, nothing but confusion of thought and harmful 
antagonisms shall result from our investigations. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION — 347 


A short analysis of the characteristics of science will make 
evident its nature. Science is knowledge by description, 
and this knowledge comes to us by means of observation 
and experiment. Now, scientific demonstration presup- 
poses definite and fixed conditions from which, when verified, 
truth results. The results of this demonstration are ex- 
pressed in a scientific formula which is something more than 
the mere record of the experiences of the individual inves- 
tigator. A scientific formula or generalization represents a 
truth which can be verified by any investigator, and there- 
fore presents an undeniable case where our thoughts about 
nature represent truly what is taking place in nature itself. 
Science, therefore, relies upon facts, and the explanation 
which it offers of these facts is sound, convincing, and de- 
cisive. 

The method employed by Science is that of verification 
of sensible phenomena by means of laboratory investiga- 
tion. These phenomena, because of their sensible nature, 
leave themselves open to investigation by means of the 
exact and rigorous methods peculiar to each one of the spe- 
cial sciences. The world of phenomena external to the mind 
is such that it can be reached and tested in a way which 
produces results whose truth is not open to question. The 
study of nature, therefore, occupies a much more advan- 
tageous position than does the study of mind. And the 
concrete character and practical value of the results ob- 
tained by scientific method are thus very apt to prejudice 
one in his conception of the place which must be accorded 
scientific truth in the general hierarchy of human knowl- 
edge. Science is praised for its treatment of fact and the 
practical uses to which it puts its theories, based as they 
are upon fact. From this position it is but one step to the 
assertion that scientific truth alone is of value, and that if 
we are ever to progress to a complete and satisfactory view 


348 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


of the world, we must begin and end in the study of facts 
by way of scientific method. 

On the other hand, however, it is assumed, not proved, 
that the only verification worthy of the name is that ob- 
tainable by laboratory methods, and that the only facts 
worthy of investigation are the objects of sense perception, 
what Russell calls “‘hard data” as distinguished from the 
“soft data” which come to us in any other way. It is not 
true, of course, that the only facts are those of the sensible 
order,! those which we can see, hear, or touch. There are 
other facts, facts of the intellectual order whose existence 
is as sure as those brought to us by perception. Now, if 
such facts exist, certainly we can assure ourselves of their 
reality, we can describe them, mark off their characteristics, 
and discover the laws under which they appear and which 
determine their nature. Scientific demonstration is prac- 
ticable wherever we deal with facts. The world of mind, 
therefore, fulfills the conditions required for scientific in- 
vestigation. No one can deny that in this field the facts 
are most difficult to express and to study, or that the ordi- 
nary instruments of the laboratory are practically valueless 
in making known their nature. But that there are facts 
which cannot be weighed and measured will cause neither 
surprise nor chagrin except to him who has already made 
a veritable idol of the methods and results of experimental 
science. In the field of mind, the results of our study, if 
scientifically pursued, may be quite as true and quite as 
certain as any expressed in purely mathematical formulas. 
The essence of scientific demonstration and verification 
lies in this, it analyzes facts; whether these facts be of the 
sensible or intellectual order is a matter of pure indifference. 
To narrow the extension of scientific proof solely to facts 
perceived by our senses is unwarranted on any grounds, 


1 Ollé-Laprune, Le Philosophie et Le Temps Present, pp. 72 et seq. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 349 


and can but eventuate in a view of the cosmos which is at 
once narrow, and to that extent, at least, false. 

Conceding that there exist facts which cannot be studied 
by the experimental method, it cannot be denied that little 
progress has been made in the direction of understanding 
and formulating them into an acceptable system. In this 
respect, at least, the procedure and results of science are in 
marked contrast to the shifting opinions which pass muster 
as the beliefs of philosophy. Below we shall deal somewhat 
in detail with the question of progress in philosophical 
thought and of the fixity of philosophical principles. Here 
we wish to point out that the vaunted stability of both 
scientific method and achievements is much exaggerated, 
to put it mildly. The moment we pass from the most ele- 
mentary conceptions of science, or attempt to define more 
exactly those accepted elementary notions, we enter upon 
a region where the disputes which divide scientists are so 
numerous and so vigorous as to shake our very faith in the 
stable character of even the supposedly exact sciences, like 
mathematics and physics. The revolution which has re- 
cently taken place in the field of physics, led by Einstein 
and the defenders of relativity, and which threatens to 
overturn all our conceptions of the phenomenal universe 
as built up on the investigations of Newton and his succes- 
sors, is one, but a sufficient example to serve as a warning to 
those who attempt to decry philosophy by exalting the 
positive character of the sciences. 

There is fixity in philosophy. This quality of permanence 
in philosophy is not so evident as that which exists in the 
sciences. The constant movement in philosophical thought 
often deceives us, and we conclude that change is more 
characteristic of it than stability. However, we must not 
forget that philosophy touches the most elementary things, 
both in life and in thought. It is about these basic princi- 


350 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


ples that human speculation runs rife and often presents a 
series of results which have all the appearance of mere the- 
ory, and in which the personal equation seems to predomi- 
nate. A sane, impartial view of the achievements of both 
science and philosophy, however, reveals in both realms 
stability and impersonality to a marked, though not an 
equal degree. It is not only science which produces posi- 
tive results. Philosophy, too, is based on positive facts 
and leads to positive results by means of positive methods. 
In the world of speculation, the positive exists and can be 
demonstrated. And the term ‘‘positive science” can be 
restricted to the physical sciences only by assuming that 
they alone are capable of arriving at positive results. That 
is an assumption which cannot be proved either a priori 
or a posteriori. 


Science and Determinism.—The advocates of science 
will tell us here that we have missed the whole point of 
their contention. It is not so much that they wish to deny 
that philosophy deals with facts. That may be admitted 
readily enough. Philosophy does not, however, deal with 
facts in a scientific manner. For what is the essence of 
scientific method? It is found in Determinism.! A fact 
is determined in this, that being a consequent, it has in its 
antecedent a sufficient and indispensable condition for its 
own existence. Scientific causality consists precisely in 
that uniformity of succession which is found in every ex- 
perience wherein the problem of the existence and the na- 
ture of an effect are involved. Every effect must have a 
sufficient cause. To know the effect one must know the 
cause. From this knowledge of causality we proceed not 
only to a scientific generalization, but to the power of pre- 


dicting what must inevitably happen, given such a cause. . 


1 Ollé-Laprune, La Philosophie et Le Temps Present, pp. 80 et seq. 


—— ss 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 351 


Science not only explains, it also predicts. It is here pre- 
cisely that the note of determinism, which is so prominent 
a characteristic of science, reveals to us the inner nature of 
science itself. It is here, too, that science differs so radi- 
cally from philosophy. And nothing but the acceptance 
of this deterministic viewpoint, not only for astronomy, 
physics, or biology, but for the universe as a whole, can 
ever save human knowledge. For beyond the realm of the 
determined lies nothing but fantasy, dreams, illusions. 

No one can question, if the above analysis of the purpose 
and aims of science be exact, that there is nothing left for 
philosophy but to submit humbly and to accept its place 
as the handmaiden of science. If it can become scientific 
on no other basis than by an unqualified acceptance of de- 
terminism, there is an end to philosophy as a separate and 
distinct intellectual discipline. Philosophers, however, 
will think twice before subscribing to any such pretensions 
on the part of science. Philosophy must be scientific, it is 
agreed, but if it can become so only by accepting conse- 
quences which entail signing its own death warrant, then 
both common sense and ordinary prudence demand a se- 
rious inspection of this axiom, generally received amongst 
scientists, that science and determinism are one and the 
selfsame thing. 

Now, is it true that we can legitimately identify science 
and determinism in the sense that such a union explains all 
the facts of nature, or that it is demanded by the very neces- 
sities of logic itself? That any scientific explanation 1s 
completely satisfactory from every point of view, no one 
can contend. Science is strictly limited, both in the range 
of data open to its examination and in the explanations it 
offers of these data. The greater the scientist, the more 
freely comes the acknowledgment from him that science, 
upon many things, has no view at all, for the simple reason 


a5e AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


that many things lie entirely outside its range. Even the 
theories advanced are generally put forward in a tentative 
manner with the recognition that explanations founded 
solely on scientific causality may be overthrown at some 
future date, or that, if they do conquer the assaults of sub- 
sequent scientists, they are not by any means the highest 
and most profound explanations possible. Further ques- 
tions always remain, and we do not solve them by denying 
their existence, or by contending that such problems surpass 
the powers of human knowledge. Therefore, to admit the 
inadequacy of science in the face of many problems is to 
proclaim, at the same time, that the pretended equation 
between science and determinism is not perfect. If it is 
possible to conceive of problems insoluble by any known 
means of science, and at the same time to acknowledge that 
a species of knowledge exists which is capable of attacking 
such problems, be the attack as weak as it may and its re- 
sults as unsatisfactory as possible, it follows that the idea 
of science cannot be restricted to determinism without 
doing an extreme violence to the cause of truth. 

This question of the all-sufficiency of scientific determin- 
ism may likewise be approached from the side of fact. Is it 
true that outside the field of phenomenal fact nothing exists 
but illusions and fancies? To uphold such a view one must 
assume that either our means of observation are perfect or 
that, by means of the laboratory method, it is possible to 
learn the nature itself of every object. But it is only neces- 
sary to state such a pretension in order to recognize its utter 
futility. The facts of mind, to be concrete, are not mere 
illusions. That they are as valuable as the facts of the exter- 
nal world can scarcely be doubted. Yet these mental facts 
cannot be reduced to mere expressions of behavior without 
doing them an injustice, without destroying the very thing 
in them which is peculiar and proper, their immanent spir- 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 353 


itual character. Because inner facts differ from outer facts 
is no reason to deny their existence, much less to contend 
that they must be reduced to outer facts before we can pos- 
sibly understand them. The facts of mind can be read out 
of the universe of scientific investigation only on the a 
priori assumption that such facts are not facts at all, but 
illusions, that scientific determinism must be extended to 
every realm of being for the simple reason that we wish so 
to extend it. 

Finally, scientific determinism can be accepted as an 
adequate explanation of the universe only on the added 
assumption that the phenomenal world is self-sufficient, and 
that the explanations offered for phenomena exhaust the 
possibilities of being. However, few scientists will contend 
that their formulas tell us anything at all about the 
essence of things. While convinced that these formulas 
are true as far as they go, that things are determined me- 
chanically and act as if the reign of mechanical law is uni- 
versal, no scientist can assert that such is the undeniable 
fact, or that at bottom it must be so and cannot be other- 
wise. Such an assertion would completely transcend the 
scientific viewpoint which is exclusively phenomenal. On 
the contrary, his researches lead him to the supposition 
that beyond the phenomenal extends a realm where every 
thing is not determined, but where things determine them- 
selves. Nor can he be true to his own mechanism unless he 
supposes that the series of mechanical results which he 
studies points unerringly to a higher order from which the 
mechanical proceeds and for the attainment of whose pur- 
poses it exists. 

It seems to us, therefore, equally bad science and bad 
philosophy to contend that the mathematical and phys- 
ical sciences exhaust the possibilities of science as such. 
Over and above the so-called natural sciences there exist 


354 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


other sciences which, both in subject-matter and in method, 
present a strictly positive character. It is purely arbi- 
trary, in our opinion, to restrict the meaning of the term 
“science” to those processes of knowledge in which de- 
terminism plays the central réle. Such a procedure can 
only be justified if we are willing to assume that the particu- 
lar sciences alone deserve the name Science. Philosophy, 
it is true, is not an experimental science. But from this 
admission it does not follow that it is in no true sense of 
the word a science. If philosophy deals with facts, if it 
studies them scientifically, if it exhibits all the necessary 
characteristics which we have come to associate with scien- 
tific inquiry, then there is assuredly no reason in the world 
for denying it a rightful place amongst the sciences, or for re- 
fusing to accept its tested conclusions with the same assur- 
ance as we do those of the physical or mathematical sciences. 


The Instrumentalism of Professor Dewey.—Probably 
the best expression of the view current in certain circles 
that philosophy, to be successful, must subordinate itself 
entirely to experimental science is that of Professor Dewey. 
Experiment in this theory, however, assumes a much wider 
meaning than is ordinarily given to that term. Dewey does 
not confine experiment to the purely physical, but includes 
the whole field of the moral, the economic, and the social. 
Human behavior, too, must be studied after methods mod- 
eled on those of the experimentalist, if we would under- 
stand it thoroughly and aspire to provide for man’s progress 
and well-being.! 

In criticism of this position of Professor Dewey, it may be 
pointed out, first of all, that it involves a theory of knowl- 
edge which we have already shown to be false.? Pragma- 


1 For this theory of Dewey, see Education and Democracy, pp. 256-270 and 
pp. 388-418. 
? See supra, p. 226 et seq. 





PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 3s 


tism, or the utility theory, presents a certain aspect of the 
making of truth which is a faithful enough picture of the 
psychological processes involved in the attainment of the 
principles which guide our actions. But it overemphasizes 
the practical or experimental aspects of the truth relation 
by insisting that truth is a purely personal affair, a mere 
guide to action. 

Again, it is hopeless, as a general rule, to seek for an ex- 
periment which will prove or disprove a given philosophical 
theory, for ‘‘a philosophical theory is rarely such that it 
can be proved or disproved by some action devised ad hoc.” } 
And the reason for this is that a philosophical position in- 
volves a statement about realities which, because of their 
intangible nature, cannot be weighed or measured, cannot 
be tested in the experimental sense of the word. It is use- 
less, if not absurd, for example, to look for a laboratory 
proof of the falsity of monism or of the truth of realism. 
Such views, because of their very inclusiveness, transcend 
any particular experience which we could possibly con- 
struct to test their worth. Since they involve a total view 
of reality, it is manifestly impossible to find their truth or 
falsehood by means of any individual experiment. But 
that these positions may be tested by a strictly philosophical 
method, that is, that they can be proved not to conflict with 
the accepted results of experiment nor with our individual 
human experience, is a fact beyond question. Such testing, 
such experimentation is going on constantly. It is thus that 
philosophy advances from positions more or less unsound 
to other positions which convince us of their truth and va- 
lidity. And this is the only possible way to “make” 
philosophical truth. 

Dewey claims for Instrumentalism this great advantage 


1 Hoernlé, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, p. 46. Consult pp. 46-49 for his 
criticism of the Instrumentalism of Dewey. 


356 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


over previous conceptions of philosophy, namely, that it 
leads to results which work. Philosophy in the past con- 
stantly revolved about the same problems, discussing and 
rediscussing them, but never attaining certainty. To which 
we might reply that the very universality of the problems 
which philosophy discusses makes their reappearance for 
every generation a foregone conclusion. Each philosopher 
must think out for himself the answers to the great recur- 
rent problems of philosophy. And since each man’s cul- 
ture and experience are different from that of every other 
man, so also his understanding of these problems and of the 
solutions offered for them by bygone sages will be different. 
This does not mean surely that no progress is being made in 
the formulation of a total view of reality. Nothing is more 
certain than that we have made remarkable advances in our 
views of the universe since the days of Plato. The progress 
is not so showy, nor has it led to such practical results as 
have characterized the recent advances in the natural sci- 
ences. But for all that, it is progress of a most substantial 
kind, and signs are not wanting to indicate that we are 
standing to-day on the threshold of a new era in philosophical 
speculation, through which can be discerned the outlines of a 
world-view which, when possessed by us, shall present to 
the philosopher as stable and positive a character as do the 
constructions of modern science. 


The Logico-Analytic View of Philosophy.—Bertrand 
Russell thinks that the mathematical, and not the labora- 
tory sciences represent best the scientific method which 
must be applied to philosophy.! This is particularly evi- 

‘For Russell’s view, see his Philosophical Essays, pp. 50-86; Mysticism and 


Logic, pp. 74-125 and pp. 209-232; The Problems of Philosophy, pp. 220-237, and 
Our Knowledge of the External World. 


For a criticism, Hoernlé, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, pp. 34-38, whom 
I have followed. 





PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION — 357 


dent in the field of logic, to which mathematics can be re- 
duced. Philosophy need not preoccupy itself, as it has in 
the past, with the results of science. ‘‘It is not results, but 
methods, that can be transferred with profit from the sphere 
of the special sciences to philosophy.” ! Now, a philosoph- 
ical proposition to be of any value must be general, not in 
the sense that it represents anything about the “‘universe,”’ 
“‘for there is no such thing as the universe,” ? but in the 
sense that what it states ‘‘may be asserted of each individ- 
ual thing, such as the propositions of logic.” This philoso- 
phy he calls ‘‘logical atomism” or ‘‘absolute pluralism.” 
In the second place, philosophical propositions must be a 
priori, that is, they must be such “‘as can be neither proved 
nor disapproved by empirical evidence.” ? The world of 
which philosophy treats, therefore, is a purely possible world 
where truths are eternally true and untouched by either the 
fluctuations of mind or of matter. Thus, philosophy be- 
comes for all practicable purposes indistinguishable from 
logic. 

Russell illustrates his method by applying it to such prob- 
lems as those which have arisen as a result of the develop- 
ment of the non-Euclidean geometry, the problem of space, 
the epistemological problem, and the problem of realism. 
Thus, for example, in answer to the question whether our 
perceptions are ‘‘real,’’ he replies that if the question is to 
be intelligible we must acknowledge the existence in this 
universe of two kinds of objects, real and unreal.* He then 
contends that an object can be real even though it is neither 
perceived nor perceivable. And his philosophy deals pre- 


1 Mysticism and Logic, p. 08. 

4 Op, cit.; po1t0. 

Op cit?, Durie 

4 This is an evident misconception of the whole problem. The distinction is not 
between real and unreal, but between the real which is perceived and the real which 
is not perceived. 


358 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


cisely with this kind of reality, which escapes both physics 
and the older philosophies. Philosophy, according to Rus- 
sell, arrives at views which are purely tentative, but in this 
it closely approaches all the other sciences which claim 
nothing more than that their results are approximations © 
to the truth. 

In criticism of Russell’s view it may be said, in the first 
place, that it involves the acceptance of metaphysical plu- 
ralism, which, as we have already pointed out, is an insuffi- 
cient explanation of the problem of reality.? 

Again, Russell reads out of the universe the category of 
values which he claims has no existence therein. Now, this 
position not only entails a new conception of what problems 
philosophy can rightly attempt to solve, but assumes that 
values as such are not a part of the universe at all. To that 
extent, at least, his philosophy becomes a world-view, the 
very thing he criticises in his predecessors. Moreover, and 
this is a most serious objection, his position appears to us 
to be nothing short of a more or less disguised pessimism, 
looking on the universe as a grim reality, the meaning and 
value of which is beyond all human speculation. ‘‘ There 
lies the real sting of Russell’s plea for scientific method. 
There lies his real challenge to all philosophy which, in the 
hands of the great masters of speculation, has sought to 
elicit from all the resources of our experience a synthetic 
vision of the whole, which would justify that deep confi- 
dence in the world which is the fruit of religion at its best. 
It is because of this renunciation that no thorough-going 
philosophy can, in the end, find salvation by any method 
which is scientific in the spirit of Russell’s utterances.” ? 

Finally, the emphasis placed on theory in philosophy, in 
contrast to the practical side of it, which alone seems to 


1 See supra, pp. 47 et seq. 
2 Hoernlé, Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics, p. 44. 





PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION — 359 


impress the pragmatists, is undoubtedly not misplaced. 
However, we must not exaggerate. Theory in philosophy 
does not exist merely for its own sake. It turns, too, upon 
practical needs and subserves practical ends. Philosophy 
is something more than the “‘science of the possible.’’ And 
what we must look for from philosophy, and what we shall 
continue to look for, if we would be true to our trust, is a 
satisfactory and satisfying combination of both theory and 
practice in a synthesis which, while it does not fail to scan 
the higher things, is at the same time not too proud to stoop 
to the lower. 


The Limitations of Science.—In speaking of science so 
far, no effort was made to point out the limits beyond which 
scientific procedure and results cannot be extended without 
doing violence to facts. Science has its well-defined limits, 
and no one is more ready to acknowledge the existence of 
gaps, lacuna, and even blind alleys in the field of scientific 
theory and fact than is, be it said to his honor, the scientist 
himself. These limits are of two kinds—intrinsic, the nat- 
ural limitations of the mind of the observer, and extrinsic, 
the material universe itself which, for many reasons, as we 
shall see below, makes difficult if not impossible a total view 
of the processes which operate therein. A frank recognition 
of these boundaries set to natural knowledge, on the part of 
both scientist and philosopher, will go a long way in the 
direction of dissipating many of the difficulties which ob- 
scure the problem of the relations of philosophy to science.1 

From the side of the observer, the congenital limitations 
of the human mind make a completely satisfactory expla- 

1 For a very excellent treatment of this topic, see J. Arthur Thomson, The System 
of Animate Nature, Vol. I, pp. 13-25. I have summarized in the briefest fashion 
Thomson’s statement. 


See also Poincaré, The Value of Science, trans. by Halsted, pp. 321-395; Perry, 
Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 85-109. 


360 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


nation of nature practically impossible. Our senses are 
determined in their range of possible observation by physio- 
logical boundaries, which make perfect exactness and final- 
ity in our knowledge of the world impossible. It is quite 
true, of course, that the range of sense knowledge has been 
immeasurably widened by the discovery of numerous in- 
struments, like the telescope and the microscope. In spite 
of these aids, scientific observation still remains partial and 
incomplete. There are myriads of objects, organic and in- 
organic, which escape our vision—a fact which should en- 
gender a becoming humility in every follower of science. 
Again, scientific generalization is the result of a process 
of mental abstraction. In science we abstract, in our con- 
sideration of any effect, from all determining conditions 
except the special one under analysis. Living things, for 
example, may be studied in abstraction from the ambient 
in which they live. In such cases, the abstraction is obvious 
and in the conclusions we draw account is generally taken 
of that fact. However, in other cases, the abstraction is 
not so patent with the result that a foreign and unproved 
principle is sometimes smuggled into a scientific theory to 
the confusion of all concerned. To study, for example, liv- 
ing things in terms of mechanical movement, or of tropisms, 
and then to conclude that animal behavior is solely mechan- 
istic, is nothing short of a disfiguring of the very character- 
istics which make living beings different from non-living. 
Not only are our powers of observation limited, but the 
amount of exact data which we actually possess on any 
given problem is woefully small in comparison with the 
wide field which a scientific generalization constructed 
upon the data known to us embraces. It cannot be denied 
that the truth of a generalization does not depend on the 
accumulation and verification of every possible datum. 
However, a generalization must always leave open the door 


Le Oe Oe 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 361 


to possible correction in the light of subsequent discoveries. 
This fact of possible modification, due to new discoveries 
or to a more profound study of a scientific truth by later 
thinkers, makes present-day scientific generalizations, no 
matter how well-founded, tentative and approximate ap- 
proaches to truth, and not in any sense of the word the final 
dictum on the problem under discussion. 

Furthermore, a statement of any given effect in mathe- 
matical symbols does not exhaust, as it is too often assumed, 
the full possibilities of that effect. Neither is the function 
of prediction synonymous with a total description of the 
objects under consideration. Prediction in itself is but a 
by-product of scientific accuracy, as are the practical appli- 
cations to which a particular theory may be put. The pri- 
mary function of science is not to predict, but to discover 
causes. Whether these causes as explanations are exhaust- 
ive or not depends on the attitude with which we approach 
aproblem. If we seek a partial explanation, they may well 
satisfy all our demands. The applicability, whether partial 
or total, of an explanation, therefore, depends on what atti- 
tude we assumed as we studied the problem under consider- 
ation. 

Science only deals with the more or less obvious. As 
such, it makes no effort to penetrate the final secrets which 
lie hidden behind all things. What it takes up and considers 
is the object present, hic ef nunc. In order even to generalize 
about this it must assume the existence of matter as well as 
the existence of the scientist who studies matter. Supposing 
the scientist can learn all there is to be known about matter, 
there still remains the problem of what matter is. The 
further back he pushes his researches, the more complex 
and the more difficult his problems become. He finally 
reaches a stage where he can go no further with the appara- 
tus at his command. It is there precisely that the philos- 


362 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


opher takes up the burden of the quest and pushes his 
investigations to the point where the vision of the philos- 
opher tries to see what is hidden irom the eye of the sci- 
entist.! 

We are not, in all this, attempting to cast suspicion upon 
the proved results of science. Both scientific method and 
its conclusions have won for themselves an assured place in 
the process of gaining intellectual control over the forces of 
nature. Science, by its exact descriptions of phenomena, 
not only increases our knowledge of these phenomena, but 
to that extent makes more certain our mastery of nature. 
However, it must not be forgotten that all scientific general- 
izations do not possess an identical value. In our enthu- 
siasm for science we are apt to confer upon mere guesses or 
tentative theories the same power to achieve certainty as 
we do on proved and generally accepted results. Sup- 
position, conjecture, probability, all play an important réle 
in our scientific constructions. The results based upon such 
approximations are clearly to be distinguished from those 
which are in great measure independent of any purely 
hypothetical formulation. 

Moreover, the philosopher cannot but view with alarm 
the efforts being made by some scientists to dispossess him 
of his proper field of inquiry, recognizing that such attempts, 
due to the nature and limitations of science, are doomed to 
disappointment. The cause of truth will not be advanced by 
the substitution of a view of the universe which is essentially 


1‘* No body of scientific doctrine succeeds in describing in terms of laws of succes- 
sion more than some limited set of stages of a natural process; the whole process— 
if, indeed, it can be regarded as a whole—must for ever be beyond the reach of scien- 
tific grasp. The earliest stage to which science has succeeded in tracing back any 
part of a sequence of phenomena itself constitutes a new problem for science, and 
that without end. There is always an earlier stage and to an earliest we can never, 
attain. The questions of origins concern the theologian, the metaphysician, perhaps 
the poet.’”—Schuster and Shipley, quoted by Thomson, The System of Animate 
Nature, Vol. I, p. 21. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 363 


limited for one which is total and final. On the other hand, 
philosophy has no criticism of science for raising constantly, 
as it does, ultimate questions. But that it lies within the 
province of science to answer adequately these problems is a 
contention which philosophy cannot admit. Over and 
above the processes of science, there exist both a field of 
problems and a method for studying them, which is properly 
philosophical. It is neither in the true interests of science 
nor of the progress of human knowledge for scientists to 
essay a usurpation in a realm which transcends the empiri- 
cal order. Science is description, philosophy interpretation. 
Both must coéperate to obtain a total and harmonious 
view of the whole of nature and of human experience.! 


The Meaning of Philosophy.—We have written of 
Philosophy as if it were a simple subject. As a matter of 
fact, it is singularly complex. On the one hand it bears close 
and definite affinities with religion, while on the other it 
relies to a large extent upon the conclusions of scientific 
research. It differs from religion both in the subject-matter 
it treats and in the methods it employs, yet its viewpoint 
includes many problems which are essentially religious in 
character. . Mankind looks to philosophy not only for 
assistance on questions which transcend the range of science, 
but also for guidance on many of the problems of ethics and 


1‘The revived attention to logical methods of the sciences is killing the crude 
sensationalism of the days which saw the first publication of Mach’s Science of 
Mechanics and Pearson’s Grammar of Science. The claims of ‘induction’ to be a 
method of establishing truths may be fairly said to have been completely exposed. 
It is clearer now than it was when Kant made the observation that each of the 
‘sciences’ contains just so much science as it contains mathematics, and that the 
Critical Philosophy was fully justified in insisting that all science implies universal 
a priori postulates, though it went wrong in thinking that these postulates are laws 
of the working of the human mind or are ‘put into’ things by the human mind. 
How far Science has moved away from crude sensationalistic empiricism may be 
estimated by a comparison of the successive editions of the Grammar of Science.” 
Marvin, Recent Developments in European Thought, p. 59. 

See Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 45~108. 


364 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


life, religion and God, which touch so closely the welfare 
of each one of us. Others view philosophy more especially 
as science, and depend upon it to solve the many ques- 
tions which science, because of its limitations, will not 
or cannot answer. That these diverse expectations need 
not belooked upon as contradictory, but rather in the 
light of complementary functions, we shall endeavor to 
point out. 

Philosophy, too, presents analogies with art, since 
imagination plays a very conspicuous réle in the building 
of every philosophical system. Philosophy is literary, 
speculative, doctrinal. For an understanding of philos- 
ophy, therefore, its many connections with science, art, 
religion, and life must not be lost sight of. 

Philosophy may be defined as wisdom. But wisdom is of 
many kinds. It is, in the first place, of a most elementary 
type. Such wisdom is, for practical purposes, synonymous 
with the universally accepted conclusions of common sense. 
These conclusions are regarded as final, but they have not 
been analyzed and criticised by those who accept them. 
However, their truth is sufficiently evident to all of us that 
we may live and act by them. But no conscious effort has 
been made to reach a more profound acquaintance with 
these truths, or to test out in every possible way their valid- 
ity. Such is the philosophy of the man in the street, which 
presents many analogies with the position of him who 
accepts the elementary parts of each science but does not 
enter into controversial questions or into those questions 
which require continued and difficult study. He accepts as 
much of science as is necessary to get along with in this 
world. 

_ Now, “‘common sense, in spite of the obloquy cast upon it 
in certain schools of philosophy, still asserts its position as 
the ultimate tribunal before which all speculation has to 


Ne Bae gt tl ee 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 36s 


justify itself.” ! Common sense is the starting point of all 
knowledge. Although its beliefs may not be all equally well- 
founded, still it exhibits a solid nucleus of truth which must 
never be lost sight of, either by the scientist or the philos- 
opher. Both in the sensible and in the intellectual order 
certain facts and principles, as for example, the tri-dimen- 
sional character of bodies or the principle of identity 
possess a validity beyond question. Likewise, the immedi- 
ate conclusions which the human mind draws from these 
facts and principles are spontaneous expressions of a certi- 
tude which no amount of argumentation can shake. Such 
beliefs and judgments are called the judgments of common 
sense, because they are the common possession of every 
rational man. Their certitude is, in every sense of the word, 
equal to that which the truths of science possess. We can- 
not deny these truths without doing violence to the natural 
and primitive judgments of the human mind itself. 

The deliverances of common sense form the ground- 
work for the philosophy of the plain man. They speak to 
him not merely with the authority of universal consent, as 
the Scottish School contended, but as truths founded upon 
evidence which is undeniable.? However, the ensemble of 
these common sense truths exhibits a very imperfect 
picture of what we understand by a philosophical acquaint- 
ance with reality. Just as the embryo is an organism but 
not completely developed and organized, so a common sense 
philosophy is to a scientific philosophy as the embryo is to a 


1Merz, History of European Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. If, p. 3. 

2 The position of Reid, which would make of common sense a special faculty of an 
instinctive character, is explained by Pringle-Pattison, Balfour Lectures on Scottish 
Philosophy. The intuitionistic or sentimentalistic theory of such thinkers as Jacobi 
and Bergson, who view sentiment or intuition as a higher and superior faculty for 
finding truth, falls into the same exaggeration, though from another side, as the 
Common Sense Philosophy of Reid. There is but one way to know truth, namely, 
by the intellect. Neither common sense nor intuition should be contrasted with 
intellect, since both are but functions of mind. 


366 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


fully developed and active man. The difference between 
the two is one of degree. Philosophy accepts the facts which 
sense perception brings to us, as well as the first principles 
of knowledge which are self-evident, but it analyzes and 
criticises these presentations before it uses them as the 
starting point for its formulations. Its approach to them is 
scientific, in the sense that where everyday knowledge 
stops it pushes on its investigations and attempts both to 
justify and to extend the data observed by every man in his 
ordinary contacts with the world and with life. 

Now, although philosophy recognizes fully the authority 
of common sense, it does not depend upon this authority as 
the foundation for its theories. Philosophy cannot contra- 
dict common sense, except under pain of becoming fantastic 
and irresponsible. It must justify its beliefs, though by a 
higher evidence than that of common sense. For philosophy 
bases itself on the natural evidence of the human intellect, 
not on any instinctive or intuitive beliefs. ‘Thus inter- 
preted and correlated with philosophy, common sense 
assuredly does not deserve the severe criticisms to which 
it has been subjected by thinkers of the idealistic and ration- 
alistic schools. To commence our study of the problems of 
philosophy by explicitly and deliberately casting over- 
board the facts and principles admitted by mankind in 
general and denying to them all speculative value whatso- 
ever, is to throw away the best and most certain support 
which any philosopher can have in his journey towards 
total and ultimate truth. 

The student of philosophy must always begin with com- 
mon sense. As he progresses in his search for truth, he 
must constantly hark back to common sense, as to a guiding 
and corrective principle. Having arrived at conclusions, he 
should doubt most strongly any of them which do not 
harmonize with the generally accepted truths of mankind. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 367 


In philosophy, as in every field of human endeavor, we do 
not attain perfection by discarding beforehand or refusing 
to recognize the validity of the imperfect. There is progress 
in truth as there is in life. Only by accepting the imperfect 
truth with the purpose of perfecting it, may we hope to pass 
some day to that superior and complete knowledge which 
science holds out to us.1 


The Function of Philosophy.—Philosophy, in the tech- 
nical sense, embraces all those subjects which treat of the 
ultimate principles of life, thought, and being. To become 
a philosophical science, therefore, it is both necessary to 
consider certain restricted subjects and to consider them in a 
philosophical manner. The movement which has gained 
great headway to divorce the different philosophical 
disciplines from the parent trunk and to make of each one 
a single and autonomous science, leaving to philosophy 
only the field of the purely conjectural, the moral, and 
the religious, cannot but result in the destruction of 
philosophy itself. If a subject is philosophical, it is so 
because its approach is philosophical, not because it lacks, 
as philosophy, either precision or exactitude. Philosophy 
does not acquire the total or ultimate viewpoint by desiring 
to become science, in the narrow sense of the word. To be 
concrete, logic is an exact science, as rigorous and as 
scientific as mathematics. But because it is a science, does 
it follow that logic ceases to be eo ipso a philosophy? Logic 
concerns itself with human thought, viewed in its most 
essential and universal aspects. It is, therefore, meta- 
physical since it embraces every possible situation in which 
thought plays a part. Logic deals not only with my 
thought, or your thought, or thought in general, but with 
thought itself. A science, therefore, which searches the 


1 Maritain, Introduction Générale a La Philosophie, pp. 87-94. 


368 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


very depths of thought assuredly gains nothing by becoming 
either mathematics, physics, or astronomy, or by using the 
methods of these sciences. Every science, it may be ad- 
mitted readily, aspires to take a more or less complete view 
of the part of nature which it investigates. To that extent 
these sciences serve as a preparation for the philosophical 
viewpoint. They cannot, however, without losing their 
distinctively scientific character, assume to speak on the 
universal, necessary, and eternal character of the subjects 
which they study. Such pronouncements are the exclusive 
function of philosophy.? 

What has been said of logic may be repeated of psychol- 
ogy, ethics, and esthetics. Psychology as science is merely 
the physiological viewpoint of mind. Such a viewpoint is 
laudable, but is it sufficient, is it final? Only on the theory 
that mind and brain are identical—an assumption which 
postulates more than even the most metaphysical psychol- 
ogy has ever demanded of us. Ethics and esthetics, too, 
become unintelligible if viewed solely from the laboratory 
or historical angle. There is something in each philosophical 
science which transcends the temporal, the contingent, the 
quantitative. That something is the ultimate cause. 
Philosophy searches out these ultimate causes. By crit- 
icisms of a final character, by an analysis which reaches 
down to the last causes, we recognize a philosophical 
science and distinguish it from one of the particular sciences. 
Philosophy thus means ‘‘seeing things together.” It is 
what Hoernlé calls the “synoptic vision.” ? To say that 
such vision is impossible is to argue that man cannot think 
properly, that it is impossible for him to reach final conclu- 
sions about anything. 

Final conclusions, however, are not reached until we have 


1 Ollé-Laprune, La Philosophie et Le Temps Present, pp. 151-163, 
2 Matter, Life, Mind, and God, p. t. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION _369 


made a long and detailed examination of many things of a 
preparatory nature, which must be settled even before it is 
possible to ask of ourselves final questions for which we 
expect to find final answers. Philosophy does not proceed 
in a haphazard or unmethodical fashion. No less than sci- 
ence, it goes step by step, criticising here and verifying there, 
until, sure of its position, it finds itself prepared to establish 
the existence of such relations as indicate a rational de- 
pendence amongst things. Thus prepared by analysis, it 
is ready to fashion a synthetic view of reality. 

The preparatory exercises of the philosopher have to do 
with the deliverances of common sense. These he must 
know and try to evaluate. From common sense he passes 
on to logic, whose laws he discovers to be the foundation 
of all thought and reasoning. The next subject for consid- 
eration is the particular sciences. At the basis of all critical 
thought lie the mathematical sciences. Philosophy tests 
the primary principles, as well as the consequences of math- 
ematics, and points out their relations both to the other 
sciences and to philosophy itself. Physics, chemistry, and 
especially the biological sciences, comprising as they do the 
principal avenues of approach to the physical world, in- 
organic and organic, furnish a great mass of the material for 
further investigations in the philosophical sciences. Not only 
is this material of interest to the philosopher, but the phi- 
losophy of the methods which these sciences use, as well as 
the philosophy of the sciences themselves, constitute an 
introduction to an exact and detailed study of the last prin- 
ciples of nature itself. After analysis and criticism of these 
data, philosophy then commences to walk the difficult path 
of synthesis. Each science has its own field, possesses its 
own conclusions. These we collect, criticise, and build 
into a system, into a philosophy of nature. 

Up to this point, however, we have taken no account of 


370 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


the phenomena of mind, which undoubtedly possess most 
interest for the thinker. What does biology, physiology, 
psychology tell us of the concomitants of mind? We must 
collect all the information possible concerning the physical 
and physiological aspects of our mental operations. But 
we do not merely think, we will and act. Human activity 
exhibits itself in a maze of productions, artistic, social, 
economic, political, and religious. Philosophy enters into 
this practical field, and tries to organize into an intelligible 
whole the many and apparently conflicting purposes and 
ideals underlying all these manifestations of the human 
spirit. From amongst this mass of ideas some will stand 
out in bolder relief than others. These are the dominant 
ideas of the individual, of the century, of the race. Are 
they true? Are they good? Why should man be domina- 
ted by this particular idea rather than another? What is 
the value of this idea, both in itself and for practical out- 
comes? Such questions, too, philosophy asks and en- 
deavors to answer. 

Ideas, however, are not merely practical. As ideas they 
have a history, and present problems which must be solved. 
Are ideas merely subjective or do they present an essentially 
objective reference? What is it to know? Beneath the 
surface of every problem, scientific or philosophical, flows 
the steady current of the epistemological problem. It must 
be examined and we must take a position. We cannot be 
neutral in the face of the claims of idealism, pragmatism, 
or realism for our support. Again, things exist, either in the 
mind or outside the mind. But what does it mean to be a 
thing, what does it mean to exist? The mind is a thing, the 
body is a thing, God is a being. But are they all beings in 
the same meaning of the term? Surely God as being must 
be quite different from a stone ora man. In what does this 
difference consist? 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 371 


The philosopher must discover all he can about being. 
He must know what substance is, what accidents are. In 
every other way he must attempt to satisfy the intellectual 
curiosity which urges him on to a synthesis of all reality. 
The philosopher’s quest is a long and arduous one, beset by 
many difficulties. Is it any wonder then that there should 
have been pointed out to mankind so many and divergent 
ways to attain his goal, or that philosophers should not be 
in agreement as to which is the surest and quickest route 
to follow? Should we even hope for the coming of a day 
when all difficulties shall disappear and our journey made 
safe and easy? Until scientists are in perfect agreement on 
all the points of their doctrine, in a word, until human 
knowledge is perfect, and not until then, can we hope for 
unanimous agreement on the doctrines of philosophy. In 
the meantime, both scientists and philosophers must con- 
tinue to labor, conscious of the fact that each addition to 
human knowledge brings us closer and closer to the day 
when we may expect to reach the philosophical synthesis 
which all mankind will embrace and accept. The spirit of 
philosophy is essentially synthetic. In its best and truest 
forms, nothing satisfies it but a complete and final view of 
all things, science, thought, and life. And it can only sur- 
render this passion for wholeness if it is ready to give up, 
at the same time, truth itself, the driving power which has, 
since the dawn of civilization, sustained and comforted the 
greatest thinkers in their search for a comprehensive 
thought. 

Philosophy, viewed as the science of wholeness, 1s what 
we call Metaphysic, and deserves the appellation “‘science” 
no less than any of the particular natural sciences. It is a 
general science, yes, but it is none the less a science. The 
materialistic conception of being, which restricts all being 
to the realm of observable fact, is itself an egregious meta- 


372 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


physical assumption, the direct result of which is to narrow 
for the sensist his conception of science to those subjects 
which deal directly with sensible facts. That there is a 
metaphysical no less than a physical reality, that there can 
exist by consequence a metaphysical no less than a physical 
science, appears to us unquestionable. No man may deny 
the existence of general ideas. If such general ideas exist, 
and they do, by what right or by what logic is it permissible 
to restrict their extension to the abstract concepts and defi- 
nitions that have come to us through an analysis of factual 
reality, and to deny that extension to the equally real 
though more profound ideas which also represent to us real- 
ity, although freed from the determinations of time and 
space? ! 

Philosophy, therefore, is science, though not in the narrow 
sense of the word. The efforts of positivist thinkers to re- 
duce philosophy to a species of science can but result in a 
disfiguring of philosophy and in a misinterpretation of its 
essential réle in the process of gaining a synoptic view of the 
universe. The scientific dogmatism of the last century, 
which reached its zenith in the philosophy of Herbert Spen- 
cer, coupled with the rationalistic dogmatism which began 
with Kant, effectively changed the whole modern concep- 
tion of the place of philosophy in speculative thought. 
Naturalism, either in its naive or critical form, read philoso- 
phy as a general science out of existence. Every category 
or concept which could not be verified on empirical grounds 
was looked upon as non-existent. Truth and sense knowl- 
edge were thus held to be synonymous. Philosophy as 
science having been honorably buried, Naturalism set it- 
self up as the sole interpreter and custodian of all knowledge. 
Kant tried to save the validity of philosophy by conceding 
truth to such fundamental ideas as God, liberty, and immor- 

1 Ollé-Laprune, La Philosophie et Le Temps Present, pp. 203-230. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 373 


tality in so far as they are the products of the moral self. 
Viewed simply as ideas, their existence cannot be proved, 
since the noumenal reality escapes our knowledge. Neither 
can we prove the real existence of the temporal and spatial 
elements which enter into all our judgments, since the con- 
cepts of space and time are essentially a priori and have no 
direct reference to reality at all. 

Philosophy, however, in our opinion must be rescued 
from both these false attitudes. At one and the same 
time, its scientific character must be preserved and its 
dependence on intellectual synthesis recognized as valid. 
It is an exaggeration to overemphasize the réle of positive 
science in the formulation and proof of philosophical theory. 
It is a minimizing of the function of the intellect not to 
recognize that we are capable of knowing the truth about 
things outside and above the field of the phenomenal only 
by and through the moral judgment. The balance between 
science and philosophy on the one hand, and science and 
belief on the other, must be rigorously and exactly main- 
tained if we would not distort the true meaning and func- 
tion of philosophy. This can be done if one would recognize 
the essentially descriptive and analytical character of 
science as a preparation for the interpretative and synthetic 
character of philosophy. 

Philosophy, however, is not self-sufficient, nor all-inclu- 
sive. It mediates between theory and belief, assuming to 
itself what is true in theory and using this as a means of 
approaching what we must believe. As theory is not the 
whole of knowledge, so philosophy is not the whole of life. 
Beyond any truths which can be proved by the light of 
human reason alone, there exists the realm of religious 
beliefs. Philosophy cannot, if it would fill the deeper needs 
and tendencies of human nature, fail to give expression to 
the beliefs which control human acts. Philosophy, there- 


374 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


fore, is something more than an analysis of the true, the 
good, and the beautiful. Its practical character must be appre- 
ciated, since it comes before us likewise as a mode of life, 
and as such, attempts to formulate the guiding principles 
which lead mankind to the possession of that justice after 
which the race has always hungered and thirsted. 


The Schools of Philosophy.—The number of conflicting 
schools of philosophical thought seems to militate strongly 
against the pretension of philosophy that from its study 
there shall result at some time a total view of life and 
thought, a veritable Weltanschauung. The apparent unity 
of scientific speculation serves only to throw into bolder 
relief the opposing claims of philosophers. The history of 
philosophy appears to carry a very significant lesson for 
him who wishes to judge in a dispassioned way the claims 
of philosophy to be scientific. Every great thinker has 
founded a school. Now, a school is merely one way of 
looking at the universe, or rather one way of making the 
world conform itself to what our views concerning it are. 
In all this the personal element is as prominently present 
as 1t is conspicuously absent in the constructions of science. 
Philosophies are ordinarily called after the names of the 
men who invented them. Science, however, repudiates 
such connections with the individual investigator. What 
the scientist discovers is a fact, not a theory. As long as 
his discovery remains within the circumscribed limits of 
pure theory or hypothesis, it retains the earmarks of its 
authorship. The moment it becomes scientific fact, it 
sloughs off the shackles of its former slavery and becomes 
the free common possession of all mankind. 

For many minds this is unquestionably a very serious 
objection against the position which philosophy claims must 
be accorded to it. The force of the objection, however, is 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION = 375 


considerably weakened if we recall that, in its long history, 
philosophy presents something more than the mere record 
of opposing opinions. That philosophers have disagreed 
amongst themselves, and radically, is beyond question. 
But so have scientists. The disagreements amongst philos- 
ophers may be readily understood when we consider for a 
moment that the questions under discussion are not such 
that an appeal to sense observation can settle them. 
These problems affect the most fundamental and _far- 
reaching principles of life and thought. Is it any wonder, 
then, that thinkers should not agree in such cases? Nor 
should it be necessary to point out the disagreements which 
divide scientists when we pass beyond the most elementary 
principles of each science. Disagreement in neither case 
should be brought forward as an argument against the 
claims of philosophy or of science. It can be urged equally 
well against every form of knowledge, and, to our way of 
looking at the question, proves nothing more than that the 
human mind is limited and that our knowledge is essentially 
fallible. If philosophers have disagreed, then we can only 
continue to labor and wait for the day when, because of new 
arguments or new syntheses, a philosophy shall be elaborated 
which shall stand the severest tests and be found generally 
acceptable to all men of good will. In the meantime, let us 
not forget, neither science nor philosophy is advanced by 
mutual recriminations. 

Again, the disagreements as a rule have affected only the 
underlying principles and have divided philosophers into 
schools whose divergent characteristics result from a totally 
different approach to the problem under discussion. A phi- 
losophy comes before us as a systematic solution, not as one 
out of a multitude of theories about reality. It, therefore, 
sums up in itself the answer, not to one, but to practically 
every possible problem in philosophy. For example, the 


376 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


lines which divide Idealism, Pragmatism, and Realism are 
not merely epistemological. The differences between these 
standpoints manifest themselves in Psychology, Ethics, 
and in Metaphysics as well. They present three diverse 
ways of looking at not one, but at all the problems of 
thought. Is it any wonder then, that in the secondary and 
more remote conclusions which are drawn from these funda- 
mental viewpoints, the mark of division is much more prom- 
inent than it would be amongst scientists who practically 
agree on fundamentals, but disagree merely as to remote 
conclusions? 

There is a sense in which it may be said that no philos- 
opher, not even Plato or Aristotle, founded a school. These 
thinkers created or personified certain tendencies of human 
thought; they were the mouthpieces of the best thought of 
the age in which they lived, but neither had a successor nor 
heir in the strict meaning of the word. Their great influ- 
ence, even at the present day, is undeniable. But their 
successors immediately began to go over their work. It 
was studied in the light of each man’s culture and insight. 
Modifications ensued, clarifications followed, arguments 
were developed or refined. In time a totally new specula- 
tion arose to command the assent of mankind.! 

The philosophies of antiquity which held sway for so long 
over the minds of men, like Epicureanism or Stoicism, were 
much more than a theory. They were a rule of life, a faith, 
a religious doctrine, and their domination resulted more 
from their ethical than their strictly intellectual import. 
Christianity, which succeeded upon the ancient philoso- 
phies, was not at first a philosophy. It, too, was a belief, 
a mode of life. If the Christian religion had been a mere 
philosophy, one might question the probability that it 
would have endured to our own day. In the Middle Ages, 

1 Ollé-Laprune, La Philosophie et Le Temps Present, pp. 292 et seq. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 377 


philosophers attempted a union between theory and belief, 
and one of them, Thomas Aquinas, succeeded in thinking 
through the most systematic formulation of philosophy and 
religion which has yet appeared. This synthesis he incor- 
porated in the justly famous Summa Theologica. The unity 
of philosophical speculation, so prominent a characteristic 
of medieval thought, was the direct result of the fact that 
the same religious beliefs were accepted by all and governed 
the life of every man. The vitality of medieval philosophy 
owes a great deal to the union which it effected with the 
reigning Christianity. And its hold upon mankind can best 
be explained in terms of the vitally religious significance 
which the teachings of the School possessed for every indi- 
vidual thinker. 

The union between philosophy and religious thought 
continued in full vigor, though often challenged, until the 
beginning of the nineteenth century. For religion, science 
was then substituted and on the foundations of positive 
fact a new religious philosophy, that of Humanitarianism, 
was erected. The Christian revelation was either denied 
altogether or passed over in silence. The highest and the 
best of ethics and morality, however, were taken over 
(without credit) from Christianity, and the philosophy of 
Positivism tried to teach men how to live Christian lives 
divorced from the acceptance of Christian ideas and prin- 
ciples. Contemporary thought has been severely critical of 
these attempts at formulating a religion without God. 
The insufficiency of Positivism is manifest to all who wish 
to see it. That the religion of Positivism does not respond 
to the exigencies of the religious spirit, nor fill the needs of 
the religious conscience, nor satisfy even the demands of 
scientific or speculative thought, is for the majority of 
present-day thinkers an unquestionable judgment. The 
efforts to devise a philosophical credo which can stand by 


378 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


itself have been weighed and found wanting. The whole 
process seems to-day to be compounded of a false reading 
of the true nature of religion and of science, and a miscon- 
struction of the true nature of philosophy. Positivism 
at this hour commands allegiance only amongst those who 
have definitely renounced all hopes of attaining a synthetic 
view of the universe outside the realm of scientifically ob- 
served fact. It has not developed and made certain the 
philosophies of the past; on the contrary, it has but interred 
them, and proclaimed to the whole world that for the great 
problems of life and of thought, we are not only ignorant 
of the solution, but we are incapable of ever arriving at a 
solution. 


Is There a “ Philosophia Perennis ’??—The student of 
philosophy is very much impressed with the historical suc- 
cession of philosophical systems, beginning with the crude 
efforts of the early Greek thinkers and ending in the scien- 
tifically constructed philosophies of our own day. ‘This 
succession is apt to impress him in two different but closely 
connected ways. On the one hand, the fluidity of philoso- 
phic thought 1s likely to strengthen his ideas of its unscien- 
tific character and to make him suspicious of the efforts of 
philosophers to place their subject on the same basis as 
experimental science. On the other, he is likely to be led 
away by the thought that philosophy, like science, is capa- 
ble of indefinite perfectibility. Both of these judgments 
have their roots in the thesis that philosophical truth is 
essentially relative and variable. For the Hegelian, since 
mind is in a continual process of becoming, no limit of per- 
fection can be conceived where we can say, thus far you may 
go and no farther. This view of philosophy has received 
added support in our own day from an almost general 
acceptance of the evolutionary standpoint in philosophy. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 379 


The inspirational side of such a view may merit un- 
qualified approval. Its logical value, however, is another 
matter and cannot, we believe, be accepted. For diversity 
of judgment is not always the result of the impossibility of 
understanding a thing. Neither does it follow that con- 
flicting views point to the chimerical character of the ob- 
ject over which a disagreement exists. Objects, especially 
living objects, are many-sided. It is possible to view them 
from many and totally different angles. Diversity of judg- 
ment in such cases does not spell error. The face of a friend, 
though well known to one, may present one appearance to- 
day, and quite a different one to-morrow. ‘The text of a 
book exhibits a different reading as I approach it from a 
changed intellectual or emotional starting pomt. In all 
these changes, however, there is a certain amount of fixity, 
and it appears to us unjustifiable to state that a subsequent 
and more complete judgment of a friend’s appearance or of 
the meaning of a text negatives my prior understanding. 

Now, philosophy, since it is a search for the reasons of 
things, suffers from the same instability that every human 
judgment does. The facts about which we reason may not 
be clearly perceived, the causes for these facts may escape 
the most untiring search, or a cause may appear to be 
sufficient on present examination which would be held in- 
sufficient after longer reflection. Disagreements naturally 
result. However, there may be no disagreement at all 
concerning the fundamental facts. On these, as a matter of 
fact, there exists agreement. The philosopher, it must be 
remembered, is always a man. He, too, accepts and is 
guided by the deliverances of common sense. These deliv- 
erences he analyzes and criticises, but he does not create 
them. Here, at least, is a fixed point—a point from which 
every philosopher starts out and to which he must even- 
tually return. 


380 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


The history of philosophy confirms this analysis. In- 
definite progress in philosophy is refuted by the very exist- 
ence of thinkers like Plato and Aristotle, philosophers who 
dominated, and continue to dominate, present-day thinking. 
Changes there have been. Each age has produced thinkers 
whose writings correspond exactly to the aspirations and 
the particular ways of looking at the problems of that age. 
But beneath all the oscillations of philosophical theory 
there have remained constant and fixed certain principles 
which can only be called into question under penalty of 
introducing anarchy into philosophical thought. Philos- 
ophy is not like Melchisedec, without father, without 
mother, without ancestry. There is an ancestry for every 
system of philosophy, which dates back to the very earliest 
times, conferring thus upon present-day thought a prestige 
which even the oldest human dynasties lack.? 

Again, speculative disagreements need not connote dis- 
agreements as to fundamental principles. Idealists may 
not agree amongst themselves in their explanation of the 
origin and development of thought, although all are in agree- 
ment as to the essential spirituality of mind. Epistemolo- 
gists disagree in their analysis of what certitude means, but 
all are agreed that there must be some such thing as cer- 
titude. Materialist and dualist are one on the real exist- 
ence of matter, despite a disagreement as to the place which 
must be accorded matter in the general scheme of things. 
No one by all this wishes to deny the influence of time, 
place, or of race upon philosophical constructions. Social, 

1 Newman, in a well-known passage of the Idea of a University, p. 109, brings out 
the stable character of philosophical thought. He writes: ‘‘While the world lasts, 
will Aristotle’s doctrine on these matters Jast, for he is the oracle of nature and of 
truth. While we are men, we cannot help, to a great extent, being Aristotelians, for 
the great master does but analyze the thoughts, feelings, views, and opinions of 
human kind. He has told us the meaning of our own words and ideas, before we were 


born. In many subject-matters, to think correctly, is to think like Aristotle, and we 
are his disciples whether we will or no, though we may not know it.” 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 381 


economic, racial, and religious influences deeply affect every 
man’s reading of the universe. And philosophy exhibits a 
character which reflects only too well the earmarks of an 
age, an epoch, a nationality. But from this admission to an 
acceptance of the materialistic conception, which looks 
upon philosophy as merely the product of the economic 
conditions which prevail at any given time, is a long and 
illogical jump. Philosophy is life, is movement. But 
beneath the ever-changing current of opinion there flows a 
steady stream of truth which, if we look below the surface 
of our disagreements, we can see. “Side by side with the 
things which are subject to change and belong to one 
condition of the life of mankind, there is a soul of truth 
circulating in every system, a mere fragment of that com- 
plete and unchangeable truth which haunts the human 
mind in its most disinterested investigations.” 1 

Philosophy must never fail to base itself upon life and 
upon the commonly accepted beliefs of mankind. It is as 
true of philosophy as of morality, that an extreme singular- 
ism only leads to the bizarre and the ridiculous. The man 
who supports a strangely individualistic lime of conduct is 
no less certainly in error than the thinker who cuts him- 
self away deliberately from the past or from the fixed 
beliefs of his fellows. We do not mean to condemn individ- 
uality in thought. But individuality carried to the point 
where it denies the fundamentals of life, the common things 
which we all possess because we are living human beings, 
can only fall to the ground by the sheer weight of its own 
unreasonableness. Philosophy, on the other hand, should 
not be static. Its principles must be gone over, again and 
again. By means of discussion the fixed points will be made 
more firm, the disputed points clarified and finally dissolved. 


1 De Wulf, Article “‘ Philosophy,” Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. XII, p. 34. Consult 
also Ollé-Laprune, La Philosophie et Le Temps Present, pp. 333-360. 


382 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


A final and definitive philosophy is beyond all hope, the 
human intellect remaining what it is. But assuredly we do 
not help along the progress of philosophical inquiry by 
assuming beforehand that all is essentially relative. Ches- 
terton remarks that progress may be of two kinds—up 
hill and down hill. Let us assure ourselves of progress up 
hill by holding on firmly to the fixed principles of philos- 
ophy. The primary and universally acknowledged prin- 
ciples of common sense, the facts of positive science, the 
axioms of thought, the evident conclusions which can be 
deduced from these axioms—these must be our starting 
point. From these the philosopher will progress in his 
upward journey to a synthesis which, while neglecting 
nothing acquired in any field of knowledge, will sum up in 
itself the highest and truest vision of the universe of which 
man, through the unaided light of human reason, is capable. 


Philosophy and Morality.—Philosophy is something more 
than an analysis of the material and intellectual factors 
which make up and explain the universe in which we live. 
An overemphasis of the theoretical side of philosophy may 
easily incline one to the opinion that when we have ex- 
plained reality our task is over. Such is not the case. 
Besides theory, philosophy is a life. As a critic of life and 
as a guide to action, it holds a most important place in that 
total view of the world for which we are ever searching. 
All will agree that the moral consciousness is no less a fact 
than are the facts of science and psychology. A theory of 
morality, therefore, must be developed by the philosopher 
if he would possess a complete and well-rounded view of 
human nature and of the relations of mankind to the uni- 
verse of which he forms a part. 

Every great system of metaphysics has exhibited a moral 
tendency, over and above any specific program of ethics 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION — 383 


which it may have defended. It has thus recognized that 
man is something more than a mere thinking machine, that 
no matter how logical and convincing its own system of 
ethics may appear to be, back of ethics there lies some- 
thing which is more final than the authority of reason. 
Mankind has always recognized the sanction of religious 
authority in giving significance and value to the course of 
action imposed upon it by the moral reason. This superior 
sanction of morality, the existence of which the history of 
human morals attests only too well, cannot be disregarded 
by any thinker who would adequately describe and eval- 
uate those influences which have deeply affected the lives 
and purposes of mankind. 

Man acts by reason. He is also a moral being. But is 
reason, taken alone, capable of supporting a moral code 
whose appeal is irresistible and whose authority would not 
be questioned by us? That there exist men who live by 
reason and look no further for any justification for their 
lives than to the approval of reason, we may readily grant. 
An ethics, which will appeal to some men, can be constructed 
on the basis of reason alone. This, however, is a purely 
theoretical statement of the question. Actually, men 
demand a superior authority for their actions than the 
dictates of the moral reason. And it is of the great majority 
of men, and of the motives which sway them, not of the few 
or the extraordinarily high-minded, that we ask the ques- 
tion—is morality possible without a religious sanction? 

The attempts to construct a morality independent of 
religion have been numerous in the history of philosophy. 
Every attempt has been a dismal failure, for all have 
battled in vain against a universal tendency of human 
nature which has ever sought sanction for its acts in a rec- 
ognition of the existence of a Supreme Being from whom 
both nature and the moral order flow. A valid ethics which 


384 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


would deny the existence and authority of God and expect 
to obtain the approval of the mass of men is a sheer im- 
possibility. Nor is the supreme authority of the moral 
consciousness made intelligible to us by denying its exist- 
ence. Philosophy may point out why, under any given 
circumstance, I should obey the dictates of conscience. But 
if I should challenge the authority of my conscience thus to 
guide me, where then must I search for the authority which 
can command me to act thusly and not otherwise, if not in 
the sanctions of religion? Ethics guides me in particular 
and not difficult cases. It remains for religion to evolve an 
authoritative line of conduct which must be followed by all 
men and under every possible circumstance. And religion, 
without a God, who has created man for a definite end and 
purpose, is a pure figment of the imagination. 

Positivists and thinkers of the evolutionary school do 
not explain morality when they describe its history or 
development. Ethics is more than a descriptive science, 
like Physics, Botany, or Chemistry. Primarily, it is 
regulative, and establishes rules of conduct not merely to 
demonstrate that such rules can be logically thought out, 
but in order to guide and to control our actions thereby. 
Morality, therefore, is something more than a purely the- 
oretical or historical Ethics. Morality involves a rule of con- 
duct, a definite sanction, a valid moral obligation, the 
authority of conscience, none of which indispensable factors 
can possibly be found in any system which denies the 
existence of an All-Wise God, the author and end of the 
moral law. 

Human life, to be viewed totally, must be considered 
from the moral and religious side. But the moral and the 
religious need not be regarded as contradictory, nor even as 
mutually exclusive. As a matter of fact, they are com- 
plementary aspects since in both we discover the selfsame 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 385 


truths standing toward one another in an almost identical 
relationship. It is as impossible to divorce morality from 
religion as it is to divorce religion from morality, the ad- 
vocates of an independent morality to the contrary not- 
withstanding. For religion can only be separated from 
morality if we suppose falsely that these two sentiments 
involve distinct and opposed elements of consciousness. 
Since morality is founded upon the rational will, it is as- 
sumed that it can in no wise be related to religion, which is 
supposed to be essentially irrational. But that religion, to 
be acceptable, demands a rational ground, we shall en- 
deavor to prove below. 

Faith presupposes and implies reason, and the rational 
correctly interpreted, leads to and is consummated in the 
religious. The rational always comes first. From it belief 
arises and to it belief constantly returns as to one and a 
most important source of its credibility. A separation of 
the moral from the religious sanction can only result in 
theoretical confusion as far as ethics goes, and in practical 
disaster for the individual man. 

This conception of man, which views him as essentially re- 
ligious, while founded upon reason, has its origin in revealed 
religion. No adequate conception of morality is possible 
if the philosopher fails to take into consideration the part 
which Christianity has played in the construction of moral 
ideals. The Christian revelation is not only an historical 
fact. Millions have lived by it, and live by it to-day. The 
ethical ideals which Christianity has preached continue to 
be the sublimest expression of moral conduct. At the basis 
of Christian ethics we find love of God and love of neighbor 
as the bed-rock principles upon which the superstructure 
has been erected. 

Everything begins with love and ends in love. Love is 
the motive power and reward of all moral effort. And love, 


386 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


as the Apostle writes, is God. The perfect view of morality, 
therefore, is not philosophical. Philosophy points the way, 
but revelation completes the ideal. Reason shows us a 
moral order in this universe and it exacts an obedience from 
us to the behests of this order. But the moral order as dis- 
covered by reason is fragmentary. Only in a union of the 
moral and religious conceptions of morality can we find a 
conscious realization of that correspondence with the Di- 
vine plan of the universe which is definitive, complete, and 
perfect.? 


Philosophy and Religion.—The intimate connection of 
morality with religion brings to the fore the question of 
what place must be accorded to religion by the philosopher 
in his attempts to describe fully this universe in which we 
live.2, A complete philosophy must take account of every- 
thing which, either directly or indirectly, mfluences the 
life of man. It is only a narrow and superficial viewpoint of 
philosophy which would restrict investigation to the lim- 
ited field bounded by empirical fact. Belief, likewise, is an 
integral part of the intellectual and moral make-up of man. 
Moreover, religion has always contended that it can offer, 
and authoritatively, the solution of certain problems which 
deeply concern the philosopher. No matter what our at- 
titude towards religion may be, logic forces us to investigate 


1 For a complete statement of the relations of morality to religion, consult Fox, 
Religion and Morality, pp. 156-162 and pp. 208-236. 

? Recent literature on the relations of philosophy to religion is very extensive. 
The following works will enable the student to acquaint himself with the different 
viewpoints: Hocking, The Meaning of God in Human Experience; Balfour, Thetsm 
and Humanism, The Foundations of Belief; Collingwood, Religion and Philosophy; 
Martineau, A Study of Religion; Pratt, The Religious Consciousness; Pringle-Pattison, 
The Idea of God; Ward, James, The Realm of Ends; Ladd, The Philosophy of Religion; 
Eucken, Christianity and the New Idealism; DeBroglie, La Definition de la Religion; 
Boedder, Natural Theology; Joyce, Principles of Natural Theology; Garrigou-La- 
grange, Dieu, Son Existence et Sa Nature. 

For a history, Lecky, History of European Morals; Merz, History of European 
Thought in the Nineteenth Century, Vol. IV. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION = 387 


the claims it makes upon mankind, as well as the solutions 
which it offers to such questions as the existence of God, the 
freedom of the will, and the immortality of the soul. The 
history of philosophy stands witness to the close connection 
which has always existed between religion and philosophy. 
A fair conception of these relations is, therefore, required 
of all who would judge correctly of the function and place 
of philosophy in the general scheme of human knowledge. 

Many thinkers look upon belief as an irrational act, or 
as an act which is completely independent of reason. But 
such is not the case. The rules of thought hold good in the 
field of belief, as they do in that of positive demonstration, 
for belief is no less a product of thought than is acceptance 
of scientific principles. Belief, however, is a distinct kind 
of knowledge from that acquired by scientific investigation. 
We know a thing when the reason for our affirmation exists 
in the thing itself. We believe a doctrine when the reason 
for our affirmation exists not in the thing, but outside of it. 
This acceptance on our part, however, need not be regarded 
as irrational. On the contrary, it becomes supremely ra- 
tional if the reason outside the thing, namely, the authority 
of the person who speaks, is such that we can put implicit 
confidence in it. This appears very elementary to us, yet 
it is precisely because this clean-cut distinction between 
theory and belief is so often obscured or misstated that in- 
numerable difficulties arise when we try to define the rela- 
tions of one to the other. Now, religion is essentially a mat- 
ter of beliefs, for religion is built upon faith, which accepts 
the doctrines presented to it, not because their rationality 
can be proved, but solely on the testimony of one in whom 
we can confide. The distinction between philosophical 
and religious knowledge is, therefore, a very fundamental 
one. 

If philosophy and theology treat of distinct fields of hu- 


388 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


man knowledge, it follows that the two cannot be confused 
without doing harm to both. Not only is the subject-matter 
of each different, but the starting point is not the same. 
Philosophy proceeds along the paths marked out for it 
by human reason. It depends upon no resources outside 
the human mind itself. Its method, therefore, is one 
which must look upon human reason as the only means 
which it can employ to attain truth. In relation to subject- 
matter, philosophy confines its investigations to those facts 
and phenomena which can be studied or perceived in them- 
selves, and for which it seeks an ultimate explanation. 
Just as it would be little short of suicidal for philosophy to 
borrow from science the proper and exclusive methods of 
the natural sciences, so it would be no less dangerous to 
its own cause, if it would look at things from a strictly the- 
ological point of view or accept the methods of study cur- 
rent in theology. 

Theology, on the other hand, is concerned with a region 
which transcends the powers of human reason. Since “the 
science of God” revolves about an object inaccessible to 
human investigation unless supported by Divine revela- 
tion, its methods and principles must have a different source 
than those of philosophy. The subject-matter of theology 
consists of dogmas, or articles of faith, which are accepted 
upon the testimony of God. Its independence of philosophy 
is, therefore, quite evident. No less autonomous, however, 
is philosophy which can invoke theological reasons in de- 
fense of its positions only under pain of becoming both un- 
scientific and ridiculous. ‘The two disciplines must be kept 
quite distinct. This statement, however, need not be in- 
terpreted in the sense that they must be separated to such 
an extent that no relations of any kind may exist between 
them. On the contrary, assuming the formal independence 
of each, the truths of one cannot contradict those truths 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE, AND RELIGION 389 


commonly accepted by the other. Just as it is true in every 
science, as well as in mathematics, that two plus two equals 
four, so likewise a dogma of revealed truth cannot be proved 
false by philosophy. This principle must always remain the 
groundwork for every attempt to define the relations which 
should exist between philosophy and theology. For truth 
is truth, in whatsoever sphere and by whatsoever means it 
has been attained. We cannot give up this principle with- 
out falling back into a scepticism which is destructive of 
all certitude. 

The question as to when a particular theory is certain is 
quite a different and distinct one from the principle just 
enunciated. This certainty must be determined according 
to the methods proper to each science. Assuredly, it is no 
function of philosophy to lay down criteria for the estab- 
lishment of theological truth, as it 1s no part of its work 
to fix the data and conclusions of any of the particular 
sciences. Holding an intermediate position between science 
and theology, philosophy looks both ways—in the direction 
of science for its empirical data and in the direction of theol- 
ogy for the solid truths of religion. As long as it consist- 
ently maintains this position, no fear need be experienced 
that it will ever fail us, either by assuming too much or by 
failing to accept enough. 

Philosophy did not invent religion, which has existed as 
long as mankind itself. And religious truths, expressing 
themselves in moral and religious ideas, have ever wielded a 
powerful influence upon the minds and morals of men. 
These truths were not discovered by the philosopher as 
the scientist has discovered the laws of mathematics and 
physics.1 He has done nothing more than to discover the 
reasons why men have believed in this fashion and acted 


1Qllé-Laprune, La Philosophie et Le Temps Present, pp. 265 et seq. and particu- 
larly pp. 277-281. 


390 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


according to certain moral principles. These religious be- 
liefs are as old and as all-pervading as the very air we 
breathe. To live is to subject oneself to such influences. 
Now, the philosopher is also a man. As such, he cannot 
hope to be successful if he deliberately puts himself outside 
the interests of humanity. Both nature and reason lead 
men on to religion. In the fullness of time, Christ came, 
and, from His teachings, has arisen a doctrine which calls 
incessantly upon each one of us for our acceptance and sup- 
port. The cause of truth assuredly is not served by closing 
one’s eyes to this momentous fact, nor is the value of phi- 
losophy enhanced in our estimation by its failing to take 
cognizance of the position which Christianity occupies even to- 
day in the thoughts and lives of millions. 

This idea receives added emphasis when we reflect that 
all philosophers, regardless of the positions which they have 
assumed, either explicitly or implicitly founded a religious code 
upon their principles. Idealism, with its insistence on the Ab- 
solute, turns logically to a union of man with God by means 
of contemplation as to the final outcome and triumph of its 
system. Materialism, by its denial of God, makes earth 
the sum and substance of human endeavor and finds its 
heaven here below.’ Christian thinkers answer the ques- 
tion in quite another way. In no theory, however, is it 
possible to cut away altogether our philosophy from our 
faith. Belief is as necessary an adjunct to philosophy as 
breath is to life, for the reason that belief is necessary and 
intrinsic to thought itself. Theory, indeed, can carry us 
along a great distance in the search for truth, but there 
comes a time when theory fails us, and then we must reach 
out for the supports and assurances of faith. To refuse to 


1For the religious consequences of Materialism, see Paulsen, Introduction to 
Philosophy, pp. 67 et seq.; of Idealism, Kiilpe, Philosophy of the Present in Germany, 
trans. Patrick, pp. 78-114; Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 188-193. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND RELIGION — 391 


give our assent to the truths of religion because we do not 
see clearly why they must be so, is deliberately to condemn 
ourselves to a partial knowledge of reality. On the other 
hand, to concede to faith the place it rightfully occupies 
even in philosophy does not mean the opening of the flood- 
gates of conjecture and of probability upon a realm whose 
proud claim is that it is essentially objective. For faith 
does not create the objects about which it is displayed. It 
receives them from above, from Him from Whom all truth 
and all philosophy are derived. 

What does it mean to philosophize, to be a philosopher? 
To philosophize is to search for the last reasons and causes 
of all things. Philosophy sums up in itself the effort to 
give a reason why things are what they are, not in any sec- 
ondary or derived manner, but in their ultimate and con- 
stitutive principles. This total view of reality necessarily 
carries along with it a view of life itself, as the most im- 
portant and far-reaching element in our experience. Phi- 
losophy, too, is a science, not m the sense that it uses the 
methods of the particular sciences, but because it founds 
itself upon the results of science which it examines and 
clarifies, accepts or refuses to do so, as the case may be. 
Beginning as science, philosophy passes quickly to its special 
work, that of metaphysical speculation. Here, in a region 
which transcends sensation, it conducts its search for the 
ultimate why of all things. Being a product of the reflective 
reason, it examines critically the totality of nature for which 
it seeks a definitive and universally applicable explanation. 
It, therefore, is concerned with everything which touches 
our thoughts in any way whatsoever; of this totality it takes 
a synoptic view, and its conclusions are the last word of 
human thought upon the most fundamental questions 
which can be asked by us. 

Philosophy is, first of all, speculation. It does not create 


392 AN INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY 


facts. Upon facts as known and accepted by the majority 
of men, and as analyzed and described by science, it re- 
flects in order to discover the reasons why things are as 
they are. It, therefore, does not precede either common 
sense or the achieved results of natural science. But philos- 
ophy is practical as well, for it guides men to the acceptance 
and the living of ideals which the moral reason has justified 
beforehand, and which conscience informs us we must ac- 
cept if we would live as rational beings. Thus conceived, 
philosophy leads mankind step by step not only to the at- 
tainment of the highest truth and to the living of the noblest 
ideals of conduct, but to the gates of faith itself, by which 
we may enter into the vision of Him Who is Infinite Truth 
and into the possession of Him Who is Infinite Love. 


REFERENCES 


BALFour: Theism and Humanism. 

BoEDDER: Natural Theology. 

BosANQUET: The Value and Destiny of the Individual. 

CoLLINncwoop: Religion and Philosophy. 

Dewey: Education and Democracy. 

DE Wutr: Article ‘‘Philosophy,” Catholic Encyclopedia. 

GARRIGOU-LAGRANGE: Dieu, Son Existence et Sa Nature; Le Sense 
Commun. 

HALDANE: Essays in Philosophical Criticism. 

HOERNLE: Studies in Contemporary Metaphysics. 

Jevons: Philosophy, What Is It? 

Joyce: Principles of Natural Theology. 

Lapp: Philosophy of Religion; Introduction to Philosophy. 

LairD: A Study in Realism. 

Maritain: Introduction Générale ad La Philosophie. 

Marvin: Recent Developments in European Thought. 

OLLE-LAPRUNE: La Philosophie et Le Temps Present. 

PERRY: Present Philosophical Tendencies. 

Poincare: The Foundations of Science. 

Pratt: The Religious Consciousness. 

PRINGLE-PATTISON: The Idea of God. 


PHILOSOPHY, SCIENCE AND RELIGION —§ 393 


RussELL: Philosophical Essays; Mysticism and Logic; The Problems of 
Philosophy. 

TuHomson: The System of Animate Nature. 

Warp, JAMES: The Realism of Ends; Naturalism and Agnosticism. 

Warp, WiiuiAm: The Philosophy of Theism. 


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INDEX 


Absolutism, theory of knowledge of, 
162 ff.; criticism of the theory of 
knowledge of, 163 ff. 

Agnosticism, 54, 60. 

Alexander, 284. 

Altruism, 2809 ff. 

Analytico-synthetic method, 19. 

Animism, 93 ff., 328. 

Apriorism, 155, 157. 

Aquinas, 5, 12, 41, 98, 343, 377. 

PURISLOLLe Sy TT, 12, 13,27 AT. 63) 
343, 345- 

Aristotelian society, proceedings of, 
127. 

Atomism, chemical, 112. 


Bain, 278. 

Balfour, 127, 386. 

Bentham, 278. 

Bergson, 94, 166. 

Berkeley, 194 ff.; spiritualism of, 
65 ff. 

Biology, 20. 

Boedder, 386. 

Booth, 59. 

Bosanquet, 162, 199, 222, 223. 

Bowden, 166. 

Bradley, 27, 163, 222, 278, 284. 

Broad, 118, 123. 


Caird, 162, 290. 

Calderwood, 295. 

Categorical imperative, 290 ff. 

Cathrein, 288 

Coffey, 14, 29, 56, 156, 158, 159, 166, 
183, 185, 196. 206, 211, 218, 210, 
B99 23h 0241. 324. 

Cohen, 290. 


Collingwood, 386. 

Comte, positivism of, 17. 

Conceptualism, 148. 

Consciousness, 82, go ff. 

Conservation of energy, law of, 
103 ff. 

Cresson, 290. 

Criticism, 215 ff.; neo, 62. 

Croce, 162. 


Darwinism, 61, 79. 

De Broglie, 386. 

de Munnynck, 130. 

Descartes, 10, 42, 64,. 312,°'345; 
extreme dualism of, 42. 

Determinism, 244 ff., 253; criticism 
of, 248 ff. 

Dewey, 11, 166, 226, 278, 305, 
354; instrumentalism of, 354 
ff 


DeWulf, 15, 16, 47, 381. 

Dogmatism, 165, 213 ff. 

Double aspect theory, 81 ff. 

Douglas, 278. 

Drake and others, 197. 

Driesch, 111, 127, 130, 135. 

Driscoll, 166, 226. 

Dualism, 27, 39 ff., 52, 107; argu- 
ments in favor of, 43 ff.; Cartesian 
theory of, 45; common-sense, 40 
ff.; criticism of, 45 ff.; metaphysi- 
cal, 47; naive, 40; of Aristotle, 
40 ff.; of Descartes, 42. 

Dualistic realism, 339; and the 
self, 322 ff.; arguments in favor of, 
324 ff. 

Dubois, 288. 

Duhem, 117. 


395 


396 


Ego, 95 ff.; materialism and the, 314. 

Egoism, 288 ff. 

Energism, 116 ff. 

Engert, 61. 

Entelechy, 96. 

Epiphenomenalism, 77 ff. 

Epistemology, 13, 146 ff. 

Equivocation, 165. 

Esthetics, 14. 

Ethics, 14; criticism of ethics of 
reason, 2099 ff.; evolutionary, 284 
ff.; Kantian, 200 ff.; of reason, 275. 

Eucken, 59, 92, 386. 

Everett, 245, 256, 264, 282. 

Evolution and the validity of 
knowledge, 200 ff. 


Feldner, 299. 

Fichte, 67. 

Fonsegrive, 248, 249, 260, 266, 270. 

Formalism, 165. 

Forster, 290. 

Fouillée, 246, 249. 

Fox, 278, 283, 285, 287, 296, 208, 
301, 386. 

Free will, arguments in favor of, 
259 ff.; criticism of, 266 ff.; mean- 
ing of, 252 ff. 

Fullerton, 21, 29, 116. 

Fulliquet, 290. 


Garrigou-Lagrange, 386. 
Gemelli, 142. 

Gerard, 142. 

Green, 163, 222, 278. 


Haldane, 127. 
Hayward, 284. 
Hedonism, 275 ff.; criticism of, 279 


Hegel, 19, 30, 31, 67, 150, 3213 
monism of, 3o. 

Hegelian absolute, 32. 

Hegelianism, 32; neo, 32. 

Henderson, 127. 


INDEX 


Hibben, 69. 

Hobbes, 278. 

Hocking, 386. 

Hoernlé, 17, 77, 119, 124, 126, 135, 
309, 322, 323, 343, 355, 359, 358, 
368. 

Holt, 197, 317. 

Howison, 142, 211. 

Humanitarianism, 377. 

Hume, 278, 316. 

Hutcheson, 278. 

Huxley, 286. 


Idealism, 67 ff., 148 ff.; and the ego, 
318; criticism of Kant’s, 157 ff.; 
Kant’s, 149; logical or objective, 
30; of Locke, Berkeley, Hume and 
Kant, 43. 

Identity hypothesis, 81. 

Immanence, 163. 

Immaterialism, 65. 

Instrumentalism, 175; of Dewey, 
354 ff. 

Interactionism, 77, 94 ff.; arguments 
in favor of, 99 ff.; criticism of, 
ror ff. 

Intuitionism, 275, 2094 ff.; naive, 295; 
philosophical, 295. 


James, 16, 38, 39, 48, 49, 50, 87, 94, 
132, 166, 167, 168, 472, 107, 220, 
227, 317; 323; 325, 335: 

Janet, 250, 278. 

Jeanniere, 226. 

Joachim, 220, 222. 

Johnstone, 142. 

Joyce, 386. 


Kant, 82, 277, 321. 

Kant’s idealism, 149; criticism of, 
59 fh 

Kant’s theory of the self, 310 ff. 

Kantianism, 149 ff. 

Knowledge, copy theory of, 179; 
correspondence theory of, 180 ff. 


INDEX 


Knowledge theory, 
basis of, 151 ff. 
Kremer, 197, 201, 313. 


Kiilpe, 34, 37, 47, 59, 61, 71, 86, 
120, 149; 155, 102,200; )215, 390. 


psychological 


Ladd, 8, 15, 38, 156, 207, 217, 306, 
3II, 316, 325, 332, 380. 

Laird, 307, 308, 314, 315, 319, 321, 
325, 326, 328, 330, 335. 

Lange, 57. 

Lecky, 278, 386. 

Leibniz, 19, 63 ff.; spiritualism of, 
63 ff. 

Leighton, 68, 166, 197, 199, 223, 271, 
272.310; 

Lindsay, 166. 

Locke, 278. 

Logic, 13: 

Lotze, 873325327. 


Mach, 117. 

Macintosh, 197, 313, 318. 

Maher, 46, 87, 183, 188, 193, 206, 
BIOL 201 H205,. 210, 357, 430. 

Malebranche, occasionalism of, 43. 

Maritain, 367. 

Martineau, 278, 295, 386. 

Marvin, 48, 60, 66, 75, 89, 198, 363. 

Materialism, 33, 54 ff.; and the 
ego, 314; arguments in favor of, 
57 ff.; criticism of, 58 ff.; meta- 
physical, 33; new, 80; of Haeckel, 
61; psychological, 78 ff. 

Mathematics, 12 ff. 

Mechanism, 111 ff.; arguments in 
favor of, 117ff.; atomic, 112; 
criticism of, 126 ff.; new, 115 ff.; 
pure, 118. 

Mercier, 9, 43, 98, 117, 156, 183, 188, 
ZIO, 21553215. 312, 330. 

Metaphysics, 12 ff. 

Merz, 127, 365, 3806. 

Mill, 278, 282. 

Mind, meaning of, 3009 ff.; spiritual- 


397 


ity of, 329 ff.; -substance, 85 ff.; 
-substance theory, 333. 

Ming, 278, 282, 208. 

Monism, 27, 52; arguments in favor 
of, 34; criticism of, 35 ff.; criticism 
of psychical, 86 ff.; idealistic, 30; 
materialistic, 32 ff.; metaphysical, 
28; of Hegel, 30; of Spinoza, 28 ff.; 
psychical, 77, 81 ff., 85, or. 

Monotheism, 20. 

Montague, 142. 

Moore, 166, 173, 248, 278. 

Morgan, 142. 

Muckermann, 142. 


McDougall, 46, 93, 105, 127, 139, 


325, 328, 320, 336. 
McGilvary, 318. 


Natural selection, theory of, 79. 
Naville, 247, 260, 265, 267, 270. 
Neo-Platonists, 27. 

Newman, 239, 380. 
Nominalism, 148. 

INVSt10 7, F27e 120.1150: 


Ollé-Laprune, 21, 348, 350, 368, 372, 
276, 381, 380. 

Ontology, 13. 

Ostwald, 117. 

O’Sullivan, 156, 162. 


Pantheism, 28, 49. 

Panpsychism, 68. 

Parker, 307. 

Paulsen, 6, 58, 59, 68, 81, 84, 123, 
138, 139, 140, 141, 156, 246, 278, 
282, 290, 390. 

Perry, 34, 36, 43, 50, 51, 62, 148, 
158, 165, 166, 195, 197, 198, 199, 
215, 313, 317, 359, 363, 390. 

Perry and others, 197. 

Parallelism, arguments in favor of, 
83 ff.; double aspect theory of, 
8x ff.; idealistic, 77, 81 ff.; identity 


398 


hypothesis of, 81; phenomenalistic, 
81 ff.; psycho-physical, 77, 80 ff. 

Phenomenism, criticism of sensa- 
tionalistic, 314. 

Philosophia perennis, is there a, 
378 ff. 

Philosophy, 20; analytico-synthetic 
method, 19ff.; and morality, 
382 ff.; and religion, 386 ff.; de- 
ductive or synthetic a_ priori 
method of, 18 ff.; definition of, 1 ff.; 
divisions of, 11 ff.; experimental 
or analytic method of, 16 ff.; ex- 
planation of definition of, 5 ff.; 
function of, 367 ff.; logico-analytic 
view of, 356 ff.; meaning of, 363 ff.; 
methods of, 15; of Leibniz, 64; 
of the absolute, 30; of the beauti- 
ful, 14; practical, 12; schools of, 
374 ff.;—science and religion, ch. 
xl; subdivisions of theoretical, 
12 ff.; subdivisions of practical, 
13 ff.; theoretical, 12; value of, 15; 
Wolffian division of, 14 ff. 

Physics, 12, 13. 

Plats 248, 250, 25.0200, 263. 

Plato, 18, 27,-03; 

Plotinus, 27. 

Pluralism, 27, 47 ff., 52; arguments 
in favor of, 50; criticism of, 50 ff. 

Poincaré, 350. 

Porter, 290, 295 

Positivism, 60. 

Pragmatism, 48, 166 ff.; criticism of 
as a theory of knowledge, 173 ff. 
Pratt, 47, 77, 80, 82, 91, 93, 105, 108, 
LOG, 3'75.'19 751220, 1227, 22n0 240, 

386. 

Prichard, 156, 159. 

Pringle-Pattison, 365, 386. 

Problem of freedom, ch. viii; of 
knowledge, ch. vi; of life, ch. v; 
of morality, ch. ix; of the nature 
and criteria of truth, ch. vii; of 
the nature of reality, ch. iii; of the 


INDEX 


one and the many, ch. ii, of the 
self, ch. x; psycho-physical, ch. iv. 
Psychology, 20. 


Rand, 278. 

Rashdall, 243, 245, 252, 257, 276, 
278, 280, 282, 284, 286, 288, 290, 
291, 292, 299, 30I. 

Rationalism, 214. 

Realism, 180 ff.; arguments in favor 
of, 187 ff.; criticism of, 191 ff.; 
dualistic, 339; naive, 179 ff.; new, 
197 ff.; theory of knowledge of, 
177 it, 

Reason, the sanction of morality, 
295 ff. 

Renouvier, 2409. 

Rey, 117. 

Richter, 310. 

Rickaby, 248, 278, 299. 

Riley, 1098. 

Royce, 27, 31, 133, 102. 

Russell, 21, 44, 45, 356, 357- 


Scepticism, 205 ff. 

Schiller, 48, 142, 166, 168, 226. 

Schinz, 166, 226. 

Schopenhauer, 27. 

Schurman, 286, 290. 

Science, and determinism, 350 ff.; 
limitations of, 359 ff.; nature of, 
346 ff. 

Sellars, 80, 197. 

Sentroul, 156, 290. 

Sidgwick, 278. 

Singularism, 27. 

Solipsism, 44. 

Soul theory, criticism of, 333 ff. 

Spaulding, 198. 

Spencer, 284 ff. 

Spinoza, 19, 27, 28, 29, 82, 246; 
monism of, 28. 

Spiritism, 62. 

Spiritualism, 54, 62 ff.; arguments in 
favor of, 69 ff.; criticism of, 70 ff.; 


INDEX 


dualistic synthesis of, 71; moder- 
ate, 63, 71 ff.; of Berkeley, 65 ff.; 
of Leibniz, 63 ff.; of objective 
idealists, 66 ff. 

Stephens, 284. 

Stewart, 166. 

Stdckl, 148. 

Stream of consciousness, 87; of 
thought theory, 316 ff. 

Substance, 88 ff. 

Supernaturalism, 275. 


Taine, 327. 

Theology, 388. 

Thing-in-itself, 162. 

Thomson, 359, 362. 

Tilman-Pesch, 290. 

Truth, coherence theory of, 222 ff.; 
correspondence theory of, 232 ff.; 
criticism of the coherence theory 
of, 224ff.; criticism of utility 
theory of, 230 ff.; meaning of, 
217 ff.; pragmatic or utility theory 
of, 226 ff. 

Turner, 39, 65, 68, 148, 156, 162, 
166, 278. 


399 


Unity in difference, 163 ff. 
Utilitarianism, 276, 278 ff.; criticism 
of, 282 ff. 


Vitalism, 111, 133 ff.; arguments in 
favor of, 135 ff.; criticism of, 138 
Hy neoy 1348 

von Wolff, 14. 


Walker, 150, 152, 154, 160, 162, 
TOA;AL00,01 75, 17 7oLoz rol aie. 
AL2y) 210; "1222, 2205 1220) 1) 200) 
231, 232, 235, 237, 239, 241. 

Ward, 30, 94, 127, 142. 

Ward, J., 117, 156, 386. 

Warren, 316. 

Wasmann, 142. 

Watson, 278, 290, 201. 

Weber, 57, 65, 68, 148, 162, 278, 310. 

Wells, 40. 

Whewell, 295. 

Willmann, 3, 148. 

Windleband, 162. 

Windle, 142. 


Zeller, 278. 








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